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Abstract 
How do norms and discourses travel across cultural difference? How do actors negotiate 
the constitutive norms of liberal global governance at the juncture of the domestic and the 
international? This project provides an answer to these questions by developing a 
performative account of norm socialization and uses this theoretical framework to 
analyze Islamist negotiations of secularism and democracy in Turkey and Egypt. I 
suggest that the International Relations scholarship often takes socialization as a 
pedagogic process in which the non-West is made to transition into the norms of liberal 
modernity in a hierarchical relationship of authority. In this perspective, actors either 
socialize into liberal norms or resist them. After identifying the shortcomings of these 
narratives, I develop a reading that takes socialization as a performative process of 
cultural translation and norm appropriation. By so doing, I analyze the ways in which 
norms can be adopted non-normatively—at once inhabited and resisted. I argue that a 
performative reading enables a more complex understanding of the dynamics of 
normalization and resistance in socialization. Then I employ this framework to analyze 
Turkish AK Party’s and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s negotiation of secularism and 
democracy by drawing mainly on the data I collected in my fieldwork research in Turkey 
and Egypt. More specifically, I examine the performative politics of translation and 
appropriation in the AK Party’s notions of ‘democratic secularism’ and ‘conservative 
democracy’ and the Muslim Brotherhood’s notions of ‘civil state within an Islamic 
framework’ and ‘Islamic democracy.’   
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In his first visit to post-Mubarak Egypt in the September of 2011, the Turkish 
Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan, the founder and chairman of the Islamically-oriented 
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Party, [Justice and Development Party]) which has been 
in power since 2002, was welcomed with enormous enthusiasm by thousands of Muslim 
Brotherhood members at the Cairo International Airport in the middle of the night. 
During his much-publicized visit Erdoğan made a surprising move. When he was asked 
about his opinions on Egypt after Mubarak, he stated that secularism should not be seen 
as atheism or irreligiousness, but as guarantor of religious freedoms, and thus should be 
enshrined in the constitution. These remarks came at the distaste of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as the latter has long been calling for an Islamic state that implements the 
principles of shari‘a (Islamic norms and law) as the law of the land. The spokesperson of 
the Brotherhood, Mahmoud Ghazlan, immediately responded to Erdoğan by accusing 
him of interfering in Egypt’s internal affairs and by arguing that Turkey’s and Egypt’s 
conditions and experiences were very different.1  
This was indeed an intriguing moment. Here you had Erdoğan, whose party was 
convicted by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 2008 for ‘becoming a hub for anti-
secular activities’ and who himself served a four-months prison sentence in 1999 and was 
forced to quit his position as the Mayor of Istanbul for an ‘anti-secularist’ public speech, 
now advocating for secularism in Egypt, whose constitution takes the principles of 
                                                
1 “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Criticizes Erdogan’s Call for a Secular State,” Al Arabiya, September 14, 
2011, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/14/166814.html. 
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shari‘a as “the main source of legislation.” (masdaru-r-raisi li’t-tashri’) Many observers 
saw this as the moment of crystallization of the differences between two versions of 
Muslim politics: an Islamist one, on the one hand, represented by the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, aiming to establish an Islamic state that implements shari‘a as state law, 
and a ‘post-Islamist’ one, on the other, exemplified by the Turkish AK Party, discarding 
the notion of Islamic state and endorsing secular liberal democracy. Stressing that 
difference, the local (Egyptian and Turkish) and international media as well as academic 
discourse overwhelmingly pointed to the AK Party as a ‘model’ for the Brotherhood and 
other Islamists in the Arab world by virtue of its socialization into secular liberal norms.2   
However, what is as intriguing as Erdoğan’s advocacy of secularism in Egypt is 
the politics of translation involved in the exchange between him and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. After returning from his trip to Egypt, Erdoğan was asked about the 
reactions of the Brotherhood’s spokesperson to his comments. He said his words were 
misunderstood because of a mistake in translation: “In Arabic, there is a word for 
‘irreligiousness,' and the translator used that word for secularism (laiklik). Secularism is 
not about being an enemy of religion. It is about the state maintaining the same distance 
                                                
2 Ahmet T. Kuru, Muslim Politics without an “Islamic” State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development 
Party Be a Model for Arab Islamists?, Policy Briefing (Doha: The Brookings Institution Doha Center, 
February 2013); David D. Kirkpatrick, “Turkey’s Premier, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Takes On Regional 
Role,” The New York Times, September 12, 2011, sec. World / Middle East, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/world/middleeast/13egypt.html; Jack Shenker, “Turkey’s PM Rallies 
Arab World in Cairo with Call for UN to Recognise Palestine,” The Guardian, September 13, 2011, sec. 
World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/13/turkey-rallies-arab-world. For earlier work 
on the Turkish AK Party as a model for other Islamists, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim 
Democracy,’” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 (2005): 13–27; Hakan M. Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim 
Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge, UK  ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); William Hale and 
Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (Routledge, 2009); 
S. Tepe, “Turkey’s AKP: A Model‘ Muslim-Democratic’ Party?,” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 
69–82. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It 
Will Mean for Our World (Simon and Schuster, 2009). 
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to all religions and acting as a custodian of their beliefs. This is what we mean when we 
say ‘don't be afraid of secularism.’”3 Indeed, Erdoğan’s translator used the Arabic word 
‘almaniyya as a translation of the Turkish word ‘laiklik’—the two words used as the 
equivalents of secularism in Arabic and Turkish, respectively. However, the word 
‘almaniyya has negative connotations in Egypt’s Islamic circles for its association with 
hostile attitudes toward religion.4 Essam El-Errian, the vice president of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s now closed down Freedom and Justice Party, echoed this distaste with the 
term ‘almaniyya to back up his criticism of Erdoğan’s comments: “Secularism has a very 
bad perception among Egyptians. We have no need for this term.”5 
This exchange has become even more interesting when Ahmet Davutoğlu, the 
Turkish Foreign Minister, later clarified that the term Erdoğan used (‘laiklik’) should 
have been translated into Arabic as ‘dawla madaniyya’ (civil state) or ‘siyasa madaniyya’ 
(civil politics) instead of “‘almaniyya” (secularism) since the term ‘almaniyya is often 
understood as not allowing Islam to play any role in public life, in a way that parallels 
Kemalist laicism (laikçilik).6 What is remarkable here is that dawla madaniyya is already 
what the Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) have been calling for in 
their programs and statements since 1990s. FJP’s 2011 program declares that the party 
                                                
3 “Erdoğan Tell Arabs His Secularism Remarks Mistranslated,” Today’s Zaman, September 16, 2011, 
http://www.todayszaman.com//news-257047-erdogan-tell-arabs-his-secularism-remarks-
mistranslated.html.  
4 Talal Asad, “Fear and the Ruptured State: Reflections on Egypt after Mubarak,” Social Research: An 
International Quarterly 79, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 271–98. 
5 Marc Champion And Matt Bradley, “Islamists Criticize Turkish Premier’s ‘Secular’ Remarks,” Wall 
Street Journal, September 15, 2011, sec. New York, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424053111904491704576570670264116178. 
6 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Interview by the author, January 7, 2012. Fahmy Howaidy, a prominent Islamist 
intellectual and columnist in Egypt, also confirmed the same point in his interviews with Davutoglu. See, 
Fahmy Howaidy, “Hiwar ‘an Al-’Almaniyyati Fi Turkiya,” Al-Shorouk, October 11, 2011, 
http://www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=11102011&id=73700458-5863-4865-8fba-
096d795a59d7. 
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envisions “a civil state within an Islamic frame of reference” (dawla madaniyya bi’l 
marji‘iyya’l Islamiyya). In Brotherhood’s political imagination, this is a democratic 
Islamic state (dawla Islamiyya) that is neither secular (‘almaniyya) nor 
religious/theocratic (diniyya/theoqratiyya) but instead a civil state (dawla madaniyya).  
Even though Erdoğan’s comments attracted considerable local and international 
attention, his and Davutoğlu’s later remarks didn’t. However, they together reveal the 
complexity of the meaning-making practices around the concept of secularism that belies 
the simple binary construction of Islamist Muslim Brotherhood rejecting secularism 
versus the post-Islamist AK Party internalizing it as it is often depicted.  Rather, as this 
particular instance indicates, both AK Party and the Muslim Brotherhood engage in a 
negotiation of secularism that has strikingly similar features as well as significant 
differences. These differences, however, can hardly be shoehorned into a binary narrative 
of the AK Party accepting and the Brotherhood rejecting secularism and democracy. 
Surely there are important differences between the AK Party and the Brotherhood as the 
exchange between the two shows. But it also shows that these differences are far subtler 
than it is generally described.  
My dissertation aims to explore and account for such complex dynamics of norm 
socialization in global politics. I argue that the International Relations (IR) scholarship 
tends to take socialization as a process of norm adoption that is pedagogical in nature 
(Chapter 2), and highlighting the shortcomings of this pedagogic treatment, I develop a 
performative reading of socialization that attends to the dynamics of cultural translation 
and appropriation of norms (Chapter 3). I then use this analytic optic to analyze AK 
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Party’s conception of ‘conservative democracy’ and ‘democratic secularism’ (Chapter 4) 
and the Muslim Brotherhood’s notions of ‘Islamic democracy’ and ‘civil state within an 
Islamic frame of reference’ (Chapter 5) as their performative socialization into 
democracy and secularism.  
The concept of socialization generally refers to the “process of inducting actors 
into the norms and rules of a given community.”7 Through socialization state and non-
state actors come to adopt the constitutive norms, identities, and interest perceptions of a 
particular international society.8 Socialization is one key mechanism through which 
liberal global governance produces particular subjects with particular identities, interests, 
and capacities9 through the exercise of various forms of power.10  
Chapter 2 of my dissertation argues that the IR scholarship, particularly the liberal 
and constructivist accounts, tend to take socialization as a pedagogic process. I identify 
three main components of these pedagogic frameworks. First, they view socialization as a 
process of transition of the non-West into liberal norms and Enlightenment universals. 
This transition seeks to induce forms of subjectivities with secular liberal sensibilities and 
commitments. Such renditions of socialization rest on a particular “diffusionist teleology” 
that constantly predicts and prescribes convergence and/or homogeneity around Western 
                                                
7 Jeffrey T. Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework,” 
International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005): 804. 
8 Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press, 1996); 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); 
Frank Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and 
Eastern European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” in Norms and Nannies  : The Impact of 
International Organizations on the Central and East European States, ed. Ronald Haly Linden (Lanham, 
Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 1–32.  
9 Alastair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton University 
Press, 2008); Finnemore, National Interests in International Society. 
10 Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59, 
no. 1 (2005): 39–75. 
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norms and institutions.11 They operate with a singular logic of modernity that originates 
in Europe and demands “assimilation or acquiescence on the part of other civilizations.”12 
Examples of this vision can be seen in statements such as the one Daniel Deudney and G. 
John Ikenberry make: “[T]he foreign policy of the liberal states should continue to be 
based on the broad assumption that there is ultimately one path to modernity—and that it 
essentially liberal in character.”13 Such narratives are “Eurocentric all the way down”14 
since they position the West as the driving force of norms in world politics and ‘the rest’ 
as recipients of them. The “destiny” of the non-West, in these accounts, is “to mimic, 
never quite successfully, the history already performed by the West.”15 In that sense, a 
transitionist pedagogy also posits a ‘not yet’ on the part of the ‘socializee’ that places the 
latter into the “waiting room of history.”16 This ends up authorizing universalist 
exclusions (e.g. ‘Egypt is not yet secular, therefore democracy should wait’) and violent 
inclusions (e.g. ‘Afghan women should be liberated,’ ‘Iraq should be democratized.’)17  
Second, pedagogic accounts of socialization produce hierarchical subject 
positions in relation to norms: teachers and students, nannies and children, norm setters 
and norm followers. Reiterating Zürn and Checkel’s observation that “teacher-student 
constellations” are in fact not as rare in world politics as it is generally assumed, I suggest 
                                                
11  Sudipta Kaviraj, “An Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity,” European Journal of Sociology / 
Archives Européennes de Sociologie 46, no. 03 (2005): 497–526. 
12  Tim Dunne, “The Liberal Order and the Modern Project,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 
38, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 539. 
13 Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Myth of the Autocratic Revival - Why Liberal Democracy Will 
Prevail,” Foreign Affairs 88 (2009): 93. 
14 Barry Buzan, “Culture and International Society,” International Affairs 86, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 1–
25.  
15 Timothy Mitchell, Questions of Modernity (University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 1. 
16 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
17 Sergei Prozorov, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” 
Millennium - Journal of International Studies 35, no. 1 (December 1, 2006): 75–99. 
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that they in fact underlie much of the understandings and practices of norm socialization. 
The pedagogic function of ‘transmitting’ Western liberal norms of international society to 
its members18 is often carried out by international pedagogues. For example, Frank 
Schimmelfennig depicts international organizations (in his case, EU institutions) as 
“nannies” who “disseminate, teach, and enforce…the constitutive liberal norms of the 
Western international community and the membership norms of the Western 
organizations.”19 Thus, international socialization “involves several teaching and nursing 
activities.”20 In order for these tutelary activities to take hold, Schimmelfennig suggests, 
the relationship between socializer and socializee must be asymmetrical and the 
socializee must be weaker and vulnerable in order to change his own situation. This 
pedagogic rendition of socialization also stipulates a relationship of authority between a 
“norm setter” and “norm follower.”21 The norm follower or the socializee is placed to 
follow the norms of the pedagogue socializer in such a way that the latter defines it. 
Hence the ideal trilogy of pedagogic socialization: “Successful nannies, good pupils, 
smooth socialization.”22  
Third, pedagogic models of socialization tend to approach normative 
engagements through the binary of acceptance versus rejection. Accordingly, actors 
either socialize into norms or they reject them. Actors either adopt the norm together with 
                                                
18 Thomas Risse-Kappen and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms 
into Domestic Practices: Introduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38. 
19 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” 2–3. 
20 Ibid., 8. 
21 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 04 (1998): 887–917. 
22 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” 18. 
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its normalizing logic—its hegemonic articulation—or resist the norm and reject it. As 
Ikenberry and Kupchan put it, non-Western elites either ‘buy into’ the norms articulated 
by the hegemon or ‘resist’ them.23 They cannot do both. Therefore, pedagogic treatments 
of socialization fall short of fully recognizing how norms can at once be adopted and 
contested.  
By so doing, pedagogic narratives gloss over the performative dynamics of 
socialization. Chapter 3 of my dissertation develops a performative reading to account for 
these dynamics. Along the lines of these three tendencies of the pedagogical narratives 
mentioned above, my performative account makes three theoretical interventions. First, it 
takes socialization not solely as a process of transition but also as a process of cultural 
translation. When the constitutive norms of liberal order that are universal in nature and 
global in reach—such as democracy, human rights, equality, freedom, and rule of law—
travel across borders, they get translated and thus transformed through the filter of other 
languages and traditions. Actors negotiate the universality of liberal norms and 
institutions through their cultural and/or religious traditions and social imaginaries. 
Second, the authority relationships established around norms get troubled when actors 
performatively institute their own authority in appropriating the norm. Especially those 
who are in the margins of liberal global governance may adopt the norms non-
normatively, that is, against their hegemonic articulation and normalizing logic, through 
various discursive strategies such as by claiming the norms from which they are excluded 
or by introducing difference into the norms they adopt. Hence, and this is the third point, 
                                                
23 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International 
Organization 44, no. 03 (1990): 283–315. 
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norms can at once be adopted and contested, in ways that trouble the binaries of 
acceptance versus rejection in pedagogic accounts of socialization.  
In that context, I suggest that the discourse of post-Islamism that locates the AK 
Party and the Muslim Brotherhood at the opposite sides of the binary of socialization 
versus non-socialization into democracy and secularism is a pedagogic story of 
socialization. The term post-Islamism emerged in 1990s but has become more 
pronounced with the Arab popular uprisings in 2011.24 Many observers described the 
Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings as a “post-Islamist revolution,” or a political 
manifestation of “new Arab street in post-Islamist times.”25 They suggested that Arab 
activists transcended the classical coordinates of Islamist politics by endorsing a liberal 
language of human rights, democracy, and equality rather than aiming at establishing an 
Islamic state implementing shari‘a. In that vein, many pundits and policymakers pointed 
to the AK Party experience in Turkey as a ‘model’ for Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and 
Tunisian al-Nahda for getting rid of its Islamist baggage and its ushering into a post-
Islamist stage. Post-Islamism is depicted as the “privatization of Islamization as opposed 
                                                
24 When it was first coined by Asef Bayat in 1996, the term post-Islamism meant to describe the conditions 
and social trends in post-Khomeini Iran, but it then enjoyed a wider circulation and became an across-the 
board claim about the metamorphosis that Islamism was undergoing “in ideas, approaches, and practices 
from within and without.” Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist 
Turn (Stanford University Press, 2007), 10. In Gilles Kepel’s usage, the term refers to a process of 
departure from jihadi and salafi variants of Islamism towards embracing democracy and human rights; and 
for Oliver Roy it describes a process of “privatization of Islamization as opposed to the Islamization of the 
state.” Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2003); Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (Columbia University Press, 2006), 
204. All point to a trend toward liberalization and secularization within the Islamist movement as a result of 
a disappointment with or the failure of Islamism.  
25 Asef Bayat, “A New Arab Street in Post-Islamist Times,” Foreign Policy Blogs, January 26, 2011, 
http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/26/a_new_arab_street; Olivier Roy, “Révolution 
post-islamiste,” Le Monde.fr, February 14, 2011, 
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2011/02/12/revolution-post-islamiste_1478858_3232.html.  
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to the Islamization of the state,”26 hence as the carrier of secularization and liberalization 
as opposed to the anti-secular and ‘illiberal’ undertones of the Islamist project. As such, 
post-Islamism discourse describes and prescribes27 the “end of political Islam”28 and the 
rise of a “post-ideological”29 moment whereby Islamists “embrace the universality of 
political modernity”30 and give up on their claims for an Islamic alternative together with 
their challenge to the liberal order and its attendant norms and institutions. In that sense, 
post-Islamism tells the story of Islamist ‘normalization’ and the “absorption of an 
antisecular challenge” to capitalism and liberalism.31  
Post-Islamism discourse is intimately tied to the broader debates over Islamism, 
secularism, and democracy. It argues that while Islamism is an authoritarian ideology that 
seeks top-down Islamization through enforcing Islamic law as state law, post-Islamism, 
on the other hand, represents a radical shift toward secular liberal democracy since it 
discounts the idea of a shari‘a-implementing Islamic state. Rather, the latter incorporates 
Islam in the form of personal religiosity or ethical guidance and adopts the key liberal 
constructs such as individual rights and autonomy, public and private distinction, state 
neutrality, and free markets. Thus conceived, Islamism and post-Islamism is depicted as 
the story of two competing social forces: “those who want a democratic religion and 
                                                
26 Roy, Globalized Islam, 10. 
27 Post-Islamism is both a description and a prescription because it is posited as both a ‘condition’ and 
‘project’ of integration of the Islamically-oriented political actors into the values of liberal order. See, 
Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 11. 
28  Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
29 Bayat, Making Islam Democratic. 
30  Ihsan Dagi, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in 
Turkey,” Critique Critical Middle Eastern Studies 13, no. 2 (2004): 135–51. 
31 Cihan Tugal, Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford University 
Press, 2009), 3–4. 
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those who pursue and authoritarian version.”32 Post-Islamists, in Bayat’s view, are the 
subjects who “make Islam democratic,”33 as opposed to Islamists who fall short of 
making Islam democratic due to their insistence on putting democracy within the bounds 
of shari‘a. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood’s claim that democracy is acceptable as 
long as “it [does] not contradict the scriptures, the Quran and sunna”34 stands, for Bayat, 
as the indication of its anti-democratic character. Islamists’ call for democracy does not 
command legitimacy or authority due to the unsecular and ‘illiberal’ character of their 
conception of democracy. Then, what Islamists refer to as ‘Islamic democracy’ is not a 
genuine democracy but a variant of Islamic authoritarianism that incorporates some 
democratic procedures. On the other hand, post-Islamists’ separation of shari‘a from state 
law authorizes them as proper democratic subjects. 
In that sense, the post-Islamism narrative is very closely intertwined with the 
nascent discourse of ‘Muslim democracy.’ The transition from Islamism to post-Islamism 
by and large overlaps with the transition from ‘Islamic democracy’ to ‘Muslim 
democracy.’ In the Islamist conception of ‘Islamic democracy,’ popular sovereignty and 
legislation are acknowledged only within the confines of shari‘a, whose content is 
decided by a constitutional body—a supreme court or a council of Islamic scholars. The 
liberal configuration of the public and private distinction and religion’s relegation to the 
private is squarely rejected in the Islamist model of ‘Islamic democracy.’ Mawdudi’s 
                                                
32 Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 6. 
33 The fundamental motive in Bayat’s conception of post-Islamism is to transcend the question of the 
doctrinal compatibility between Islam and democracy by suggesting that it is up to the believers of a 
tradition to make their doctrine compatible or incompatible with democratic sensibilities. Hence, the 
response to the question of compatibility would arise not through a novel theological exegesis but out of a 
balance of power between democratic and authoritarian interpretations of the tradition. 
34 Quoted from ‘Asam al-Eryan in Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, 177. 
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concept of “theodemocracy,”35 Hofmann’s model of “shuracracy”36, and the 
constitutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan stand 
as examples of Islamist attempts to combine democracy and shari‘a in various forms.37  
In juxtaposition to this Islamist notion of ‘Islamic democracy,’38 post-Islamists 
foresee a ‘Muslim democracy’ that aims not at establishing shari‘a as state law but at 
incorporating Islamic values in their political strategy of competing for the median voter 
in elections.  The dynamics of political participation, the argument goes, compel Islamists 
to moderate their platforms and discourses so as to embrace liberal democracy as ‘the 
only game in town.’ In other words, rather than aspiring to Islamize democracy through 
the models of “shuracracy” or “theodemocracy,” Muslim democrats accept liberal 
democracy as a general framework for the organization of political life. According to this 
narrative, while Islamists resist secular liberal democracy, post-Islamist ‘Muslim 
democrats’ socialize into it. This socialization entails transition from one set of 
commitments to another, as the tables below highlight:  
 
                                                
35 Abul ’Ala Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976). 
36 Murad Wilfried Hofmann, Religion on The Rise: Islam in the Third Millennium, 1st ed. (Amana Pubns, 
2001). 
37 Noah Feldman discusses the potential and actual institutional arrangements that “constitutionalize” and 
“democratize” shariah, whose public observance serves as the penultimate goal of the Islamist movements.   
See, Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, First edition. (FSG, 
2003). 
38 Here it is interesting to note the title of a chapter in Noah Feldman’s book, After Jihad, which reads: 
“Islamic not Islamist Democracy.” This distinction is very reasonable if one thinks that even so-called 
‘Muslim democrats’ who do not vie for an ‘Islamic democracy’ indeed do so because they believe it is 
more Islamic. In that sense, Feldman’s point is very well taken. But here I take ‘Islamic democracy’ as an 
Islamist view of democracy. While Islamists seeks to ‘Islamize’ democracy by constitutionally keeping it 
within the bounds of shari‘a, ‘Muslim democrats’ such as the AK Party do not seek to ‘Islamize’ 
democracy through institutional design but rather aims to produce Islamic outcomes (shari‘a-compliant 
decisions and actions) out of the democratic process.  
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ISLAMISM POST-ISLAMISM 
Authoritarian Democratic 
Illiberal  Liberal  
Shari‘a law Secular law 
Duties/Obligations Rights/Compromise 
Exclusive Inclusive 
Singularity (monopoly of truth) Plurality (ambiguity) 
Fixed scripture Historicity-hermeneutic 
Past-oriented Future-oriented 
Table 1.1. Islamism and Post-Islamism, derived from Asef Bayat (2007) 
 
ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY MUSLIM DEMOCRACY 
Rule by shari‘a Rule by Muslim values 
Islamic state with narrow 
interpretation of shari‘a 
Discount the claim that Islam 
demands a shari‘a state 
State-centered Society-centered 
Top-down through state Bottom-up through civil society 
Idealist/Utopian Pragmatic/Realist 
Islamic trumps political Political trumps Islamic  
Illiberal, authoritarian, little room 
for civil liberties, cultural 
pluralism, rights of women and 
minorities 
Liberalizing; harbinger, not the 
follower, of more liberal Islamic 
thought and practice.  
Democracy not deeply legitimate 
but a tool for building Islamic state 
Channels Islamic aspirations into 
liberal democracy to help them win 
votes 
Islamist parties and legislative 
demands, mostly cadre parties 
Center-right liberal democratic 
parties with conservative Islamic 
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values, mostly catch-all parties 
Anti-secular Inevitable secularization due to 
electoral logic  
Mixed economy Private-sector oriented, free 
markets 
Table 1.2. Islamic Democracy and Muslim Democracy, derived from Vali Nasr (2005) 
 
These two discourses share the common conviction that secular liberalism is an essential 
sine qua non for democracy, but they slightly differ in where they locate secularism in the 
political trajectory. Post-Islamism narrative tends to see secular liberal commitments as a 
precondition for democracy. It stipulates that the “separation of the secular and religious 
domains is the prerequisite for liberating the forces of reform in the Muslim World.”39 
Accordingly, in order for ‘authoritarian Islamists’ to become ‘democratic post-Islamists,’ 
they have to secularize their platforms and adopt liberal configurations of the public and 
private realms. But for the Muslim democracy narrative, secularism is not a precondition 
that must be met prior to having a democracy, but rather it is an unavoidable outcome of 
democratic mechanisms, particularly of electoral politics. As Nasr notes, “the depth of 
commitment to liberal and secular values that democratic consolidation requires is a 
condition for Muslim Democracy’s final success, not for its first emergence.”40 Similar to 
the transformation and moderation of the revolutionary Marxist movements and parties in 
the nineteenth century Europe41 and the Christian Democratic parties in the twentieth 
                                                
39 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (Harvard University Press, 2004), 295. 
40 Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” 2005, 15.  
41 Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986).
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century,42 the inherent electoral logic of competing for the median voter will force 
Islamist parties to transition into a ‘Muslim democratic’ stance. The pragmatic orientation 
to win elections will force Islamists to “transform their unsecular tendencies … into long-
term commitment to democratic values.”43 In that sense, the desired socialization into 
secular liberal norms will be “the harbinger, not the follower, of more liberal Islamic 
thought and practice.”44  
It is important to note that the call for secularism within the discourse on post-
Islamism is not solely a call for an institutional arrangement regulating the relationship 
between state and religion. It is also a project about fostering a particular kind of subject 
that bears liberal secular sensibilities. A post-Islamist, according to Dağı, is one who 
adopts the “secular/modern/western alternative”45 and joins the global current by 
internalizing secular liberalism. Therefore, the discourse of post-Islamism reproduces the 
pedagogic power of secular liberalism within global politics. Secularism here functions as 
a form of political authority that authorizes the kinds of subjectivities that are compliant 
with the norms and conventions of liberal global governance. As Saba Mahmood points 
out, “secular liberalism cannot be addressed simply as a doctrine of the state, or as a set 
of juridical conventions: in its vast implications, it defines, in effect, something like a 
way of life.”46 In that sense, secularism’s “normative impetus” is to “reorganize 
                                                
42 Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1996). 
43  Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” 2005, 15. Note that Nasr here indexes “unsecular tendencies” 
as equivalent of undemocratic tendencies.  
44 Ibid., 26. 
45 Dagi, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West,” 17. 
46 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton University 
Press, 2005), 191.  
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subjectivities in accord with a modality of political rule.”47 Along these lines, the 
‘project’ of post-Islamism is the project of transforming sensibilities and remaking 
subjects—a pedagogic project of socialization. The secularist dynamic at work in post-
Islamism discourse not only aspires to neutralize the political domain from the 
‘inappropriate intrusion’ of religion but also seeks to produce a ‘proper’ subject whose 
actions and reasonings are in line with the imperatives of secular liberal political rule. 
Thus, as a pedagogic discourse of socialization, post-Islamism interpellates subjects into 
internalizing secular liberal sensibilities and commitments.  
Chapter 4 of my dissertation employs the theoretical framework developed in 
Chapter 3 and sets out to analyze the Turkish AK Party’s notions of ‘conservative 
democracy’ and ‘democratic secularism’ as manifestations of its performative 
socialization into secularism and democracy. Post-Islamism and Muslim democracy 
narratives do capture important aspects of the transformation AK Party has been going 
through under conditions co-created by the Kemalist state and liberal international order 
that pressure the party toward pedagogic socialization. Yet, as stories of transition they 
fall short of accounting for the politics of translation that the AK Party embarks on. AK 
Party translates key political categories of Islamic tradition into modern liberal concepts 
(and vice versa) rather than simply transitioning to them. Analyzing the closure case 
against the AK Party at the Turkish Constitutional Court and the previous decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights that upheld the Turkish Constitutional Court’s earlier 
decision to close down the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)—AK Party’s 
                                                
47 Saba Mahmood, “Secularism, Hermeneutics, and Empire: The Politics of Islamic Reformation,” Public 
Culture 18, no. 2 (2006): 328. 
   17 
predecessor—I examine how the Kemalist Turkish state understood and imposed a rigid 
form of secularism, how liberal international order endorsed it, and how AK Party 
developed its own conception of ‘democratic secularism’ and ‘conservative democracy’ 
in relation to and in response to these constraints. To do so, in addition to these court 
cases, I draw on my interviews with AK Party members, leaders, and deputies together 
with first-hand and secondary resources produced by them.  
Similarly, Chapter 5 analyzes Muslim Brotherhood’s performative socialization 
into democracy and (in some ways) secularism in its conception of an Islamic civil state. 
Drawing on my interviews with Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members together with 
the firsthand and secondary sources, I look at how Muslim Brotherhood translates and 
non-normatively appropriates democracy and negotiates the secular state.  
As for methodological commitments, my dissertation works through an 
interpretivist epistemology and a critical discourse analytic methodology in order to 
capture the practices of signification in Islamists’ engagement with the norms and 
institutions of liberal global order.48 I take discourses as “systems of signification which 
construct social realities.” I dwell on the theoretic commitment that power, understood as 
“the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of 
actors to determine their circumstances and fate,”49 always inheres in the operations and 
effects of discourses. In other words, the discursive production of subjectivities as 
“situated social capacities of actors” is a form of power exercised diffusely through social 
                                                
48 Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch suggest that discourse analysis “broadly denotes methodologies that 
capture the creation of meanings and accompanying processes of communication.” Audie Klotz and 
Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 19.  
49 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” 42.  
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relations of constitution. (Barnett and Duvall 2005: 48)  Hence, by deploying discourse 
analysis as an interpretive method I intend to “demonstrate how systems of knowledge 
and discursive practices produce subjects through social relations that are quite indirect, 
socially diffuse, and temporally distant.”50  
Chapter 2 provides a critical discourse analytic reading of the socialization 
literature in IR. Chapter 3 draws on postcolonial theory and poststructuralist theories to 
develop a performative reading of norm socialization. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 analyze 
the historical, constitutional, legal, political, social, and international dynamics within 
which discourses and practices—both pedagogic and performative—are produced, 
disseminated, and articulated. In analyzing discourses, I look at their operative logics, 
underlying assumptions, and the ways in which concepts relate to each other. I analyze 
how subjects are interpellated and authorized within discourses and how actors 
performatively produce the authority of their meaning-making practices. I investigate the 
hierarchies and exclusions created and reinforced in and through discourses.  
My dissertation’s methodological orientation in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is akin to 
what Michael Burawoy calls “the extended case method.”51 This method interlinks the 
micro and the macro scopes by looking at how global forces condition, restrain and 
produce the local and how the local relates to and negotiate or resist global dynamics.52 
Therefore it has a two-way focus: it analyzes the mutual imbrication of the constitutive 
and causative power of structures and the idiosyncrasies of particular locales. Thus it 
                                                
50 Ibid., 48. 
51 Michael Burawoy, “The Extended Case Method,” Sociological Theory 16, no. 1 (March 1, 1998): 4–33. 
52 Michael Burawoy, “Revisits: An Outline of a Theory of Reflexive Ethnography,” American Sociological 
Review 68, no. 5 (October 1, 2003): 645–79.
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enables theory reconstruction through highlighting the anomalies or weaknesses in the 
theory that one identifies in ethnographic fieldwork. Here, I identify the problems and 
tendencies of the post-Islamism discourse in terms of how it represents and positions 
actors (AK Party and Muslim Brotherhood) and I identify the institutional and material 
forces, both domestic and global, that exert a pedagogic power to socialize actors and 
how actors navigate and negotiate these forces.  
I study the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish AK Party as examples 
because they are often taken as the typical and most representative cases of Islamism and 
post-Islamism, respectively. Therefore, the explanatory and interpretive power of the 
narrative of post-Islamism must be highest in these two paradigmatic cases. By the same 
token, if post-Islamism narrative does not fit well to the most typical cases, then this 
might cast more doubt on the explanatory and interpretive framework. To probe the 
plausibility of post-Islamism as a pedagogic narrative of socialization and to investigate 
the interpretive leverage of a performative reading, I etnographically study the meaning-
making practices of actors in two locales in relation to the global dynamics. In that sense, 
my focus is less on generalizability and more on theory reconstruction. In so doing, I 
bridge local examples with the broader patterns and dynamics of liberal global 
governance.  
The data I use for my dissertation comes from my ethnographic fieldwork 
research that I conducted in the summer of 2010 and the fall of 2011 in Egypt and 
Turkey. I conducted semi-structured interviews with the cabinet ministers, 
parliamentarians, and other leaders and members of the AK Party in Turkey. I also 
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analyzed the published articles, books, speeches and interviews of these leaders in order 
to understand how they construct the concepts of secularism, democracy, and shari‘a as 
well as their interrelationship. Other firsthand sources I used include the published 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and the Turkish Constitutional Court, 
as well as AK Party’s court defense, party program, official statements and policy 
proposals. I also used secondary sources such as newspaper articles, think-tank reports, 
and relevant academic literature.  
Similarly, in my fieldwork in Egypt, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 
members and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the leaders of its Freedom 
and Justice Party. I used various other firsthand sources such as the statements of the 
movement on democracy, secularism and shari‘a since 1980s, published articles of the 
Brotherhood leaders, and various election platforms and draft party programs declared 
since 2004. I also draw on my fieldwork notes I took in the events or rallies organized by 
the Brotherhood or the FJP. Occasionally I have found myself in natural focus group 
discussions in very unpredictable situations, sometimes with Coptic Christian Egyptians 
in a coffee shop in midnight, sometimes with current and former Brotherhood members 
during a protest against the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) in Tahrir Square, 
sometimes with students in a classroom setting during a guest-lecture at American 
University in Cairo, or sometimes with secular liberal activists during a guest public talk 
at Alexandria Library.  I also dwell on my interviews with journalists, students, and 
activists critical of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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This project is an interdisciplinary undertaking at its core. It frames the question 
within the field of IR, but engages with various debates and literatures in anthropology, 
sociology, literary theory, history and Islamic studies. It particularly draws on 
postcolonial and poststructuralist theoretical insights in order to shed a different light on 
the question of Islamist norm socialization in global politics. In that vein, the next chapter 
analyzes the pedagogic character of the discourse of socialization in IR. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PEDAGOGIC SOCIALIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
“Much of the discussion of contemporary world order is still preoccupied with the 
dynamics of the spread of and resistance to a universalizing West.” Such was R.B.J. 
Walker’s observation back in 1984.1 The ongoing debates over the triumphant 
declarations of global homogenization around liberal norms on the one hand and the 
prophecies of intercivilizational clashes on the other testify that this statement still holds 
true. International norm socialization is one prominent analytical framework used in the 
International Relations (IR) discipline to address these “dynamics of the spread of and 
resistance to a universalizing West.” Socialization in IR generally refers to the processes 
in which actors are made to adopt the norms of liberal international order. Therefore, 
socialization is the mechanism through which subjects are produced as actors with 
particular identities, interests, and resources. In this chapter I argue that much of the IR 
literature on norm socialization operates through a particular pedagogic discourse. This 
discourse, I argue, posits not only which norms are proper, but also how these norms are 
to be interpreted and practiced. It creates the hierarchically placed subject positions of 
‘teachers/pupils’ or ‘nannies/children’ in world politics. Finally, I argue that this 
pedagogic narrative rests on a Eurocentric diffusionist teleology that takes socialization 
as a process of transition. In so doing, it falls short of attending to the complexity of 
normative engagements and reproduces the hierarchical organization of global politics.  
                                                
1 R. B. J. Walker, “East Wind, West Wind: Civilizations, Hegemonies, and World Orders,” in Culture, 
Ideology, and World Order, ed. R. B. J. Walker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 4. 
   23 
This pedagogic discourse manifests itself in various ways. It often takes the form 
of an international organization ‘actively teaching’ the pupil socializee the ‘correct’ 
interpretation of ‘proper’ norms.2 More often than not, it is some international 
organization located in the West teaching “Western norms” and “Western ways” to the 
rest of the world. Sometimes the teachers are transnational actors.3 Combining the 
strategies of reward, punishment, and persuasion, these transnational ‘entrepreneurs’ 
engage in “moral proselytism” motivated by “the compulsion to convert others to [their] 
beliefs and remake the world in [their] own image.”4These transnational proselytizers at 
times take the form of “epistemic communities,” those professionals who can lay 
authoritative claim to competence in a particular policy area, who teach norms5 and guide 
policy-makers on the correct practice.6 Sometimes international institutions serve not as 
‘active teachers’ but as ‘environments’ within which newcomers learn the norms of the 
community.7 For some, the pedagogic function of socialization operates not necessarily 
through particular organizations or institutions, but through the compelling and ever 
expanding rules of a ‘Western world-culture.’8 Therefore, even though the dominant 
                                                
2 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society; Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as 
Agents of Socialization? NATO and the ‘New Europe,’” International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005): 
973–1012. 
3 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders  : Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change.” 
4 Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society,” 
International Organization 44, no. 04 (1990): 481. 
5 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 
International Organization 46, no. 01 (1992): 1–35. 
6 Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation 
of a Reflective Research Program,” International Organization 46, no. 01 (1992): 367–90. 
7 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” International Studies 
Quarterly 45, no. 4 (2001): 487–515; Johnston, Social States, 2008. 
8 John W. Meyer et al., “World Society and the Nation-State,” American Journal of Sociology 103, no. 1 
(July 1, 1997): 144–81. 
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liberal constructivist theories privilege agentic accounts that identify a locus of agency 
actively doing the work of ‘teaching,’ socialization does not necessarily entail the 
existence of a proximate ‘teacher.’ The pedagogy of liberal socialization is operative as 
well in the absence of a pedagogue. Broader structures and institutions (such as markets 
and elections) and discourses (such as individual rights and autonomy) can and do 
socialize actors in liberal order.9 To put it in Barnett and Duvall’s terms, the kind of 
power exercised in pedagogic socialization is not only “compulsory” (wherein a 
proximate agent produces effects through material incentives and coercion) and 
“structural” (through interactions based on socially produced asymmetrical roles).10 
Socialization also wields “institutional” and “productive” kinds of power that produce 
effects without necessarily entailing proximate interaction between agents. Institutional 
power is exercised through designing the rules of the game, and productive power 
produces effects through discursive formations.11 Pedagogic models of socialization 
variously combine these forms of power in inducing actors into the norms of liberal 
international society.    
                                                
9 I make an analytical distinction between pedagogy and paternalism. I understand paternalism to be a 
hierarchical relationship in which the immature or not yet rational is brought under the care of a superior 
protector, in such a way that the latter decides and acts on behalf of the former. Pedagogic relationships, 
however, while still hierarchical, do not necessarily entail one superior set of actors acting on behalf of the 
inferior other. Rather, pedagogic relationships seek to induce the desired behavior or meaning through 
various combinations of coercion, incentives, and persuasion.  Pedagogic socialization may include 
paternalistic measures, as the title of the book “Norms and Nannies” suggest: Ronald Haly Linden, Norms 
and Nannies: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and East European States, New 
International Relations of Europe (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002). European 
colonial practices in nineteenth century in Asia and Africa; American policies in post-World War II 
Germany and Japan and in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade also represent various instantiations of 
paternalism. Yet, they are analytically distinct modes of relationship. 
10 Barnett and Duvall, “Power in International Politics.” As a process of transforming and producing 
subjects through various mechanisms of coercion, incentives, and persuasion, socialization is thoroughly 
infused with the exercise of various forms of power. Power always conditions normative engagements. 
Liberal accounts (including mainstream constructivism), however, rather tend to overlook that dimension. 
11 Ibid. 
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Either with the presence or absence of an educator, socialization often entails 
some thin or thick notion of ‘teaching’ taking place within a rigid or relaxed relationship 
of authority and hierarchy. The pedagogic relationship entailed here is not one between 
equal learners who are set to learn from each other. Rather, the prescribed relationship is 
one between a teacher and a student whereby the former assumes moral and expert 
authority and the latter is situated as the lesser party who is to learn the norms in the way 
that the teacher teaches them. Such hierarchical relationships produce the subject 
positions of “norm setter” (socializer) and “norm follower” (socializee),12 or “norm 
giver” and “norm taker.”13 It grants one set of actors the power of setting a norm and of 
teaching and enforcing it, and produces another set of actors as the receiving end. As 
such, socialization is construed as the ‘transition’ of an often non-Western outsider into 
the norms of liberal global governance, the success of which is then measured by how 
much the newcoming ‘student’ internalizes the norms set by the ‘teacher.’ 
In this chapter, I identify and discuss three main interlinked components of these 
pedagogic models of norm socialization. First, they rest on a Eurocentric “diffusionist 
teleology,”14 that construes normative engagements as ‘transitions’ into ‘Western norms.’ 
This renders international socialization as the process through which “international 
society transmits norms to its members”15 and transforms “norm breakers” into “norm-
followers.”16  
                                                
12 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
13 Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58, no. 02 (2004): 239–75. 
14 Kaviraj, “An Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity.” 
15 Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction.” 
16 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
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Second, pedagogic accounts of socialization tend to create the subject positions of 
‘teacher’ and ‘student’ and place them in a hierarchical relationship in which the former 
assumes authority, technical expertise, and material capability to ‘teach’ the correct 
interpretation of proper norms to the latter who then recognizes the authority of the 
former. Accordingly, the teacher of norms in global governance gets named as ‘the 
West,’ which renders ‘the rest’ the latter’s students. Furthermore, this pedagogic narrative 
is based not on mutual learning but on a unidirectional relationship in which one party is 
set to teach and the other party is set to learn. As such, it reproduces the hierarchical 
structure of global politics.17  
Third, they rest on a constative logic that views the interpretation and 
implementation of norms through the binaries of true vs. false or correct vs. wrong. This, 
as I will argue in Chapter 3, overlooks the ways in which norms can be and are 
appropriated performatively, that is, in non-normative ways. Pedagogic accounts of 
socialization tend to take norms as settled, saturated, and pre-given and then they concern 
themselves with how actors are induced to adopt the correct interpretation and 
performance of norms at various levels. This, I argue, misses the structurally open 
character of norms that allow for struggles within them and for making differential and 
                                                
17 Here I differentiate horizontal relationships of learning from hierarchical modes of teaching. Despite the 
fact that power relationships condition the dynamics of learning among actors, learning, understood as 
being directed not solely towards strategic gains but also towards mutual understanding and empathy, is 
one important hope for a democratically open and inclusive organization of global social life. Learning as 
communication can well be subordinated to the pedagogic project of liberal socialization, but they are still 
analytically distinct. Furthermore, collapsing learning into being one face of teaching runs the risk of giving 
up on the fundamental insight, embraced by both mainstream and critical constructivist scholarship, that 
identities and interests are not pre-given but are formed and transformed through social interactions. The 
concept of socialization seeks to capture these processes, and learning is but one way of such formation and 
transformation of subjectivities, identities, and interests. If there is not much difference between horizontal 
learning and hierarchical teaching, then we are most likely left with the world of instrumental rationality of 
pre-formed actors trying to maximize their already given interests in the most cost-effective way. 
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conflicting claims on them. Such models of international socialization underplay the 
complexity of normative negotiations in the contemporary world politics. My project is to 
present a systematic critique of the inadequacy of conventional treatments of 
socialization in the IR literature in order to create the basis for a preferable conception 
later in the dissertation. In what follows in this chapter, I first discuss the concept of 
socialization and address its different receptions in IR, then I go on to identify and 
critique the three main components of the pedagogic narrative— its Eurocentric teleology 
of transition, its positing of hierarchical subject positions, and its constative 
understanding of norms.  
 
1. Defining Socialization: Mechanisms and Logics 
  
The concept of socialization is used in many different and at times contradictory 
ways. There is no consensus on what socialization entails in terms of specific 
mechanisms and logics of action. But in general socialization rests on the fundamental 
idea that actors in world politics are embedded in “dense networks of transnational and 
international social relations that shape their perceptions of the world and their role in 
that world.”18 Through these global social relations, actors get “socialized to want certain 
                                                
18 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 2. Even though the idea of socialization speaks to 
a thick notion of international society, the very analytics of socialization does not necessitate such a strong 
position. Many rationalist accounts in IR operate with a very thin notion of international social life but they 
still document the effects of socialization. This relates to the constructivist-rationalist divide within the 
mainstream disciplinary literature, but as I will discuss below, even though strong/thick accounts of 
international sociality have more to say about socialization, rationalist/individualist accounts that operate 
with a thin notion of international sociality also find socialization to be operative through utility-
maximizing individualist logics. Hence, the debate is about how these different logics and readings of 
sociality interact to produce effects captured under the rubric of ‘socialization.’ 
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things by the international society.” They change their goals and values, and redefine 
their interests “in the context of internationally held norms and understandings about 
what is good and appropriate.” 19 Socialization thus names the process by which actors’ 
“identities and interests get formed” in line with social expectations.20 State and non-state 
actors “are socialized to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest” within 
international life by actors such as international institutions.21 Thus, socialization is a 
“process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community.”22 It denotes 
“the process directed toward a state’s adoption of the (constitutive) norms of an 
international community.”23 Hence, it induces a change in actors’ identities, preferences, 
and understandings of the international system toward convergence with the norms of 
international order.24 As a process, socialization “creates preferences”25 and serves as the 
mechanism through which social integration occurs in world politics.  As such, the 
concept of socialization directly pertains to the broader questions of “the ends of political 
                                                
19 Ibid. As I will discuss below, states, international institutions, or transnational non-governmental 
organizations often “teach” states and their decision-makers the proper norms and their correct 
interpretation. For example, the literature suggests that UNESCO taught states that having a science 
bureaucracy was part of what was a “necessary component of modern state,” ICRC taught state decision-
makers the norms of conduct during war (Finnemore, National Interests in International Society.), NATO 
taught states the correct norms of liberal democracy (Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of 
Socialization?”.), EU acted as a “nanny” in teaching the Central and Eastern European states the correct 
norms of democracy through material rewards and punishments (Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The 
Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States--Conceptual and 
Theoretical Issues.”) 
20 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 170. 
21 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 5. 
22 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 804. 
23 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” 1. 
24 Johnston, Social States, 2008. 
25 Alastair Iain Johnston, “Conclusions and Extensions: Toward Mid-Range Theorizing and Beyond 
Europe,” International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005): 1015. 
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life and the nature of political community”26 and speaks to the questions of stability and 
change in identity, community, and norms.27 
In disciplinary terms, even though socialization is not the exclusive “home turf” 
of constructivism, it lies at the very heart of it. To the extent that constructivism is a 
critique of mainstream rationalist (both neorealist and neoliberal) accounts for having an 
“undersocialized” conception of actors, and to the extent that constructivism provides an 
account of actors and their interests as socially constructed, socialization stays at its 
center stage.28 As Wendt points out, socialization is “a staple of sociological discourse” 
with which constructivism is aligned.29 However, rationalist approaches also develop 
accounts to explain how actors come to conform to societal expectations, but 
constructivists are more interested in the ways in which socialization creates the identities 
and redefines interests.30 There are instrumentally rational and strategic mechanisms of 
socialization. Therefore, socialization cannot be collapsed into internalization and logic 
of appropriateness. Socialization is not about constructivism versus rationalism since 
both approaches highlight different mechanisms of socialization. Of the three 
mechanisms of socialization Johnston identifies, namely mimicking, social influence, and 
persuasion, only persuasion operates through the logic of appropriateness that “leaves 
                                                
26 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 5. 
27 Charlotte Epstein, “Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization?,” International 
Studies Perspectives 13, no. 2 (2012): 135–45. 
28 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 4. 
29 Ibid., 318. 
30 Ibid., 170. This distinction corresponds to Nye’s conceptions of “simple learning” and “complex 
learning” respectively. See Joseph S. Nye, “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes,” 
International Organization 41, no. 3 (July 1, 1987): 371–402. This conceptual family resemblance is also 
discussed in Andreas Hasenclever, Theories of International Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997); Finnemore, National Interests in International Society; Wendt, Social Theory of International 
Politics.  
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actors with new definitions of self that provide self-evident and normal notions of 
expected behavior.”31 The first two fall within the rationalist paradigm in which actors 
seek to maximize their utility functions. Moreover, strategic action might be adopted to 
induce a norm-following behavior,32 just as norms can be followed for strategic 
purposes.33 Hence, to talk about socialization is not to reject strategic behavior as if 
socialization was an ideational process or a concept devoid of interest-bases. This points 
to the role of material inducements (e.g. rewards and punishments, membership 
conditionality) as well as ideational transformation (e.g. persuasion, internalization, 
social learning) in socialization. Hence, the analytics of socialization “does not fit into 
either a constructivist or a rationalist approach.”34  
This marks an interesting tension within the concept. Wendt, for example, argues 
that socialization is not a distinctively constructivist hypothesis as it can be created at 
different levels through force, price, or legitimacy. Put differently, there may be 
neorealist, neoliberal, and constructivist pathways to socialization based on 
considerations of power, interest, and legitimacy, respectively. But Wendt argues that 
only in the third degree of internalization, that is in internalizing the norm on the basis of 
legitimacy concerns, can one talk about a situation where “actors are really constructed 
by culture.” And legitimacy is a “distinctively constructivist hypothesis” about 
socialization. Then, socialization is at the same time the turf of constructivism (because 
                                                
31 Alastair I. Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton University 
Press, 2008), xxvii. 
32 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Keck and Sikkink, 
Activists beyond Borders; Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World  : International 
Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
33 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.” 
34 Johnston, Social States, 2008, xxvii. 
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“true” socialization can happen only through the constructivist category of legitimacy) 
but it is also not exclusive to constructivism (since there are different pathways to 
internalization on the basis of power and interest).35  
A similar tension is evident in Zürn and Checkel’s definition of socialization. 
“While socialization research has typically been construed as constructivism’s home 
turf,” they point out, “an emphasis on mechanisms and scope conditions reveals that 
rational choice has much to contribute here as well.”36 Yet, Checkel argues that 
socialization is about internalization of norms and that it is necessary to observe a shift 
from a consequentialist logic to a logic of appropriateness to count it as socialization.37 
That means adoption of norms (“community rules”) should be “quite independent from a 
particular structure of material incentives or sanctions.”38 This creates a paradox within 
the argument, and Checkel and Zürn acknowledge that their definition of socialization (“a 
process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community”)39 “cannot 
                                                
35 This also sits somewhat in tension with Wendt’s surprise with Waltz’s use of the term socialization. For 
Waltz, socialization is the mechanism through which states comply with the logic of the international 
system in order to survive. This, in a way, is an account of socialization that is based on an individualist 
logic of self-interest deduced from the imperatives of the anarchic nature of the international system. In 
other words, this is a Neorealist socialization based on interest defined as survival. In that sense, Wendt’s 
surprise with Waltz’s use of the term ‘socialization’ is surprising since he himself opens space for 
Neorealist and Neoliberal pathways for socialization as providing different degrees of internalization of the 
culture or norms of the international system. Wendt is right in pointing out that Neorealists are not fond of 
using the term socialization since they assume interests and preferences are exogenously given rather than 
endogenously produced. However, Wendt’s own account of socialization creates that possibility for a 
Neorealist socialization, which does not really count as socialization, but still represents a step, a level, or a 
“degree” of internalization.  
36 Michael Zürn and Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Getting Socialized to Build Bridges: Constructivism and 
Rationalism, Europe and the Nation-State,” International Organization 59, no. 04 (2005): 1047. 
37 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe,” 804. 
38 Ibid. 
39 For them, this definition of socialization, rooted in sociology and symbolic interactionism, covers both 
sociological and rationalist accounts of norm adoption. 
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overcome the general paradox” but at least “fosters a dialogue between constructivists 
and rationalists” in order to build bridges across theoretical orientations.40 
For Wendt, Waltz’s notion of socialization is analogous to “natural selection” in 
that it rewards or punishes on the basis of conformity to norms. But Wendt develops a 
notion of socialization that is the equivalent of “cultural selection”41 which operates 
through imitation and social learning.42 Wendt’s distinction between natural and cultural 
selection largely maps onto Wendt and Duvall’s earlier distinction between “systemic 
integration” (through selection) and “social integration” (through constitution.)43 They 
argue that rationalist approaches (“the new institutionalism of the 1980s”) rely solely on 
the “systemic integration” of states through the mechanism of selection. They overlook 
the ways in which international life is socially integrated through mechanisms of 
constitution, which prepares the conditions for the possibility of meaningful interaction 
among actors, among with its systemic integration through mechanisms of selection.44 
Hence, both rationalist notions of selection (systemic integration) and constructivist 
notions of constitution (social integration) are intricately related components of 
socialization and both are necessary to understand the ordering of global politics.45  
                                                
40 Zürn and Checkel, “Getting Socialized to Build Bridges,” 1046. 
41 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 320. Cultural selection here refers to “the transmission of 
the determinants of behavior from individual to individual, and thus from generation to generation.” Ibid., 
324.  
42 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 324. 
43 Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, “Institutions and International Order,” in Global Changes and 
Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, ed. Ernst Otto Czempiel and James N. 
Rosenau (Lexington Books, 1989), 62. 
44 Ibid. 
45 The main constructivist premise that norms are both constraining and constitutive follows the same line 
of argument about the necessity of thinking both “systemic integration” and “social integration” together.   
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Hence, socialization is not exclusively about logic of appropriateness, but the 
latter is its pinnacle. There are consequentialist, means-ends calculating, utility-
maximizing logics of norm-following action in world politics. Norms can be adopted to 
different degrees of internalization (power/force, interest/price, legitimacy/identity), in 
different forms (compliance, conformity, internalization), and for different reasons 
(coercion, self-interest, legitimacy), which correspond to the different pathways offered 
by mainstream theories (neorealism, neoliberalism, constructivism).46  
 
2. Socialization as Transition 
 
Pedagogic models construe socialization as a process of ‘transition’ into liberal 
modernity. They understand modernity and its constitutive political norms as something 
emerging in and belonging to the West and then transmitted to the non-West. The task 
then is to induce the non-West to adopt Western liberal norms in the way that the West 
interprets them. Pedagogic socialization seeks to produce subjects along these liberal 
norms by way of direct or indirect teaching by Western actors and discourses. Potentially 
subversive slippages that might occur within the transfer of ‘Western norms’ into non-
Western locations are to be disciplined and policed per the pedagogic function.  
Such powerful pedagogic forces and hierarchical relationships do exist in current 
liberal global governance. In a sense, what I refer to here as pedagogic accounts of 
socialization very aptly describe some of these processes. But while they describe the 
operations of the pedagogic power, some contribute to its reproduction by ideologically 
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justifying it, and only a few attend to the performative dynamics of socialization that 
operate alongside pedagogic forces.47  
This pedagogic conception of socialization broadly corresponds to what Dipesh 
Chakrabarty calls ‘History 1,’ that is, the history of capital and of liberal modernity that 
rests on a universal logic of infinite expansion and incorporation. History 1 is the history 
of how capital puts the whole world under its sway and seeks to cancel out historical 
differences it encounters or incorporates them for its further expansion.48 It marks 
capitalist modernity as a single unity, which then enables the historicist narration of 
different elements in the present as belonging to a past that has ‘not yet’ achieved the 
maturity of modernity.49This historicism is integral to the idea of modernity and has 
enabled the domination of the world by Europe in nineteenth century. For Chakrabarty, 
Marx’s statement that an industrially developed country shows to the less developed “the 
image of its own future” and Mill’s claim that Africans and Indians are not yet civilized 
enough to rule themselves are expressions of such historicism. The teleological logic of 
socialization posits a linear path that the non-West should follow. It also constantly 
produces a ‘not yet’ on the part of the ‘socializee.’ This pushes them back to the “waiting 
room of history” or seeks to incorporate them violently.   
For Chakrabarty, the narratives of transition posit modernity not solely as global 
but as “globalizing over time, by originating in one place (Europe) and then spreading 
outside it.”50 The mantra of “first the West and then elsewhere”51epitomizes their logic 
                                                
47 I explicate these performative dynamics in Chapter 3. 
48 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 48. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
50 Ibid., 7. 
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and becomes evident in the discourses of progress, development, and catching up—
discourses that not only posit Europe’s past as the future of non-Europe but also portray 
the latter as ‘not yet’ ready for the universals of political modernity.  
Such renderings of socialization rest on what Sudipta Kaviraj calls a “diffusionist 
teleology,” which constantly predicts uniformity around European institutions.52 It places 
the non-West at different stages of formation depending on how deep they internalize 
Western ‘standards.’ Charlotte Epstein observes that the socialization narratives in IR 
infantilize the socializee and embody an “inherent normative teleological design”53 
resting on a “unilinear, liberal understanding of progress.”54 This “universalizing 
teleology” in the literature conceals the origin of norms and “purports to cast as universal 
what is always necessarily a localized and historically specific set of values.”55 
What gets glossed over in the historicist pedagogic accounts, however, are the 
ways in which normative engagements are not solely processes of transition but also of 
translation. As Chakrabarty notes, modernity is not only a process of transition but also of 
translation of categories and institutions—an insight I develop in Chapter 3. In seeking to 
govern the performance of norms, socialization is thought of solely as a process of 
transition in which non-Western actors are made to think and act in ways authorized and 
prescribed by the ‘West.’ Translation, however, exposes the norm to resignification and 
                                                                                                                                            
51 Ibid., 4. 
52 Kaviraj, “An Outline of a Revisionist Theory of Modernity.” 
53 Epstein, “Stop Telling Us How to Behave,” 137. 
54 Ibid., 136. 
55 Ibid. Moreover, this unilinear view has a “progressive norms bias” which, for her, omits ‘bad norms’ 
such as colonization that are as well constitutive of the current global order. The ideological sources of this 
bias, for Epstein, can be traced back to the “liberal, Hegelian conceptions of history” and “the classic ideal 
of progress harbored by positivism’s founding fathers.” 
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displacement. Put differently, translation may put the normalizing power of the norms at 
risk. Hence, performance of norms has to be policed. 
 The transitionist pedagogy makes two analytically distinct but interrelated 
gestures. First, it authorizes universalist exclusions by claiming that non-Western 
societies are ‘not yet’ ready to join the club of the civilized. This is pretty much the 
discourse one sees in arguments about preconditions—i.e. preconditions of democracy 
(‘Egypt is not yet secular, so democracy should wait’) or preconditions of membership to 
organizations such as the EU or NATO (‘Turkey has not yet reached the standards of 
civilization to be part of the EU’). This stagist logic of ‘not yet’ constantly gets 
reproduced in international politics.56 Take NATO’s relationship with the post-Soviet 
Eastern Europe for example. Gheciu suggests that “in the NATO discourse, the Czech 
Republic appeared in a position of becoming vis-à-vis the superior West: while it was 
more advanced than other former communist countries, it had not yet reached the end of 
its journey of transition to democracy.”57  
Second, it authorizes violent inclusions on the basis of these constitutive norms. 
(‘Afghan women should be liberated,’ ‘Iraq should be democratized.’) This, for John M. 
                                                
56 Even though the pedagogic discourse constantly produces ‘not yet’ for the socializee, the socializee can 
and should approximinate the ‘standards of civilization’ posited and represented by the socializer. For 
example, in many respects, post-World War II Japan is thought to have socialized into Western liberal 
norms, but its so-called ‘collectivist culture’ makes it ‘not yet’ fully liberal. Or post-indepence India is 
thought to be socializing into the norms of secular liberal democracy but the way Hindu religious customs 
and beliefs fuse themselves with modern institutions are referred to as ‘not yet’ as fully modern character of 
Indian society. For an endorsement of the ‘not yet’ perspective, see V. S. Naipaul, India: A Wounded 
Civilization (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2011). For a critique, see Chakrabarty, Provincializing 
Europe. 
57 Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?,” 989. Exclusions are also justified through a 
relativist strategy. For example, some Orientalist perspectives suggest that the non-Western world, 
particularly the “Islamic civilization,” is alien to democracy because of its ‘cultural tradition.’ Therefore 
supporting autocracies in the Muslim world becomes not only strategically necessary but also ethically 
justifiable. 
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Hobson, corresponds to an “active imperialism,” whereas various universalist and 
relativist exclusions can be regarded as instances of “passive imperialism.”58 Partha 
Chatterjee’s reading of the pedagogic character of the colonial encounter in India 
provides an insightful analysis of both dimensions—universalist exclusion and violent 
inclusion. Chatterjee indicates how the nineteenth century British liberal thinkers 
supported “paternal despotism over the morally infantile subjects”59 in India as a 
“pedagogic project.”60 He identifies two ways through which the British “colonial 
tutelage”61in India, as well as today’s imperial relations in world politics, were and are 
sustained: “pedagogy of violence” and “pedagogy of culture.”  That is to say, “the colony 
must either be disciplined by force or civilized by culture,” or both.62 To unpack that, he 
traces the two different conceptions and operations of norms created in the nineteenth 
century normative literature on politics.  
First, norms have been construed as “the empirically prevailing average,” and 
second, as “the desired standard to be achieved.”63 Chatterjee notes that the first meaning 
of norms (as average) have been used to measure countries via placing them on a scale to 
see how much they deviate from the empirically prevailing norm.64 The pedagogic task of 
socialization here is to uplift the deviant to the level of the empirically prevailing 
                                                
58 John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
59 Partha Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power (Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 179. 
60 Ibid., 182. 
61 Ibid., 156. 
62 Ibid., 344. 
63 Ibid., 186. It is worth noting that this difference parallels the distinction made in IR scholarship between 
behavioral and ideational treatment of norms, the former describing norms as behavioral regularities and 
patterns, and the latter as prescriptive and principled ideas. See,  Finnemore and Sikkink, “International 
Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. 
64 Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire, 186. 
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average. “The imperial power,” Chatterjee notes, “must take on the responsibility of 
educating, disciplining, and training the colony in order to bring it up to the norm.”65 
However, the second meaning of norms (as ideal) were used in order to declare, when 
necessary, exceptions to the norm concerning the deviant. “Countries that were above the 
global empirical norm,” Chatterjee points out, “would then set the universally desirable 
standard.”66 But more importantly, “the practices associated with those standards might 
not be considered appropriate for countries where the predominant standards were much 
lower.”67 Hence, exceptions were made and justified. For Chatterjee this “prerogative to 
declare the colonial exception” is the definition of imperial power.68 For example, while 
the liberals of the early nineteenth century Britain believed that representative 
government with a possibly universal franchise was the best form of government, they 
thought this was not applicable in the colonies in Asia and Africa. Hence the formula 
“democracy at home, despotism abroad.”69 The “universal norm” of democracy could not 
be applied in the colony, but these representative institutions could possibly be 
established in the future “with sufficient tutelage.”70  
Here, the “liberal-colonial imaginary” deals with difference in either of the two 
ways; liquidation or liberation. The first one seeks to exterminate, the second to 
educate.71 While liquidation is reserved for those who are cut off from access to reason 
                                                
65 Ibid., 344. 
66 Ibid., 186. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 337. 
69 Ibid., 218. 
70 Ibid., 217.For example, Chatterjee discusses Woodrow Wilson’s argument that the backward people of 
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and morality, liberation “encounters the Other in order to save it, to salvage it from its 
brutish existence, by teaching it the correct Reason, Morality, and Power.”72 This 
orientation to ‘save’ the different creates “many pedagogical moments in Self-Other 
encounters.”73  
Socialization discourse in IR seeks to account for, and often reproduce, such 
pedagogical moments of teaching norms as well as their correct meaning.74 It works 
through a logic of global diffusion of liberal norms and institutions in ways that erase 
difference. This is for the most part due to liberalism’s rather precarious relationship with 
difference. Liberal imaginary, Himadeep Muppidi notes, “is systematically closed to the 
possibility of relating democratically to difference.”75 For him this makes liberal 
imaginary “colonial in its orientation to the world,” on the grounds that it tends to 
universalize a particularity and to globalize a locality.76  
Eurocentric assumptions figure prominently in the pedagogic accounts of 
socialization. Schimmelfennig, for example, takes international organizations, especially 
EU institutions, as “nannies” who “disseminate, teach, and enforce…the constitutive 
liberal norms of the Western international community and the membership norms of the 
                                                
72 Ibid., 66. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Sergei Prozorov makes a similar argument in a different theoretical register. He claims that the ‘liberal 
politics of enmity,’ that is liberalism’s turning of the public enemy into a personal foe, seeks to “transform 
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Western organizations.”77 The figure of the ‘nanny’ as the mature and reasoned owner 
and enforcer of norms marks the subject position of the liberal West that authorizes it to 
transform others in its own image. Since the role of the nanny is “to disseminate, teach, 
and enforce” the liberal norms of global governance, any effort to resist or differentially 
or subversively appropriate those norms troubles the pedagogy of socialization and 
deserves punishment.  
Socialization for Schimmelfennig “prepares” countries for partaking in 
international organizations such as the EU whose membership is “conditional on 
successful socialization (to the degree required by the organization.)”78 For him, “as the 
standard setter for legitimate statehood in Europe, the Western community is in a position 
to provide authoritative interpretations of the norms, to accord or withdraw international 
recognition, and to confer international legitimacy upon states.”79 He argues that the 
Western international community, constituted by liberal norms,80 transmits and teaches 
these norms to others, which hierarchically situates Western countries and organizations 
in relation to the non-West. In this picture, Western “nannies” are set to enforce liberal 
norms and the novice non-West is tasked with learning and ‘properly’ performing the 
                                                
77 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” 2–3. 
78 Ibid., 3. 
79 Ibid., 16. Even though Schimmelfennig argues that with respect to European regional system, his 
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norms of the nanny. This erases the possibility of meaningful agentic intervention on the 
part of non-Western actors in their engagements with norms. Non-Western traditions 
matter only to the degree that they score on the “domestic salience” measures, which is 
about how much preexisting local norms and customs accord with the new Western 
liberal norm.81 Local traditions, therefore, are treated either as a limit/constraint or as a 
facilitator depending on how much they accord with Western norms. They are not, 
however, taken as legitimate social textures that negotiate and rework liberal normative 
constructs.  
Similarly, sociological institutionalism and liberal constructivism construe actors 
in world politics as “enactors of scripts” written in the West. The global expansion of the 
rules of the “Western world-culture” fosters convergence on the “highly rationalized and 
universalistic” Western norms.82 Socialization here names the process of convergence 
through which subjects get normalized within the Western knowledge systems and 
practices. Western-originated norms and institutions diffuse and become global, form 
exogenous constraints on behavior, serve as structures of authority and sources of 
legitimacy, and produce normalized subjects. This Western world-culture defines the 
nature and purposes of actors. “The expanding and deepening Western world culture,” 
Finnemore points out, forms “world cultural rules that constitute actors—including states, 
organizations, and individuals—and define legitimate and desirable goals for them to 
pursue.”83  
                                                
81 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
82 Meyer et al., “World Society and the Nation-State,” 144. 
83 Martha Finnemore, “Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism,” 
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Gheciu’s liberal constructivist argument about NATO’s pedagogic practices 
provides yet another example of how Eurocentric presuppositions underlie the discourse 
of socialization.  She argues that after the end of the Cold War NATO has embarked on 
the task of projecting “a particular set of Western-based norms”84 and of disseminating “a 
Western-style democratic culture”85 into the Central and Eastern European countries.  In 
doing so, she notes, NATO exported “Western-defined liberal norms and rules of 
international behavior”86 in order to change the way people “think and behave.”87 That, 
for her, was an attempt at “socializing [them] into the Western ways”88 and “Western 
ideas.”89 NATO’s pedagogic task was “educating pro-reform political elites to think 
about democracy within Western-defined categories.”90 Once again, the goal of these 
educative activities, Gheciu notes, was to socialize the actors to “the values and norms of 
Western-defined democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and to teach them to 
define national identity and interests within the framework of those norms.”91 She 
maintains that NATO “explicitly aimed at teaching students to regard Western-defined 
norms as the correct foundation of a progressive society.”92 In this hierarchical 
relationship between the teacher and the student the former is positioned to define the 
‘correct’ interpretation of norms and to impose closure on their differential appropriation.  
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86 Ibid., 974. 
87 Ibid., 976. 
88 Ibid. 
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Furthermore, being a student/socializee entails recognizing the teacher/socializer 
as “a legitimate normative guide.”93 For Gheciu, NATO entertained the position of a 
“legitimate educator”94 because it was “an essentially Western institution …defined by 
superior attributes of freedom, stability, and progress.”95 Being regarded as an 
“expression of the Western world” grants the institutions of liberal order the position of a 
“legitimate educator.”96 One scope condition of the process of teaching norms, Gheciu 
notes, is the socializer’s “ability to secure recognition in the eyes of its socializees” as an 
“authoritative guide” or a “legitimate educator.” (1004) Through these efforts to institute 
its authority and legitimacy, the West has to constantly reinstitute its pedagogic power as 
the teacher and enforcer of norms so that it can discipline the performance of norms. 
Furthermore, it is not only that socialization necessitates an acceptance of the teacher-
student relationship but also that the ‘correct’ way of constituting a polity is named 
‘Westernization.’97 She interprets the efforts to resort to a society’s past to provide a 
blueprint for the future as a rejection of socialization and of liberal democratic norms. 
Instead of searching for a country’s future in its own historical resources, the prescription 
for the ‘socializee’ is to accept the idea that “Western agencies” are “authoritative 
guides” and “teachers” for a better polity and for better shaping of domestic institutions.98 
In this discursive matrix, challenging this pedagogy is to challenge the universally 
aspired global norms.  
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Likewise, the English School account of the ‘expansion of international society’ is 
depicted as a process of socialization in which Westphalian norms and institutions diffuse 
and become global. The international society rests on a single logic of modernity that 
originates in Europe and demands “assimilation or acquiescence on the part of other 
civilizations.”99 The “destiny” of the non-West, in these accounts, has been “to mimic, 
never quite successfully, the history already performed by the West.”100 As Buzan 
highlights, such accounts are “Eurocentric all the way down”101 since they position the 
West as the driving force of norms in world politics and ‘the rest’ as recipients of 
them.102 In his analysis of the “sense of alarm” among liberal internationalists about the 
rising non-Western powers, Tim Dunne suggests that these powers are seen as “either 
‘different, and a threat,’ or ‘like us,’ and in need of socialization and rule compliance.”103 
Dunne points out that liberal internationalism’s “supreme confidence in the singularity of 
modernity” is coupled by “a hierarchical ordering principle in which dominance and 
subordination are configured.”104 In that vein, Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry 
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argue that “the foreign policy of the liberal states should continue to be based on the 
broad assumption that there is ultimately one path to modernity—and that it essentially 
liberal in character.”105  
As Finnemore notes, the forerunners of the English School such as Hedley Bull, 
Adam Watson, Martin Wight, and Gerrit Gong argue that historically “the content of 
international society comes from the liberal principles of Western European democracies 
and became internationalized with the expansion of the West.”106 Liberal human rights—
individual freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights—are at the core of the Western 
community’s identity. They are the “constitutive values that define legitimate statehood 
and rightful state action” in the domestic as well as in the international realm.107 In the 
domestic realm, the liberal principles of social and political order—social pluralism, the 
rule of law, democratic political participation and representation, private property, and 
market-based economy—are derived from, and justified by, this liberal interpretation of 
human rights. Finnemore suggests that both sociological institutionalism and the English 
school “point to the expansive power of the West and its notions of rationality as the core 
of an international social structure.”108 Both theoretical orientations place at the center of 
their analysis “the globalization of Western standards of civilization and Western 
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morality.”109 They rest on the idea of “the triumph of Western norms and Western 
rationality in contemporary international society.”110   
Amitav Acharya’s norm localization account is one attempt within IR to rectify 
the Eurocentric narratives. He offers an alternative explanation of norm diffusion and 
institutional change, one that is beware of reproducing the tendency to talk about 
socialization as an almost uncontested diffusion of Western norms into the non-West. 
Criticizing the existing literature on norm diffusion for depicting local actors as “passive 
targets and learners”111 and for “sidelining” the agency of non-Western actors, Acharya 
stresses how local actors (“norm-takers” in his language) “actively borrow and modify” 
transnational norms.112 This is what Acharya calls localization of a transnational norm. 
Localization defies the “strictly dichotomous outcomes of acceptance and rejection” and 
attends to the complexity of the processes through which “norm-takers build congruence 
between transnational norms […] and local beliefs and practices.”113 In the case of 
ASEAN, he indicates how local agents “reconstruct foreign norms” through various 
localizing strategies such as framing, grafting, redefining, pruning, modifying, and 
selective adoption.114 Acharya’s stress is on how “the cognitive priors of the norm-takers 
influence the reshaping and reception of foreign norms,” rather than on how these ‘norm-
takers’ get converted by outside advocates or entrepreneurs.115 Preexisting local 
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normative orders engender “variations” in the adoption of global norms such as 
democracy and human rights.  
I share many of Acharya’s core insights, yet I diverge from him on two points. 
First, Acharya underemphasizes the constitutive power of norms in the form of global 
discourses. For him, the emphasis on the constitutive effects of global discourses was a 
characteristic of the first wave of norms scholarship, which focused on the international 
systemic level and erased the crucial role of the local actors.116  However, his abstention 
from talking about constitutive norms comes at the cost of barring him from addressing 
the question of how in the first place certain categories come to be desirable objects of 
localization. In Acharya’s analysis, norms are principled ideas with less constitutive 
force. The category of socialization, however, communicates a structural constitutive 
dimension. In that sense, Acharya’s account is more about diffusion than about 
socialization. 
Second, even though Acharya places substantial agentic force into the process of 
localization of a norm, localization for him is still a category between resistance and 
acceptance. In other words, his analytical framework is rather ambivalent about the 
possibility of a resistant localization. Even though localization is marked by many 
gestures of resistance (i.e. ‘pruning’ and ‘reconstitution’) Acharya ends up locating 
‘resistance and contestation’ in the ‘prelocalization’ stage.117 Localization transcends the 
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binary of acceptance and rejection,118 yet it is also not the site of resistance. The advent of 
localization marks the end of resistance and contestation. However, that form of 
contestation is already recognized in Finnemore and Sikkink’s claim that “new norms 
never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a highly contested normative 
space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest.”119 Thus 
Acharya and Finnemore and Sikkink converge on the idea that new norms enter into a 
terrain of contestation, however they diverge on where to put the emphasis in norm 
adoption—transnational norm entrepreneurs or local initiators and agents. There is no 
contestation or resistance once a norm is inhabited. Put differently, there is not much 
theoretical possibility of adopting a norm non-normatively—working in and outside the 
norm, for and against the norm, and using the norm for other purposes. Then several 
questions follow: How does one even start thinking about inhabiting a norm non-
normatively? What does a non-normative adoption of a norm look like? How does one 
recognize resistance in norm-adoption? I try and address these questions in Chapter 3 
through a performative reading of socialization.  
 
3. The West as the Pedagogue: The Question of Authority 
 
Zürn and Checkel suggest that “student-teacher relations … are seldom seen in 
international relations” because such constellations “amount to a form of role-playing 
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that is highly atypical for any conception of international relations.”120 Curiously enough, 
right after this remark, they make a rather different gesture. They argue that “[a]lthough 
one’s initial reaction may be to consider such constellations as highly unusual … a closer 
look might reveal that they occur more often and therefore require further analysis.” In 
this section I reiterate Zürn and Checkel’s observation that “teacher-student 
constellations” are in fact not as rare in world politics. In fact, I argue that they underlie 
much of the understandings and practices of norm socialization. Frank Schimmelfennig 
takes it even one step further when he depicts international organizations (in his case, EU 
institutions) as “nannies” who “disseminate, teach, and enforce…the constitutive liberal 
norms of the Western international community and the membership norms of the Western 
organizations.”121 For him international socialization “involves several teaching and 
nursing activities.”122 This paternal function, named socialization, “prepares” countries 
for membership in the international organizations.123 Here, the relationship between 
socializer and socializee needs to be asymmetrical and the socializee must be weaker and 
vulnerable in order to change its own situation. But the subject-position of ‘teacher’ or 
‘nanny’ necessitates and establishes more than an asymmetry in power. It also attributes 
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legitimacy and authorizes actions. This pedagogic discourse configures socialization as a 
relationship of authority between a “norm setter” and “norm follower.”124 Hence its ideal 
formula: “Successful nannies, good pupils, smooth socialization.”125  
These pedagogic relationships take various forms. Usually, international 
organizations are “active teachers” teaching states the proper course of action, policies to 
follow, institutions to build, and norms to follow, meanings to internalize.126 Sometimes 
transnational advocacy networks do the pedagogic work through pressuring states to 
induce a norm congruent behavior. 127 Sometimes the teacher-student relationship is 
established around “epistemic communities.”128 These expert groups share “causal beliefs 
and cause-effect understandings” in a certain issue are and use their position of authority 
to channel policies of states toward particular directions. The pedagogic function of 
socialization is also operative, however, even in the absence of a proximate pedagogue. 
Institutions such as markets, elections, or particular organizations also exercise power 
and shape actors’ identities and interests without necessitating immediate actors. These 
institutions perform the pedagogic function by virtue of their logic of operation. The very 
logic of global capitalist markets, for example, pressures individual and state actors to 
organize their social life in particular ways. Similarly, the logic of elections pushes party 
                                                
124 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” 
125 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” 18. 
126 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society; “Finnemore_Sociological Institutionalism.pdf,” 
n.d.; Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World; Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of 
Socialization?”. 
127 Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders; Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn 
Sikkink, eds., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
128 Haas, “Introduction.” 
   51 
actors to assume particular ideological positions.129 Furthermore, discourses also exercise 
pedagogic power through constituting the conditions for the possibility of meaningful 
action and producing subjects with particular capacities and resources.130 The discourse 
of secularism, for example, operates as a form of political authority in world politics in 
ways that differentially enables and authorizes actors.131  
However, the predominant frameworks privilege agentic accounts. Finnemore, for 
example, takes socialization as a process driven by external actors who actively teach 
states the constitutive norms of Western world-culture. She argues that the constitutive 
norms of international society, which rest on Weberian notions of rationalization and 
bureaucratization, are externally supplied to states rather than internally demanded by 
them.132 Hence, the fundamental mechanism of diffusion is not learning but teaching.133 
For Finnemore, this teaching is different from “imitation” or “self-teaching” which imply 
that the impetus is from the inside. The real impetus comes from outside.134 The 
fundamental problem with the explanations based on self-learning and imitation, 
Finnemore argues, is that “there are no active teachers” in them.135 Yet, in all of her cases 
she finds out that “there are active teachers with well-defined lesson plans for their 
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pupils.”136 International organizations “teach states new norms of behavior.”137 Imitation 
or mimetic action provide explanations based on “an unmediated process [which] locates 
the impetus for imitative actions in the imitator.”138 However, they are in fact provided by 
international actors. Once again, states are not “self-taught” but there are “active 
teachers” who teach states their wants and needs in line with the constitutive norms of 
liberal international society.  
While the causal force behind state preference-formation may be external, it is 
domestic politics that mediates those externally-driven efforts of “active teaching.” 
Finnemore points out that international organizations play “the role of teacher” for 
states.139 States “may not always know what they want and are receptive to teaching 
about what are appropriate and useful actions to take.”140 For example, UNESCO created 
“teaching missions” to teach states the material and symbolic significance of establishing 
state science bureaucracies.141 ICRC, which was initially composed of transnational 
nongovernmental actors “created and taught to decisionmakers in states” the very interest 
in war-time humanitarian behavior.142  
This relationship of teaching and learning, however, is fundamentally 
hierarchical. Schimmelfennig points out that international socialization requires “some 
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sort of asymmetrical relationship” between the socializer and “the state to be 
socialized.”143 Similarly, Trine Flockhart notes that her own framework of socialization 
rests on the implicit presupposition that “the relationship between socializer and 
socializee is an unequal one where the socializer either has, or believes itself to have, a 
greater knowledge or understanding of the norm set than those that are being socialized, 
and that it has the power to judge whether the required norm changes have been taken 
satisfactorily.”144 The figure of the ‘nanny’—the mature and reasoned enforcer of 
norms—here marks the subject position of the liberal West and authorizes it to transform 
others in its own image. Since the role of the nanny is “to disseminate, teach, and 
enforce”145 the liberal norms of global governance, any effort to resist or differentially or 
subversively appropriate those norms troubles the pedagogy of socialization and deserves 
punishment—through exclusion from membership into community, non-access to 
resources through conditionalities, etc—just as a nanny punishes the child.  
Insofar as socialization is about “moving the target countries to pro-norm 
behavior,”146 it creates the subject positions of “movers” and the “moved” and 
differentially authorizes and empowers each of them. This hierarchical relationship is 
                                                
143 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues,” 14.According to that rationalist logic of 
socialization, the “target state” must be “sufficiently sensitive or vulnerable to the actions of the 
international organization to react to sanctions in the desired way.” (14) 
144 Trine Flockhart, “Similar and Yet So Different: The Socialization of Democratic Norms in Post-War 
Germany and Present Day Iraq,” International Politics 43, no. 5 (November 2006): 15–16. Flockhart 
adopts Risse et.al.’s (1999) definition of socialization as the “induction of new members … into the ways 
of behavior that are preferred in a society.”  
145 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.” 
146 Zürn and Checkel, “Getting Socialized to Build Bridges,” 1063.  
   54 
evident in Gheciu’s analysis of NATO’s “pedagogic practices”147 of “socializing Central 
and Eastern Europeans into the Western ways”148 and “teaching the correct norms of 
liberal democracy to the Central and Eastern Europeans.”149 Gheciu recognizes that a 
very “significant, although subtle, form of power is involved” in this hierarchical 
pedagogic process, so much so that “if the pedagogic work is effective, it effectively 
shapes subjects, leading them to regard the schemes of thought and action disseminated 
by the socializing agent not as a contingent cultural product, but as the normal way of 
thinking and doing things.”150  
Equally importantly, in Gheciu’s narrative, if actors do not see themselves as 
students, then they are less likely to socialize.151 They do not recognize ‘the socializer’ as 
“a legitimate teacher of norms,” and instead “articulate a different vision of the ‘good’ 
polity, and advocate norms and politicies that [do not] conform to [the teacher’s] 
prescriptions.”152 They do not believe in the necessity of “complete (re)construction of … 
society on a Western model” and they “do not see Westernization as the right way of 
(re)constructing the identity of their country.”153 Their “vision of the future rel[y] on a 
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particular reading of the … past as a blueprint for the future,” and hence, “the idea that 
Western agencies might shape new domestic institutions [is] unacceptable” for them.154  
This pedagogic vision tends to treat normative engagements as dichotomous, 
norms are either adopted or not adopted, which leaves very little space for recognizing 
differential adoptions and claims on norms. Such contestations are registered as 
“opposition to change” or anti-socialization. For example, for Gheciu, those who do not 
accept NATO as an “authoritative guide” see it as a “threat” and an “exploitative 
influence of the West.” Therefore, the only options available are either accepting the 
authoritative guidance of NATO and accepting global norms, or rejecting the 
authoritative guidance of NATO and rejecting those norms. What is erased here is the 
possibility of rejecting the tutelage of NATO yet at the same time having a different 
relationship with global norms. Such differential engagements with norms are treated as 
deviations that should be made to conform to the “correct” interpretation.155  
Once again, the problem with pedagogic socialization is not that it depicts the 
non-West as learners, but that they are learners only. They are produced as students in a 
relationship with their teacher, the West. They are not set to learn from each other. The 
relationship is unidirectional, one teaches, the other learns. 156 Hence, the problem in the 
pedagogic conceptualization of socialization is not that it is about learning, but that it is 
unidirectional and hierarchical. Their relationship is asymmetrically organized around 
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differential authorizations bestowed by the norms upon actors.  The subject positions of 
teacher and student, nanny and child, matures and novices are unmistakenly power 
positions. They differentially enable and constrain actors.157  
Epstein observes a dynamic of epistemological violence and silencing operative in 
such accounts of socialization. For her there is an “implicit” and “patronizing”158 
infantilization within the socialization literature which assumes that “the socializee, like 
the child, holds no prior legitimate identity, or whose identity is in need of being 
molded.”159 For Epstein, such infantilizing dynamics actively erase the past identity of 
the socializee and create a loss. Apparaising change “a priori as a good thing … crowds 
out the possibility of considering it as loss.”160 Consequently, it legitimizes treating the 
socializee “like a child or a blank page upon which all the ‘good’ norms can be 
written.”161 For example, Epstein suggests that in its attempts to socialize Japan into 
current whaling norms, Australia “implicitly cast[s] Japan in the position of the child in 
need of learning the norms of ‘good’ whale-related behavior.”162 Such infantilizing 
gestures delegitimize and erase the ways Japan relates to her own whaling past.163  
Barnett and Finnemore point to another hierarchical dimension of pedagogic 
socialization. They point out that international organizations (IOs), as prominent 
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regulative and constitutive actors in world politics, founded by “Western liberal states” 
and “designed to promote liberal values,”164 lack accountability and participation so 
much so that it “raises the possibility that at the global level we face an undemocratic 
liberalism.”165 IOs are “unabashedly undemocratic, and procedures for consent of the 
governed are very weak.”166 Hierarchy is one of the defining characteristics of 
bureaucratic organization, and for Barnett and Finnemore, “we certainly live in a 
bureaucratic organization.”167 This hierarchy is produced and sustained through IOs’ 
position of authority, that is their ability to use “institutional and discursive resources to 
induce deference from others.”168 IOs as international “authorities” exercise power to 
“regulate” global social life through manipulating incentives to alter the behavior of 
states and nonstate actors. But they also exert a “social construction power” as they 
participate centrally in the constitution of global social reality. Through using their 
authority position, IOs are “deferred” to define “meanings, norms of good behavior, the 
nature of social actors, and categories of legitimate social action in the world.”169 They 
are “empowered to decide” on the definition and solution of problems, hence governing 
almost all aspects of international life.170 
In that sense, Barnett and Finnemore point at the pedagogic character of the 
authority IOs claim and the power they exercise. IOs assume the role of ‘teacher’ who 
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know the proper norms and their correct interpretation, and bear the responsibility and 
authority to teach them to ‘pupils’ globally. They also punish through sanctions or reward 
through incentives as part of their pedagogic function. The IMF, for example, “routinely 
tries to teach states what it means to have a market economy.” 171 They act as 
“missionaries of our time [a]rmed with a notion of progress.”172 The socialization process 
then is akin to a “conversion process.”173 Understood this way, the pedagogic function of 
socialization is taken one step further, to the level of the pastoral; father taking care of his 
flock and trying to save more souls through conversion. The strength of the language in 
Barnett and Finnemore’s analogy speaks to the deeply pedagogic, and at times pastoral, 
construal of socialization in world politics and in IR.  
This pedagogic function of defining what proper norms and their correct 
interpretations are is an exercise of power. The kind of authority that IOs claim involve 
more than just the ability to get states to do what they otherwise would not do; it “often 
consists of telling people what is the right thing to do.”174 It “supplies the social 
purposes” for actors.175 The power of these IOs is produced through the authority they 
claim, and authority, as they point out, is a legitimated form of domination. Hence, 
commanding some degree of consent and mobilizing coercion, IOs participate in the 
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social control of international life that is intimiately related with the categories of 
“steering, guiding, regulating, and imposing.”176 As such, Barnett and Finnemore 
recognize that “the distinction between power and authority is almost always blurry.”177 
Authority is an exercise of power even when it achieves generating some degree of 
consent, because the socially produced authority “gives its bearer the capacity to get 
others to defer.”178 
I have so far argued that existing accounts of socialization operate through a 
particular pedagogy that enact and reproduce hierarchies in international politics. 
However, the communicative (argumentative) approach to socialization claim to offer a 
distinctly non-hierarchical account of persuasion. Thomas Risse, for example, claims that 
the argumentative approach presents a “non-hierarchical steering mode enabling actors to 
change voluntarily their perceptions of the situation and even their preferences through 
reasoned consensus.”179 Despite his attempt to present the logic of arguing as one non-
hierarchical model of socialization for global governance, Risse’s own account of arguing 
produces a similar sequential relationship with pedagogic practices. He points out that 
“arguing and persuasion are crucial for socialization processes to ensure the compliance 
of actors—whether public or private—with international norms.”180 In that sense, I will 
argue that instead of being an alternative to the pedagogic models of socialization, 
argumentative rationality is but one particular stage and mechanism of it.  
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To begin with, the communicative or argumentative approach does have some 
nuances from other pedagogic models of socialization. It recognizes that norms and their 
validity claims are open to contestation. It acknowledges the possibility that the three 
forms of validity claims, that are “the truth of assertions,” “the moral rightness of the 
norms underlying arguments,” and “the truthfulness and authenticity of the speaker”181 
may all be subject to contestation. With reference to March and Olsen, Risse points out 
that “the more the norms are contested, the less the logic of the situation can be captured 
by the statement “good people do X” than by “what does ‘good’ mean in this situation?” 
or even “what is the right thing to do?”182 For Risse, the adjudication of norms in such 
situations involves the “logic of truth seeking or arguing.” That is, through a 
communicative process, actors deliberate about the correctness of their causal 
assumptions and the appropriateness of their normative claims.  
However, this argumentative rationality presupposes a common life-world among 
the interlocutors, resting on “collective interpretations of the world and of themselves,” 
consisting of “a shared culture, a common system of norms and rules perceived as 
legitimate, and the social identity of actors being capable of communicating and 
acting.”183 But normative contestations occur precisely because actors do not share this 
common life-world or differently interpret its repertoire. This means that communicative 
rationality of supposed equals and learners can take place among those who already share 
the same norms or interpret them in the same way. That produces an internal tension for 
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it claims that normative contestation can occur among those who already have no 
significant contestation over norms.184  
Parties are supposed to enter into a communicative relationship with the 
recognition that both can change their minds and be persuaded by the force of the better 
argument. It is worth noting that such a conception has as its precondition openness to 
being persuaded, or making oneself ready to learn from the equal other instead of being 
fastened on teaching to the inferior (non-equal) other. In that sense it differs from 
pedagogic narratives. However, scholars of argumentative logic claim that in 
international politics an argumentative relationship starts when governments “find it 
necessary to make rhetorical concessions and cease denying the validity of … norms.”185 
In other words, paradoxically, argumentative rationality takes over only when the 
contestation over the norm ceases, hence, the arguing mode indeed ceases to be a 
contestatory one. But also in an interesting way, argumentative accounts could have been 
more suitable for a democratic thinking of the politics of constitutive norms had they not 
been subordinated to the logic of pedagogic socialization. Their theoretical openness to 
the possibility of contestation of a norm through its adoption provides a space for 
differential engagement with norms, yet at the same their insistence on consensus and 
their precondition of sharing a common life-world assumes too much “mutual acceptance 
of the underlying norms” and very little contestation. Therefore it finally collapses into 
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the binaries of “defection versus socialization.”186 This consequently cripples the 
potential of communicative theories to provide an inclusive enough politics of normative 
engagement in world politics.187  
In communicative settings, the argument goes, “socializees need not, and indeed 
often do not, accept their role as students in the process of learning, from an authoritative 
teacher, broad schemes for making sense of the world.”188 Instead, they recognize other 
parties as “legitimate partners in a process of (international communication).”189 In other 
words, teaching is not between equals. In a communicative situation of arguing or 
persuasion there is no overt coercion, yet “such interactions take place within a socially 
constructed framework of ideas, which reflect the power of particular actors to define the 
“common life-world” within which certain arguments are regarded as legitimate, while 
others (which violate the established collective interpretations of the world) are not.”190  
This communicative setting, therefore, necessitates prior educative relationships. 
Gheciu suggests that “successful educational practices” can facilitate persuasion, because 
“if the socializees were to adopt the worldview taught by the pedagogic institution, 
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further social communication would occur within a shared normative framework.”191 
Therefore, through a curious twist, she envisions the (supposedly) egalitarian 
communicative relationship only after the hierarchical pedagogic relationship of teaching 
does its work. This way, the whole point in the logic of arguing and persuasion becomes 
emptied since it postpones it till the more favorable conditions are created by 
asymmetrical relationships of teaching.  
Therefore, while the argumentative approach seems at first sight to diverge from 
the previously discussed pedagogic approaches, I argue that it represents but one phase 
within them.  Arguing and persuasion are conditioned on prior pedagogic socialization. It 
is only after such pedagogic attempts to construct a “common lifeworld” on the basis of 
shared understandings, identities, and histories that the argumentative logic can take over. 
Risse recognizes that there is never an ideal speech situation in world politics. But even if 
we concede that there are truly argumentative situations in world politics, this can only 
take place after the pedagogic work of socialization is done. Risse and Sikkink point out 
that “the goal of socialization is for actors to internalize norms, so that external pressure 
is no longer needed to ensure compliance.”192In other words, external pressure is needed 
in the first place to prepare the grounds for persuasion. In that sense, argumentative 
rationality and persuasion are expected “to prevail in later stages of the socialization 
process.”193  
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This point is also evident in Risse’s discussion of arguing as a further/later stage 
in norm socialization.194 The rhetorical/instrumentalist stage wherein actors (mostly 
states) are forced to talk the talk of the norm precedes the argumentative/deliberative 
stage where real ‘truth-seeking’ behavior kicks in. In the previous stage international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, through shaming and naming, and 
through manipulating rewards and punishments get the norm-violating state to 
rhetorically adopt the norms. Then only through these “civilizing effects of hypocrisy”195 
or through the efforts to rectify ‘cognitive dissonance’ between deeds and words, do 
actors enter into the presumably nonhierarchical, egalitarian, inclusive, power-free, truth-
seeking deliberation. But to end up there, such intergovernmental organizations or 
transnational advocacy networks “legitimately claim authoritarive knowledge or moral 
authority (or both)” and hence exercise “moral power and authority.”196 These norm 
entrepreneurs “treat the norm-violating state as an international pariah, an outsider to the 
community of civilized nations.”197They teach the norm violating state “what it means to 
be a modern and civilized state.”198 The pedagogic function has to operate in advance in 
order for argumentation to kick in, and indeed it serves as one tacit precondition that 
Risse does not openly acknowledge or problematize. Arguing in that sense is one 
mechanism for norm socialization199that explicitly claims to distance itself from a 
hierarchical, nonegalitarian, patronizing, exclusive understanding of socialization. But 
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even in this formulation, the pedagogic function lurks in the background and tacitly 
serves as a precondition. 
Global governance is theorized as a non-hierarchical organization of international 
political life.200Arguing or persuasion is supposedly the least hierarchical mechanism of 
socialization in the reproduction of global governance, yet it becomes integral to the 
hierarchical organization of global life through pedagogic socialization. It differs from 
other pedagogic accounts in that it sees the ideal speech situation of the communicative 
interaction as a nonhierarchical and inclusive truth-seeking and reason-giving 
relationship between equals who share a common lifeworld. Conceding that such ideal 
situations do not exist in world politics, scholars of the communicative approach then 
point to the possibility and indeed actual existence of such communicative interaction 
after the pedagogic function of socialization (through coercion, material incentives and 
persuasion) pushes (putatively equal) interlocutors toward a more intersubjectively 
shared lifeworld. As Risse notes, “socializing actors into new norms requires more than 
simply manipulating cost-benefit calculations”201since norm violation is likely to happen 
when material rewards and punishments are removed. A “sustained compliance” with 
norms can only take place by way of “some degree of rule internalization, and for Risse, 
“this is where arguing and persuasion become relevant for socialization processes.”202 
Persuasion is a more effective way of inducing compliance with international norms. But 
arguing is particularly effective “at the latter stages of a socialization process.”203 The 
                                                
200 Risse, “Global Governance and Communicative Action.” 
201 Ibid., 306. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid., 307. 
   66 
process of “argumentative self-entrapment” starts with “rhetorical action and strategic 
adaptation to external pressures” but later “ends with argumentative behavior.”204 Risse 
admits that this is far away from Habermas’s notion of an ‘ideal speech situation’ since 
states are “forced into a dialogue by the pressure of fully mobilized domestic and 
transnational networks” as well as by the “economic or political sanctions by the 
international community.”205In that sense, supposedly nonhierarchical argumentative 
processes are conditioned on and preceded by the pedagogic processes that are essentially 
built on hierarchies of power, material and ideological. This, in a sense, accords with 
Partha Chatterjee’s observation that even in today’s global techniques of power, “the 
pedagogy of violence must often precede the pedagogy of culture.”206As it is implied in 
Risse’s communicative account, the pedagogy of violence (coercion, sanctions) should 
precede and prepare the grounds for deliberation among similar equals (pedagogy of 
culture). But this is also an impossible task, because the non-West cannot possibly share 
‘Western’ life-world. Then the two pedagogic functions, of violence and of culture, 
complement each other through various combinations of the global techniques to produce 
violent inclusions and universalist exclusions.  
  
4. The Binary Logic of Either/Or: Adoption versus Rejection of Norms 
  
One key component of pedagogic models of socialization, I argue, is their 
tendency to reduce normative negotiations to the binary categories of adoption versus 
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rejection, which underplays the complexity of normative engagements in world politics 
and ends up imposing a closure on the meaning and practice of norms. Some pedagogic 
accounts either take norms as constatives207 to be approached through the categories of 
true/false or correct/wrong. Accordingly, pedagogic socialization is the process in which 
the correct interpretation and practice of a norm is taught to the socializee. This 
constative rendition assumes that international norms have ‘correct’ interpretations that 
are taught by the pedagogic socializers. By so doing, it registers different interpretations 
of or claims on the norm as ‘incorrect.’  
This constative approach to norms is evident in Alexandra Gheciu’s account of 
“NATO’s pedagogical practices” in Eastern Europe. She describes NATO’s role in 
Romania as one of “teaching” people the “true democracy” which is “a universally valid 
model of state-society relations.”208 For her, NATO acted as “an authoritative agent 
providing ‘correct’ interpretations of the world, including definitions of the self and 
others, and identifying reasonable actions in that world.”209 In that vein, it “depicted 
Western liberal-democratic norms … as the correct foundation of a modern democratic 
polity.”210 NATO’s “pedagogic practices”211 do not simply “teach Western-defined 
norms” but also seek to “convince [the socializees] to accept a particular interpretation of 
the application of those norms.”212 By doing so, it seeks to police the slippages that might 
possibly occur in the translation of those norms. This pedagogic activity amounts to no 
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less than teaching the socializee “a whole lifeworld, a set of new meanings and 
dispositions for making sense of and acting in the world.”213 It is a comprehensive project 
of conversion by the norm proselytizer.  
Gheciu’s narrative is one example of the constative pedagogic treatment of norms 
within pedagogic discourse of socialization. This discourse situates the socializer to the 
position of “a legitimate normative guide,” and the socializee in turn accepts “Western-
defined interpretations of the world” as “correct.”214 Socialization may fail when the 
“novice” comes to “challenge [the teacher’s] specific prescriptions, arguing for a 
different interpretation regarding the correct application of the new norms in a particular 
case.”215 In other words, “a different interpretation” of the norm does not count as a 
contestation within the norm, but rather it falls outside the norm hence counts as a failure 
of socialization. This binary of either acceptance or rejection of norms within Gheciu’s 
constative pedagogic account falls short of registering contestations and differential 
claims within norms, thus foreclosing the norms from assuming different meanings, 
expressions, and practices in different contexts. What it envisions is a smooth transition, 
not cultural translation.  
This has serious consequences for global politics and for our understanding of it. 
Much of the political struggles in world politics take place through interpreting and 
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contesting the meaning of constitutive norms of modernity. In other words, more often 
than not political struggles are forged and discourses articulated through challenging a 
norm’s posited pedagogy—its correct interpretation and authorized enactment—rather 
than the norm itself. This is not, I argue, adequately captured within the norm 
socialization literature for it does not open much space to the idea that fundamental 
political categories (constitutive global norms) of modern international life are essentially 
contested and that their meaning gives content and reasons to political struggles. Hence, a 
constative treatment of norms falls short of recognizing how norms can be both accepted 
and challenged at the same time, both inhabited and resisted at once. As such, it tends to 
overlook the structural openness of norms to the possibility of their differential 
appropriation or performative adoption.  
As Finnemore points out, “normative contestation is in large part what politics is 
all about: competing values and understandings of what is good, desirable, and 
appropriate in our collective, communal life.”216 It is the locus of politics precisely 
because they involve the fundamental normative goods and there is “no clear stable 
normative solution.”217 Such political debates are about the nature of the norm. It is 
precisely because of the structural openness of the norm to multiple interpretations that 
subjects as actors laid claim to the norm, and adopted it differently. Such normative 
conflicts have “no unique solutions,” which means that “different and shifting solutions 
will be tried in different places, and local context becomes important in identifying the 
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particular solutions that will be tried in each place.”218 Even between the European and 
North American states, who are taken as coming closest to forming a community219 there 
are different interpretations about the appropriate role of the market in social life.  
Therefore, the socialization literature’s treatment of norms as pre-established 
stable structures in response to which states react fails to capture the situations that Antje 
Wiener refers to as “contested compliance.”220 According to Wiener, the conditions of a 
norm can sometimes be contested by a designated norm follower, which in turn may 
reconstruct the meaning of norms and transform the “normative structure of world 
politics. 221” She draws on Giddens’s structurationist sociology to argue that norms have a 
“dual quality” of being both “structuring and constructed.” Hence, taking compliance as 
contested is to attend to the ways in which the meaning of norms are produced, contested, 
and transformed through social practices.222 But she claims that this possibility is not 
entertained in the socialization literature because of its behaviorist treatment of norms as 
social facts that structure, constrain, and produce behavior. Therefore it “obscures the 
possibility of analytically defining variation in the meaning of norms.”223 The focus of 
norm compliance should therefore shift from government behavior to meaning of norms. 
This is especially true for constitutive norms such as democracy, human rights, 
equality, dignity, freedom, and development that are the key categories of political 
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modernity and are aspired globally.224 These “constitutive”225 or “generic”226 or 
“generative”227 norms provide compelling reasons for action. These norms are different 
from the “specific category of procedural norms” that prescribe “instructions” for specific 
situations228 or “single standard of behavior”229 in the form of regulations.230  
Constitutive norms “encompass a wider set of sociocultural information, entailing world-
views or core constitutional norms and principles such as, for example, the reference to a 
‘community of values.’”231 And it is quite likely to observe procedural/regulative norms 
conflicting with generic/constitutive norms. The example Wiener provides is the 
relationship between human rights and death penalty. States that acknowledge the reason 
entailed in the constitutive norm of human rights may adopt conflicting regulative norms. 
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For example, despite the fact that the U.S. signed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, 38 states within the U.S., including the federal state, have authorized death 
penalty. In that sense, the translation of a norm into practice is wrought with contestation 
even when the norm itself is adopted.232  Hence, as I will elaborate more in Chapter 3, 
constitutive norms are more likely to be the subject of performative appropriation 
because of their structural openness to multiple and conflicting interpretations.233  
However, not all pedagogic accounts take norms as constatives. Some do 
recognize the performative dimensions of norm socialization as a structural possibility 
and empirical fact. But they then put the emphasis on the pedagogic forces that would 
normalize the practice and meaning of these norms. For example, Finnemore and Sikkink 
do recognize that domestic structures and domestic norms serve as filters of international 
norms, and as such, they can “produce important variations in compliance and 
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interpretation of these norms.”234 But “norm entrpreneurs” coalescing with “transnational 
advocacy networks” effectively put domestic and international pressure on state actors to 
interpret norms in particular ways—as in the examples of Chinese footbinding or female 
genital mutilation.235 Elsewhere, Finnemore points to the contested character of norms 
such human equality. She suggests that despite the fact that “the norm of human equality 
rarely comes under overt attack,” the questions of “who is human” and “equal with 
regard to what” continue to introduce difference into the norm.236 Therefore the meaning 
of the norm of equality is not static but rather changes dynamically on the basis of who is 
conceived as proper human and on what basis equality is measured.237 Same for the other 
norms Finnemore mentions, markets and bureaucracy. However, the meaning of these 
norms are constantly under the pedagogic tutelage of Western state and non-state actors 
and discourses. World Bank delimits a particular understanding of the market and 
enforces it worldwide through various measures such as membership and conditionality. 
Hence, pedagogic socialization attempts to fix or arrest the meaning and practices of 
norms even when it recognizes contestations within norms.238  
Despite her overall endorsement of the sociological institutionalist approach, 
Finnemore criticizes sociological institutionalist notions of global isomorphism as 
equifinality or homogeneity in that they overlook “the tensions and contradictions among 
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social values and do not attend to the implications of those tense relationships.” 239 These 
tensions and contradictions among norms, for Finnemore, “leave room for different 
solutions and different arrangements, each of which makes legitimacy claims based on 
the same norms.”240 That means the precise shape of the norm in a given situation reflects 
the interaction of both local and international factors. For example, the modern state is 
now dictated as the “appropriate form of political organization” in global politics, but its 
shape varies in different contexts that reflect the influence of “local norms and customs 
with which international norms have had to compromise.”241 Yet there is always the 
inherent possibility that such variations take the form of ‘abnormalities’ deviating from 
the norm or even ‘transgressions’ subverting the norm. In Finnemore’s own example, the 
modern state has established itself as a global norm, but the different ways in which states 
appeal to that particular norm takes a deeply contestatory character. Take the example of 
communist states, autarkies, or theocracies. This differential adoption of the norm (in this 
case the ideological/constitutional adjective of the state) becomes a locus of political 
contestation. Some of the socialization literature recognizes the inherently contestatory 
character of constitutive norms in global politics, but then places the emphasis on the 
pedagogic mechanisms and actors that discipline these interpretations along liberal lines.   
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For example, Finnemore notes that while human equality has gained a status of 
global recognition as a norm and as a “necessary good,” understandings of human 
equality “may differ in Islamic societies, socialist states, and West European states.”242 In 
that sense, such constitutive norms leave “substantial room for interpretation and 
contestation, particularly in light of other strong norms in international life.” 243 However, 
as I mention in Chapter 1, pedagogic discourses such as post-Islamism and ‘Muslim 
democracy’ seek to discipline Islamist interpretations of the character of the state, public 
and private distinction, the place of religion in state and politics, and gender equality. In 
other words, while constative treatment of norms fail to register contestation within the 
norm, others who recognize the inherently contested character of norms highlight the 
pedagogic power of socialization to transform and discipline these interpretations along 
liberal lines. Hence, both stripes of socialization narrative operate with a common 
pedagogic template that seek to normalize actors and their normative negotiations.  
In a sense, if norms are collective expectations of appropriate behavior for a given 
identity244one can identify in the very structure of norms an inherent normalizing logic. 
After all, norms produce their effects through implicit or explicit do’s and don’ts, and 
they “by definition embody a quality of ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment.”245 
They are what “good people do (or do not do)” in particular situations.246 Socialization 
seeks to produce actors who would follow the norms because “it is the normal thing to 
                                                
242 Ibid., 139. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security (Columbia University Press, 1996). 
245 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 892. 
246 James Fearon, “What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word),” Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford 
University, Stanford, California, 1999, 27. 
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do.”247 Hence, there is an inherent normalizing logic in norm socialization. But more 
important for my purposes here is that the pedagogy within liberal socialization posits 
meta-rules that govern how norms are to be adopted and performed. It prescribes 
particular ways and manners through which universally aspired categories such as human 
rights, democracy, equality, and freedom are to be understood. In other words, one key 
component of this pedagogic discourse of socialization is to impose closure on the 
meaning of the sullied terms of modernity by way of treating them as constatives.  
Finnemore acknowledges that such expansion in the meaning of norms can 
happen only through a contestation of the meaning of the norm within the norm, or 
through practices that enact a performative contradiction.248 As she notes, social norms 
and institutions are “continually being contested, albeit to varying degrees at different 
times.”249 Furthermore, international norms can make “countervailing claims on people” 
or they can “mobilize groups with opposing claims, both of which are grounded in basic, 
legitimate norms of society.”250 For example, when equality meant equality of white 
males, actors invoked the norm of equality to establish it for non-whites and non-males. 
Once this meant equality for women and then it took the form of equality for all genders.  
Therefore, internal contestations within the norm cannot be registered in the 
binary of whether one socializes into it or rejects it, but they rather need to be understood 
as performative appropriations or differential/conflictual claims on the norm. 
Contestation within the norm has been fundamental to the historical evolution of the 
                                                
247 Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic 
Practices: Introduction,” 17. 
248 I discuss performative contradiction in Chapter 4.  
249 Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 135. 
250 Ibid., 138. 
   77 
norm. It is precisely because of the structural openness of norms to multiple 
interpretations that actors lay differential and conflictual claims on them.  
Checkel argues that norms are “certainly not accepted by all, but this is not 
surprising—a key insight of research on norms is their contested nature.”251 Here Checkel 
recognizes contestations over the norm but implies that contestation is thought only in 
terms of ‘not acceptance’ or rejection. If there is contestation, then the norm in question 
is not accepted. And when the possibility of contestation within the norm is entertained it 
is more often than not strategic manipulation of state or non-state actors to circumvent the 
norm. It is “talking the talk” of the norm and creating “Potemkin harmonization” to 
escape from the “costs of adaptation.”252 In other words, we either have “smooth 
socialization, good pupils” or absence of socialization and rejection or manipulation of a 
norm. This binary framework falls short of accounting for the complexity of political 
contestations over the key constitutive norms/categories of modernity, such as human 
rights, democracy, equality, freedom, dignity.  
Take human rights for example. Both proponents and opponents of legalization of 
abortion invoke the discourse of human rights—right to life and right to choice—to 
establish and defend their claims. Similarly, states that adhere to the constitutive norms of 
human rights may still differ in their interpretation of whether capital punishment should 
be included in the penal system or whether gay marriage should be recognized. 
Sometimes, even the states within the same federation can differ sharply on such 
politically charged issues.  
                                                
251 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.” 
252 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.” 
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Pheng Cheah argues, for example, that East Asian countries’ discourse about 
‘Asian values’ and their critical position in various international human rights 
conferences can and should be seen not as a rejection of human rights, but as a claim to 
human rights that interprets the notion of human dignity differently, one that prioritizes 
economic development over individual rights.253 This does not mean that such gestures 
are unproblematic. One may find these claims troubling in many ways. But they are 
contestations within the norm, not its rejection. Such gestures at once accept the 
fundamental prescription of the norm yet challenge its particular pedagogy—normalizing 
logic. Similarly there are numerous adjectives and models of democracy (liberal, social, 
communist, Christian, Islamic, Jewish) that overlap as well as conflict with each other. 
These interpretations cannot be conceived through the categories of correct vs. wrong. 
This does not paralyze judgment, and it is not a call for relativism. Rather it calls for an 
appreciation of differential adoptions of constitutive norms in different contexts. 
Adjudicating between those interpretations cannot be based on the constative binaries 
without doing considerable violence.  
Norms are intrinsically ambivalent and structurally open to multiple 
interpretations.254 This is why liberal pedagogy of socialization seeks to discipline how 
actors repeat norms. It prescribes not only behavioral compliance to norms but also 
solicits their internalization and habitualization as it aims at producing particular subjects 
with particular orientations, identifications, sensibilities. Schemmelfennig gives ‘private 
                                                
253 Pheng Cheah, Inhuman Conditions: On Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (Harvard University Press, 
2009). 
254 Raymond Duvall and Arjun Chowdhury, “Practices of Theory,” in International Practices, ed. Emanuel 
Adler and Vincent Pouliot (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 335–54. 
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property’ as an example of constitutive norms and ‘social policy’ as an example of 
regulative norms.255 But various debates such as the ones over taxation and social 
spending indicate that the meanings of these norms are not pre-given and the distinction 
between constitutive and regulative norms are not hard and fast but are rather analytical. 
They are negotiated through political struggles in specific contexts. In that sense, the 
decision on whether one practice constitutes a legitimate variation on a theme or counts 
as norm-violation is performative. It is a faith-like grounding of claim-making, a 




 I argued in this chapter that the current theorizing on norm socialization operates 
through a hierarchical pedagogic discourse that understands normative engagements as 
“assimilation of others”257  (the novice, the pupil, the child, the non-West) to ‘us’—the 
West as the embodiment of liberal norms. It does not envision a process of “reciprocal 
learning” informed by “reciprocity of understanding.” Instead it posits a unilateral 
relationship whereby one is set to acknowledge the authority of the teacher and learn 
from him and the other to teach the pupil. The ultimate goal is to create a new subject 
                                                
255 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.” 
256 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Religion (Routledge, 2013); Stephen Hopgood, “Moral Authority, Modernity 
and the Politics of the Sacred,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 229–
55. 
257 Fred Dallmayr, “Conversation Across Boundaries: Political Theory and Global Diversity,” Millennium - 
Journal of International Studies 30, no. 2 (June 1, 2001): 341. 
   80 
who internalizes the teacher’s norms as defined by him so that it becomes taken-for-
granted.  
Barnett and Finnemore see in the expansion of the functions and domains of 
international organizations a strong possibility of “undemocratic liberalism” in global 
governance.258 This chapter looks at this possibility at the level of normative negotiations 
and how they are framed in terms of the hierarchical positions of teachers and students 
and what these authority relationships entail. I argue that both the actual operations of 
liberal global governance and also the mainstream literature on norm socialization in IR 
rely on and reproduce a pedagogic understanding of normative engagements in which 
Western teachers are set to teach proper norms and their correct interpretation to non-
Western pupils. This, I argue, reflects and reproduces the hierarchical structure of liberal 
global governance. Teaching is considered an occasional and rare mechanism of 
socialization in world politics,259 but I suggest in this chapter that norm socialization 
takes place, and is studied within much of IR scholarship, in a pedagogic register. It is 
through various pedagogic mechanisms that liberal global governance produces and 
reproduces itself.  
Yet at the same time, there is much that cannot be subsumed under or consumed 
by the pedagogy of liberal global governance. The meaning and practice of norms are 
constantly negotiated and contested, albeit under conditions created by liberal modernity. 
While the structures and actors of liberal international order exercise such disciplinary 
power over the ‘novice non-Western,’ there is always an excess that seeks to escape, 
                                                
258 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the World. 
259 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe”; Gheciu, “Security Institutions as 
Agents of Socialization?”. 
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mitigate, or circumvent the hierarchies and exclusions created by these relationships. 
Those in the margins of liberal global governance engage with norms in ways that 
constantly put the pedagogy of socialization at risk. It is these performative dynamics and 
strategies that I now turn to in the next chapter.
   82 
CHAPTER 3 
PERFORMATIVE SOCIALIZATION: CULTURAL TRANSLATION AND 
APPROPRIATION OF NORMS IN LIBERAL GLOBAL GOVERNANCE   
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that norm socialization literature in IR tends to 
take socialization as a ‘pedagogic’ process in which the (often non-Western) 
‘newcomers’ are made to transition into ‘Western’ norms, mostly but not exclusively by 
the pedagogues of liberal international order. Here in this chapter I advance an alternative 
account of socialization, one that attends to the performative dynamics of normative 
engagements in global politics.1 To do so I draw on postcolonial and poststructuralist 
theoretical insights variously developed in the fields of literary theory, anthropology and 
history. First, I propose to read socialization not solely or simply as a process of 
‘transition’ into the prescribed meanings and authorized practices of norms but also as a 
process of their ‘translation’ through different social imaginaries and historical traditions. 
                                                
1 The concept of ‘performativity’ has a diverse genealogy and is taken up very differently in different 
disciplinary fields. Shannon Jackson notes that in a cross-disciplinary conversation one finds out that the 
concept means different things to different people and it has different trajectories and intellectual histories 
coming from “Bakhtin or Bateson, from Turner or Goffman, from Dewey or Austin, from Derrida or 
Lacan, from Butler or Sedgwick.” Professing Performance: Theatre in the Academy from Philology to 
Performativity (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12. Many possible paths of intellectual influence can 
be outlined within the trajectory of the concept in the fields of linguistic philosophy, literary studies, 
anthropology, social theory, queer theory and folklore studies. But as Jonathan Culler notes, “the relations 
among various thinkers’ notions of the performative and performance are scarcely clear.” Jonathan Culler, 
The Literary in Theory, 1 edition (Stanford University Press, 2006), 138. So much so that Dwight 
Conquergood suggests that performance should be taken as one of the essentially contested concepts, 
similar to democracy, power, and authority. Dwight Conquergood, “Of Caravans and Carnivals: 
Performance Studies in Motion,” The Drama Review 39, no. 4 (October 1, 1995): 137–41. But here I 
follow Culler’s proposal that “rather than try to restrict or simplify the performative’s domain, by choosing 
one strand of reflection as the correct one, we ought to accentuate and pursue the differences between 
them—so as to increase our chances of grasping the different levels and modes in which events occur.” 
Culler, The Literary in Theory, 165. Therefore, acknowledging the complexity and at times contradictory 
deployments of the concept of performativity, I try and clarify how I use it. Here my reading of 
performativity draws on Austin and various postructuralist and postcolonial readings of him, particularly by 
Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri C. Spivak, and Dipesh Chakrabarty.  
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Second, I discuss some of the strategies through which actors adopt norms non-
normatively, and hence destabilize the pedagogy of socialization. Third, I investigate the 
complex and unstable dynamics of authority and authorization in socialization by 
analyzing the role of conventions and audiences. Fourth, I distinguish performativity 
from performance and investigate its implications for the study of norm socialization. 
Finally, I discuss performative socialization as both adoption of and resistance to norms 
and I delineate the scope of the performativity of socialization. 
IR scholarship has used the lenses of performativity to analyze the production of 
state identities in and through foreign policy practices2 and as gendered subjects3 and to 
deconstruct the institution of international order.4 Building on speech act theory, the 
‘Copenhagen School’ has developed a theory of securitization.5 Constructivist scholars 
have drawn on speech act theory to interrogate the linguistic construction of rules, norms, 
and identities in international politics.6 However, the implications of the analytics of 
performativity for norms and socialization research in IR have not been systematically 
investigated. This is quite puzzling given performativity’s thorough engagement with 
questions of normativity and socialization, hence its potential to open up new interpretive 
                                                
2 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (University 
of Minnesota Press, 1998). For a powerful critique of the application of performative accounts of 
subjectivity to state actors, see Mark Laffey, “Locating Identity: Performativity, Foreign Policy and State 
Action,” Review of International Studies 26, no. 03 (2000): 429–44. 
3 Cynthia Weber, “Performative States,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 27, no. 1 (March 1, 
1998): 77–95. 
4 Badredine Arfi, “Rethinking International Constitutional Order: The Auto-Immune Politics of Binding 
Without Binding,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 39, no. 2 (December 1, 2010): 299–321. 
5 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 
Pub, 1997). For an extensive review of the securitization approach, see Holger Stritzel, “Security as 
Translation: Threats, Discourse, and the Politics of Localisation,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 
05 (2011): 2491–2517. 
6 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations (University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions. 
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possibilities for IR theorizing. Cynthia Weber suggests that “normativity is always bound 
up with performativity,” and performativity “takes up a critical position in relation to 
normativity.”7 Despite this intimate relationship, the implications of performativity for 
norms and socialization research are still underexplored.8   
At its core, to attend to the performative dimensions of socialization is to explore 
the ways in which globally dominant norms in world politics, many of which are 
expressed in the language of the universal, are appropriated by, and resignified from, the 
margins of liberal global governance. Echoing Amitav Acharya’s critique of the norm 
diffusion literature for its heavy emphasis on “conversion rather than contestation,”9 a 
performative reading further explores the dynamics of both normalization and 
insurrection within socialization.  In the next section I argue that cultural translation is a 
key mechanism through which these dynamics of normalization and contestation unfold.   
 
1. Socialization as Cultural Translation 
 
                                                
7 Cynthia Weber, “Performative States,” Millennium - Journal of International Studies 27, no. 1 (March 1, 
1998): 82. 
8 The promise of the analytics of performativity becomes evident in Jonathan Culler’s discussion of 
performativity. Culler suggests that performativity—particularly with reference to Judith Butler’s 
writings—is “a model for thinking about crucial social processes where a number of matters are at stake: 
(1) the nature of identity and how it is produced, (2) the functioning of social norms, (3) the fundamental 
problem of what today we call “agency” in English: how far and under what conditions can I be a 
responsible subject who chooses my acts, and (4) the relationship between the individual and social 
change.” Culler, The Literary in Theory, 161. Evidently, all of these questions are central to much of the IR 
theorizing, particularly within the Third Debate and with respect to constructivist and critical approaches, 
and have significant ramifications for theorization of norms and socialization in IR. 
9 Acharya, “How Ideas Spread,” 242. For Acharya, it is unfortunate that the literature tends to view norm 
diffusion as a process of teaching by transnational norm entrepreneurs—or in Nadelmann’s language, 
“moral proselytizers”—in a way that assigns “causal primacy to ‘international prescriptions,’ hence 
downplaying the role of different social imaginaries and the agency of local actors. 
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“New norms never enter a normative vacuum,” Finnemore and Sikkink argue, 
they rather “emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with 
other norms and perceptions of interest.”10 Various discourses, traditions and social 
imaginaries fill in the normative space of societies into which new norms arrive. The 
liberal norms, discourses, and institutions that now command global dominance, or at 
least relevance, do not travel in thin air, but they “encounter pre-existing concepts, 
categories, institutions, and practices through which they get translated and configured 
differently.”11 Engagements with the universalizing norms of liberal global governance 
occur in and through the pre-existing norms and discourses, and hence call for a politics 
of translation. Modernity as a process involves translation of norms and institutions, and 
as Niranjana points out, people in postcolonial societies live “always already in 
translation.” In that sense, translation is a metaphor for, and a mechanism of, 
socialization, especially (but not exclusively) in cross-cultural settings.  
Translation refers to the travel of meanings and signs across languages and 
cultures,12 hence socialization can be investigated as a process of cultural translation as it 
involves the circulation of norms and institutions across borders and cultures.13 In its 
narrowest sense translation is the act of “turn[ing] something from one language into 
another”; accordingly, cultural translation is “the translation of one culture into terms 
                                                
10 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 897. 
11 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, xii. 
12 Lydia H. Liu, “Introduction,” in Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global 
Circulations, ed. Lydia H. Liu (Duke University Press, 1999), 2. 
13 Susanne Zwingel, “How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational 
Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 115–29. 
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intelligible to another.”14 Translation is not solely an interlingual process or a linguistic 
question. It is also a “social practice,”15 a “problematic,” “a field,”  “a set of questions.”16  
Translation is a performative practice. It is so for two intimately related reasons. 
First, translations are inevitably mediated by language, and language itself is a mediated 
construction rather than a transparent medium. Therefore, translations “invent rather than 
represent culture.”17 As Liu points out, “one does not translate between equivalents; 
rather, one creates tropes of equivalence in the middle zone of translation between the 
host and guest languages.” 18 In other words, translation does not register an already 
existing equivalence between meanings, but rather, it creates them. Therefore, translation 
is “the performative nature of cultural communication.”19  
 Second, translation produces a relationship of difference (rather than equivalence) 
out of seeming incommensurabilities,20 and any articulation of difference, “whether 
                                                
14 Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context 
(University of California Press, 1992), 47. Shaden Tageldin defines “interlingual” translation as “the 
rendition of one language in another,” and “intercultural” translation as “the transaction of epistemic 
‘equivalence’ in economies of cultural exchange.”Tageldin also talks about an “intersubjective” form of 
translation, which denotes “the translation of one’s self to resemble an Other’s, as in Fanon’s rephrasing of 
the Hegelian dialectic.” (p.13) Her analysis of the politics of translational seduction as the modus operandi 
of cultural imperialism in (post)colonial Egypt draws on all these three forms of translation. Shaden M. 
Tageldin, Disarming Words: Empire and the Seductions of Translation in Egypt (University of California 
Press, 2011), 13. 
15 Liu, “Introduction,” 2. 
16 Ibid., 8. 
17 Niranjana, Siting Translation, 81. 
18 Lydia H. Liu, “Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth 
Century,” in Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, ed. Lydia H. Liu 
(Duke University Press, 1999), 137. 
19 Homi K Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), 326. 
20 As Chakrabarty points out, the relationship between non-Western histories and European thought is one 
of translucence instead of transparency, which neither erases the relationship nor establishes transparent 
equivalences between them. Cultural translation thus marks this translucence and produces difference 
performatively. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 18. Also see, Naoki Sakai, Translation and 
Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism (University of Minnesota Press, 2008).  
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antagonistic or affiliative,” is performative.21 Ergo, as a difference-producing practice, 
translation is performative. Translations are “transformations that never reproduce the 
‘original.’”22 There is a structural dynamic within translation that makes deformation and 
displacement inescapable.23 Through translation concepts “take on new genealogies of 
thought and action from the new language.”24 They get transformed. Especially those on 
the margins “continually stretch” the norms and discourses that govern global social life, 
and in so doing, create friction. Such displacements and transformations turn cultural 
translation from a “discursive condition of dominance” into a “ground of intervention.”25  
Norms, institutions, and discourses travel across borders through the mediation and 
filtering of different languages, histories and traditions if they are not imposed by sheer 
coercion and domination. Since there is “no cultural consensus on an international level 
about what ought and ought not to be a claim to universality, who may make it, and what 
form it ought to take,” any normative claim has to go through a process of cultural 
translation in order to institute itself as a norm in different cultural contexts.26 Otherwise, 
“colonial and expansionist logic” becomes the only way left for asserting the universality 
of norms and discourses.27 
                                                
21 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 3. 
22 Niranjana, Siting Translation, 117. 
23 Ibid., 46. Niranjana highlights that the Latin word translatio—the etymological root of translation—as 
well as its equivalents in Greek (metaphorein) and German (Übersetzung) communicate a sense of 
“movement, disruption, displacement.” Ibid., 8. 
24 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton University Press, 
2005), 224. 
25 Niranjana, Siting Translation, 46. 
26 “Without translation,” Butler points out, “the very concept of universality cannot cross the linguistic 
borders it claims, in principle, to be able to cross.” Judith Butler, “Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and 
the Limits of Formalism,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, 
ed. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek (Verso, 2000), 35. 
27 Ibid. Similarly, Susan Buck-Morss suggests that “there is no Archimedean point in space at which we 
could station ourselves while putting the globe in dry-dock for repairs,” this is why there is no option 
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The narratives that construe modernity as a process of ‘transition’ do not 
necessarily reject the role of translation, but rather they adopt a particular model of 
translation, a “sociological” or “modern” one as Chakrabarty names them, which relies 
on a universal third-term to enable exchange and equivalence between two categories.28 
This mode of translation lies at the heart of what Chakrabarty calls “History 1”—the 
“universal and necessary” history created by the global expansion of capital. History 1, 
and hence sociological translation, is “indispensable” for understanding how the 
commodifying, abstracting, and generalizing logic of capitalist exchange transformed the 
world.  
However, as much as it is indispensable, this “sociological” translation is also 
“inadequate” for it erases differences between categories and falls short of accounting for 
“History 2s”—the “affective histories” or “histories of belonging” that “always” modify 
History 1— “constitutively but unevenly.”29 History 2s are the domains of “diverse ways 
of being human” and “historical difference”30 that constitute different social imaginaries 
and discursive traditions. They “interrupt” and “punctuate” the universalizing and 
homogenizing logic of History 1 by resisting the generalizing force of sociological 
                                                                                                                                            
“except the slow and painful task of a radically open communication.” This radically open communication 
is “the task of translation as a political project,” and as such, it is performative. Susan Buck-Morss, 
Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left (Verso, 2003), 6-7. 
28 In his example, H2O is the general universal third-term that mediates and creates a relationship of 
equivalence between pani in Hindi and “water” in English. Or in Marx’s account, “abstract labor” becomes 
the universal currency that enables the commodification of things by making them available for exchange.  
Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 85. 
29 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 68-70. 
30 Ibid., 70. 
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translation. In so doing, History 2s do not reject or transcend History 1, but rather 
supplement and provincialize it.31  
Chakrabarty’s categories of transition/translation and History 1/History 2s are 
quite suggestive for thinking about dynamics of norm socialization. Pedagogic narratives 
of socialization are articulated within the realm of History 1, hence one can think of them 
as Socialization 1—the processes through which actors are made to adopt the norms of 
liberal global governance. Similarly, performative socialization can be construed as 
Socialization 2—processes in which the homogenizing force of Socialization 1 is 
negotiated and tamed. Just like the relationship between History 1 and History 2s, 
pedagogic and performative socializations are intimately related but deeply wrought with 
tension. A performative reading seeks to account for the ways in which cultural 
translation supplements and displaces the transition narrative (Socialization 1).32 
In that sense, translation is a terrain of contestation.  Translation, especially in a 
post-colonial context, is a “struggle”33 to unsettle the homogenizing force of norms and 
discourses by “interrupting the Western discourses of modernity.”34 It marks a resistance 
to the “assimilationist technologies” of modernity.35 As Bhabha notes, “the power of the 
postcolonial translation of modernity rests in its performative, deformative structure.”36 
Through translation the norms and institutions of modernity (i.e. citizenship, public-
                                                
31 Ajay Skaria, “The Project of Provincialising Europe: Reading Dipesh Chakrabarty,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 44, no. 14 (April 4, 2009): 56. Chakrabarty argues that a “nonsociological” and 
“nonmodern” mode of translation, which does not rest on a universal third-term (i.e. H2O) and instead 
takes “barter” or one-on-one form of exchange between categories as its model, is better equipped to 
understand the relationship between History 1 and History 2s.  
32 Ibid.  
33 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 348. 
34 Ibid., 346. 
35 Ibid., 9. 
36 Ibid., 346–347.  
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private division, secular reason) get transformed and cultural difference get written over 
them.   
However, even though cultural translation entails a form of strategic agency, it is 
not necessarily bound to challenge existing relations of hierarchy and domination. In fact, 
hierarchies and power differentials often get written into language also through 
translation. The fact that translation transforms does not necessarily mean that it subverts. 
This is so for two main reasons. First, the liberating potential of cultural translation is 
constrained by the original text. The original commands a certain force on the translation 
to remain faithful to the original, despite the displacements enacted in translation.37 As 
Asad suggests, 
the original text constrains in a way that a translation of it does not; that 
while one argues about the original one cannot, as a translator, argue with 
it. The latter activity can be properly carried on only in relation to the 
translation. Like the medieval translations, all translations must seek to 
articulate the power of the relic in its new habitat, and remain faithful to 
that power. 
 
The relationship between the ‘original’ and the ‘copy’ is often constructed in asymmetric 
and hierarchical ways. The expectation to be ‘faithful’ to the original exerts a pedagogic 
pressure on translating actors. Susan Bassnett lucidly captures this dynamic:  
“Europe was regarded as the great Original, the starting point, and the 
colonies were therefore copies, or ‘translations’ of Europe, which they 
were supposed to duplicate. Moreover, being copies, translations were 
                                                
37 Talal Asad, “A Comment on Translation, Critique, and Subversion,” in Between Languages and 
Cultures: Translation and Cross-Cultural Texts, ed. Anuradha Dingwaney and Carol Maier (University of 
Pittsburgh Pre, 1996), 331. 
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evaluated as less than originals, and the myth of the translation as 
something that diminished the greater original established itself. (…) The 
notion of the colony as a copy or translation of the great Original 
inevitably involves a value judgment that ranks the translation in a lesser 
position in the literary hierarchy. The colony, by this definition, is 
therefore less than a colonizer, its original.”38 
 
In other words, the constraining power of the original text casts significant doubt on the 
resisting force and liberating claims of translation. After all, in order for a translation to 
be appropriate, it must convey the ideas in the original text with as much fidelity as 
possible so as to be a successful translation.39 In the colonial context the colonizer 
‘invites’ the colonized into “the modern world culture” and at the same time “insists, as 
its authentic originator, on being the judge of successful enculturation.”40 The juridical 
metaphor Asad uses here (‘judge’) only multiplies the force of the pedagogic dynamics of 
rendering socialization as transition and acculturation—as the process of adopting the 
norms and ways of the dominator.  
 However, when we shift the unit and scale of translation from literary or 
philosophical texts to broader concepts, norms, and institutions, the constraining power of 
                                                
38 Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi, Postcolonial Translation: Theory and Practice (Routledge, 2012), 4.; 
quoted in Sathya Rao, “From a Postcolonial to a Non-Colonial Theory of Translation,” in Translation, 
Biopolitics, Colonial Difference, ed. Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon (Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 
74. 
39 Strikingly, in “The Politics of Translation” Spivak addresses this aspect of translation as a transformation 
that the translator goes through—a transformation through which translator surrenders her sovereignty or 
autonomy by “work[ing] at someone else’s title.” This for Spivak is the translator’s “surrender to the text” 
that she translates. But Tageldin points out the perils created by power asymmetries in such relinquishing of 
autonomy. She writes, “Spivak’s call on the self to surrender itself in translation enjoins humility on the 
dominant but holds peril for the dominated. For where does the colonized translator fly after she or he bids 
the self good-bye? Into the master-Other. If, for the colonized, the eros of translation fabricates a 
dangerously seductive “likeness” in the face of difference—the deep difference power makes—then the 
politics of (post)colonial translation beg retheorization […].” Tageldin, Disarming Words, 24.  
40 Asad, “A Comment on Translation, Critique, and Subversion,” 330. 
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the ‘original’ lessens. That power diminishes even further when one thinks of the 
universalizing norms of the Enlightenment, which are mostly essentially contested 
concepts, such as democracy, human rights, equality, freedom, or sovereignty. Hence, the 
dynamics of ‘fidelity’ to a text in translation vary.41 The performative force of translation 
is located in the potential of the ‘copy’ to destabilize the expectations of fidelity to the 
‘original.’42  
Furthermore, the dynamics of cultural translation can also transform processes of 
‘enculturation’ into processes of ‘transculturation.’ While acculturation or enculturation 
speaks to a linear process of transition and homogenization, transculturation results from 
and in turn produces cultural translation.43 The heterogeneity introduced by translation 
into the claimed purity of the ‘original’ concepts and categories presents a possibility of 
intervention.44 Translations “contaminate” the supposed purity of the ‘original.’45 
                                                
41 The examples Asad provides are his own translations of the sermons of a Saudi Arabian Islamic preacher 
into English, or the translation of Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. He points out, quite rightly, that a competent 
translation of a text “is not itself a critique.” Ibid., 331. 
42 In that vein, Niranjana notes that “the notion of fidelity to the ‘original’ holds back translation theory 
from thinking the ‘force’ of translation.” Niranjana, Siting Translation, 58. 
43 Similarly, in her discussion of Partha Chatterjee’s critique of the discourses that depict Eastern 
nationalisms as “failed imitations of Western political formations” and as “the illiberal, ‘evil’ 
mistranslations of a ‘good’ liberal original,” Shaden Tageldin suggests that “Chatterjee’s nationalism is 
neither mistranslation nor perfect translation but a crossing of the two: a response by the colonized to the 
loss of self-determination that takes the historically ‘necessary’ form of the nation in order to be heard by 
empire but just as purposely diverts that form to its own ends.” Tageldin, Disarming Words, 197–198. This 
insight captures the performative dynamics of socialization—in this case, into the norm of nationalism. It 
denotes a particular kind of political strategy—“response”—of differential and non-normative adoption of a 
norm (in this case “nationalism”).  
44 As Walter Benjamin argues, translation is “a removal from one language into another 
through…transformations.” Quoted in Siting Translation, 156. 
45 Ibid., 120. The relationship between translation and the original is one that Derrida calls supplementarity: 
“Translation is belated, always comes after the original, is always a supplement. Bu the ‘original’ lives on 
only in translation.”  Ibid., 160. As Liu points out, both Benjamin’s and Derrida’s accounts of translation 
based on the notion of supplementarity “refuses to privilege the original over the translation.” Lydia H. Liu, 
“The Question of Meaning-Value in the Political Economy of the Sign,” in Tokens of Exchange: The 
Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, ed. Lydia H. Liu (Duke University Press, 1999), 14. Susan 
Buck-Morss also builds on Benjamin’s remarks that “a successful translation leaves neither the original nor 
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Transculturation emerges out of cultural translation and “inflects rather than effaces” 
what is deemed to be the original. That inflection brought about by translation is a locus 
of intervention in norm socialization.46  
Second, the liberating force of translation is curtailed by the very conditions of 
power within which translation occurs. “The process of cultural translation,” Talal Asad 
notes, “is inevitably enmeshed in conditions of power—professional, national, 
international.”47 Power asymmetries condition and influence translation in various ways. 
For example, the Chinese language was transformed in its interaction with English in the 
nineteenth century, in ways that English language was not. Many neologisms were 
created in Chinese to create the sense of equivalence between the languages—for 
example, the word quanli was created in order to counter the concept of ‘right’ in 
English—but no English neologisms were perceived to be necessary or created in that 
interaction.48 This suggests that although translation opens both the receiving and original 
languages to transformation, the material conditions of asymmetry and inequality end up 
transforming languages differently and asymmetrically.  
                                                                                                                                            
the receiving language unchanged,” and envisions translation as an attempt to “force each language to 
extend itself creatively, becoming more than it was, producing an open space in which a new politics might 
take root.” Buck-Morss, Thinking Past Terror, 6–7. Buck-Morss recognizes that “translation among 
political languges is [not] easily accomplished” since “real differences exist.” However for Buck-Morss it 
is precisely in those “apparent incommensurabilities” that the promise of translation lies. The project of 
cultural translation treats political languages as “mutually open to transformation.” In so doing it 
“challenges the unequal arrangements of global power” and expands the discursive field. Susan Buck-
Morss, Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left (Verso, 2003), 6–11. 
46 As Dingwaney argues, “insofar as translation designates the space within which the dominant language 
and culture is rewritten, inflected, subverted by the ‘subaltern,’ [it] functions as a form of resistance.” 
Dingwaney, “Introduction: Translating ‘Third World’ Cultures,” 8. 
47 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion  : Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 198. 
48 Liu, “Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century.” 
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As Asad puts it, “global patterns of power created by imperialism and capitalism” 
asymmetrically situate languages, and this inequality creates “asymmetrical tendencies 
and pressures in the languages of dominated and dominant societies.”49 These power 
dynamics point to the necessity of attending to the social and institutional forces and 
relations that condition various kinds of literary, cultural, and institutional translation.50  
Cultural translation may well work “in full complicity with the logic of colonial 
expansion, when translation becomes the instrument through which dominant values are 
transposed into the language of the subordinated, and the subordinated run the risk of 
coming to know and understand them as tokens of their ‘liberation.’”51 As Shaden 
Tageldin points out, translation has been “both an instrument of and a response to cultural 
imperialism.”52 Translation served as “a significant technology of colonial domination” 
in the colonial enterprise.53 The colonizers translated the native’s texts and practices into 
their own languages, and in so doing domesticated, purified, and objectified them. 54 The 
task of translation in the colony was to “purify the debased native texts”55 and “to 
domesticate the Orient” in order to turn it into “a province of European learning.”56 As a 
                                                
49 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 199. 
50 Asad, “A Comment on Translation, Critique, and Subversion,” 329. 
51 Butler, “Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism,” 35. 
52 Tageldin, Disarming Words, 2. 
53 Niranjana, Siting Translation, 21.  
54 Ibid., 34. For example, translating the authentic, indigenous literary and legal texts of the colonized was a 
central preoccupation of the British colonial administrators. British colonial administrators in India were 
motivated by a “desire to translate in order to contain and to contain and control in order to translate.” This 
was an integral part of the European ‘civilizing mission.’ 
55 Ibid., 16. 
56 Ibid., 12. Through translation the colonial administrators, some of which were influential translators of 
Indian and Persian texts into English, as well as Western ethnographers aimed at “constructing” the world 
of the indigenous people, “representing” them and “speaking on [their] behalf.”  Ibid., 70. 
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social practice enmeshed in relations of power, translation was and is utilized to render 
the local languages “weaker”57 and “nonuniversal.”58  
Yet, it was not only the colonizer who engaged in translation. The colonized also 
did. Nevertheless, under conditions of colonial or imperial asymmetries, the colonized 
often translated, and still translates, his cultural tradition in ways that would fit into that 
of the colonizer in order to prove the ‘equivalence’ and ‘commensurability’ between his 
own language and culture and those of the colonizer. In such settings, the disciplinary 
powers of liberal modernity operate in part through a mode of translation that, as Asad 
suggests, “reinterprets non-European traditions in order to make them compatible with 
Western ideals.” For example, the fact that many “modernist and progressivist Islamic 
movements” aim to “demonstrate a Western essence in Muslim traditions” stands as an 
expression of the “structured inequality in power between Western and non-Western 
traditions.” 59 Likewise, Tageldin argues that the logic of “imperial translationality” 
                                                
57 Asad, “A Comment on Translation, Critique, and Subversion,” 330. 
58 Liu, “Introduction.” For Niranjana, colonial enterprise of translation rested on the ideas of the 
transparency of representation, immediacy of reality, fidelity to the original meaning, and equivalence 
between languages. It was also accompanied by a historicist teleology. The historicist framework of this 
translation rested on and reproduced the structured asymmetries and hierarchies between languages and 
cultures in the colonial setting. In treating historical difference as “natural” and “essential,” and the non-
Western societies as “static,” “unchanging,” and “outside of history,” the historicist framework of 
translation performed what Johannes Fabian calls “a denial of coevalness.” She points out that the kind of 
translation that conceives representations as being immediate and transparent “colludes with or enables the 
construction of a teleological and hierarchical model of cultures that places Europe at the pinnacle of 
civilization, and thus also provides a position for the colonized.” Niranjana, Siting Translation, 18. For her 
the “liberal impulse of humanism” was the “credo” of colonial translation. Ibid., 59. Niranjana further 
remarks that especially since the Renaissance translation has been regarded in the West as the “the 
quintessential humanistic enterprise” since it was tasked with “bridging the gap between peoples.” Ibid., 
47. 
59 Talal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of 
Stanley Diamond, ed. Stanley Diamond and Christine Ward Gailey (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1992), 347. 
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pushed (post)colonial Egypt to “eradicate all local incommensurability with a European 
“universal”.”60  
This suggests that the distinction between pedagogic and performative 
socialization cannot be easily mapped onto the binary between domination and resistance. 
Cultural translation—the realm of the performative production of difference—may very 
well reproduce the pedagogic logic of transition. Since translations are carried out under 
conditions created by modern institutions of power, they may rewrite the asymmetries 
and inequalities of the material field into language. In addition, this asymmetric structure 
of linguistic and cultural exchange does not have to be one of imposition. Rather, as 
Tageldin points out, translation does not simply or solely impose. It also seduces. It lures 
the colonized toward what Tageldin calls the “fantasy” of equivalence—the illusion of 
equivalence despite the unmistakable inequality between the colonizer and the 
colonized.61 It works through “a politics of translational seduction” that “represses the 
inequalities between those dominators and themselves.” 62 Such translational seduction 
                                                
60 Tageldin, Disarming Words, 30. 
61 Tageldin, Disarming Words. Though the relationship between the colonized and the colonizer is 
“decidedly unequal,” there is still a “love-logic at work in an Orientalism usually understood as simple 
‘domination’” which creates an illusory affective economy that enables the colonized to imagine herself as 
being “equal to or greater than” the colonizer. Ibid., 9. Tageldin’s notion of ‘seduction’ marks this complex 
relationship. For her, through “[u]nderstanding cultural imperialism as willful imposition—not attractive 
proposition—the reigning  discourse conceals the undertow of seduction, which often transmits colonial 
culture.” The colonizer and the colonized together “converted instruments of coercion into those of 
seduction and thereby solicited—and often elicited—the complex ‘love’ of the colonized and their 
(post)colonial heirs.” This dynamic of seduction, Tageldin argues, “haunts both empire and 
decolonization.” In the Egyptian (post)colonial context that Tageldin is writing about, this amounts to what 
she calls “fantasies of modern Egyptian sovereignty.” At the same time, the colonizer “translated Europe” 
into the language of the colonized (in Tageldin’s case, to “Arab-Islamic terms,”) in order to tempt them “to 
imagine themselves ‘masculinized’ masters of the Europeans who were mastering them.” The colonized is 
captivated by the colonizer as much as captured by the colonizer. Ibid., 7. 
62 Tageldin, Disarming Words, 10. 
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gives an illusion of equal footing in language despite the relationship of domination in the 
colonial situation.  
Cultural translation is conditioned by the productive and repressive powers of 
modern norms and institutions. The task then is to investigate “how power enters into the 
process of cultural translation” and defines its possibilities and limits in socialization.63 
To do so, one has to look at historically specific cases to investigate the kinds of 
interventions actors make through cultural translation. 
 
2. Strategies of Appropriation: Performative Contradiction and Inscription of 
Difference 
 
Along with translation, there are other ways in which actors appropriate norms 
performatively and trouble the pedagogy of socialization.64 Here I highlight two 
intimately interrelated but still distinct forms of appropriation: (1) performative 
contradiction, and/or (2) inscription of difference. The first happens when actors claim to 
partake in a norm from which they are excluded (unauthorized to claim); and the second 
occurs when actors claim to differ from the normalizing logic of the norm while 
                                                
63 Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 199. As Asad puts it, “modern world culture has no difficulty in 
accommodating unstable signs and domesticated exotica, so long as neither conflicts radically with systems 
of profit.” Asad, “A Comment on Translation, Critique, and Subversion,” 331. 
64 Ashcroft et al. define appropriation as “a term used to describe the ways in which post-colonial societies 
take over those aspects of the imperial culture –language, forms of writing, film, theatre, even modes of 
thought and argument such as rationalism, logic and analysis—that may be of use to them in articulating 
their own social and cultural identities.” The colonizer may well appropriate the language of the colonized, 
yet as Ashcroft et al. point out, post-colonial theory focuses on exploring “the ways in which the dominated 
or colonized culture can use the tools of the dominant discourse to resist its political or cultural control.” In 
that sense, appropriation, as a mode of ‘norm-taking,’ is a “strategy of usurpation” that does not follow the 
normalizing pedagogy of the norms and discourses, but rather seeks to displace it. See, Bill Ashcroft, 
Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies (Psychology Press, 1998), 19–
20. 
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remaining within its bounds (unauthorized to differ). Put differently, performative 
socialization takes the form of a claim for inclusion within a norm or for difference 
within a norm. While the former challenges “universalist exclusion,” the latter resists 
“violent inclusion” in the form of assimilation or homogenization.65 Such claims denote a 
form of appropriation that is “beyond the assimilationist’s dream or the racist’s 
nightmare”—the ‘assimilationist’s dream’ of violent inclusion into norms through 
negating difference, and the ‘racist’s nightmare’ of undoing the protocols of exclusion, 
e.g. from the norms of equality, self-rule or freedom.66 In both instances the pedagogy of 
the norm gets troubled, but in different ways and with different effects.  
  Through performative contradiction, those who are excluded from the reach of a 
norm appropriate that norm. It takes place “when one with no authorization to speak 
within and as the universal nevertheless lays claim to the term.”67 In the performative 
contradiction of claiming the norm from which one is excluded, one “speaks from a split 
situation of being at once authorized and deauthorized.”68 One is not properly authorized 
by the existing conventions and relevant audiences to claim the norm, but nevertheless 
claims it with authority. The force of the performative contradiction is negotiated in this 
very gap. For example, Rosa Parks’s act of sitting in the front of a bus in a segregationist 
society takes place in this ambivalent space. Parks authoritatively laid claim to a right 
that she was not authorized to within the existing normative structure, and as such, hers 
                                                
65 Prozorov, “Liberal Enmity.” 
66 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 322. 
67 Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (Routledge, 1997), 91. 
68 Ibid., 90. 
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was a performative contradiction. Her unauthorized act endowed her with a certain 
authority and challenged the codes of legitimacy of the existing social order.69 
Similarly, when colonized peoples invoked the Enlightenment belief in equality in 
opposition to the colonial practices of inequality, they performed a contradiction by 
laying claim to a norm from which they were excluded. In that sense, they socialized into 
the norm of equality, but their socialization was performative: their rearticulation of the 
colonial script was not a straightforward assimilation into the norm since the normative 
order in the colony rested on their exclusion. Or, when equality meant equality of 
Christian white males only, actors invoked the norm of equality to expand the norm—to 
establish it for non-Christian, non-white, non-males.70  
In that vein, when the colonized claimed self-rule against the ‘not yet’ of the 
pedagogy of the colonizer and the postcolonial elite, their appropriation of democratic 
norms was a performative contradiction. By so doing the colonized subverted the 
structure of tutelage that expected him or her to master the “art of waiting.”71 In the 
pedagogic historicist discourse invoked by both the colonizers and the postcolonial elites, 
the non-West is not yet ready and mature enough to exercise the norms of political 
modernity, such as equal citizenship and self-determination. In J.S. Mill’s imaginary, for 
                                                
69 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
In a similar but still different register, Derrida discusses the American Declaration of Independence as an 
example of the productive ambivalence of authority in performativity. The “good People of these Colonies” 
invoked in the Declaration as the ultimate authority in whose name the “Representatives” sign the 
Declaration do not exist prior to the signing of the document. (Derrida 1986)  The Declaration creates the 
very people in whose name it speaks. It attempts to create the conditions for its own felicity, yet as such, it 
is an infelicitous speech act. It can at best be taken as a promise that can be assessed through looking at 
how it manages to realize itself. James Loxley, Performativity (Routledge, 2006), 103. 
70 Finnemore 1996, 138. 
71 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 8. 
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example, the colonized were “not yet civilized enough to rule themselves.”72 They had to 
wait in the “waiting room of history” till they acquire the “public spirit” and “historical 
consciousness” necessary for self-rule. This pedagogic discourse invoked, and still 
invokes, various preconditions derived from European history to make the non-West 
ready for exercising democracy and equal rights, and the norms of political modernity in 
general.73 Performativity of socialization lies in the subaltern’s assertion of ‘maturity’ and 
institution of authority (self-authorization) to inhabit the norm against the exclusions of 
the pedagogic discourse of ‘immaturity.’  
Universalism figures prominently, and at times paradoxically, in such 
performative contradictions. On the one hand, universal claims “justify coercion into 
internationally mandated standards of progress and order,” and as such, they are “at the 
center of neocolonial disciplinary programs—just as they were to colonialism.”74 On the 
other hand, Enlightenment universals (i.e. reason, rights, equality, freedom) have also 
been central to anticolonial struggles and thinking. The colonized have forced these 
Enlightenment universals to expand so as to include themselves. This reveals a “deep 
irony” in the logic of the universal: “universalism is implicated in both imperial schemes 
to control the world and liberatory mobilizations for justice and empowerment.”75 “When 
those excluded from universal rights protest their exclusion,” Tsing writes, “this protest 
                                                
72 Ibid. 
73 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Legacies of Bandung: Decolonisation and the Politics of Culture,” Economic and 
Political Weekly 40, no. 46 (November 12, 2005): 4812–18. 
74 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection (Princeton University Press, 
2005), 9. 
75 Ibid. 
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itself has a twofold effect: It extends the reach of the form of power they protest, even as 
it gives voice to their anger and hope.”76  
For example, when environmental activists mobilize around the “universalizing 
rhetorics of rights and justice,” they are at once “making their case to the world” through 
the power of these discourses and are being “shaped by liberal logics.”77 Invoking such 
universals expands the reach of their power, but these universals are inevitably 
transformed when they are translated, actualized, and “engaged” in a place. This is why 
“all universals are engaged when considered as practical projects accomplished in a 
heterogenous world,” and “engaged universals travel across difference and are charged 
and changed by their travels.”78 Historical and cultural differences transform the way in 
which the universals of political modernity are received. This process of normative 
negotiation is woven with “friction.”79  In order to make these global discourses work 
within particular situations they have to make “compromises and collaborations” through 
which “new meanings and genealogies are added to liberalism.”80 As Tsing notes, 
“[a]ctually existing universalisms are hybrid, transient, and involved in 
constant reformulation through dialogue. Liberal universals mix and meld 
with the universals of science, world religions (especially Christianity and 
Islam), and emancipatory philosophies including Marxism and feminism. 
Moreover, the embrace of universals is not limited to just one small 
section of the globe. The West can make no exclusive claim to doctrines 
of the universal.”81 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 5. 
78 Ibid., 8. 
79 Ibid., 10. I draw on Tsing’s metaphor/concept of ‘friction’ more extensively in the next section.  
80 Ibid., 5. 
81 Ibid., 9. 
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In that sense, performative contradiction denotes a form of appropriation beyond the 
conventions of authority and propriety for enacting the norms. This is why, Butler argues, 
a norm adopted through a performative contradiction does not amount to “a simple 
assimilation” (read, pedagogic socialization) to that norm for it is “predicated on the 
exclusion of the one who speaks [in the name of the norm], and whose speech calls into 
question the foundation of the universal itself.”82 Rather it is a challenge to the limits of 
the norm to open it up for future possibilities (read, performative socialization). In that 
sense, performativity compels the constitutive norms and categories of modernity “to 
embrace those they have traditionally excluded.”83 In so doing it “exposes the failure of 
the norm to effect the universal reach for which it stands,” and thereby highlights “the 
promising ambivalence of the norm.”84 As such, performative contradiction exposes the 
limits of the norm and the parochiality of its claims to universality.85 It exceeds, Butler 
argues, the normalizing discipline of pedagogic felicity:  
What happens, for instance, when those who have been denied the social 
power to claim “freedom” or “democracy” appropriate those terms from 
the dominant discourse and rework or resignify those highly cathected 
terms to rally a political movement? If the performative must compel 
collective recognition in order to work, must it compel only those kinds of 
recognition that are already institutionalized, or can it also compel a 
critical perspective on existing institutions? What is the performative 
power of claiming an entitlement to those terms—“justice,” 
                                                
82 Butler, Excitable Speech, 90. 
83 Ibid., 161. 
84 Ibid., 90. 
85 Ibid. 
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“democracy”—that have been articulated to exclude the ones who now 
claim that entitlement?86  
 
While pedagogic forces of socialization seek to discipline actors toward ‘proper’ and 
‘competent’ enactment of norms, performative dynamics of socialization point toward 
and capitalize on the potentials of ‘improper’ performances or, what Raymond Duvall 
and Arjun Chowdhury dub “imcompetent practices.” Duvall and Chowdhury take issue 
with the practice turn’s exclusive focus on ‘competent performances’ of actors—those 
perpetrated by the right subjects in right situations and recognized as such by the 
audience community. They argue that there are also situations “where actors either 
reflexively or self-consciously act incompetently in order to establish their identity—or 
more precisely, their identity itself is constituted by departing from what would constitute 
‘competent performance.’”87 These deliberate “incompetent” performances might unfold 
in the form of reflexive “acting-outs” or self-consciously subversive “transgressions.” 88 
Such incompetent performances “can mark a refusal to abide by the current rules, and can 
be the basis for a challenge to those rules—and potentially, change in the rules 
themselves.”89  
One important political effect of incompetent performances is their opening up of 
the possibility of change in international politics through contesting existing rules. Duvall 
                                                
86 Ibid., 157–158. 
87 Duvall and Chowdhury, “Practices of Theory,” 341. 
88 Ibid., 342. 
89 Ibid., 348. Hence, Duvall and Chowdhury suggest that practice turn’s stress on “pattern, regularity, and 
repetition, albeit with a bit of ‘wiggle room’” ends up exaggerating the stability of existing structures. 
Therefore it “can obscure both the social processes that generate change and the inherent instability of 
practices themselves.” Ibid., 337.The exclusive focus on competent practices “serves to reify the existing 
order, because competence is always in relation to existing norms and mores.” Ibid., 349. 
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and Chowdhury discuss the example of anti-dam activists, who are not recognized as 
legitimate interlocutors by policymakers and development experts, and hence are 
unauthorized as actors, but who nonetheless “forced major changes in the perceptions of 
the utility of dam projects” precisely through their ‘incompetent performances’ that failed 
to abide by the rules of economic rationality.90 Similarly, when the French slave colony 
San Domingo revolted and established the independent state of Haiti in 1804, this 
transgressive act was an incompetent performance in that it was not authorized within the 
texture of the colonial world order of the time. Yet it was able to authorize itself and 
initiate a transformation in international order. 
The second strategy of appropriation that can trouble the pedagogy of 
socialization is the inscription of difference into norms even when the subject inhabits 
them. In general this is a mode of ‘negotiation’ (rather than negation) in which “words or 
concepts [are] wrested from their proper meaning.”91 Inscription of difference in norms 
becomes a strategy of survival within the pedagogic ‘matrix’ of socialization. It raises a 
challenge to the homogenizing dynamics and forces of socialization. This is akin to the 
challenge that History 2s pose to History 1’s pressures to “evacuate the local by 
assimilating it to some abstract universal.”92 History 2s reinscribe and resignify modern 
norms and discourses, and as such, become the “grounds for claiming historical 
difference.”93  
                                                
90 Duvall and Chowdhury, “Practices of Theory,” 343. 
91 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 263. 
92 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 18. 
93 Ibid., 71. 
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One strategy of such insertion of difference in norms is grafting and paleonymy. 
While the former refers to the situations where one discourse is inserted into another,94 
the latter refers more specifically to “the retention of old names while grafting new 
meaning upon them.”95  For Derrida, paleonymy is a tactic that seeks to maintain “an old 
name in order to launch a new concept.”96 In paleonymics, the name of the norm is kept 
as a “leverage for intervention” in order to “keep a handle” on the operations of the 
norm.97 Through grafting and paleonymy, difference gets inscribed into the norm while it 
is adopted, hence the graft becomes a form of intervention.98   
For example, the meaning of ‘sovereignty’ has changed from a state’s right to 
non-intervention to a state’s responsibility to protect the rights of its citizens.99 This, in 
Duvall and Chowdhury’s terms, is a “synchronic” change since the signifier (sovereignty) 
remains the same in time while its meaning gets transformed. Similarly, the very meaning 
of the norm of equality has changed in line with the changes in the responses to the 
questions of “who is human” and “equal with regard to what.”100 This change also speaks 
to the polysemic and contested nature of the meaning of norms primarily because of their 
dependence on language. The relationship between norms and signifiers can and does 
change. Even presumably straightforward signifiers get signified and interpreted in 
multiple, crisscrossing, and conflictual ways. 
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95 Ibid., 142. 
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In his account of norm ‘localization’ Amitav Acharya includes grafting as a 
strategy of norm-taking. He takes grafting as “a tactic norm entrepreneurs employ to 
institutionalize a new norm by associating it with a preexisting norm in the same issue 
area, which makes a similar prohibition or injunction.” He takes issue with constructivist 
scholars’ treatment of grafting as a strategy that transnational actors employ for changing 
local norms. In those accounts, “there is no sense of whether, to what extent, and how the 
preexisting norm helps to redefine the emerging norm at least in the local context, or at 
the receiving end.” Hence, he presents his framework of localization as a “more complex 
process of reconstitution” that goes beyond simple repetition of the norm.101 Acharya 
aptly levels a critique against mainstream constructivism for its treatment of grafting and 
framing as strategies of transnational actors, but I argue that Acharya too 
underemphasizes the performative force of strategies of grafting.  For him grafting is only 
an “adaptive process” that makes “an outside norm congruent with a preexisting local 
normative order.”102 However, as Duvall and Chowdhury point out, grafting may well be 
reconstitutive of the norm. 
Another strategy of inscription of difference in a norm is ‘catachresis.’ The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines catachresis as “improper use of words; application of 
a term to a thing which it does not properly denote; abuse or perversion of a trope or 
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metaphor.”103 A catachrestic engagement with a norm then is one in which the norm is 
“wrongly used, misapplied, and wrested from its proper meaning.”104 Extrapolated from 
its original meaning, catachresis in the postcolonial condition refers to “the process by 
which the colonized take and reinscribe something that exists traditionally as a feature of 
imperial culture.”105 As the etymological root of the word ‘catachresis’ suggests 
(‘perverted use’), it is a form of negotiation “in terms of reversing, displacing and seizing 
the apparatus of value-coding.”106 For Spivak, “claiming catachresis from a space that 
one cannot not want to inhabit [the sentence, sententious], yet must criticize [from 
outside the sentence] is then, the deconstructive predicament of the postcolonial.”107 In 
other words, catachresis is a strategy of non-normative adoption of norms within the 
postcolonial condition. Through catachresis, those in the margins of liberal global 
governance reinscribe the constitutive norms of political modernity. Put differently, one 
of the ways in which subalterns socialize into the constitutive norms of liberal order is 
through their catachrestic appropriation that reinscribes difference into norms and hence 
unsettles the pedagogy of socialization. Through catachresis, the norm is at once adopted 
and challenged. One example of such catachresis can be found in Spivak’s discussion of 
the postcolonial appropriations of parliamentary democracy. As Ashcroft et.al. point out,  
When Spivak speaks, for instance, of the ability of the subaltern ‘to 
catachretize democracy’, she means ‘the insertion and the reinscription of 
something which does not refer literally to the correct narrative of the 
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emergence of parliamentary democracy.’ That is, while parliamentary 
democracy emerges from a specific European history and culture, its 
adoption into, and adaptation by, the culture of the postcolonial society, 
including the assertion, for instance, that there exists a pre-colonial native 
tradition of parliamentary democracy, may offer an empowering avenue of 
self-determination to the subaltern subject.108  
 
Indeed the debates over the proper meaning and practice of secularism in India in the 
Constituent Assembly that drafted the Indian Constitution in 1940s present various 
catachrestic adoptions of secularism. For example, one member of the Assembly suggests 
that the state must be secular in the sense that it must unite politics and religion. The 
Western historical experience has shown, he argued, that separating religion and state 
was necessary to prevent bloodshed and that the state “should not identify itself with the 
religion of any particular section of the population.”109 But for this representative, there 
was a difference between a particular religion and dharma as the latter was standing for 
“the true values of religion or of the spirit” which all states need in order to solve their 
problems: “When I say, Sir, that the State shall not establish or endow or patronise any 
particular religion, I mean the formal religions of the World; I do not mean religion in the 
widest and in the deepest sense.” De Roover et al. note that this was a “conceptual 
distortion” envisioning a secular state that was “both separated from and unified with 
religion.”110 Through catachresis the terms of a discourse gets appropriated “for other 
kinds of purposes.” This possibility of breaking with the ordinary meanings and acquiring 
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non-ordinary meanings is the promise, and possibly also the peril, of performative 
catachresis. Through the “rehearsal of conventional formulae in non-conventional 
ways,”111 catachresis embodies non-normative adoption of norms and “contests what has 
become sedimented in and as the ordinary.”112 Therefore, performative adoption of norms 
may not simply reproduce norms, but may as well transform them by engendering new 
possibilities, creating new meanings and functions. Such resignifications constitute a 
locus of normative change.113  
Furthermore, inscription of difference in a norm can also take the form of 
mimicry.114 According to Bhabha mimicry is the colonized’s repetition of the colonizer in 
a form that is “almost the same but not quite.”115 As a “mode of repetition and 
reinscription” mimicry appropriates in inappropriate ways.116 Through mimicry, actors 
insert cultural difference into norms and trouble the normalizing logic of the norm.  
Alastair Iain Johnston takes ‘mimicking’ as a mechanism of socialization in international 
relations. For him, mimicking is a “microprocess” of socialization whereby “a novice 
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initially copies the behavioral norms—including discursive practices—of the group to 
navigate through an uncertain environment.”117 This kind of “borrowing” is a “safe, first 
reaction to a novel environment,” which restricts the options available to the novice.118 In 
that sense, mimicking for him is a “survival strategy.”  
However this rendition of mimicking undercuts the performative force that 
mimicry commands. In Johnston’s notion of mimicking, unlike Bhabha’s, there is not 
much room for inscription of difference into the norm, rather, the impetus is to conform 
to the normalizing logic of the norm in order to survive. Johnston construes mimicking as 
a “satisficing first step designed simply to be able to participate in the group by following 
its most basic rules, even before the actor has a clear sense of what its interests might be 
that need maximizing.”119 And through the repetition of such mimicking of “prosocial 
behaviors,” actors may internalize them as a taken-for-granted script down the road.120 
Thus construed, mimicking does not have a potential to trouble the pedagogy of 
socialization. On the contrary, it works to consolidate the normalizing logic of norms. 
These strategies can manifest themselves in various combinations. For example, 
in Anna L. Tsing’s notion of ‘engaged universality’ performative contradiction and 
inscription of difference come together: 
[T]he universal is what, as Gayatri Spivak has put it, we cannot not want, 
even as it so often excludes us. The universal offers us the chance to 
participate in the global stream of humanity. We can’t turn it down. Yet 
we also can’t replicate previous versions without inserting our own 
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genealogy of commitments and claims. Whether we place ourselves inside 
or outside the West, we are stuck with universals created in cultural 
dialogue. It is this kind of post- and neocolonial universal that has 
enlivened liberal politics as well as economic liberalism as they have 
spread around the world with such animation since the end of the Cold 
War. Nor is scholarly knowledge exempt; every truth forms in negotiation, 
however messy, with aspirations to the universal.121 
 
Here Tsing outlines a performative mode of engaging with the universal norms and 
discourses of liberal global governance.  Hers is a call for adopting the universalizing 
norms and discourses (“participate in the global stream of humanity”) without 
succumbing to their normalizing pedagogy (“replicating previous versions”). She seeks to 
appropriate these universals by inserting difference and through cultural translation 
(“cultural dialogue” and “negotiation”). Construed this way, universals become 
“practical” and “engaged,” that is, wrought with contestations and frictions. 
Strategies of non-normative adoption of norms are by no means limited to 
performative contradiction and inscription of difference through paleonymy, grafting, 
catachresis, and mimicry. Rather, these are examples of discursive strategies that seek to 
insert agency and difference into the adopted norms and discourse.122 They all indicate, in 
different ways, a “subversive strategy of subaltern agency that negotiates its own 
authority through a process of iterative ‘unpicking’ and incommensurable, insurgent 
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relinking.”123 This brings us to the question of authority, which I now turn to in the next 
section.  
 
3. The Force of the Performative: Conventions, Audience, and Authority 
 
“All performativity,” as Butler argues, “rests on the credible production of 
authority.” 124 Then, what makes normative enactments authorized in world politics? To 
answer this question we need to explore both the ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocutionary’ 
power of normative enactments. The illocutionary power of an act is the effect it creates 
in the very act (in the conditions of its enunciation), whereas its perlocutionary power is 
the effect it creates through the act (in the dynamics of its reception).125 While the former 
necessitates setting forth the conventions that make a particular performative possible and 
successful,126 the latter channels our attention to the role of the audience(s) for the 
success of the performative. Conventions and audiences are both crucial for a 
performative to produce the authority it seeks to be effective. I argue that the force of the 
performativity of socialization is negotiated in between its illocutionary and 
perlocutionary effects, that is, its simultaneous reliance on and troubling of the 
conventions, norms, and discourses that make the act possible as well as of the reactions 
of audiences.  
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J.L.Austin coined the term ‘performative’ in his theory of speech acts in order to 
distinguish between different functions of language. While ‘constatives’ are utterances 
that report a falsifiable statement and “describe some state of affairs”127 about the world, 
‘performatives,’ for Austin, are speech acts that actually do the action they name, as in 
the examples of promising, apologizing, declaring, ordering, affirming and naming. 
Constatives are statements that are either true or false; but performatives are utterances 
that enact a world-creating power. Hence, while constatives can be tested on the basis of 
their correspondence to the outside world, performatives cannot simply be true or false 
for they do not report or describe.128  
Rather, the force that performatives command derives from their compliance with 
the conventions that authorize them (illocutionary force) and from their effect on the 
audience (perlocutionary force).129 In order for performatives to be “felicitous” and 
“successful”—to achieve what they refer to—they must be uttered by proper actors, 
through proper procedures, and in proper circumstances. A performative would be 
“infelicitous” if it does not abide by the conventions and conditions that authorize it. 130 
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For example, the utterance ‘I do’ in a marriage ceremony is a performative that enacts a 
marriage bond. However, as Austin points out, it can only create the aimed effect (e.g. 
marriage contract) if the ‘I do’ is uttered by the right person, in the right moment, in line 
with proper procedures. If one of those conditions is not met, the performative ‘I do’ fails 
or “misfires.” Hence, for Austin performatives are felicitous only when they perform a 
“public, authorized act, according to the socially stipulated rules.”131  
That also means all performatives carry the structural “illness” of infelicity or 
“misfire” due to their conventional nature,132 and this is where Jacques Derrida takes up 
Austin’s notion of the conventionality of performative acts.  “Wherever there is the 
performative, whatever the form of communication,” Derrida writes, “there is a context 
of legitimate, legitimizing, or legitimized convention.”133 Derrida refers to this 
conventionality as “citationality” and “iterability” of performatives. Iterability is the 
simultaneous repeatability and alterability of a sign, such that the trace of the old context 
is conserved while the context gets transformed.134 However, because performatives are 
iterable, they are always haunted by the structural possibility of failure. As Culler puts it, 
“something cannot be a performative unless it can go wrong”—unless it can misfire.135 
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Derrida then goes on to ask: “Could a performative utterance succeed if its 
formulation did not repeat a ‘codified’ or iterable form, in other words if the formula I 
utter to open a meeting, christen a boat, or undertake marriage were not identifiable as 
conforming to an iterable model, if it were not thus identifiable as a kind of citation?”136 
In answering this question, Derrida argues that performatives can break with their 
contexts and create new contexts by authorizing themselves without being authorized by 
existing conventions. In that sense, while Austin looks at how socially accepted norms 
and conventions authorize or de-authorize speech acts, Derrida investigates the ways in 
which performativity of language and practices may enact something new by breaking 
rules or troubling norms. Performatives can destabilize “the political and institutional 
structures that make possible and govern our practices, our competencies, our 
performances.”137 For Derrida the performatives that are not priorly authorized can 
trouble existing norms and hence inaugurate a change, while this inauguration is made 
possible by the very norms and conventions that unauthorized performatives unsettle. 
This is why the meanings and practices of norms are under constant surveillance and 
policing in order to produce them in line with their normalizing logic. “If the police is 
always waiting in the wings,” Derrida writes, “it is because conventions are by essence 
violable and precarious.”138  
Butler draws on Derrida’s notion of citationality in her account of gender 
performativity. For Butler identity categories, including gender, are not constative truths 
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but rather performative effects produced in and through social relations.139 Gender is 
enacted and produced by one’s actions. Through stylized repetitions of socially 
established ways of behaving as a woman or a man, one assumes a gender identity.140 
Therefore, the “forcible citation of gender norms” (socialization into gender norms) is the 
condition of possibility for being recognized as a gendered subject.  
However, since performatives are citational and historical, they carry the 
possibility of introducing difference, reinscribing meanings, and displacing and 
recontextualizing conventions. Such reinscriptions indicate the possibility of political 
intervention into the norms and discourses “by attempting to capture and redeploy” 
them.141 The performativity of socialization into norms, then, takes the form of 
differential repetition. Such repetitions bring about socialization into these norms, but this 
socialization is also the resource for inflecting and destabilizing the norms:   
Performativity is a matter of reiterating or repeating the norms by which 
one is constituted: it is not a radical fabrication of a gendered self. It is a 
compulsory repetition of prior and subjectivating norms, one which cannot 
be thrown off at will, but which work, animate, and constrain the gendered 
subject, and which are also the resources from which resistance, 
subversion, displacement are to be forged.142  
 
The perlocutionary power of performatives, however, depends in large part on the 
audience. The ability of a performative to produce effects through the act is negotiated in 
its co-constitutive relationship between the actor and audience(s). Since the 
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perlocutionary force of performatives is unconventional and depends on the audience, the 
performativity of enactments and claims does not guarantee or ensure political outcomes. 
Yet the influence of audience varies according to the kinds of performatives. For 
example, audience is more central for the success of “contractual” performatives, such as 
‘I bet,’ compared to “declaratory” performatives, such as ‘I declare.’ In order for a bet to 
be made successfully, it should be accepted by the taker.143 But for declarations to be 
effective the concurrence or authorization of audience may not be as significant. Indeed, 
declaratory performatives can create the very audience they address more so than they are 
being permitted by that audience.144 They are self-authorizing and self-grounding, and in 
a way, unilateral. 145 The question then is “how far can acts be unilateral?” and “what 
counts as [an act’s] completion?”146 A person, if he or she is in the right role, can appoint 
another person to a position without the consent of the latter, but one cannot marry 
without the consent of the other party. Hence, the role of the audience is contextual.  
Furthermore, there can be discordances between conventions regulating a norm 
and audiences participating in an enactment, and at times a hard and fast distinction 
between conventions and audiences may not hold. For example, according to the existing 
conventions in place, the Egyptian military’s ousting of President Mohammad Morsi in 
July 2013 appears as a typical example of a military coup; however, the international 
audience, particularly the key state and interstate actors, opted to not recognize it as such. 
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In that sense, there was incongruence between conventions and audience as to whether 
the Egyptian military’s intervention was a coup d’état. But on the basis of the very same 
example, one can argue that the reason why the liberal international community failed to 
name Egyptian military’s intervention a coup is the prevalent liberal ideological 
conventions that consider non-liberal and particularly Islamist actors as essentially anti-
democratic, justifying military interventions against them. In that sense, conventions and 
audiences are very much intertwined. 
Likewise, until very recently same-sex marriage was not authorized by existing 
social and legal conventions in Western liberal democracies, but liberal audiences have 
been able to transform these conventions significantly. In that sense, conventions, 
audiences and the relationship between them are dynamic and open to change, though 
with significant variations depending on the issue-area. But at the same time if a marriage 
ceremony fits into the accepted social conventions authorizing the act, then the reception 
of audience or even the sincerity of parties involved would not render the performative 
void. In that sense, the force of the performative is affected by varying combinations of 
conventions (formal and informal rules and institutionalized practices) and audiences 
(actions and reactions of relevant spectators). The ways in which conventions and 
audiences interact in particular speech and non-speech acts, however, is a matter of 
empirical investigation. 
This point about the joint role of conventions and audiences in determining the 
force of performative enactments has been powerfully made in the securitization 
literature. In its original statement, the securitization theory developed by the 
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‘Copenhagen School’ draws on Austin’s speech act theory and suggests that 
securitization occurs when actors in appropriate positions carry out speech acts that 
define a certain issue as an existential threat to the core values of a political community 
that demands extra-political emergency measures. As Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde put 
it, in order for a securitizing move to be successful “the particular persons and 
circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular 
procedure invoked.”147 Therefore securitization occurs performatively through actors’ 
articulations in line with existing conventions of discourse and status.148 Yet Buzan et al. 
argue that “securitization is not decided by the securitizer but by the audience of the 
security speech act.”149  The success of the securitizing speech act is measured by the 
degree to which the audience accepts something to be an “existential threat to a shared 
value.” Hence, it is the audience that gives the securitizing actor “the permission to 
override the rules that would otherwise bind,”150 but the securitizing move is made 
possible by the conventions in place. 
However, the subsequent scholarship on securitization finds Buzan et al.’s 
attention to the interaction between audience(s) and securitizing actors less than adequate. 
Thierry Balzacq argues that Buzan et al. appeal to the role of the audience but their 
framework ignores the ways in which audiences provide formal and moral support as 
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well as limits.151  However, the goal in securitizing moves is “to persuade a target 
audience, drawing on contextual clues, to issue a mandate for action to defeat or reduce 
the identified threat.”152 Hence, Balzacq argues that security pronouncements should not 
be taken as speech acts which become successful if they follow rules, but rather as 
“discursive techniques allowing the securitizing actors to induce or increase the [public] 
mind’s adherence to the thesis presented to its assent.” (Balzacq 2005, 172) Audience 
holds the key for the success of securitizing moves, while conventions authorize security 
moves in the first place. For example the securitizing audiences can agree with the 
‘securityness’ of an issue but may not authorize extraordinary measures to deal with it, 
hence creating an ambivalent situation as to the success of the securitizing moves of 
actors.153  
Other IR scholars also stress the role of audiences in different contexts. Some 
rationalist scholars argue that talk is not always cheap in international politics since 
relevant audiences, both domestic and international, could make it quite costly for state 
elites if they back down in a war of attrition or fail to follow through their threats.154 
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Audience here serves as a limit or constraint on speech capable of incurring reputational 
costs. Others investigate the ways in which rhetoric can exert causal and even coercive 
force. For example, Krebs and Jackson identify dynamics of “rhetorical coercion” when 
actors seek to outmaneuver their political opponents by strategically linking their own 
claims to the deeply ingrained norms of the audience, and by so doing, depleting their 
opponents from resources to sustain a counter-argument.155 In these situations, political 
actors devise strategies to rhetorically “threaten” their opponents to bring the 
public/audience in on their own sides and against their opponents.156 They therefore 
“must craft their appeals with an eye to some audience which sits in judgement of their 
rhetorical moves.” 157 For example, the Druze invocation of their participation in the 
Israeli military to compel Israeli politicians to concede them full-citizenship rights;158 the 
coercive power that the discursive fixation of the meaning of 9/11 as war commands in 
the American public sphere;159 or the local legitimacy-boosting or -bashing effects of 
states’ rhetoric about their opponents or allies160 can all be taken as examples where the 
heart of the question is winning the audience to compel the opponent toward a certain 
course of action.  
                                                                                                                                            
in International Relations: An Experimental Approach,” International Organization 61, no. 04 (2007): 
821–40. 
155 Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of 
Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 35–66. Also 
see, Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer K. Lobasz, “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the 
Road to War in Iraq,” Security Studies 16, no. 3 (2007): 409–51. 
156 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms,” 47. 
157 Ibid., 44. 
158 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms.” 
159 Krebs and Lobasz, “Fixing the Meaning of 9/11.” 
160 Arjun Chowdhury and Ronald R. Krebs, “Talking about Terror: Counterterrorist Campaigns and the 
Logic of Representation,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 125–50; 
Ronald R. Krebs, “Rethinking the Battle of Ideas: How the United States Can Help Muslim Moderates,” 
Orbis 52, no. 2 (2008): 332–46. 
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However, there are modes of contestation and claims-making which do not take 
the form of a rivalry between two parties to rhetorically corner each other, or where the 
goal is not primarily to win the audience against an opponent, or where the audience is 
not as directly implicated. For example, in cultural translation of norms, the contestation 
is not between antagonistic parties rebutting each other’s claims to force the opponent 
toward a particular course of action. Rather it is about the hegemonic articulation of a 
norm and its travel and transformation across cultural difference. When the AK Party in 
Turkey invokes ‘democratic secularism’ as a universal norm, it speaks to various 
domestic and international audiences (i.e. the European Union, the US, the Islamic world, 
the Kemalist state, the pious electorate), but the question of secularism and democracy 
for the AK Party is not solely a question of how its ‘performance’ would be received by 
the audience(s). Equally important, it is about what the Islamically most appropriate 
course of action would be in a given domestic and international circumstance. Similarly, 
when the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt invokes ‘Islamic democracy,’ it does not seek to 
deny its opponents the “rhetorical materials out of which to craft a socially sustainable 
rebuttal.”161 Rather, it is attempting to rework modern political norms in line with its 
reading of an Islamic tradition to which it claims adherence.  
Or take Rosa Parks for example. The dynamics of contestation in her sitting in the 
front of a bus in a segregationist society are different from those of a competition to win 
the audience. The audience is not directly or primarily implicated in her insurrectionary 
act. She did not openly or primarily seek to get the authorization of the audience. Her 
transgressive act was not authorized by the conventions of the society she was lived in; 
                                                
161 Krebs and Jackson, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms,” 42. 
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rather, she contested the hegemonic articulation of the norm of equality by laying a 
differential claim to it. Hence her adoption of the norm was non-normative, and her act 
performatively authorized itself without a direct appeal to, or authorization from, the 
audience. Therefore, an audience’s reception is not always determinative of the felicity of 
performatives. That felicity is, rather, a function of the varied and combined effects of 
conventions and audiences in particular sociopolitical contexts. Audience is necessary for 
any speech act to take place, but what force does audience compel in such claims? To 
what extent do utterances successfully institute themselves unilaterally? Such questions 
require empirical investigation of specific contexts to parse out the effects of the complex 
interaction of conventions and audiences on the force of enactments.162  
 
4. Performance, Performativity, and Socialization 
 
One may think that the performative reading of norm socialization I develop here 
is a reading of socialization as performance. However, despite significant overlaps in 
meaning, I suggest that performativity and performance are different and that this 
difference matters for students of norm socialization.163 Performance and performativity 
share the same etymological root (French parfunir: to furnish, to accomplish) and as 
concepts they were developed independently of each other roughly around the same time 
                                                
162 Likewise, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) transforms the norms of 
‘cooperative security’ and ‘flexible engagement’ in their regional context, it does not necessarily seek to 
win an audience but to rework the norm in line with its conventions. Acharya, “How Ideas Spread.” 
163 I thank Ronald R. Krebs for pressing me to flesh out these differences more clearly and explicitly.  
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in the mid-1950s.164 They are used interchangeably in various contexts,165 which, 
according to Eve Sedgwick and Andrew Parker, end up creating “a carnivalesque 
echolalia of what might be described as extraordinarily productive cross-purposes.”166 
They point out that “the oblique connection between performativity and the loose cluster 
of theatrical practices, relations, and traditions known as performance” has proven very 
productive but remains underarticulated.167 Despite this proximity, however, there are 
differences between the two. So much so that J. Hillis Miller, a prominant theorist of 
performativity, claims that “performativity as performance style and performativity as the 
felicitous operation of a speech act have almost nothing to do with one another.”168 
Treating the two as the same or almost the same, for him, creates “considerable 
confusion.” Thus it is important to differentiate “the force of a performative speech act” 
from “the condition of being performed, as by an actor or a dancer.” 169 When applied to 
the question of socialization in IR, these differences are not hard and fast, but rather 
differences in emphasis and context. Then how are the two different, and why and how 
does that difference affect our reading of socialization?  
First, performance and performativity entail different roles for audience. 
Dramaturgical accounts that take socialization as performance place the audience at the 
                                                
164 The concept of the performative was introduced by J. L. Austin in 1955 and on the other hand Erving 
Goffman’s seminal work on social action as theatrical performance was published first in 1956. Gregory 
Bateson’s account of behavior as performance in “A Theory of Play and Fantasy” also appeared in 1955.  
165 For example, Butler’s theory of gender performativity suggests that gender is a stylized performance of 
what it means to be a boy or girl. And Marvin Carlson’s oft-cited book on performance discusses Austin’s 
concept of performativity under the title of “Performance of Language: Linguistic Approaches.” See, 
Butler, Gender Trouble and Marvin A. Carlson, Performance: A Critical Introduction (Routledge, 2004). 
166 Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Performativity and Performance (Routledge, 1995), 1. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Miller, “Performativity as Performance / Performativity as Speech Act,” 219. 
169 J. Hillis Miller, “Resignifying Excitable Speech,” WSQ: Women’s Studies Quarterly 39, no. 1 (2011): 
225. 
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center stage in social action, whereas performativity places more emphasis on the force of 
conventions to authorize and de-authorize enactments despite its recognition of audience. 
Performance entails a sense of audience that is more immediate, proximate and effective. 
As Marvin Carlson notes, performance is “always performance for someone, some 
audience that recognizes and validates it as performance even when, as is occasionally 
the case, that audience is the self.”170 Performance invokes a rather proximate and even 
physical presence of audience in its various uses related to theatricality (e.g. ritual, 
ceremony, public display), display of skills (e.g. an athlete in a competition), standard of 
achievement (e.g. a student in a test), or “culturally coded pattern of behavior.” (e.g. 
social role of a father.)171 
The sociologist Erving Goffman, a leading mid-twentieth century theorist of 
social performance, defines performance as any and all kind of activity that seeks to 
influence the audience.172 His conception of socialization as performance is one in which 
actors constantly play socially ascribed roles by offering performances to spectators. 
Socialization then is the process through which people come to inhabit roles in social 
plays as actors performing on stage—e. g. doctors filling in the role of care-giver. 
Therefore, socialization is focused on how actors present themselves before audience(s) 
when they perform norms, and hence are driven by strategies of impression management, 
role-playing, stagecraft, and manipulation.173 Constructivists who applied Goffman’s 
                                                
170 Carlson, Performance, 6. 
171 Ibid., 5. Dictionary defines performance as “a presentation, especially a theatrical one, before an 
audience.” (American Heritage Dictionary, quoted in Miller 220) 
172 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Doubleday, 1959), 15. 
173 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life; James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (Yale University Press, 1990). 
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performance theory of socialization to IR have argued that actors socialize into the norms 
and institutions of international society by adopting the roles defined in it. For example, 
Alex Wendt considers role-taking as the primary mechanism of socialization through 
which states ‘fit in’ to particular roles defined by international institutions.174 Similarly, 
Michael Barnett discusses how states deal with role-conflicts that emerge out of their 
participation in multiple institutions.175  
On the other hand, the sense of audience that performativity implies is rarely as 
proximate, direct and causal as it is in theatrical performance. Instead, as an analysis of 
the world-making powers of speech (and nonspeech) acts, it is focused more on the social 
and linguistic conventions, norms, and structural conditions that authorize an enactment. 
For Austin what is necessary for a performative to bring off its effect is that it should be 
uttered in right circumstances and by right procedures.176 He claims that a performative 
utterance would be “hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a 
poem, or spoken in soliloquy.”177 This statement, in a curious way, both establishes the 
necessity of audience for any speech act to be heard and understood, and at the same time 
deprives the performative of its force if it is staged. Hence in order for a performative to 
be felicitous, it needs an audience to witness it, but what ultimately authorizes the speech 
                                                
174 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 
International Organization 46, no. 02 (1992): 391–425, doi:10.1017/S0020818300027764; Alexander 
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge Studies in International Relations) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
175 Michael Barnett, “Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System,” International 
Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 (September 1, 1993): 271–96, doi:10.2307/2600809; Michael N. Barnett, 
Dialogues in Arab Politics (Columbia University Press, 1998). 
176 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 8. The necessary condition for a performative to be forceful is 
that “there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, that 
procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.” Ibid., 14. 
177 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 22. 
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act is not the audience (at least not primarily) but the conventions and procedures that 
prescribe what a proper initiation of marriage entails.  
Second, I argue that performance accounts of socialization have a hard time 
registering the performativity of non-normative adoption of norms. They take 
socialization as a process in which actors mold and modify their performances in order 
“to fit into the understanding and expectations of the society in which it is presented.”178 
Performances presented before others “tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially 
accredited values of the society”179 and “highlight the common official values of the 
society” in which they occur.180 In that sense, socialization “fixes” actors by putting them 
to a “strict test of aptness, fitness, propriety, and decorum.”181 Therefore in Goffman’s 
structural account of social encounters, performances constantly reinforce the disciplinary 
power of socialization. Actors constantly seek to show that they properly “fill in” the 
roles society expects and that they live up to social standards.  
This theatrical analogy about role-playing, impression-management and stagecraft 
provides useful insights for analyzing the disciplinary and normalizing dynamics in 
international politics. However, it does not attend to how actors translate, resignify and 
appropriate what those roles are and what they entail. It sheds very useful light on how 
social life gets reproduced through induced competent performances, but it does not 
account for what Duvall and Chowdhury call conscious “incompetent performances” and 
how these can destabilize conventions. Goffman’s account does not offer much insight 
                                                
178 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 35. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid., 55. 
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into the situations where norms are at once adopted and challenged, or adopted non-
normatively.182 Likewise, even though Wendt’s socialization as role-taking serves as a 
possible source of change in international system, he does not have much to say about 
whether and how roles can be taken up non-normatively—e.g. adopting the role but 
contesting its posited behavioral patterns or standards of appropriateness.  
Similarly, James Scott’s perceptive analysis of everyday resistances also develops 
a reading of socialization as performance and role-taking.183 In his account, the 
subordinate learns the knack of acting like a slave, a serf, or a racial inferior in the course 
of socialization. In Scott’s analysis of performance, socialization exerts an immensely 
domineering pedagogic force, yet he shows that even in such tightly disciplined contexts 
domination fails to achieve ideological conversion or hegemonic incorporation. For Scott, 
“most subordinates conform and obey not because they have internalized the norms of 
the dominant, but because the structure of surveillance, reward, and punishment makes it 
prudent for them to comply.”184 In other words, compliance with norms does not 
                                                
182 Indeed Austin’s conception of performativity also does not offer much on this score. Similar to 
Goffman, Austin was interested only in the public, conventionally authorized, and socially stipulated 
speech acts. He did not explore how speech acts could actually produce their effects by breaking or eluding 
the rules. His account does not address whether an enactment unauthorized by the existing conventions can 
still take place. It was Derrida and Butler who probed this question later.  
183 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 49. Scott looks at the gap between what he calls “public 
transcripts”—the open interaction between the powerful and the subordinate—and the “hidden 
transcripts”—“offstage” discourses that are “beyond direct observation by powerholders.” (4) While in 
public transcript the dominant actors “compel performances from others,” the subordinates use the 
strategies of disguise and impression management (17) and then challenge the public transcript in their 
hidden discourses—e.g. jokes, rumors, gossip, folktales, songs, and so on. These two discourses are meant 
for different audiences and are produced under different constraints of power. (5)  
184 Ibid., 193. 
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necessarily indicate internalization of them—an observation with which mainstream 
socialization accounts concur.185  
However, Scott’s account of the hidden (speech and non-speech) acts of 
resistance to domination does not explore how the less powerful can take up the prevalent 
norms and discourses non-normatively. He comes closest when he discusses one of the 
strategies of resistance that subordinates employ, the one in which subordinates realize 
that some of their own interests could “find representation in the prevailing ideology” of 
the dominant elites and hence they utilize the rhetorical space provided by it.186 For 
example, slaves in the U.S. South used the paternalistic discourse of their masters as a 
ground to achieve further concessions from them for better conditions of living—food, 
treatment, mobility, and so on.187 However, in performative modes of adopting a 
discourse the less powerful not only adopt the ‘prevailing ideology’ but also appropriate 
it and rework it to a different effect, in ways that might run counter to the disciplining 
logic of that ideology. The socializee-as-subordinate in Scott’s account constantly keeps 
an eye on “what is permitted on stage”188 and presses against its limits only in private. A 
performative reading of socialization, however, explores how actors publicly take up 
these norms and discourses non-normatively. This is more in line with what Scott later 
                                                
185 Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe”; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink, The 
Power of Human Rights; Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the 
Central and Eastern European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.” 
186 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 18. 
187 This is in some ways similar to Krebs and Jackson’s model of rhetorical coercion, except that in the case 
of the relationship of master and slave, one can hardly talk about an audience to which the master would be 
accountable for the kinds of claims slaves would make. 
188 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 196. 
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refers to as “the imaginative capacity of subordinate groups to reverse or negate dominant 
ideologies.”189  
Since they view socialization through the lenses of pedagogic forces only, the 
performance frameworks tend to register non-normative adoption of norms not as 
contestations within the norm but as insincere performances or misrepresentations. The 
question of differential claims on norms then gets transformed into a visceral question of 
sincerity. For Goffman sincere actors are those “who believe in the impression fostered 
by their own performance,”190 and cynical actors are those who do not believe in what 
they do or have “no ultimate concern with the beliefs of [their] audience.”191  On that 
basis Goffman distinguishes between performances that are “real, sincere, and honest” 
and those that are “contrived” and “false.”192 Then for a performance to “come off,” the 
audience “by and large must be able to believe that the performers are sincere.”193 In 
other words, in Goffman’s dramaturgical model of socialization, the audience’s 
evaluation of the sincerity of actors is key to the success of performance of a norm.194 
However, there is ultimately no way to decisively know the intentions of another 
since there is no way to get into that other’s head. There are no consensual standards of 
                                                
189 Ibid., 91. 
190 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 18. 
191 Goffman notes that cynical actors need not necessarily act out of self-interest. Sometimes their roles or 
audience “do not allow them to be sincere,” as in the example of a doctor giving a placebo to a patient. 
Ibid. 
192 Ibid., 70. 
193 Ibid., 71. 
194 Although part of the distinction lies in the intentions of the performer, Goffman also refers to the social 
conventions through which audiences judge the performer: “Sometimes when we ask whether a fostered 
impression is true or false we really mean to ask whether or not the performer is authorized to give the 
performance in question, and are not primarily concerned with the question itself.” Ibid., 59. A “legitimate” 
and “competent” performer is differentiated from “impostor,” “out-and-out fraud,” or “masquerade” if it is 
discovered that he “did not have the right to play the part he played, that he was not an accredited 
incumbent of the relevant status.” Ibid.It is worth noting that these descriptions very closely parallel J. L. 
Austin’s discussion of conventions regulating performative utterances.  
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sincerity and definitely no way to conclusively measure it. Even personal reports, private 
conversations or interviews cannot help on this front since they can also be manipulated 
strategically.195 Likewise, one can also not know conclusively the intentions of the 
audience. Therefore there is no theoretically compelling reason for why anyone or any 
performance could pass the test of sincerity. It does not mean actors do not have 
intentions and audiences do not judge on the basis of intentions. They both do, but this 
cannot ground an analysis of social action. Moreover, as was discussed above, not all 
enactments need to get the approval of the audience or pass the test of sincerity held by 
the audience. Declarations, proclamations and even a marriage ceremony can still create 
the effect they seek even if the audience puts the sincerity of the enactors in question.    
Furthermore, the distinctions between competent versus incompetent, sincere 
versus impostor also become more open to contestation in international politics where the 
institutional setting is less total and the definition and implication of roles are less clear 
and more contested.196  For example, we may more easily accept that one who attempts to 
do a brain surgery without proper medical certification is an impostor, but it is not as 
readily apparent and uncontroversial to call a state an impostor democratic state if it is 
allowing or disallowing abortion, euthanasia, death-penalty, gay-marriage, or 
                                                
195 Indeed this is what critics of Robert McNamara argued after the documentary Fog of War. Critics 
argued that he was strategically trying to give the impression that he regrets for his key role in the Vietnam 
War. Although McNamara’s appearance in the documentary is surely a performance, there is no way to 
decide his intentions, and about whether he is “sincere” or “cynical.”  
196 Even a supposedly total institution such as military often fails to create effect of socialization it seeks. 
See, Ronald R. Krebs, “A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How 
It Might,” International Security 28, no. 4 (April 1, 2004): 85–124. 
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unregularized markets.197 It is precisely because of the deeply contentious nature of 
political issues and concepts that labels such as sincere or insincere performances and 
competent and imcompetent performers lose their sharp edge. In the institutional setting 
of liberal international order, what a democratic state is and what being a democratic state 
entails is more contested than what it means to be a professor at a college.  
This observation leads to the third difference between performance and 
performativity; that is, performance accounts of socialization fit better to situations where 
governing power relationships are more hierarchically organized and where the 
institutional setting is more controlling and roles are more clearly delineated, such as 
doctors in a hospital or officers in a military. For example, Scott focuses almost 
exclusively on the relationships of domination between slaves and masters, untouchables 
and Brahmins, or feudal farmers and their landlords. Similarly, Goffman emphasizes that 
his dramaturgical model of social action fits more aptly to interactions “organized within 
the physical confines of a building or plant”198 or where “persons enter into one another’s 
immediate physical presence.”199  He then goes on to admit that these kinds of “highly 
ceremonial occasions” and highly institutionalized settings, which that dictate certain 
kinds of routine behaviors, are the exception rather than the rule.200  
                                                
197 As Goffman points out, “claims to be a law graduate can be established as valid or invalid, but claims to 
be a friend, a true believer, or a music-lover can be confirmed or disconfirmed only more or less.”Goffman, 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 60. 
198 Ibid., xi. 
199 Ibid., 254. 
200 Ibid., 30. Furthermore, Goffman suggests that he is not interested in “the specific content of any activity 
presented” by actors, rather he is interested solely in the actors’ “dramaturgical problems of presenting the 
activity before others.” (15) However, there is more to norm socialization than impression-management and 
stage-craft. Attention to the processes of cultural translation and resignification necessitates looking inside 
the norms and discourses. Thinking and acting through different cultural and discursive traditions and 
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Normative negotiations in liberal global governance, however, are hardly driven 
by sheer domination, even though it also exists. Rather, various pedagogic, disciplinary, 
persuasive and seductive mechanisms are at work and various direct and indirect forms of 
power are operative in these processes. Even though domination and brute force always 
remain on the back stage and occasionally make it into the front stage, much of 
international normative political activity takes place outside the domain of brute force or 
sheer domination. In many contestations over the constitutive norms of liberal global 
order, the exercise of power is rarely as direct and “tyrannical” as in domination. 
Furthermore, for Scott the powerful do not seek to gain the agreement of the subordinates 
but rather coerce them to comply with their rule.201 Such relationships of domination are 
built “against the will of the dominated.”202 Socialization, however, is the process in 
which the powerful seek to get the agreement, and if possible the conversion, of the 
weak.203 The powerful attempt to gain the consent and transform the will of the 
‘socializee’ in order to have the latter adopt the norms of liberal international order.204  
 
5. Both/And: Power, Resistance and the Scope of Performativity  
 
Even though the pedagogic accounts tend to approach socialization through the 
binary of acceptance versus rejection of norms, the performative reading attends to the 
                                                                                                                                            
social imaginaries, actors negotiate both their own traditions and the norms and institutions of political 
modernity.  
 
201 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 67. 
202 Ibid., 45. 
203 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” 
204 Schimmelfennig, “Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern 
European States--Conceptual and Theoretical Issues.” 
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ways in which it is both. For example, Ikenberry and Kupchan posit socialization against 
resistance. The elites of the “secondary states” either “buy into” the norms of the 
hegemon or resist them. They cannot do both.205 However, cultural translation and 
various strategies of appropriation indicate a seemingly paradoxical but fundamental 
dimension of socialization: norms may at once be adopted and resisted. They can be 
taken up non-normatively—against their normalizing logic. In so doing, the normative 
and normalizing dynamics of norms can be disjointed.206 Performativity of socialization 
is then located in this gap where a norm’s normative and normalizing powers are 
negotiated.207  
Consequently, contestations within the norm are registered either as taking place 
outside the norm or as anomalies to be corrected down the road. Non-normative 
adoptions are registered as “Potemkin socialization”208 or “strategic socialization”209 that 
lacks deeper ‘internalization’ of the norm. This framing of contestation as a problem of 
sincerity also reproduces the either/or logic. However, in myriad and conflicting claims to 
universal normative categories such as freedom, equality, justice, independence, 
autonomy, sovereignty, representation, participation, rights, and democracy, the question 
                                                
205 Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” Such accounts tend to treat norms as 
rather stable and pre-given, downplaying their inherently multivalent and unstable character. See, Duvall 
and Chowdhury, “Practices of Theory.” 
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is not whether to reject or to accept the norm, but rather how to repeat the norm, or how 
to participate in it.   
Undoing the binary of socialization (as norm-adoption) versus resistance (as 
norm-rejection) is necessitated in part for the “structural collusion” of the two.210 Here 
Tageldin’s notion of ‘transymmetry’ provides helpful insights into thinking about the 
both/and form of normative engagements. For Tageldin transymmetry marks the 
“a/symmetry of translation” in which domination and resistance are “mutually, but not 
equally, constitutive.”211  Transymmetry suggests that resistance often “derives from 
imposition, works through and displaces it (as Bhabha suggests).”212 Tageldin suggests 
that Said himself intimates this insight in his Culture and Imperialism when he talks 
about the form of anticolonial resistance: 
If modern European imperialism began with a “voyage out” to non-
Western lands, the non-Western decolonization movements of the mid-
twentieth century represent what Said calls “the voyage in”: a “conscious 
effort to enter into the discourse of…the West, to mix with it, transform 
it.” Such a definition of resistance implies its hybridity—however 
strategic—with imperialist discourse. Yet Said goes on to posit 
decolonizing resistance as always and only a radical “alternative” to the 
historical logic of domination, retracting his intimation that it might also 
couple—“mix”—with hegemonic discourse.213  
 
                                                
210 Tageldin, Disarming Words, 17. 
211 Ibid., 18–19. Tageldin uses transymmetry as an alternative to what she calls a Foucauldian notion of 
symmetry (the moral equivalency of power exercised by authority and power exercised against it) as well 
to Edward Said’s notion of asymmetry (nonequivalency of the two and a radical separation of power and 
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212 Ibid., 19. 
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In other words, Said’s “voyage in” represents a performative, non-normative adoption of 
norms and discourses that destabilizes the pedagogy of socialization encapsulated in the 
metaphor of “voyage out.” Here, Said’s “voyage in” recognizes the normalizing power of 
norms yet at the same time attends to the ways in which they are differentially 
appropriated and metamorphosed. As Vivienne Jabri points out, Said’s notion of ‘voyage 
in’ (as well as ‘contrapuntal reading’) mark a kind of postcolonial agency that is “not 
external to the inscriptional practices and structures of domination through which the 
postcolonial subject emerges.”214 In that sense, the socialization that ‘voyage in’ entails is 
both an adoption of and a resistance to norms. 
The dynamics of this coupling of adoption and resistance are also powerfully 
captured in Butler’s revision of Althusser’s conception of interpellation. In Althusser’s 
well-known example, when the policeman hails a person “Hey, you there!” the person’s 
turn toward the policeman interpellates the subject. This 180-degree turn is the moment 
of ‘subjectivation,’ which is at once subjectification (constitution as subject) and 
subjection (submission to the ideology that constitutes the subject).215 In Althusser’s 
account interpellation by the systems of power—i.e. the State, the Law—often succeeds 
as subjects often do the metaphoric 180-degree turn: they answer when they are hailed 
and they get constituted as the subject of power. In this way discourses and norms 
materialize their effect.  
                                                
214 Vivienne Jabri, The Postcolonial Subject: Claiming Politics/Governing Others in Late Modernity 
(London  ; New York: Routledge, 2012), 132. 
215 Althusser suggests that “the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit 
freely to the commandments of the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in 
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However, for Butler this narrative rather overstates the stability of norms, 
institutions and discourses. The power of such interpellations rests on their discursive 
reproduction through “chains of iteration.” If the power of norms is sustained by 
reiteration, then this power “can be deflected, parodied, turned against dominant 
norms.”216 In other words, the possibility of failure is inherent in processes of 
interpellation. They might not work towards their desired ends.217 When the policeman 
hails “Hey, you” and the subject of the call becomes interpellated by his/her turn to the 
policeman, the possibility of a “different kind of turn” embodies the possibility of a 
performative misrecognition or failed interpellation.218 In that sense, pedagogic 
socialization interpellates subjects into the authorized meanings and practices of norms, 
but the performativity of non-normative adoptions point to a “different kind of turn” and 
to the possibility of the failure of such interpellations to fully achieve themselves, that is, 
to fully produce the authorized, proper, normalized subject.219  
Likewise, Bhabha’s notion of mimicry also embodies this logic of both/and. In 
mimicry the colonized adopts the ways of the colonizer—i.e., his norms and 
institutions—in a way that is “both against the rules and within them.”220 Through 
                                                
216 Stephen K. White, “Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. The Psychic Life of Power: 
Theories in Subjection. By Judith Butler.” The Journal of Politics 60, no. 03 (1998): 881. 
217 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford University Press, 1997), 95. 
218 Butler, Gender Trouble, 130. 
219 This also parallels Tageldin’s reading of Niranjana’s notion of translation. Niranjana takes the 
colonizer’s translation of the native’s language into his own as an example of such Althusserian 
interpellation. In Niranjana’s reading, Tageldin argues, “the colonized may ‘freely’ accept his or her 
subjection and resubjectification on the colonizer’s terms—à la Althusser—but always, and only, in passive 
response to the colonizer’s acts of translation.” Tageldin, Disarming Words, 60. However, Tageldin finds 
Vicente Rafael’s reading of translation “more productive” since the latter “acknowledges the intervention 
of the non-European language of the native in the meaning-making of colonial translation and thus 
adumbrates a potential revision of the dynamics of interpellation as Niranjana understands these.” 
(Tageldin 61)  
220 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 89. 
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mimicry actors “challenge the boundaries of discourse by subtly changing its terms.”221 
This creates ambivalent hybrid forms: the outcome of repetition is “almost the same, but 
not quite” with respect to that which is repeated.  Actors “use the powers of hybridity to 
resist (…) the project of conversion” entailed in the normalizing and disciplining 
pedagogy of norms and discourses.222 For example, in the radically asymmetrical 
encounter between the natives and the Christian missionaries in colonial India, some 
natives demanded an Indianized Gospel, some rejected baptism, and some who conceded 
to be baptized said they would never take the Sacrament. Such examples, for Bhabha, 
communicates the nature of colonial mimicry as “at once a mode of appropriation and of 
resistance.”223 Mimicking a norm can entail a “mockery” of its normalizing logic, hence, 
it “poses an immanent threat to both ‘normalized’ knowledges and disciplinary 
powers.”224 As a “peculiar replication” of a norm or discourse, mimicry can disturb the 
authority of the dominant discourse225 and as such it “marks the moments of civil 
disobedience within the discipline of civility.”226  
 The form of resistance that mimicry sets forth is not one of outright rejection 
(“negative consciousness”), but one of differential repetition (“cultural hybridity”).227 
Through mimicry, norms are not rejected, but rather “repeated, translated, misread, 
displaced.”228 Just as Bhabha’s mimicry represents the ambivalent third choice when 
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faced with Frantz Fanon’s two options (“turning white or disappearing”),229 performative 
socialization represents a third choice between pedagogic socialization and rejection. In 
that sense, performativity of socialization troubles the either/or logic of pedagogic 
socialization (either socialization or resistance) and seeks to attend to the ways it is 
both.230 The question then is not “whether” to adopt a norm, but “how” to adopt it.231  
In a different register, Karen Zivi similarly argues that as a performative practice, 
rights-claiming at once follows and challenges existing normative conventions. She 
suggests that “analyzing rights theory and practice from a performative perspective 
means, then, appreciating the extent to which our claims both reference and reiterate 
social conventions and norms, and yet have forces and effects that exceed them.”232 In 
that sense, “from the perspective of performativity, rights claiming is both a rule-bound 
and a rule-breaking practice that opens up the possibility of the new, and this is precisely 
what makes it suitable for contemporary democratic politics.”233 In other words, 
performative modes of socialization works both within the norm (“rule-bound”) and 
against it (“rule-breaking.”)  
                                                
229 Ibid., 172. 
230 As Saba Mahmood points out, “agentive capacity is entailed not only in those acts that resist norms but 
also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.” Saba Mahmood, “Agency, Performativity, and the 
Feminist Subject,” in Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler, ed. Ellen T Armour and Susan M St. 
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hierarchy, normalization, marginalization and so forth.” Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 157–158. 
231 Butler, Gender Trouble. 
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Anna Tsing’s metaphor of friction also exemplifies this ‘both/and’ dynamic in 
norm adoptions. For her, frictions emerge in the varied and unequal encounters between 
universalizing norms and cultural difference. It is those frictions that keep “global power 
in motion” yet at the same time they “get in the way of the smooth operation of global 
power.”234 They create “new arrangements of culture and power,”235 and hence, through 
friction “hegemony is made and unmade.”236 In a sense, friction emerges when actors 
both adopt and contest norms. In adopting the norm actors contribute to its further 
circulation, but introducing difference in it they also trouble its smooth normalization.  
Nevertheless, this also means that friction and mimicry do not necessarily entail 
subversion. Normative negotiations may well be “antagonistic or affiliative,” or both.237 
But they are deeply conditioned by various asymmetries of power. Furthermore, Albert J. 
Paolini suggests that although Bhabha’s notion of mimicry is said to produce “an 
autonomous position for the colonial subject within the confines of the hegemonic 
discourse, one needs to ask how active and effective this autonomy is.”238 That is, one has 
to empirically investigate the possibilities and limits of reworking the dominant 
discourses and norms of global politics.  
In that vein, highlighting the power of these asymmetries and conditions, Pheng 
Cheah questions Bhabha’s conception of mimicry and hybridity for its overemphasis on 
                                                
234 Tsing, Friction, 6. Recognizing this aspect of global connections enables one to avoid both the idea that 
“new forms of empire spring fully formed and armed from the heads of Euro-American fathers” (read, 
pedagogic socialization) as well as “too eager a celebration of a [global] southern cultural autonomy 
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235 Ibid., 5. 
236 Ibid., 6. 
237 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 3. 
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the powers of culture and signification to shape economic and political conditions.239 For 
Cheah, postcolonial theorizing, in particular Bhabha’s, locates the cultural at the moment 
of enunciation and signification and hence seeks to enable change in social life through 
discourse and resignification. Although this move breaks with positivist accounts that 
take the social and cultural as ‘given,’ Cheah is skeptical of the “commonplace assertion 
that discourse produces the real.”240 He criticizes Bhabha for “unmooring cultural agency 
from the field of empirico-material forces that overdetermine it.”241 Doing so, for Cheah, 
misses the crucial constitutive and disciplining power of the material basis of socio-
economic relations. “Social transformation,” he writes, “is not achieved simply by 
‘relocating alternative hybrid sites of cultural negotiation.’”  Linguistic dynamism or 
“cultural-symbolic flux alone” is not adequate for an “emancipatory consciousness” to be 
materially effective.242  
Central to Cheah’s critique is his claim that Bhabha rests his argument on a 
“simplistic analogy” between “the contingency of sociocultural formations” and “the 
contingency of signification.”243 Therefore, hybridity overdraws on the analogy of 
linguistic performativity and social performativity, the latter being thoroughly 
                                                
239 Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, 101. 
240 Ibid., 85. 
241 Ibid., 91. Indeed, for Cheah, postcolonial agency is “not unmoored or relatively independent from 
material forces” (Ibid., 107) and therefore, Bhabha’s “paradigm of postcolonial agency in globalization” 
ends up producing a “closet idealism” (Ibid., 93) and “linguistic culturalism.” (Ibid., 90). For him, locating 
the hope and possibility of change at the moment of cultural signification and resignification is a 
thoroughly idealist hope.  
242 Cheah, Inhuman Conditions, 90. 
243 Ibid., 84. 
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conditioned and limited by the material social relations within global capitalism.244 
However, the “constraints and tendencies of politico-economic processes” cannot be 
reduced to “cultural-significatory practices.”245 “The social,” he suggests, “is not 
coextensive with, or exhausted by, its symbolic dimensions.”246 Thus, locating resistance 
in “the contingency of language as a sign system”247 and in the possibility of its 
subversive use “exaggerates the role of signification and cultural representation in the 
functioning of sociopolitical life and its institutions.”248 
Echoing Cheah’s critiques in a different register, David Scott takes issue with the 
tendency in postcolonial theory to rely heavily on a negative view of the power of 
colonialism which is always repressing, oppressing, and preventing. This reading, 
however, underplays the productive power of modern norms and institutions that 
fundamentally reshape social life and create the conditions within which non-Western 
actors have to make their history as its “conscripts.”249 This calls for renewing the 
                                                
244 Cheah argues that “the resistance to global forces promised by contemporary postcolonial rearticulations 
of national culture is severely curtailed by the fact that they arise in response to economic globalization and 
can be manipulated by state elites in the indirect service of post-Fordist global capital.” Ibid., 103.  
245 Ibid., 89. 
246 Ibid., 90.Yet pointing out the insufficiency of ideological means in securing the order also does not 
mean to deny the importance of “cultural legitimation in the formation of sociopolitical institutions and 
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249 He suggests that for the non-European, modernity was not a choice but was “itself one of the 
fundamental conditions of choice.” Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, 19. As he points out, “the conceptual 
and institutional terrain of modernity” created by the “modern disciplinary techniques, modern institutions 
of government, modern forms of subjectivity, and modern conceptions of rationality” imposes itself onto 
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“problem-space” 250 within which we make sense of issues.251 Modern liberal forms are 
“built into our lives” as they are constantly negotiated and readjusted.252 These modern 
conditions, Scott argues, define the options available to the subjects and make these 
options intelligible as options. Therefore, rather than taking modern power solely as 
negative and hence construing a model of agency as resisting and overcoming these 
negative structures, Scott suggests that the focus should be placed on the 
productive/positive dimensions of modern norms and institutions that create new desires, 
rationalities, technologies, and subjectivities.253  
A performative reading of socialization integrates these two strands of thinking 
about postcolonial agency. First, it addresses the productive and constraining power of 
                                                                                                                                            
the non-Western subject.  Ibid., 129. In the example Scott discusses, Toussaint Louverture, the leader of the 
Haitian Revolution, “was restrained to imagine and make the revolution he imagined and made within the 
conceptual and institutional terrain of modernity.” Ibid. This terrain created by slavery and the plantation 
was not up to his choice. It was not an option for him. He “could not choose not to be modern.” In Asad’s 
language, he was not a volunteer of the modern project, but was its conscript. Hence, the political projects 
that the non-West undertook in making their futures were given a distinctive shape by the conditions made 
by modern power. Ibid., 131.  
250 A problem-space for Scott is a “discursive context, “context of language, […] a cognitively intelligible 
arrangement of concepts, ideas, images, meanings.” Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, 4. It is a historically 
changing “ensemble of questions and answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as 
well as ideological-political stakes) hangs.” Ibid.With the changing of historical conditions old questions 
might lose their “salience” and “bite” and might appear “lifeless” and “quaint.”  
251 Scott, Conscripts of Modernity, 111. The old problem-space puts the negative power of colonialism at 
the center and hence “obliges one to look for the agency that transgresses it, survives it, overcomes it, and 
to look in turn for the sources (cultural or otherwise) that enabled or fed that transgression, survival, or 
overcoming.” However, modern liberal norms and institutions have so deeply structured the social and the 
political sphere that postcolonial subjects cannot but act within its boundaries and on its terms. The 
postcolonial subject cannot choose not to be modern. Ibid., 129. This echoes Niranjana’s claim that the 
postcolonial lives always already in translation.  
252  Ibid., 21.  
253 Ibid., 7. For that reason Scott takes issue with various postcolonial theories of subaltern agency and 
alternative modernities for their construction of a “normative expectation of resistance, of overcoming.” 
Ibid., 114. One central reason for this is their operation within a mode in which the modern still signifies a 
“largely passive or negative environment merely waiting to be surmounted or mastered or translated or 
displaced by preconstituted subjects.” The mode of thinking here is one that sees the subalterns as 
innovatively responding to modern transformations. Yet, Scott argues that this reading underrates the 
productive dimension of modern structures of power that create the conditions and the subjects acting 
within it. 
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modern structures, norms and institutions through the notion of socialization, which 
communicates the deeply conditioned nature of agency. Second, it attends to the 
strategies of differential adoption of liberal norms and institutions as the performative 
dimensions of socialization. In that sense, it speaks to the paradox of subjection in 
socialization: actors are simultaneously being subjected to the normalizing power of 
norms while being made the subject of norms. Put differently, actors put to risk the 
normalizing power of the norms into which they socialize. This deeply conditioned sense 
of agency in global social life is akin to the relationship Chakrabarty establishes between 
History 1 and History2s—the latter are deeply conditioned by the former but still 
interrupts its thrust. Chakrabarty invokes neither an outside to capital nor a heroic subject 
escaping or transcending it. Just as subaltern histories cannot be thought of outside the 
global forces and narratives of capital, performativity of socialization cannot be thought 
outside the pedagogic and disciplinary forces governing socialization. In that sense, to 
provincialize Europe, and to understand socialization performatively, is to hold these two 
contradictory forces in constant tension.254 For Chakrabarty this leaves us at “the restless 
and inescapable politics of historical difference” in which History 1 and History 2s 
perpetually seek to interrupt each other. This is a kind of resistance that participates in 
what it resists.255  
This both/and dynamic also points to the scope conditions of the reading I lay out 
in this chapter. Even though I do not offer a predictive theory, still there are conditions 
under which performative modes of socialization are more likely to take place. First, 
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constitutive norms (norms that define identities, core community values, and meta-rules) 
are more conducive to cultural translations and appropriations compared to regulative 
norms (norms that have specific rules or injunctions).256 Performativity can be operative 
in all normative engagements, but it is more salient in relating to constitutive norms such 
as democracy, human rights, equality, and freedom since they offer more space for 
divergence and contestation. Many such norms are essentially contested with no final 
definition that would foreclose the debate over them. For example, the European Union’s 
political criteria for membership (known as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’) include 
constitutive norms of liberal global governance such as democracy, human rights, rule of 
law, protection of minorities and market economy, which are more open to differential 
adoptions and contestations compared to the Union’s economic criteria for membership 
(known as the ‘Maastricht criteria’) that outline very specific regulative norms in 
economic field (e.g. national debt cannot exceed 60% of GDP, or annual budget deficit 
cannot exceed 3% of GDP).   
Second, performative modes of socialization cannot take place if a norm is 
rejected squarely or if a norm is adopted without any conditions, reservations, or 
difference. For example, state actors such as Saudi Arabia and non-state actors such as 
Al-Qaeda repudiate democracy as a desirable norm. They do not invoke the norm; 
therefore, there is no space to negotiate and rework it. For them democracy is 
untranslatable to an Islamic context as they see it contradicting with the principle of 
God’s sovereignty. They do not adopt the norm non-normatively since they do not adopt 
                                                
256 For the distinction between constitutive and regulative norms in international relations, see Onuf, World 
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it in the first place. Therefore there must be some form of prior socialization into a norm 
in order for that norm to be reworked. It should also be noted that unconditional rejection 
or unconditional acceptance of norms are rather rare in international relations, which 
leaves a very broad spectrum for performative modes of engagements. 
In a sense, this also suggests that the kind of resistance that performative modes 
of socialization put forth is not ‘revolutionary.’ The performative inaugurates a change, 
but it is a particular kind of change, one that is “not rule-governed” but at the same time 
“made possible by the rules and procedures in place, which language cites as it attempts 
something new.”257 Performativity does not account for the ‘event’ such as a revolution 
that erupts. The force of the event is irreducible to the force of the performative.258 As 
Butler puts it, performativity is not a matter of “radical fabrication” but rather one of 
repetition of prior norms “which cannot be thrown off at will.”259 
Third, one can expect performative modes of socialization to be operative the 
more the hegemonic articulation of a norm gets into conflict with a local norm. The 
inflecting effects of translation can be expected to be higher the further the norm travels 
across cultural difference. If the norm in question destabilizes or transforms the norms 
upheld by actors, then performativity may be more salient. In addition, the higher those 
vernacular norms perceived to be under risk are in the local hierarchy of norms, the more 
transformative its appropriations may get. For example, the norms about scientific 
management of state bureaucracies might not be seen by non-Western actors as being 
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‘costly’ or culturally threatening 260 as the emerging norms about humanitarian 
intervention and Responsibility to Protect.261 Likewise, to actors such as the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood, democracy as a norm may not appear as culturally threatening as 
the norm of secular liberalism that is usually posited as its precondition.262 In addition, 
translation also happens within a language across subgroups. For example, a well-
established constitutive norm of liberal international order, right to life, gets translated 
into particular ideological and political languages not only across countries but also 




R. B. J. Walker suggests that “the way in which the universal validity of the 
discourses of dominant groups is both claimed and challenged has long been central to 
critical social and political thought.” [emphasis added]263 This has only recently started to 
be the case for norm socialization research in IR. In this chapter I argued that 
performativity is a helpful analytical framework to uncover these dynamics of claiming 
and challenging dominant norms and institutions. What happens when actors (state or 
non-state) claim to participate in norms differently? How can resistance be recognized 
when it takes place not outside the norm (as rejection) but within the norm (as 
appropriation)? How do norms and discourses travel across cultural difference? The 
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performative reading I develop in this chapter seeks to address these questions by 
attempting a more complex theorization of norm socialization, one that attends to the 
dynamics of cultural translation and discursive appropriation in liberal global 
governance. It explores the ways in which difference is inserted into norms in ways that 
may put the hegemonic articulation of a norm at risk. It highlights how and to what 
effects normative power of norms can be disjointed from their normalizing power.  
In that sense, a performative reading of socialization explores “how marginal 
groups are challenging the pedagogical delimiting” of norms and discourses such as 
equality, democracy, human rights, and citizenship and how they are appropriating them 
“for quite different projects.”264  In attending to non-normative adoption of norms in 
liberal global governance, this reading attempts to extend Chakrabarty’s project of 
rethinking Enlightenment norms and universals from the margins and against their 
hegemonic articulations to the field of norm socialization in IR. This is also the 
democratic promise of performativity’s analytical intervention: it keeps open the 
constitutive norms and discourses to different meanings and possibilities.
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CHAPTER 4 
AK PARTY’S ‘DEMOCRATIC SECULARISM’ AND ‘CONSERVATIVE 
DEMOCRACY’  
  
Speaking at the meeting of a non-governmental organization in March 2012, 
Mustafa İsen, the General Secretary of the Presidency of Turkey and a professor of 
classical Turkish literature, said: “Just as the conservative section of society has an 
understanding of democracy so that we are able to talk about something called 
‘conservative democracy,’ then we’re also under the obligation of talking about 
‘conservative aesthetics’ and ‘conservative art’ and of establishing its norms and 
structure.”1 This statement sparked a heated debate in Turkish media about whether one 
can or should talk about ‘conservative art.’ What was quite intriguing, however, was that 
although many commentators challenged İsen’s remarks about the possibility and 
desirability of a ‘conservative art,’ his point about democracy went virtually 
unchallenged. No one seemed to question whether a conservative understanding of 
democracy exists or whether its norms and structure are so well established that it can 
serve as a benchmark. This becomes even more puzzling when one considers that the 
term ‘conservative democracy’ was introduced to Turkish politics only with the 
establishment of the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) in 2001.2 
                                                
1 Mustafa İsen’s speech at the meeting of the İstanbul Suriçi Grubu Derneği, March 29, 2012. İsen was also 
a candidate for nomination for MP from AK Party, but he was not nominated. “Suriçi Grubu Mustafa İsen’i 
Ağarladı,” accessed September 3, 2013, 
http://www.suricigrubu.net/?Syf=18&Hbr=312116&/Suri%C3%A7i-Grubu-Mustafa-%C4%B0sen%27i-
A%C4%9Farlad%C4%B1.  
2 One issue that arises in writing and talking about the AK Party is one’s preference for the acronym. Itself 
standing as an evidence of polarization in Turkish politics, most critics of the party use the acronym AKP 
   150 
How does a political party with roots in Islamism come to adopt conservatism as a 
framework for democracy and secularism as a feature of state? What kind of a politics of 
translation is at play in this transition? How does AK Party negotiate the categories of 
secularism, democracy, and Islamic tradition—particularly shari’a? If AK Party’s 
adoption of ‘democratic secularism’ and ‘conservative democracy’ constitutes a 
particular socialization into liberal international norms, then what are the conditions, 
contours, and modalities of this socialization?  How does AK Party negotiate the 
domestic and international meanings and practices of secularism and democracy? How is 
AK Party’s adoption of secularism related to liberal global governance? How does AK 
Party construe its commitment to Islamic normativity under conditions co-created by the 
Turkish state and of liberal international order?   
In this chapter I seek to address these questions. I first lay out the context within 
which AK Party interprets secularism and democracy. To do so, I focus on the case of the 
litigation at the Turkish Constitutional Court to close down the party in 2008. I analyze 
the indictment filed by the General Prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter 
the Prosecutor) as an illustration of the domestic conditions and limits set by the Kemalist 
Turkish state. I then analyze the European Court of Human Rights’s (ECtHR) upholding 
                                                                                                                                            
instead of AK Party, since the word ‘ak’ in Turkish means ‘white’ and ‘clean.’ Expressing their refusal of 
associating the party with those qualities, critics usually argue that the sympathizers of the party use the 
label AK. I find this position less than persuasive primarily because the party’s acronym is officially 
registered as AK Party and its name appears as AK Party on the ballot box. This line of critique is also 
puzzling because the same writers who attribute a certain partisanship in referring to the party as AK does 
not see it as particularly partisan in using the acronym ANAP for Anavatan Partisi, which must have been 
AP if we use the same logic, or HADEP for Halkin Demokrasi Partisi instead of HDP, or HAS Party for the 
Halkin Sesi Partisi, instead of HSP (‘Has’ in Turkish means ‘authentic’), among many other examples. 
Similarly, neither do any of those writers argue that we should not use the acronyms such as HAMAS. One 
can reasonably claim that AK Party is indeed not quite ‘ak’ (‘clean’) just as one might claim that HAMAS 
indeed is not ‘enthusiastic’ (which the acronym means as an Arabic word). But this is hardly a good reason 
for refusing to use the official names of these parties. Therefore, in this chapter and throughout the 
dissertation, I use the officially registered, self-declared name of the party as AK Party. 
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of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s verdict to dissolve the Islamist Refah (Welfare) 
Party—AK Party’s predecessor—as an affirmation of the Kemalist conception of 
secularism by the liberal international order. Subsequently I try and delineate the political 
imaginary driving AK Party’s negotiation of secularism and democracy. For that purpose 
I first analyze AK Party’s court defense in terms of the politics of universality and 
difference in its appropriation of ‘democratic secularism.’ Then I examine the politics of 
cultural translation in AK Party’s negotiation of Islamic discursive tradition3 with 
secularism and democracy. In the following section I move on to discuss how AK Party’s 
disavowal of the idea of Islamic state (a state that implements shari’a as the law of the 
land) contests and transcends the contours of Islamist imaginary from within the Islamic 
tradition. Finally, I analyze how AK Party’s discourse of ‘conservative democracy’ 
reconfigures (rather than drops) the question of shari’a observance by shifting its focus 
from the state to ‘people’ (halk).  
I draw on two kinds of sources in making these arguments: First, I use official AK 
Party documents, firsthand writings and speeches of prominent AK Party members who 
are influential in shaping the discourse and policies of the party, together with the 
original documents of the Prosecutor’s indictment, the Turkish Constitutional Court’s 
verdict, and the verdict of the ECtHR. Second, I draw on the ethnographic data I 
collected during my fieldwork research in Turkey in the winter of 2011—the indepth 
interviews I conducted with AK Party ministers, MPs, advisors, and members, and the 
                                                
3 Talal Asad suggests that Islam is “neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of 
beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals.” But rather, it is a “discursive tradition” in which actors seek 
appropriate actions and interpretations with regard to the constitutive texts of Islam. Talal Asad, The Idea 
of an Anthropology of Islam (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown 
University, 1986), 14–15. 
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secondary resources such as scholarly writings and journalistic reports in Turkish and 
international media. 
In previous chapters, I argued that the socialization literature in international 
relations (IR) predominantly views normative engagements as pedagogic processes in 
which norms and their authorized (‘correct’) interpretations are transmitted—directly or 
indirectly, coercively or noncoercively—by Western actors and institutions to their non-
Western counterparts. (Chapter 2) After identifying the problems with the pedagogic 
narrative, I offered a reading of socialization as a performative process of translation and 
appropriation. (Chapter 3) Now in this chapter, I provide a reading of AK Party’s 
adoption of secularism as a performative process of translation and negotiation whose 
countours and limits are shaped by the conditions co-created by the Kemalist state and 
liberal international order.  
Over the last decades Islamist political movements went through an ideological 
transformation and increasingly endorsed the legitimacy of democracy as a political 
regime. They formed political parties or platforms and participated in the electoral 
politics of their respective countries. However, the kind of democracy that Islamists 
invoke is rather different from secular liberal democracy. Islamists generally envision a 
democracy within an Islamic state implementing Shari‘a as state law—hence, the term 
“Islamic democracy.” They call for an ‘Islamized’ version of democracy in line with their 
ideology’s general program of Islamizing social, political, and economic life.4 The 
                                                
4 Islamism in that sense is an ideology of Islamization. This program also reveals its modernist bend since 
Islamist discourse, especially the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought, is an effort to Islamize modern 
institutions, practices, sciences, and technology—rendering them ‘Islamic’—rather than rejecting them. 
Noah Feldman notes that the adjectival usage of the term ‘Islam’ as ‘Islamic’ is a modern trend that is 
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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is usually seen as the origin and the paradigmatic example 
of this line of Islamism.  
The Turkish AK Party, however, presents a quite different trajectory. In contrast 
to classical Islamism, AK Party’s party program and electoral platform do not call for 
establishing an Islamic state implementing shari‘a as state law. Rather, the party has 
insistently declared, since its inception in 2001, that it endorses secularism understood as 
state neutrality toward religions and protection of religious freedoms of all citizens.  As a 
result, within scholarly and policy circles as well as in media debates, AK Party has come 
to represent a break with Islamism and a transition into liberalism. AK Party’s official 
identity of ‘conservative democracy’ has been taken as a liberalizing and secularizing, if 
not yet entirely liberal and secular, discourse.5 It comes to stand for a ‘post-Islamist’ 
endorsement of secular liberal democracy under the rubric of ‘Muslim democracy’ (or its 
official identity of ‘conservative democracy’). As such, AK Party is often juxtaposed to 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which comes to embody an Islamist rejection of 
secularism and liberal democracy.  
Central to this narrative, which has proved to be a very powerful one, both 
globally and locally, is the argument that post-Islamist Muslim democrats exemplified by 
the AK Party give up on the idea of a shari‘a-implementing Islamic state and instead 
move toward constructing a distinctly secular and liberal form of political rule and of 
                                                                                                                                            
“largely absent from classical vocabulary. ”Noah Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State 
(Princeton University Press, 2010), 111. 
5 Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” 2005. 
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Muslim subjectivity. AK Party’s “Shari‘a-free” politics6 or its “Muslim politics without 
Shari‘a”7 marks its difference from Islamists in the Arab world and beyond and elevates 
it as a ‘model’ for the latter. AK Party is signified as the transition from a shari‘a-based 
Islamism to a shari‘a-free post-Islamism; from illiberalism to liberalism. As such, it 
represents “liberal normalization” and a disciplining of Islamist discourse according to 
the pedagogy of liberal socialization. 
These narratives capture important aspects of the transformation AK Party has 
gone through under conditions co-created by the Kemalist state and liberal international 
order.8 After all, there is no single reference to shari‘a in any official AK Party document 
or speech. Yet, these accounts fail to capture the performative dimensions of AK Party’s 
socialization. AK Party engages in a process of cultural translation, and cultural 
translation is performative. It is productive of difference. It negotiates different social 
imaginaries.  
Yet it is also conditioned by, and in turn reinscribes, relationships of power and 
hierarchy. Performativity of socialization and cultural translation is deeply wrought with 
                                                
6 Hakan M. Yavuz, “Ethical Not Shari‘a Islam: Islamic Debates in Turkey,” The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 10, no. 4 (2012): 28–34. 
7 Kuru, Muslim Politics without an “Islamic” State: Can Turkey’s Justice and Development Party Be a 
Model for Arab Islamists?. 
8 Liberal international order has cherished the Kemalist rule in Turkey. This is, I argue, because of the 
Orientalist presuppositions they both share. Bernard Lewis represents a clear example on that score. John 
Stuart Mill has (in)famously argued that democracy could only be achieved within Western civilization. 
This Eurocentric construal of democracy is shared by both liberal international order and the Kemalist rule 
in Turkey. Kemalist authoritarian rule has been backed by liberal international order precisely because of 
their concurrence on the Orientalist assumption that the Muslim world needs ‘Enlightened despots’ and 
pro-Western dictatorships in order to have a democracy in some time in future. The most recent example of 
this was seen in Egypt after the military coup on July 3, 2013. Muhammad Al-Baradei, a Nobel Peace Price 
laureate prominent liberal figure who was first appointed as the Prime Minister by the junta, but then upon 
the opposition of the Salafi Nour Party was moved to the Deputy President, was hailed as “liberal 
modernizer” of Egypt. Roger Cohen, “Political Islam Fails Egypt’s Test,” The New York Times, July 4, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/05/opinion/global/political-islam-fails-egypts-test.html. 
   155 
liberal pedagogic practices and relations.9 Liberal international order seeks to discipline 
these translations in order to keep them within the confines of secular liberalism. In that 
context, AK Party negotiates the propriety of secularism within Islamic discursive 
tradition on the terrain co-created by the Kemalist state and liberal international order. 
This is why in the next section I lay out these conditions that impose a secularist pressure 
on the AK Party. Then, I go on to analyze the political imaginary of the AK Party 
through which it negotiates the categories of secularism, democracy, and shari‘a. 
 
1. Conditions of Performativity: Mechanisms of Secularist Pedagogy in Turkey 
 
There are various dynamics that condition AK Party’s negotiation of secularism 
and democracy in Turkey. I consider these dynamics as mechanisms of pedagogic 
socialization and categorize them under three groups in terms of the way they exert their 
force: institutional, ideological/discursive, and coercive mechanisms.10 The institutional 
mechanisms socialize actors because of their inherent logics. These include i) electoral 
politics that exert a pressure on parties to moderate their platform and  move toward the 
political center in order to win elections11; ii) capitalist markets and integration with 
global economy12; iii) the conditionality of European Union accession process, especially 
the Copenhagen political criteria (democracy, human rights, and rule of law) and the 
                                                
9 Asad, Genealogies of Religion. 
10 These distinctions between these categories are analytical and they mix and mold in different ways and 
forms. Also in some ways this classification parallels the IR socialization literature’s discussion of material 
incentives, coercion, and suasion as distinct mechanisms of socialization.  
11 Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones; Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe; Nasr, 
“The Rise of ‘Muslim Democracy,’” 2005. 
12 Nasr, Forces of Fortune; Tugal, Passive Revolution; Humeira Iqtidar, “Secularism Beyond the State: The 
‘State’ and the ‘Market’ in Islamist Imagination,” Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 03 (2011): 535–64. 
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jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)13; iv) and the 1982 
Constitution of Turkey drafted under the supervision of the military after the coup in 
1980. These four institutional mechanisms provide, in different ways, incentives to adopt 
secularism as a norm. Participating in those institutions—elections, capitalist markets, the 
conditionality of EU accession, and the constitutional-legal structure of the Turkish 
state—socializes AK Party into secularism.  
Second, there are ideological/discursive mechanisms that socialize AK Party into 
the pedagogy of secularism. These include i) the liberal intellectuals’ elevation, both by 
the international media and by their own depiction, to a tutelary role to teach AK Party 
proper norms and their authorized and ‘correct’ interpretations with the powers to grant 
and deprive it international legitimacy14; ii) and the discourses of the ‘end of Islamism,’ 
‘post-Islamism,’ ‘Muslim democracy,’ and ‘illiberal democracy,’ all of which are 
                                                
13 Bahar Rumelili, “Turkey: Identity, Foreign Policy, and Socialization in a Post Enlargement Europe,” 
Journal of European Integration 33, no. 2 (2011): 235–249; Joerg Baudner, “The Politics of ‘Norm 
Diffusion’ in Turkish European Union Accession Negotiations: Why It Was Rational for an Islamist Party 
to Be ‘Pro-European’ and a Secularist Party to Be ‘Anti-European’,” JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 50, no. 6 (2012): 922–938.Turkey has recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights in 1990 under the Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1954).  
14 In his speech to an Egyptian liberal audience at the American University of Cairo in the November of 
2011, Şahin Alpay, an erstwhile Maoist and now liberal democrat columnist, suggested that one crucial 
dynamic that led to the transformation of the AK Party from an Islamist into a conservative/liberal 
democratic party was the role of liberal intellectuals—the others were neoliberal market reforms that 
started in 1980 and the strands of democratic Islamist thinking in Ottoman-Turkish history. Şahin Alpay 
(presented at the Turkish-Egyptian Conversations on Contemporary Democratic and Political 
Transformations, American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt, October 11, 2011). Reflecting on the same 
question, Markar Esayan observes that liberal intellectuals, despite sharing “common sociological codes” 
with the Kemalist elite, have entered into “a tacit alliance” with the AK Party after it won the elections in 
November 3, 2002 elections and “as figures who support Turkey’s EU integration,” they had “a substantial 
impact in garnering legitimacy for the AK Party.” However, he notes that after 2010, with Erdogan’s stance 
at the Davos Meeting and the constitutional changes that curbed the power of the Kemalist judiciary, the 
liberal intellectuals’ “project of domesticating Erdogan has collapsed.” They “wanted to establish a tutelage 
over Erdogan” but Erdogan rejected that. For Esayan the fundamental problem of liberal intellectuals was 
that their relationship with the AK Party “was never based on an assumption of equality, but rather based 
on the idea that equality between them is within the range of the possible.” Markar Esayan, “Imagine, 
There Is No Erdogan,” Yeni Şafak, October 9, 2013, 
http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/MarkarEsayan/imagine-there-is-no-erdogan/39974. 
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mobilized, in slightly different ways, to ideologically discipline the party along the 
pedagogy of liberal secularism.15  
Third, there are coercive mechanisms that seek to socialize AK Party into 
secularism through punitive measures. These include i) the imminent and credible threat 
of a military coup—as it happened in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 (the ‘bloodless,’ 
‘postmodern’ coup), and 2007 (this was not a coup but the military issued a 
memorandum tacitly threatening with a coup d’etat); ii) and relatedly, the imminent and 
credible threat of a ban on the party by the Constitutional Court—which was attempted in 
2008 and previously happened to the predecessors of AK Party four times in 1971 
(National Order Party), 1980 (National Salvation Party), 1998 (Welfare Party), and 2001 
(Felicity Party). 
All these conditions together exert a pedagogic pressure on the AK Party toward 
adopting secularism as a constitutive norm of liberal international order. The scope of 
their impact, however, transcends the party. They transform the way people understand 
and practice religion and politics.16 In this chapter, however, I will focus on the litigation 
                                                
15 Asef Bayat, “The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society,” Critique, 1996; A. Bayat, “What Is Post-
Islamism?,” ISIM Review 16, no. 5 (2005); A. Bayat, Islam and Democracy: What Is the Real Question?, 
vol. 8 (Leiden University Press, 2007); Bayat, Making Islam Democratic; Nasr, “The Rise of ‘Muslim 
Democracy,’” 2005; M. Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, 1st ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Dagi, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West”; I. Dagi, “Turkey’s 
AKP in Power,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 25–30. 
16 For example starting with Turkey’s shift in 1980 from import-substitution to an export-oriented 
industrialization strategy, Turkey has increasingly integrated into global economy. AK Party policies 
further deepened economic liberalization and hence allowed capitalist market relations to further penetrate 
into society. This immersion into global economy was one of AK Party’s strategies to confront the 
Kemalist state on questions such as secularism. Through promoting privatization and international trade, 
AK Party sought to lessen the grip of the Kemalist state on economy, which traditionally favored Istanbul-
based big bourgeoisie and restrained the more pious Anatolian bourgeoisie—the support base of Islamism. 
This strategy delivered for the AK Party in ultimately shifting the balance, yet as many commentators note, 
some with celebration and some with complaint, the capitalist markets deeply transformed the 
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by the Chief State Prosecutor of Turkey to dissolve the AK Party on the allegation that it 
has become “a center for anti-secularist activities.” The Kemalist Turkish state’s threat to 
ban the party in the name of defending its interpretation of secularism was so imminent 
and real that deeply conditioned the terms and contours of AK Party’s discourse on 
secularism. This court case lucidly displays the ways in which the Kemalist state 
coercively delimits the field of politics and seeks to foreclose the meaning of secularism 
and democracy. The Turkish state receives full authorization by the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and by the rest of the core actors of liberal international order. 
This is why I also analyze the ECtHR’s judgment authorizing the dissolution of AK 
Party’s predecessor, the Refah Party.  
The problem space of secularism in Turkey is not formed solely within domestic 
dynamics. The contestations over the discourse and practice of secularism in Turkey take 
place at the level of domestic and international politics at once. It is simultaneously a 
local and an international question.  As AK Party’s vice-chairman put it, “secularism in 
Turkey is not only a domestic issue, it is an international issue.” Hence, AK Party’s 
negotiation of secularism and democracy in Turkey lies at the interface of domestic and 
international politics. Both the Kemalist state and the AK Party negotiate alternative 
claims to universality and cultural difference while contesting the meanings and practices 
of secularism and democracy as international norms. In that sense, AK Party’s translation 
of Islamic political thought into the language of secular conservative democracy takes 
place on a social, political, legal, and discursive terrain co-created by the Kemalist 
                                                                                                                                            
understandings, lifestyles, consumption patterns, daily practices, and political views of Islamist sections of 
society. 
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Turkish state and liberal global governance, which, I will argue, converge on Orientalist 
presumptions.  
 
1.1. The Kemalist State: Laiklik and the AK Party Closure Case 
Kemalism has been formulated as the official ideology of the Turkish state in 
1930s. As a typical example of postcolonial secular nationalism, Kemalism deemed 
radical Westernization as being inevitable for ‘catching up’ with the West.17 It launched a 
pervasive state-led program of social transformation. In the eyes of the Kemalist elite, 
this was a “civilizational conversion.”18 In doing so, Kemalism internalized an explicitly 
Eurocentric and Orientalist narrative.19 This was a case of “Orient Orientalizing itself,” as 
Edward Said put it.20 It identified the norms and institutions of the Islamic tradition as the 
main reasons for ‘lagging behind’ the West, which, for the Kemalist elite, represented the 
endpoint of the historical progress of ‘civilization.’ Aggressive secularization in the form 
of purging religion from public and even private spheres was the key to achieve this 
project of modernization.21  
                                                
17 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Constitutions and Culture Studies,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 
2, no. 1 (1990). 
18 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Taylor & Francis US, 1998). 
19 Sukru Hanioglu, “The Historical Roots of Kemalism,” in Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey, 
ed. Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred C. Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 32–60. 
20 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Vintage Books, 1979). For a reading of Kemalist ideology as 
“orientalizing the Orient,” see Salman Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of 
Islamism (Zed Books, 1997). 
21 Ahmet T. Kuru, Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey, 
1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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For the Kemalist state, this task inevitably required a pedagogic and at times 
paternalistic approach.22 The people were ‘not yet’ mature and competent enough to 
decide what was good for them and for the country. They hence had to be guided, 
educated, and corrected—through persuasion if possible, and coercion if necessary. 
Kemalism as a project was an attempt to create the proper subjects authorized by the 
secularist norms of the nineteenth century European positivism. Proper citizen of the 
republic was a secularized, Westernized, urban, ethnically Turkish individual who 
achieved the transition from membership to ‘ümmet’ (religious community) to ‘ulus’ 
(nation), from being a ‘kul’ (subject of the sultan as well as servant of God) to being a 
‘vatandaş’ (citizen).23 Secularism has been the constitutive core of this historicist 
narrative that served to justify the pedagogic/paternalist order guarded by the civilian and 
military bureaucracy of the Turkish state, who acted as self-assigned educators of the 
people.24 They viewed themselves as the instruments for socializing the people into 
secularism.  
The court case against the AK Party reveals the contours of this Kemalist 
imaginary of laiklik (secularism). The Prosecutor argues in his indictment that laiklik is 
“the most fundamental feature” of the Turkish state. He cites an earlier ruling of the 
Turkish Constitutional Court stipulating that “the Turkish Revolution has attained its 
                                                
22 Ümit Cizre, “A New Politics of Engagement: The Turkish Military, Society, and the AKP,” in 
Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey, ed. Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred C. Stepan (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2012). 
23 The prosecutor makes this point very clearly. For him, it is only through secularism that “the citizens 
became, via national consciousness (ulus bilinciyle), the individuals of the Turkish Nation that established 
the Turkish Republic.”  
24 For Kemalism, Mustafa Kemal was the chief educator/teacher of the nation and the military and civilian 
bureaucracy were tasked with following his footsteps. The military interventions and coup d’états since 
1960 institutionalized the pedagogic (and paternalist) politics of Kemalist state.  
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meaning through secularism.” Secularism is “the essence of Turkish Revolution and the 
Republic and the foundation of national life (ulusal yaşam).” Forming “the basis of the 
constitutional order,” secularism is “sovereign over all other principles embraced by the 
constitution.” It is the sovereign principle of the Turkish state in whose name exceptions 
to law can justifiably be created. It may justify banning a ruling party that managed to 
take half the votes of the electorate.25 Democracy can in no way level up to the authority 
that secularism commands; hence when necessary secularism overrides democratic 
mechanisms, rights, and liberties. The prosecutor makes this point abundantly clear with 
his references to an earlier ruling of the Constitutional Court: 
Activities against the constitutional principle of secularism cannot be 
considered as democratic rights. The principle of secularism enjoys a 
constitutional privilege (ayrıcalık) and this is not against democracy. 
Besides, all rights and liberties must be assessed on the basis of this basic 
principle. The constitution attaches a special importance and superiority to 
the principle of secularism, and seeks to protect it meticulously against 
liberties. Hence it does not allow the butchering (kıydırılmasına) of this 
principle [of secularism] by liberties.26 
 
The fundamental reason why secularism must override and if necessary postpone 
democracy is that Islam as a religion of the majority in the country has a radically 
different historical trajectory compared to Western Christianity that gave rise to 
secularism. The Prosecutor justifies the secularist pedagogy of Kemalism by introducing 
                                                
25  AK Party attained 34% of the votes in 2002 elections and formed a single party government. In 2007, 
the party won a landslide victory by increasing its votes to 47%. The Prosecutor filed the litigation in 2008. 
26 The Prosecutor’s Indictment. 
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a historical difference into the discourse of liberal secularism. His statement in the 
indictment brings home this point:  
“The concept of secularism taken from the Western world necessarily has 
to take on a different meaning and implementation in Turkey [due to] the 
unique (özgün) conditions of the country, the importance of secularism in 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the role of secularism in the 
creation of a modern state, and the special structure of the religion of 
Islam.”  
 
For the Prosecutor, the historical and theological differences between Islam and 
Christianity necessitate a ‘different’ implementation of secularism in Turkey, one that is 
overtly pedagogic and often paternalistic.27 An earlier ruling of the Constitutional Court 
provides the reason why Kemalist state has to engage in pedagogic and paternalistic 
practices: “Islam does not suffice with merely regulating the religious faith that belongs 
solely to the conscience of individuals, but it also regulates the entirety of social 
relationships, activities of the state and law.” Therefore, the court argues, liberal 
secularism that may fit to a Christian context is not apt for Turkey, whose Islamic 
heritage necessitates an authoritarian control of religion. He further elaborates on this 
claim:  
                                                
27 As I also note in Chapter 2, I make an analytical distinction between pedagogic and paternalistic modes 
of relationship. I understand paternalism as a hierarchical relationship in which the immature or not yet 
rational is brought under the care of a superior protector, in such a way that the latter decides and acts on 
behalf of the former. Pedagogic relationships, however, while still hierarchical, do not necessarily entail 
one superior set of actors acting on behalf of the inferior other. Rather, pedagogic relationships seek to 
induce the desired behavior or meaning through various combinations of coercion, incentives, and 
persuasion.  Pedagogic socialization may include paternalistic measures, yet they are analytically distinct 
modes of relationship. 
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The application of the principle of secularism in Turkey is different from 
the practices of secularism in some Western countries. It is natural for the 
principle of secularism to be inspired by the conditions of countries and by 
the characteristics of religions, and to produce different implementations 
and qualities based on these. Because of the different features of the 
religions of Islam and Christianity, the applications in our country and in 
the Western countries have been different. Besides, the understanding of 
secularism has differed even among the Western countries that adopt the 
same religion.  
 
He argues that due to “her historical experiences”—her Islamic past and the Kemalist 
“revolutions” (inkılaplar)—the Turkish state “enjoys a wide discretionary power (takdir 
hakkı)” on the question of secularism He points out that in Europe the constitutive norm 
of secularism took the form of a political doctrine separating state and religious authority.  
But this idea of secularism as political doctrine, he argues, cannot be implemented in 
Turkey since Islam has not gone through the process of secularization that Christianity 
has. That is why in the Turkish context secularism “cannot be narrowed down to the 
separation of the affairs of the state and religion.” Rather, secularism in the Turkish 
context is a substantive doctrine about good life built on science and reason. It is “an 
environment of civilization, freedom, and modernity, and its dimensions are larger and its 
space is wider. It is Turkey’s modernization philosophy, method of humane life, and ideal 
of humanity.” As such, it should “actively seek to control religious faith and practice.”28 
This “civilized way of life,” according to the Prosecutor, not only “saves religion from 
                                                
28 This point is also made in Andrew Davison, Secularism and Revivalism in Turkey: A Hermeneutic 
Reconsideration (Yale University Press, 1998). 
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politicization and from being an instrument of government” but also “keeps religion in its 
real and respectful place, which is the conscience of individuals.” Conscience of 
individuals is the sole proper place for religion in the Kemalist project. In order to keep 
religion in its ‘proper place,’ Kemalist laiklik requires “an absolute separation of sacred 
emotions of religion from politics, worldly affairs, and legal regulations.” In that sense, 
Kemalism does not aspire to separate religion and state, but rather wants to constantly 
police religion in order to extirpate it from public life, and in an indirect way, also from 
private life.29 In other words, Kemalist laiklik has to reject the Anglo-American model of 
secularism, broadly understood as ‘twin tolerations’30 between the state and religions, in 
order to be able to defend an interpretation of secularism that is inimical to any public 
expression or embodiment of religion and that posits the visceral as the only proper space 
for religion. This, as Andrew Davison aptly points out, is indeed a form of political Islam, 
albeit one that seeks to reproduce and interpret it so as to relegate it to the sphere of the 
visceral and private. 31 
Here, the Prosecutor again refers to an earlier ruling of the Constitutional Court, 
which forbids “being inspired by religion” in administering the state. The Constitutional 
                                                
29 The Prosecutor stresses that the state has the right and the responsibility to do “inspection (denetim) and 
surveillance (gözetim) in religious issues.” However, by reference to the interpretation of the Article 2 of 
the Turkish Constitution of 1982, the prosecutor also suggests that secularism cannot be interpreted as 
"atheism" (dinsizlik) and that secularism "does not require that social relations would be abstracted from 
spiritual (manevi) values." Hence, as the two statements indicate, Kemalist secularism is tasked with a 
constant regulation, control, inspection, and surveillance of religion rather than promoting "atheism." 
Indeed, it established institutions (such as the Directorate of Religious Affairs) to control and manage 
religion rather than annihilate it. Ironically, it was Kemalist establishment, instead of Islamists, who forged 
attacks on Christian missionaries on the allegation that they were a threat to national security. See, Esra 
Özyürek, “Christian and Turkish: Secularist Fears of a Converted Nation,” Comparative Studies of South 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 3 (2009): 398–412. 
30 See, Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations,’” Journal of Democracy 11, 
no. 4 (2000): 37–57. 
31 Andrew Davison, “Turkey, a ‘Secular’ State?: The Challenge of Description,” The South Atlantic 
Quarterly 102, no. 2: 333–350. 
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Court reasoned that “the principle of secularism that accelerates modernization and from 
which Turkish Revolution originates aims at keeping the society away from the irrational 
and unscientific (akıl ve bilim dışı) thoughts and judgements.” Raised to the level of a 
“way of life,” “environment of civilization,” and “philosophy of modernization,” 
Kemalist secularism perpetually attempts to prevent citizens from falling into the 
immaturity of irrational and unscientific dogmas and emotions of religion. Again, this 
pedagogic task necessitates controlling religion and relegating it to the visceral:  
“The sovereign power governing the state is not religious rules and 
necessities but is reason and science. Religion, in its own place—that is, in 
the conscience—is an issue of belief between God and the human. It is 
unthinkable to take religion, which is the regulator of one’s own interior 
world of faith, as having a say in state affairs and as the source or basis of 
legal regulations and hence supplanting modern values and law.”  
 
Here it is crucial to note that in translating the concept of secularism differently in the 
Turkish context and in justifying an illiberal and undemocratic conception of secularism 
for the Turkish polity, Kemalism still invokes the authority and legitimacy of liberal 
norms and liberal international order. For the Prosecutor, one fundamental reason why 
any allusion to shari’a must be banned is that shari’a is “incommensurable with the 
European public order that Turkey belongs to.” The article 3 of the Political Parties Law 
in Turkey stipulates that all parties must aim at “reaching at the level of modern 
civilization.” Liberal secularism is still the highest norm for Kemalism, yet the religion of 
the people (Islam) is not apt for it and the Turkish society is not yet ready for it. Hence, 
paradoxically, liberal secularism must be rejected in Turkey precisely because it is the 
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ultimate norm to reach. It must be perpetually suspended in order to be able to end up 
there finally. AK Party should be excluded from the reach of liberal secularism since it 
does not fulfill its necessary preconditions—prior secularization. Therefore in order to 
affirm the universality of the norm of secularism as a principle of the guidance of reason 
and science, the norm should not apply to Turkey and to AK Party.  There should first be 
a long pedagogic process of socialization into Kemalist secularism before any liberal 
secularism can appear on the horizon. This pedagogy was, in a sense, the Kemalist 
performativity of secularism.   
The Prosecutor argues that since Islam and Christianity are radically different in 
that the latter is kept “between God and individual” whereas the former seeks to regulate 
“the rules of state and society” as well, “there is no similarity between the political 
Islamic parties in Turkey and the Christian democratic parties in Europe.” In other words, 
the European states should not mistake AK Party as a Muslim version of Christian 
democracy. It is because AK Party is a “political Islamic party” (siyasal İslamcı) and “the 
fundamental maxim (düstur) of political Islam is Shari‘a.” Shari‘a, he points out, is made 
up of rules that not only regulate individual faith and “worldly life” but even “state and 
social life.” These rules, he argues, are “not only unchangeable but cannot even be 
debated.” This is why, the Prosecutor claims, “political Islam and Shari’a as its 
constitution are not democratic but totalitarian.” To back his argument, he refers to a 
Constitutional Court ruling which stipulates that “a democratic order is contrary to a 
Shari‘a order […] Any regulation that gives weight to religious necessities cannot be 
democratic. A democratic state can solely be a secular state.” Hence, shari‘a would mean 
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nothing but “annihilation of democracy.” Noting that there is no democratic state ruled by 
religious principles, the Prosecutor defines secularism as the way through which “the 
Turkish people were able to transition from umma to nation, from servanthood (kulluk) to 
citizenship.” This discourse posits a linear history of stages that reaches its pinnacle in 
the principle of secularism.  Secularism, as the Prosecutor puts it, marks “the final stage 
of the intellectual and organizational evolution.” As a “civilized way of life [that] 
demolished medieval dogmatism,” secularism developed “an understanding of freedom 
and democracy under the leadership of reason and in the light of science.” Since this has 
already been achieved in the West, understanding secularism as a political doctrine of the 
separation of religion and state may suffice there. But Islam is different in that it has not 
yet achieved its own reformation and hence, Turkish society is not yet ready for the full 
exercise of democratic rights and liberties. It has to be pedagogically socialized into 
secularism.  
 
1.2. The Authorization of Kemalist Secularism by Liberal International Order: The 
European Court of Human Rights’s Verdict on the Refah Party Case 
 
When AK Party was founded in August 14, 2001, most of its founders were 
leading members of the Fazilet (Virtue) Party (FP), which was dissolved by the 
Constitutional Court just a few weeks before in June 22, 2001. The Turkish 
Constitutional Court ruled that the FP became a center for anti-secularist activities by 
acting as a continuation of the Refah (Welfare) Party (RP), which was banned by the 
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same court in 1998 for the same allegation—being a center for anti-secularist activities.32 
When the Constitutional Court banned the Islamist RP in 1998 a year after the ‘soft’ 
military coup in Turkey, the party appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Strasbourg by arguing that its right to free association protected under Article 
11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) was violated. In July 31, 2001, 
the ECtHR upheld the Turkish Constitutional Courts’ verdict by suggesting that there 
were “compelling reasons justifying Refah’s dissolution and temporary forfeiture of 
certain political rights imposed” on the party leadership.33 The Court agreed with the 
Turkish state that RP had “a long term policy of setting up a regime based on shari’a 
within the framework of a plurality of legal systems and that Refah did not exclude 
recourse to force in order to implement its policy.” 34 The ECtHR found RP guilty of 
seeking to establish a “theocratic regime” based on a sharia state within the framework of 
multiple legal orders. Therefore, Turkish Constitutional Court’s dissolution of the Refah 
Party “met a pressing social need” 35 and that it was neither a disproportionate measure36 
nor was it in violation of Article 11 of the ECHR.37 On the contrary, the ECtHR 
                                                
32 It is worth noting here that the allegations the Chief Public Prosecutors put to RP in 1998 and to AK 
Party in 2007 were essentially the same—that both political parties became a center for anti-secularist 
activities with a secret aim to establish a shari‘a state. 
33 “Case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey” (European Court of Human Rights, 
February 13, 2003), §135, 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60936#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-
60936%22]}. Three of the seven judges dissented to the decision of the ECtHR and found the dissolution of 
the party as a disproportionate measure. The Refah Party appealed the decision of the ECtHR to the Grand 
Chamber of the Court. On February 13, 2003, all 17 judges of the Grand Chamber decided with unanimity 
to uphold the ECTHR’s decision that upheld the Turkish Constitutional Court’s dissolution of the Refah 
Party. 
34 Ibid., §132. 
35 Ibid., §106. 
36 Ibid., §132. 
37 Ibid., §136. 
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concluded that the dissolution of the Refah Party was “necessary in a democratic 
society”38 because of the “tangible and immediate danger” it posed to democracy.39  
What is intriguing here is that the ECtHR completely endorsed the discourse of 
Kemalist secularism (laiklik) which stipulates that secularism in Turkey cannot simply be 
a political doctrine of separation of religious and state authority but that it should actively 
seek to control and transform religion because of the particular history of the country and 
the peculiarities of Islam as a religion. The reasons that the ECtHR considers make the 
dissolution of Refah “necessary in a democratic society” replicates Kemalism’s 
Orientalist readings of the West and Islam.40 Despite the fact that since its formulation in 
1930s, Kemalism has been a quintessentially illiberal and undemocratic state ideology, it 
shares with liberalism an Orientalist imaginary, which the European Court of Human 
Rights vindicates.41 It was not only the ECtHR that embraced Kemalist secularism and its 
                                                
38 Ibid., §135. 
39 Ibid., §131. 
40 Here Orientalism refers to the Eurocentric idea that Europe (and the West in general) represent the 
ultimate stage of human civilization and the East, particularly the Muslim societies, are marked by a 
number of ‘lacks’ that prevent them from achieving the status of Western civilization. These lacks mostly 
relate to the cultures and religious traditions of the East and particularly of Islamic tradition. According to 
this teleological reading, Islam has failed to achieve Reformation and secularization, and it is one crucial 
reason why Islamic societies could not catch up with modernization. This Orientalist reading suggests that 
Islam as a religion is inimical to democracy since it does not separate religion and politics, which is a 
precondition for democracy. As a result, Islamic societies should better be ruled by ‘enlightened despots’ 
who would introduce them into secularism and modernity.  
41 The strategy of Kemalist Orientalism was to repudiate Turkey’s geography—the ‘East’ or ‘Middle East.’ 
The reason was not that Kemalists saw these terms as Eurocentric—which they indeed were—but that they 
saw Turkey as “the representative of the West in the East” and as “the nation that triumphed Western 
civilization in the East.” Kemalist Orientalism assumed a “civilizing mission” toward all sectors of society 
who still carried the backward traditions and conventions of Islam. (Turk Ocaklari Mesai Programi 1926) 
The official Turkish History Thesis developed in 1930s argued that the founders of Western civilization 
were proto-Turks, hence Turks should be considered part of Western civilization and not the East. As 
Sukru Hanioglu notes, in the imaginary of “Turkish Orientalism” East (and by implication Islam) came to 
mean a society that is “sluggish, ignorant, static, linguistically and culturally primitive, closed to any kind 
of innovation, and immersed in superstitions.” See, Hanioglu, “The Historical Roots of Kemalism”; Sukru 
Hanioglu, “Türk Oryantalizmi’nin ‘Doğu’su Olarak Ortadoğu,” Sabah.com.tr, accessed October 5, 2013, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/hanioglu/2013/05/19/turk-oryantalizminin-dogusu-olarak-ortadogu. 
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dissolution of the Islamist RP, but the liberal international order as a whole offered its 
tacit or explicit approval. There were no significant criticisms of the Turkish 
Constitutional Court’s verdict to dissolve the RP (and later the ECtHR’s upholding of 
that verdict) from any of the individual states of Europe and North America, the EU and 
its many institutions, international institutions, and non-governmental human rights 
organizations.  
The ECtHR backs the Kemalist claim that because of the special historical and 
actual circumstances of the country, the Turkish state is justified in assigning “a special 
role” for secularism in Turkey.42 It reiterates “the importance of the principle of 
secularism for the democratic system in Turkey”43 and considers that “in light of its 
historical experience” Turkey can prevent “the political movements based on religious 
fundamentalism” from seizing power.44 The ECtHR concurs with the Constitutional 
Court’s observation that secularism is “one of the indispensable conditions of 
democracy” and backs the Turkish state’s claim that secularism must be safeguarded “on 
account of the country’s historical experience and the specific features of Islam.”45 This 
necessitates an interventionist secularism that goes beyond being a political doctrine but 
functions as a way of life, philosophy of modernization, acceptance of the guidance of 
Reason and Science. ECtHR provides its support of this vision of secularism by 
suggesting that “intervention by the State to preserve the secular nature of the political 
                                                
42 “Case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey,” §128. 
43 Ibid., §67. 
44 Ibid., §124. 
45 Ibid., §25. 
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regime had to be considered necessary in a democratic society.”46 Considering “the 
historical context in which the dissolution of the party concerned took place,” the ECtHR 
affirms the Kemalist state’s “general interest in preserving the principle of secularism in 
that context in the country” in order to “ensure the proper functioning of a ‘democratic 
society.’”47 Accordingly, the ECtHR fully endorses Kemalist interpretation of “a special 
secularism” by pointing out the history of the country rooted in “Islamic theocracy” of 
the Ottoman Empire:  
The Court further observes that there was already an Islamic theocratic 
regime under Ottoman law. When the former theocratic regime was 
dismantled and the republican regime was being set up, Turkey opted for a 
form of secularism which confined Islam and other religions to the sphere 
of private religious practice. Mindful of the importance for survival of the 
democratic regime of ensuring respect for the principle of secularism in 
Turkey, the Court considers that the Constitutional Court was justified in 
holding that Refah’s policy of establishing sharia was incompatible with 
democracy.48 
 
Given the historical background of the country, the Court fully endorses the Kemalist 
“form of secularism” which relegated Islam to the conscience of the individual. The 
                                                
46 Ibid., §25. 
47 Ibid., §105. To illustrate the gravity of the threat RP poses to secularism in Turkey, ECtHR refers to 
some public opinion polls (and it does not cite any source) which is reported to show that the RP’s votes, 
which was 22% in 1995 general elections, could go up to 38% in 1997 (had there been a general election 
that time) and to 67% in 2001. (§11) This expectation of ever increasing popularity and electoral success 
was found to be alarming by the ECtHR. (§107)  Here the ECtHR drops a cautionary note: 
“Notwithstanding the uncertain nature of some opinion polls, those figures bear witness to a considerable 
rise in Refah’s influence as a political party and its chances of coming to power alone.” (§107) On this 
particular reference to an unspecified opinion poll, Judge Anatoly Kovler issues a concurring opinion 
suggesting that he finds it “rather strange” that opinion poll figures, whose use “would be natural in a 
political analyis,” are used “in a legal text which constitutes res judicata.”  
48 Ibid., §125. 
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Court later remarks that ‘private religious practice’—the sphere of Kemalist secularism’s 
proper place for religion—does not mean private law. Rather, the proper place of religion 
is individual conscience. As the Court reiterates, “freedom of religion, including the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion by worship and observance, is primarily a matter of 
individual conscience, and stresses that the sphere of individual conscience is quite 
different from the field of private law, which concerns the organization and functioning 
of society as a whole.”49 For example RP’s policy suggestion of applying some of 
sharia’s private-law rules “fall outside the private sphere to which Turkish law confines 
religion” and at the same time “contradicts with the Convention system.”50 Accordingly, 
the ECtHR finds the Turkish state totally justified in its interventions to control religion 
and confine it to the realm of the visceral. This relegation of religion to the sphere of 
individual conscience reaffirms Kemalist secularism. Furthermore, the Court also ruled 
that in dissolving the RP and in instituting an aggressive form of secularism, the Turkish 
state “did not go beyond the margin of appreciation left to them under the Convention.”51 
In other words, Kemalist secularism as it is interpreted by the state is authorized by the 
norms of secularism and democracy within the system of European Convention on 
Human Rights. In that vein, the Court suggested that the Turkish state’s ban on wearing 
headscarf was authorized by the Convention system,52 and considered RP’s demands 
                                                
49 Ibid., §128. 
50 Ibid., §127. 
51 Ibid., §110. 
52 The ECtHR relied on the Kemalist argument that encouraging and wearing headscarves in public and 
educational establishments “exerted pressure on persons who did not follow that practice and created 
discrimination on the ground of religion or beliefs.” (§27) 
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such as changing the working hours for civil servants to accommodate fasting in 
Ramadan as in violation of the principle of secularism.53  
Central to this convergence between the Kemalist state and the ECtHR is their 
common Orientalist reading of Islamic history and concepts—particularly of shari‘a. The 
Court’s political-historical claim that the Ottoman Empire was an “Islamic theological 
regime” is deeply controversial and rather superficial. Scholars from very different 
perspectives and disciplines contest such a claim.54 Just as controversial is the Court’s 
depiction of the RP’s goal as establishing a “theocratic regime.” In suggesting that 
“sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy”55 the Court 
entirely converges with Kemalism’s interpretation of Islam and shari‘a. The ECtHR 
brings home this point: 
Like the [Turkish] Constitutional Court, the Court [ECtHR] considers that 
sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by 
religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the 
political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place 
in it. […] It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human 
rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which 
clearly diverges from Convention [ECHR] values, particularly with regard 
to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of 
                                                
53 On November 15, 2005, The ECtHR decided, in the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, that the Turkish 
state’s ban on wearing headscarves in universities did not constitute a violation of the right to education and 
the right to freedom of religion. 
54 The ECtHR’s claim that Ottoman Empire had an “Islamic theocratic regime” is a dubious one and hence 
its allegation that RP’s activities represent a return to this theocratic history is rather weak to form a basis 
for legal judgement. Many scholars suggest that Ottoman Empire did not have a theocratic regime. Some 
argue that it practiced a blend of Islamic law with conventional law (töre hukuku) and sultanic decrees. 
(e.g. Halil Inalcik, Mustafa Şentop) Others maintain that it had a secular ruling structure (e.g. Rifa’at Abou 
al-Haj) or that it had practiced a “pragmatic and not philosophical” secularism (e.g. Gayatri Spivak 1990). 
The baseline here is that the ECtHR’s ruling is based on a shaky ground.  
55 Ibid., §123. 
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women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in 
accordance with religious precepts… In the Court’s view, a political party 
whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to 
the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with 
the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention. 
 
Here the Court’s representation of sharia as stable, invariable, anti-pluralistic, totalitarian, 
and essentially contradictory with the fundamental principles of democracy are but 
excessively broad and problematic generalizations that rest on and reproduce Kemalist 
Orientalism. Similarly, the Court also makes very problematic claims about the concepts 
such as ‘jihad’ (“holy war and the struggle to be waged until the total domination of 
Islam in society is achieved”56) and ‘amel-i salih’ (“peacetime activities”57). Although the 
way the Court interprets jihad is controversial, its translation of amel-i salih (‘good 
deeds’) as ‘peacetime activities’ is a gross mistake. According to the Court, Turkey’s 
“historical experience” (‘Islamic theocratic regime of the Ottoman Empire’) and “the 
specific features of Islam” (‘sharia’s incompatibility with democracy and its inherent 
totalitarian and anti-pluralistic nature’)58 justifies Kemalist secularism that posits 
secularism as a norm but immediately points to the necessity of deviating from the norm 
by creating a “special form of secularism”—a decidedly more interventionist and 
pedagogic one.   
 
                                                
56 Ibid., §130. 
57 Ibid., §33. 
58 Ibid., §25. 
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2. Challenging Kemalist Laiklik through Appropriating Secularism: The Performative 
Politics of Inclusion and Difference in AK Party’s Court Defense 
 
As the Prosecutor’s indictment makes it clear, Kemalist discourse at once affirms 
and rejects the universality of secularism as a norm. It does so by introducing a historical 
difference into the meaning and practice of secularism. Kemalism argues that secularism 
in Turkey must be ‘different’ (and decidedly more pedagogical) in order to control 
religion and encounter the difference Islam introduces into the social and political life. 
The liberal international order affirms the universality of liberal secularism on the one 
hand, yet backs the Kemalist claim that Islam (and by implication Islamist parties) should 
be evaluated on a different standard. Kemalist claim that European or American 
secularisms are inapplicable to Turkey is backed by the institutions of liberal 
international order. This is the Orientalist/Eurocentric middle ground that sutures the 
secularist pedagogies of the Kemalist state and liberal global governance. 
Here is where AK Party’s paradox is located: on the one hand, having its roots in 
Islamism and now identifying itself as a ‘conservative democratic’ party, it seeks to 
introduce a difference into secularism and democracy; but on the other it opposes the 
Kemalist demand for introducing difference into secularism and democracy because of 
the peculiarities of Islamic history and theology. Paradoxically, AK Party’s differential 
adoption of secularism in the Turkish context rests on the claim that secularism should 
not be taken differently in different contexts and that it should be harmonious with the 
‘universal standards’ of ‘contemporary civilization’ to which, AK Party claims, Kemalist 
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secularism does not live up to. It invokes the authority of “universal norms,” 
“international standards,” “international treaties,” “global values,” and “contemporary 
civilization” to foreclose the Kemalist attempt to introduce an authoritarian spin to 
secularism and to garner support from liberal international order in its encounter with 
Kemalism. AK Party’s ‘conservative democracy’ registers Anglo-American liberal 
secularism as universal in order to counter the Kemalist claim that Turkey is not yet 
ready for a more democratic settlement of secularism in which the state opens (rather 
than closes) the public sphere equally to all citizens. In that sense, AK Party’s 
performative politics of non-normative adoption of secularism is forged from within a 
process of socialization—that is, through being constituted and enabled by the existing 
normative matrix of both the Turkish state and liberal international order.  
In that vein, AK Party frames its legal-political conflict with Kemalist state not in 
terms of secularism versus anti-secularism, but rather in terms of “a democratic and pro-
freedom” interpretation of secularism versus a “dogmatic” one.59 That is to say, AK Party 
does not reject secularism as a political norm but challenges its particular Kemalist 
instantiation.  It launches a challenge to the norm from within the norm. AK Party builds 
its defense on the argument that the Prosecutor’s (hence Kemalist) “interpretation of 
democracy and secularism is incompatible with the universal understanding.”60 In its 
reply to the Prosecutor’s indictment, AK Party identifies the fundamental issue in that 
litigation as being “the incompatibility between AK Party’s understanding of democratic 
                                                
59 “Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin Kapatma Davası Hakkındaki Esas Savunması,” June 16, 2008, 16, Esas 
No: 2008/1 (Siyasi Parti Kapatma). 
60 Ibid., 1. 
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secularism that is in harmony with universal standards and the Prosecutor’s 
understanding of secularism that objectifies (nesneleştiren) the individual and society.”61 
AK Party describes the Prosecutor’s understanding of secularism as being “entirely 
problematic, unscientific, unclear, internally contradicting, subjective, not compliant with 
legal standards, and most importantly, corrosive of the entire principle of secularism that 
it purports to protect.”62 AK Party argues that the indictment does not advocate the 
principle of secularism, but rather “it supports a totalitarian ideology, a philosophical 
opinion, and most dangerously a belief system in competition with others in the name of 
secularism.”63 As such, it is “not harmonious with social realities and with the universal 
accumulation (birikim) of secular thought.”64 It then goes to great lengths in trying to 
show in each of the Prosecutor’s myriad allegations that the activities that the indictment 
describes as being “anti-secularist” do not erode but indeed consolidate secularism, 
properly understood.65 AK Party’s defense stresses that it does not pose a threat to 
secularism, on the reverse, it has “accelerated the process of its socialization 
(sosyalleşme) through democratizing it.”66 Hence, AK Party seeks to “reinterpret” and 
“democratize” secularism through challenging its Kemalist meaning and practice.  
The Prosecutor, however, takes issue with AK Party's notion of ‘democratic 
secularism’ and describes it as an attempt to dilute secularism upon which entire Turkish 
Republic is founded. For example, the Prosecutor considers Erdoğan's statement that 
                                                
61 Ibid., 16. 
62 Ibid., 5. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 41. 
66 Ibid., 13. 
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“secularism is an attribute of the state and not of the individual” as one such anti-secular 
act of dilution that should be severely penalized. The Prosecutor makes it clear that 
questioning secularism is a Kemalist taboo: "It is fundamentally opposed to the principle 
of secularism for political parties to express their ideas directed towards emptying or 
changing the content of the principle of secularism defined in the Constitution." The 
implication is that it is against secularism to debate secularism. Democratic debate on 
secularism should not be allowed in order to protect secularism hence democracy. Within 
this formula, secularism is a precondition for democracy, and ‘diluting’ secularism 
through debate undermines democracy. Therefore, the meaning of democracy should be 
fixated on Kemalist terms. 
In return, AK Party takes issue with the Prosecutor’s unease with the notion of  
‘democratic secularism’ and claims that any understanding that is at odds with 
democratic secularism can protect neither democracy nor secularism.67 AK Party defines 
secularism as a “political principle that recognizes different religions and faiths (inanç) as 
a sociological reality and seeks to establish their peaceful coexistence.”68 Secularism 
means a state’s “equidistance to all faiths.” As such, secularism is “the implementation of 
the principle of state neutrality—a principle endorsed by modern democracies—in the 
field of state-religion relationship.”69 It claims that this can be achieved only if the state 
“does not base its political and legal order on the principles of any religion.”70 For the 
AK Party, the “modern understanding of secularism requires that state order does not rest 
                                                
67 Ibid., 3. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 4. 
70 Ibid. 
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on religious rules and that the state protects the individuals’ freedom of belief and 
conscience.”71  
Opposing the indictment’s definition of secularism as “a civilized way of life” and 
as “an ideal social order,” AK Party argues that secularism cannot be a “life-style.”72 
Otherwise, it turns into an attempt to govern the “totality” of life.73 Secularism should 
instead be taken as “a very important and valuable legal principle for enabling peaceful 
and free coexistence of different lifestyles.”74 To accept secularism as a life-style would 
be “to abolish secularism” since it would turn the state into “a totalitarian and imposing 
state” that would “impose a particular life-style on different segments of society.”75 As 
such, AK Party argues that defining secularism as a life-style is unconstitutional since it 
guarantees freedoms and keeps the state neutral.76 In that sense, AK Party tries to rescue 
secularism from its Kemalist interpretation. 
Furthermore, AK Party insists that secularism also should not turn into another 
religion. What damages secularism most and “wipes out its legal value” is the attempt to 
turn it into “a religion, a faith, or a principle that seeks to eliminate others.”77 AK Party 
quotes the preamble to the Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution which suggests that 
secularism does not mean atheism (dinsizlik) but means that every person can adhere to 
and practice any faith or sect and that s/he is not subjected to a differential treatment by 
                                                
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., 9. 
73 Ibid., 5. 
74 Ibid., 6. 
75 Ibid., 7. 
76 Ibid., 8. 
77 Ibid., 4. 
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other citizens because of his/her religious beliefs. By doing so, AK Party invokes the 
authority of an Anglo-American version of liberal secularism against a Kemalist one. It 
deploys the norm of secularism against its Kemalist signification.  
This amounts to a transgressive move under Kemalist conditions. AK Party lays 
claim to the norm of secularism from which it is excluded within Kemalist discursive 
regime. In that sense, AK Party’s appropriation of secularism stands as a performative 
contradiction. Its speech acts endorsing secularism are not authorized by Kemalist 
secularism, therefore they are ‘infelicitous performatives’78 within the conventions of 
Kemalist normativity. AK Party’s performative politics of differential repetition 
challenges the authority of the official Kemalist pedagogy of how to properly repeat the 
norm of secularism and hence what the proper place of religion should be. In doing so, 
AK Party adopts and resists secularism at once. 
In trying to overcome the Kemalist pedagogy of ‘not yet’ that posits a particular 
conception of ‘proper’ religion, secularism, and democracy, AK Party seizes the ‘now 
and here’ and challenges Kemalist notions of propriety. Kemalist deferral or suspension 
of democracy rests on a particular notion of maturity understood as the capacity to 
exercise the Enlightenment reasoning with absolute belief in science, and this was what 
the populace utterly lacked according to Kemalist elites, as they were still steeped in 
religious irrationality. AK Party’s appropriation of secularism issues a performative 
affirmation of the competency and maturity of the people to self-rule, hence subverted the 
                                                
78Sukru Hanioglu, “The Historical Roots of Kemalism,” in Democracy, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey, 
ed. Ahmet T. Kuru and Alfred C. Stepan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 32–60; Sukru 
Hanioglu, “Türk Oryantalizmi’nin ‘Doğu’su Olarak Ortadoğu,” Sabah.com.tr, accessed October 5, 2013, 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/hanioglu/2013/05/19/turk-oryantalizminin-dogusu-olarak-ortadogu. 
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basis of Kemalist pedagogy. 
Much of AK Party’s challenge to Kemalist pedagogy is forged through a critique 
of positivism that Kemalism subscribes to. AK Party rejects the Prosecutor’s definition of 
secularism as a “positivist and rationalist philosophical belief.”79 It claims that the 
Prosecutor’s positivistic notions of “scientific life” and “secularism as life-style” rest on 
the presumption of a “single correct life-style” embraced and imposed by the state. The 
Prosecutor’s invocation of “a political, social, and cultural life based on science,” for the 
AK Party, is a form of “scientism (bilimcilik) that belongs to 19th century positivism.” As 
such, it is “primitive, backwards and out of date in terms of the point that modern science 
has reached.”80 Furthermore, this is also a feature of “totalitarian ideologies,” and the 
Prosecutor is indeed “defending this [totalitarian] ideology in the name of secularism.”81 
For the AK Party, such a “strict positivist and ideological approach” to secularism ends 
up treating “any difference as a threat and seeks to abolish it, and envisions the 
individuals and the society as objects who are to be transformed according to pre-
determined templates.”82 Here AK Party’s reaction to “pre-determined templates” is a 
critique of the historicist teleology that underpins Kemalism.   
In instituting secularism as universal, AK Party ends up affirming the 
Prosecutor’s depiction of secularism as the “final stage of the intellectual and 
organizational evolution of societies.” 83 It is only through elevating liberal secularism to 
the level of the universal that AK Party can forestall the Kemalist attempt to implement 
                                                
79 “AK Parti Esas Savunması,” 8. 
80 Ibid., 9. 
81 Ibid., 10. 
82 Ibid., 76. 
83 Ibid., 8. 
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secularism differently—in a more restrictive and authoritarian way. Invoking liberal 
secularism’s universality—and socialization into it—becomes the condition for an 
effective challenge to the practice of secularism in Turkey. While elevating secularism to 
the level of the universal, AK Party at the same time challenges Kemalist secularism’s 
“universalist and positivist logic of uniformity.” In other words, while AK Party rejects 
Kemalist particularism (‘liberal secularism does not apply to Turkey,’ ‘secularism and 
democracy must be implemented differently’) it also rejects its claim to universalism 
(‘Enlightenment reason and science are the sole guides in personal and social life.’)  
In order to thwart Kemalist pedagogic claims to justify the deferral or suspension 
of democracy through some reference to unique conditions, AK Party anchors itself in the 
idea of a secularism at universal standards, which, for it, finds its expression in Anglo-
American liberal secularism.84 It insistently argues that secularism should be 
implemented in line with ‘universal norms’ and should not be transformed into a bon-
pour-l’orient model. Even though it accepts that there are different practices of 
secularism in Europe,85 AK Party rejects the Prosecutor’s attempt to develop a secularism 
that is ‘proper’ and ‘unique’ to the Turkish context alone. At the same time, AK Party 
                                                
84 It should also be noted that AK Party’s invocation of a “democratic” and “pro-freedom” secularism is not 
made in the name of liberalism even when it invokes the authority of secularism practices in the UK and 
the US. AK Party, defining itself as a ‘conservative democratic’ party, seeks to widen the space for religion 
in public life through challenging with the strictures of Kemalism. AK Party adopts a liberal vision of 
secularism but for purposes that are not rooted in liberalism and not reducible to liberalism. This can even 
be sensed in its choice of using the term ‘pro-freedom’ (özgürlükçü) instead of liberal in describing its 
position. In his speech to a group of Egyptian Revolutionary Youth in their visit to the AK Party 
headquarters, Bülent Turan, an AK Party MP from Istanbul, said: “AK Party has succeeded in translating 
the conservative values into the language of the age. In that sense, it has made a modern interpretation of 
classical (kadim) Islamic thought and has implemented it successfully.” (Interviews by the author, 
December 11 and December 13, 2011.) Here, Turan claims that although AK Party’s politics parallels the 
liberal notions of state neutrality, it is rooted not in liberalism but in a new interpretation and translation of 
Islamic political thought.  
85 “AK Parti Esas Savunması,” 15. 
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draws upon the same idea that there are different secularisms in Europe and the U.S. in 
arguing that Kemalist secularism is only one interpretation that may be criticized and 
modified. For the AK Party, “the idea that ‘our secularism is unique to us’ can only 
ground anti-democratic positions.” The only uniqueness of Turkish secularism has been 
the “production of anti-democratic interpretations […] that amounts to a defense of 
dictatorship of a minority”86 Secularism should rather be taken as “a universal 
repertoire.” (birikim)  
In that sense, the Prosecutor’s pedagogic politics rests on a performative 
appropriation of secularism for the Turkish context, and AK Party’s performative politics 
of challenging Kemalist pedagogy rests on the invocation of the authority and 
universality of another—liberal—secularism. AK Party challenged Kemalist secularism’s 
claim to universality, but only at the cost of affirming the universality of liberal 
secularism. As the sovereign constitutional norm of the Turkish state, Kemalist 
secularism was above the law. It could create exceptions to law and could overturn 
democracy in order to protect itself. For Kemalism, the universal essence of secularism 
was a life-style based on positivistic belief in science and reason, and suspending law was 
justified to secure this universal essence. Hence, what we have here is a complex 
negotiation of the universality of secularism and of the kinds of differences that can 
legitimately be introduced into a national context. Hence, a straightforward narrative of 
socialization that tries to understand AK Party’s appropriation of secularism through the 
simple binary of acceptance or resistance does not capture the ways in which AK Party 
both inhabits and displaces the norm. Similarly, taking socialization as transition into the 
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normalizing pedagogy of norms does not account for the ways in which norms can be 
adopted non-normatively.  
AK Party insistently claims that the Prosecutor’s “interpretation of democracy and 
secularism (laiklik) is incompatible the universal understanding.”87 On the contrary, AK 
Party argues that the Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement that ‘secularism is a feature of 
the state and not of the individual’  “reflects the modern understanding of secularism yet 
is regarded as anti-secular in the indictment.”88 AK Party describes its understanding of 
secularism as being “completely compatible with the pro-freedom (özgürlükçü) 89 
interpretation of secularism of modern democratic societies” Defending the totalitarian 
idea of a scientific and correct life-style, as AK Party claims the Prosecutor does, 
“directly goes against the modern world and the dominant scientific understanding of 
today.”90 The Prosecutor’s vision of proper religion as being relegated to the individual 
conscience, lived within the walls of the mosque, completely cut off from worldly affairs, 
and experienced in a way that cannot form any social and cultural webs is rejected as 
having “no equivalent in any of the Western democratic secular systems.”91 Overall, the 
understanding of religion and especially of Islam in the indictment is criticized as being a 
product of “a reductionist and dogmatic ideology [which] contradicts the outlook of our 
global world on religious feelings and phenomena and also the stage that humanity has 
reached in the freedoms of belief and expression.”92  
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89 It is worth noting that the text uses the term ‘pro-freedom’ (özgürlükçü) instead of ‘liberal.’ 
90 “AK Parti Esas Savunması,” 10. 
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In that vein, the norms, conventions, and treaties of the European Union figure as 
prominent sources of authority in AK Party’s defense. It argues that it is a “clear and 
simple fact that a party that took so many important steps toward EU integration cannot 
be a hub for anti-secularism.”93 To make its case stronger, AK Party refers to the EU 
Progress Reports that speak highly about the party’s reforms to meet with the 
Copenhagen political criteria regulating the fields of democracy, rule of law, and human 
rights. “By struggling to elevate its domestic legal system to European standards and to 
EU’s legal order,” AK Party argues that it seeks to “adapt to universal law” (evrensel 
hukuk).94 To show its commitment to these standards, AK Party disowns the idea of 
multiple legal orders, which incorporates shari‘a into legal order.95 It claims that it has 
strengthened the legal dimension of secularism by “adapting the main order of the state to 
European standards.”96 It suggests that it is merely a misperception to see a political party 
as “violating the principle of secularism” which indeed “has modernized the social, legal, 
political, and economic orders of the state by adapting it to the European law, and has 
expanded the sphere of religious freedom as a second pillar of secularism.”97  
In contrast to the Prosecutor’s attempt to foreclose the meaning of secularism, AK 
Party notes that “secularism is being debated all over the world”98 and seeks to open it to 
discussion and toward different meanings. In order to be able to do that, it once again 
invokes the authority of European standards to appropriate Kemalism’s single claim to 
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Europeanize the country and to garner the support of liberal international audience. It 
gives the example that secularism was one of the most important issues in the debates 
over European Constitution. It is only through claiming to fit within the parameters of 
European debates that AK Party feels that it can garner the authority to challenge 
Kemalist secularism.  The indictment stipulates that “in the face of the founding 
philosophy and basic constitutional rules of the Turkish Republic that Ataturk founded, it 
is impossible to open secularism to debate and to question its legitimacy and 
applicability.”99 For AK Party, the indictment “does not come to terms with the fact that 
secularism as a phenomenon democratized over time.”100 Secularism is a “dynamic 
concept” that democratized in the process of the democratization of states. This even 
happened in France where “secularism is implemented in the most strict way.”101 
Through time secularism got rid of “radical and militant applications and attained a 
democratic posture by respecting the freedom of conscience and religion more.”102 By 
“highlighting the pro-freedom interpretation of secularism,” AK Party seeks to open up 
Kemalist laiklik to debate.  
AK Party challenges the Prosecutor’s claim that the true place of religion is 
individual conscience. To begin with, this understanding of religion is “incongruent with 
the sociological reality.”103 The perception of religion that grounds the Prosecutor’s 
understanding of secularism is “far away from the sociological phenomenon of religion in 
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real life.”104 It is one thing, for the AK Party, “to have religion as the fulcrum for legal 
regulations”, but another thing to have it as “a source of value and action for believing 
people in their individual and communal lives.”105 AK Party insists that the indictment is 
internally contradictory since it refers to religion as a social institution but also purports 
that in a secular state religion cannot intervene in worldly affairs. The Prosecutor depicts 
secularism as a principle that transforms the servant (kul) into an individual (birey). The 
word ‘kul’, however, has two meanings in Turkish, one being the servant of God (in 
Arabic ‘abd) and the other as subject (of a ruler). The indictment uses the term without 
differentiating its two meanings, and hence, in a way, alluding to both. AK Party suggests 
that “if what is meant by the word ‘individual’ is to cut off all relationship with the 
Creator, then it is obvious that there is no chance that religion can exist even in the 
conscience of the individual in a secular system.”106  
 
 
3. Translating Lifeworlds: Secularism, Democracy, and Negotiation of Cultural 
Difference in AK Party’s Political Imaginary  
 
 
In his speech to a delegation of Egyptian Youth, Bülent Turan, an AK Party MP 
for Istanbul and an erstwhile youth leader in the banned Refah Party, argued that AK 
Party “has succeeded in translating conservative values into the language of the age.” He 
suggested that it has “developed and successfully implemented a modern interpretation of 
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classical Islamic thought.”107 For him, the party has “internalized conservative values but 
at the same time received and synthesized global values.” This is why, he argues, it is not 
possible to “squeeze AK Party into the confines of any single ideological framework.” In 
doing so, Turan points out, “AK Party is both in power with popular vote but at the same 
time in opposition—in opposition to the system.” And he adds that AK Party’s split 
position of being at once in power and in opposition is valid for both domestic and 
international politics. In domestic politics, he notes, AK Party “has deciphered the dirty 
nature of the struggle between the center and the periphery, and returned the power to the 
people that was usurped from them by the power elites in the center.” In international 
politics, it is “trying to make Turkey once again a center country that has been put on the 
periphery after the Second World War.” As such, AK Party is “both harmonious with and 
challenging against the global system.” It is “putting a mirror to the hypocricies, cruelties, 
double standards, and injustices of the [global] system.”108 
If AK Party is translating “conservative values into the language of the age” by 
developing “a modern interpretation of classical Islamic thought,” as Turan claims it 
does, then what are the terms, modalities, and content of this translation? İbrahim Kalın, a 
professor of Islamic philosophy and the Chief Advisor to Prime Minister on Foreign 
Affairs, argues that Islamism had a “parochial language” that spoke only to the 
“insiders.” “But now,” he notes, “we must develop a universal language [that speaks] 
through concepts that has become common (müşterek) to all.” In other words, Kalın is 
pointing to the necessity of a politics of translation that will give voice to the 
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108 Bülent Turan, Interview by the author, interview by the author, December 13, 2011. 
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reinterpreted and reclaimed Islamic tradition through categories that have become 
common to humanity. This notion of translation as speaking through common categories 
is at once a recovery of the Islamic tradition and an affirmation of the possibility of the 
universal. Kalın argues that  
“Islamic civilization in the classical age had a universal language. We 
have the idea of the dignity of the human in our tradition. While exploring 
these [our tradition] we are coming into contact with the modern liberal 
internationalist language. And this [contact] is facilitating our work. Why 
should we abandon that? It is only natural that it can at times parallel and 
at times conflict [with liberalism].”  
 
In other words, it is not a particular concern for Kalin that the outcome of this process of 
the reinterpretation of Islamic tradition would run alongside or away from liberalism. 
“Fusions and intersections can always happen,” he notes: “Why should we shun these 
[fusions and intersections with liberal language]?”  For example, on the question of 
whether wearing headscarf is to be defended as a ‘human right’ or as ‘God’s command,’ 
Kalın suggests, “these are false dichotomies. It is both. It is both a human right and God’s 
command.”109 For him this is indicative of the mistaken logic of saying “if I’m a Muslim 
then I’m nothing else.” And Islamism very much relied on such a “conflictual and sharp 
attitude.” (çatışmacı ve keskin tavır) However, Kalın notes that this attitude is “quite 
modern.” Islamic tradition, he argues, “has always had multiple layers.”110  
                                                
109 Many scholars and journalists argue that defending the right to wear headscarf as a human right instead 
of as a religious obligation is a radical departure from Islamism and a move toward a liberal post-Islamism. 
For an example, see Dagi, “Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West.” 
110 Classical scholars, for example, could simultaneously be mystics, theologians, and hadith scholars—
three traditions that are usually thought in tension with each other. İbrahim Kalın, Interview by the author, 
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Here Kalın makes a clear case for cultural translation as a modality of engaging 
the concepts of liberal modernity from within Islamic tradition. The problem with 
Islamism’s “binary thinking” and “conflictual and sharp attitude” is indeed a problem of 
not lending itself to a politics of cultural translation. The idea of ‘being a Muslim and 
nothing else’ is that it rests on the idea of incommensurability. Such a position forecloses 
the possibility of a translation across concepts and lifeworlds since it renders them 
hermetically sealed and radically different totalities. Kalın clearly rejects such a politics 
of anti-translation. On the other hand, he also refuses the idea of a translation as 
equivalence—that cultures can be mapped onto each other. Rather, he endorses a politics 
of translation that is both the possibility of reaching a universal and of producing 
difference. He rejects the idea of equivalence (liberal pedagogic socialization) and 
incommensurability (both Islamist and liberal versions of ‘clash of civilizations’ 
argument)111, and instead affirms “universal concepts common to all” while recognizing 
the possibility that it is productive of irreducible difference. In that sense translation is a 
performative production of difference.  
This politics of cultural translation is also evident in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 
extensive writings on Islamic civilization, secularism, and democracy.112 Davutoğlu 
reinterprets Islamic tradition in the light of modern categories while trying to retain its 
irreducible difference. Hence, similar to Kalın, his vision of translation rests neither on 
                                                
111 Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity (London: Verso, 2002). 
112 Davutoğlu is the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the architect of AK Party’s foreign policy doctrine, 
who also served as the Chief Advisor to Prime Minister since the party’s coming to power in 2002. His 
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the idea of incommensurability (hence the impossibility of translation) nor on 
equivalency (that cultures can be mapped onto each other through a third term). Rather, 
Davutoğlu engages in a process of cultural translation in which contesting universals 
come to recognize and interact with each other.  
In that vein, in his 1999 article titled “Globalization, Mentality Crisis and 
Democracy,” Davutoğlu starts with refusing the question of ‘compatibility’ between 
Islam and democracy. For him, Islam is a comprehensive belief system that “provides 
individuals with a consciousness of being,” and hence, it can be neither in “absolute 
harmony” nor in “absolute contradiction” with any political, social, or economic 
mechanism. Trying to prove it either way ends up in a “methodological cul-de-sac.”113 
Instead, one can examine whether “the basic parameters of the mentality and the social 
norms that breed from this belief system is compatible with the fundamental 
presuppositions of a mechanism.”114  
For Davutoğlu, the fundamental mistake in analyzing this complicated question 
lies in “the Eurocentric reading of history [which] identifies human history with the 
history of the West and renders non-Western societies history-less through an object-
subject relationship.” 115 Such an “egocentric self-perception” creates a “clear-cut 
polarization between the West as the subject having the power to lead history and the 
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Rest as the passive objects of this historical process.”116 He maintains that the established 
paradigm of history presumes the universality of the historical trajectory of the West 
starting with Ancient Greece, passing through Rome, Christianity and Medieval Age and 
arriving at “modern and secular age”. This approach, according to Davutoğlu, “imagines 
a single and standard secularism and places it at the heart of modernity.”117  
What is crucial here is that Davutoğlu’s criticism of a singular and fixed 
conception of secularism is not a rejection of secularism per se. Rather, he effectively 
provincializes secularism. He recognizes secularism as a product of European history, 
hence it is not to be turned into a teleological necessity and precondition for democracy. 
However, its European origin is not a sufficient reason to disown it. While opposing the 
imposition of a frozen notion of secularism—which tacitly but clearly refers to Kemalist 
laiklik—Davutoğlu at the same time argues that Islamic political thought allows a 
“rational” and “humane” conception of political authority which can be deemed akin to 
secularism.   
Here, Davutoğlu makes a distinction between two conceptions of secularism. First 
is the one that builds on the nineteenth century positivist idea of ‘stages’ of thinking. 
Within this Eurocentric vision, Western historical experience comes to define the 
universal moment, and secularism is understood as a belief in science and reason against 
religion.118 Davutoğlu levels multiple critiques against this narrative. First, the 
“civilizational crisis” the West is going through and the philosophical discrediting of the 
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“absolutist claims of modernity” render the positivist project unsustainable. Second, 
“taking secularism as an absolute standard with universal validity” and consequently 
turning secularism into an “ideology” and into “an alternative faith system” contradict 
with the pluralist ethos of democracy.  It effectively excludes non-Western societies’ 
experiences and creates hierarchies on the basis of standards derived from Western 
history. Third, and related to this last point, reducing secularism to “the standard schemes 
of dogmatic/radical French experience” dissociates secularism from its “rational 
kernel.”119   
Contrary to the positivist, ideological, and even theological secularism 
(‘secularism as an alternative religion’) that Kemalist laiklik is built on, the second 
conception of secularism, Davutoğlu argues, despite emerging out of the European 
context, has some important overlaps with the Islamic conception of political authority. 
He claims that “contrary to Christianity which gave rise to secularism out of a dialectical 
opposition within itself, Islam does not exclude rational political mentality and 
institutionalization.”120 There is a “clear epistemological basis” in Islamic tradition to 
construe the legitimacy of political power on humane and rational basis.  In that sense, 
secularist emphasis on human authority is not alien to Islamic tradition. Indeed, he argues 
that it lies at the very root of it. He supports this claim with the example of Abu Bakr’s 
selection as the first Caliph immediately after the death of Prophet Mohammad. Even 
though the Prophet’s political authority was unique in terms of his position as God’s 
messenger, Abu Bakr’s political authority was based solely on the consensus of the 
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community (ijma) and hence humane. Even though Abu Bakr enjoyed the same rights 
and obligations as political ruler, he never claimed any metaphysical status. This marks a 
“transition from a metaphysically-based political authority to a rational political authority 
resting on the participation of individuals.” It exemplifies the transformation of the 
Prophet’s metaphysical authority into “a political and social authority produced among 
people.”121   
This, for Davutoğlu, was not the case in Christianity since St. Paul, which 
centuries later stirred a backlash and produced secularism through its internal tensions. 
Besides, Islam never had an institution like the Church that claimed a metaphysical 
authority in the first place.122 It also did not have religious wars within it that can be 
comparable to the ones in Europe. In addition, non-Muslims and particularly people of 
the book (Christians and Jews) were granted communal autonomy in Islamic tradition. 123 
For him, these are but some of the reasons why it is a mistake to project European history 
as universal and singular. Despite these historical differences between Western 
Christianity’s historical trajectory that produced secularism and Islamic tradition 
(especially the experience of the Ottoman Empire), there are crucial elements in Sunni 
Islamic tradition that posit “rationality” and “humaneness” as the basis of political 
authority. These different historical experiences—divergences and convergences—
constitute the grounds for a cultural translation of secularism and democracy.  
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Davutoğlu argues that because of the trace of Western Christian history in 
secularism, turning it into a universal precondition for democracy is highly problematic. 
Reducing democracy to secularism makes it difficult to transform democracy into a 
“common experience of humanity.” The turning of secularism into “an alternative 
religion,” for him, contributed to the failure of the global discourse of democracy “to 
institute an inclusive and universal value system.”124 In other words, positing secularism 
as a precondition derails the universality of democracy. For Davutoğlu, “ontological 
equality and freedom” constitute the universal essence of democracy. Hence, “the 
transfer of its formal aspects to non-Western societies” puts the latter’s “life-worlds” at 
risk and faces them with “the paradox of de-historicization.” (tarihsizleşme açmazı)125 He 
points out that even in the Western experience, there is not one but multiple modalities of 
interaction between democracy and different “value systems.”126 To miss these different 
trajectories and to fixate democracy on an “ideological” notion of secularism is to 
“attribute a meta-historical meaning to both secularism and democracy.”127 Democracy 
then should not be taken as “static.” Rather, it is undergoing “one of the most dynamic 
process in its history” since the “linear relations between capitalism, democracy, and 
secularism are being disentangled and the internal contradictions among these three 
constitutive institutions of European nation-state formation are weakening their inner 
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fabric which were interconnected within the frame of positivism and progressivist 
(ilerlemeci) understanding of history.”128  
Here Davutoğlu raises a double critique: first, of the Kemalist discourse, and 
second, of the liberal universalist discourse. In other words, Davutoğlu levels a critique 
against the secularisms advocated by both the liberal global governance and the Turkish 
Kemalist state.  For him, both converge on an Orientalist and Eurocentric reading of 
history in general. He points out that “the modernizers of Turkey in the early decades of 
this century adopted the process of modernization in the belief that it was an inevitable 
universal phenomenon, with secularization as its rational essence.” 129 
Hence, Davutoğlu neither rejects secularism and democracy, nor signs on to the 
pedagogy of their Kemalist or liberal articulations. Rather he engages in a project of 
translation. This project of translation is an affirmative response to the question he asks in 
the article: “Will democracy remain only as an experience of Western societies or will it 
be the common experience of humanity?” This, according to Davutoğlu, brings forth the 
question of the relationship between “the lifeworlds of non-Western societies and the 
philosophy and practice of democracy.”130 This reference to “life-worlds of non-Western 
societies” seeks to introduce the difference of Islamic political tradition in the Turkish 
context into the concept of secularism and democracy that carry the trace of European 
history, yet at the same time invokes the authority and universality of what Davutoğlu 
takes to be the essence of democracy (“ontological equality and freedom”) and 
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secularism (“rational legitimation of political authority”). Therefore, cultural translation 
is the only way secularism and democracy can attain a universal significance and 
relevance (“the common experience of humanity”). Closing it to translation and imposing 
a fixed meaning of secularism and democracy by foreclosing its other possible meanings 
will render it “only an experience of Western societies.” In that sense, he provincializes 
secularism. He challenges the positing of secularism as universal and religions as local 
since this “ignores the universal values of religions,” yet at the same time, he finds in 
secularism a potentially universalizable kernel, which for him is the rational/human 
legitimacy of political authority—locating himself and speaking within Islamic tradition.   
He refuses the Eurocentric and Orientalist narrative that depicts modernization as 
“civilizational conversion,”—which is, again, common to the discourses and practices of 
both the Kemalist state and liberal international order—yet at the same time pushes for 
exploring the points of overlaps or ‘equivalences’ between different social imaginaries. 
The question, for him, is to figure out how to make the political institutions produced in 
Western civilization’s historical experience harmonious (uyumlu) with Islamic 
worldview. This is “the biggest challenge facing Islamic political thought,” that is 
transforming Islam’s “egalitarian and liberatory existence-knowledge-value paradigm 
into a universally valid political culture and institutionalization.”131 
 While calling for and practicing translation, Davutoğlu also acknowledges the 
conditions under which cultural translation takes place. Davutoğlu emphasizes two 
coexisting dynamics: First, Western modes of thinking and organization have come to 
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dominate the world and formed the conditions upon which any alternative can be thought 
of. It is these conditions upon which cultural translation will take place: “The non-
Western societies, including the Islamic world, face the necessity of reinterpreting their 
traditions and experiences on the basis of the existing historical-spatial terrain.”132 
Second, there is now a “civilizational resurgence” in almost every major cultural basin 
toward reclaiming their history and agency, which defies the narratives of endism—end 
of history, end of idelogies, end of religion, so on.133 In other words, the constitutive and 
transformative power of modern conditions are unmistakable,134 but at the same time the 
door must be open to an agentic space through performatively appropriating the concepts 
and institutions of modernity in translating local concepts into these categories. While 
doing this, he also tries to abstain from positing these categories as universal and cultural 
life-worlds as local. Rather, he wants to institute the universality of these institutions 
through processes of translation, which, inevitably and willfully, transforms both 
languages.  
This line of reasoning frames democracy as at once a universal value and a 
particular institutional arrangement. Yet, speaking especially for the context of the 
Muslim world, Davutoğlu ties the question of the universality of democracy to the 
question of secularism. He suggests, “clinging to an absolutist (mutlakçı) neo-secular 
understanding within a modernist framework obstructs the process of reinterpreting 
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democracy in an inclusive/comprehensive (kuşatıcı) and universal way.”135 For him, 
secularism did emerge together with the nation-state form, capitalism and democracy, yet 
their interconnections are getting looser and internally contradictory. In order for 
democracy to diffuse as a global norm, it should accept the provinciality of European 
experience. Otherwise, an approach that “reduces the repertoire of humanity to the 
experience of the West and then justifies it through a globalization discourse stifles the 
life-worlds of local cultural and civilizational basins on the one hand, and hinders the 
harmonization of democratic mechanisms with local textures of mentality on the 
other.”136  In that sense, Davutoğlu stresses the need to resist “sacralizing” (kutsamak) 
democracy as “a static good” (statik iyi) or a fixed recipe—especially in a world in which 
“Western societies are trying to overcome the crisis of representative democracy.” “When 
looked beyond its legitimizing enchantment,” Davutoğlu argues, “democracy is going 
through a transformation in multiple dimensions which necessitates its redefinition in 
both its universal meaning and local practices.”137 Yet at the same time he affirms 
democracy’s universality. But its universality can only be instituted if it opens itself to 
the possibility of local appropriations and interpretations. Put differently, Davutoğlu 
comes to suggest that only through cultural translation can democracy democratically 
assert itself as a global norm and a universal value.  
Hence, Davutoğlu’s negotiation of democracy and secularism speaks of a 
particular mode of socialization into these categories. It affirms these norms while putting 
at risk the normalizing logic and power of these norms. It affirms their universality while 
                                                
135 Davutoğlu, “Küreselleşme, Zihniyet Bunalımı ve Demokrasi,” 110. 
136 Ibid., 111. 
137 Ibid., 110. 
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exposing their particularity. It does not give up on the universals, yet also does not 
subscribe to their liberal or Kemalist significations. In that sense, it does not submit to the 
normalizing pedagogies of these norms.  Rather, it enacts a performative appropriation. 
He rejects both the “neo-secular globalist discourse” (read liberal pedagogy) and 
“autarkic and cynic religious discourse.” (read Islamist rejection)138 The former is a story 
of absorption, subsumption, transition, and pedagogic socialization. The latter is one of 
rejection and clash of hermetically-sealed civilizations. Davutoğlu’s account is a negation 
of both. His narrative makes a double call: first, for a reinterpretation of the political 
norms of modernity in a more egalitarian and open way; second, for a reinterpretation of 
non-Western historical traditions and experiences on the basis of “the existing historical-
spatial plane.”139   
Despite his critique of the idea (shared by both liberal global discourse and 
Kemalist discourse) that secularism is a precondition for democracy for its 
marginalization of non-Western traditions, he comes to affirm a particular understanding 
of secularism as a basic pillar of democracy. In the Al-Ahram Weekly’s interview with 
him, he suggests that “the rational legitimacy of political power” is one of the four 
fundamental principles of a democracy—others are participation, accountability, and 
elections.140 In his 1999 article, Davutoğlu argues that non-positivist and non-ideological 
model of secularism rests on the idea that political authority is rational and humane and 
that this mode of secularism overlaps with the experience of Islamic tradition.  In other 
                                                
138 Ibid., 102. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Harmonising Immutable Values and Ever-changing Mechanisms, interview by 
Omayma Abdel-Latif, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, November 11, 2004, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/716/focus.htm. 
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words, taking secularism as the synonym of “rational legitimacy of political power,” 
Davutoğlu effectively posits secularism as one of the four basic pillars of democracy. In 
that sense, while criticizing the idea of turning secularism into a precondition for 
democracy, Davutoğlu institutes a particular secularism—one that he takes compatible 
with Sunni Islamic tradition—as key feature, if not precondition, of democracy. 
Therefore, his critique is not to reject secularism, democracy, and their interrelationship, 
but to open up space for cultural negotiation and translation of these categories. 
Crucial to Davutoğlu’s treatment of democracy is the way he locates the question 
of Islam and democracy within its global and international context. He points to the 
double standards operative in the discourses and practices of liberal global governance on 
the question of democracy in the Muslim world. He criticizes Western states’ support for 
autocratic regimes in the Muslim world in the name of stability and contrasts it to the 
same countries’ support for democratization in the post-Soviet countries. He points to the 
cynic irony that it is those who staunchly support dictatorships in the Middle East who 
also fervently support the idea of a supposed ‘incompatibility’ between Islam and 
democracy. More recently, commenting on the Western countries’ tacit support for the 
July 3, 2013 military coup in Egypt, Davutoğlu described their attitude as ‘neo-
orientalist’: “While the West supports democratic demands in Eastern Europe, she thinks 
it can be lived with autocratic regimes when it comes to the Middle East. This is neo-
orientalism. But the Arab world got the taste of democracy, there is no return.”141 
                                                
141 “Avrupa ülkeleri Mısır’da Neo Oryantalist davrandı,” Star Gazetesi, July 18, 2013, 
http://haber.stargazete.com/politika/avrupa-ulkeleri-misirda-neo-oryantalist-davrandi/haber-773188. 
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Despite his criticism of the double standards in world politics on the question of 
democracy in the Muslim world, Davutoğlu considers democracy as “the most prominent 
global value in current international order.”142 Democracy functions as “a magical 
concept legitimizing different political systems.”143 However, the tacitly governing model 
of democracy in today’s world is a version of Athenian democracy based on “ontological 
unfreedom” (the institution of slavery) and “ontological inequality” (the category of the 
metic). Through these institutions most Athenians were excluded from the exercise of 
democratic rights.144 In addition, Western support for authoritarian regimes in the Muslim 
world for strategic considerations reveal that democracy is instrumentalized and taken as 
a universal value only for some, hence, not genuinely universal. Similarly, the ambivalent 
situation of non-European immigrants in Europe, for Davutoğlu, undermines the liberal 
discourse of democracy. All in all, he asserts that “the discourses of globalization and 
democracy that legitimize the existing understanding of hierarchical and exclusionary 
political order” lacks the “philosophical depth” that would provide “ontological equality 
and freedom.”145 
In an interview he gave to Egypt’s Al-Ahram Weekly in 2004, Ahmet Davutoğlu, 
then chief advisor to the prime minister, was asked about whether Muslim intellectuals 
could develop an ‘Islamic democracy’ by fusing Islamic and Western democratic ideals. 
His response to this question starts with a distinction between values and mechanisms. 
                                                
142 Davutoğlu, “Küreselleşme, Zihniyet Bunalımı ve Demokrasi,” 97. 
143 Ibid., 109. 
144 For Davutoğlu, at the international level the international institutions such as the UN Security Council 
and G-7 (now G-8) are but manifestations of an outlook that translates inequalities in economic and 
political power into ontological inequalities. See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Civilizational Transformation and the 
Muslim World (Mahir Publ. Sdn. Bhd., 1994). 
145 Davutoğlu, “Küreselleşme, Zihniyet Bunalımı ve Demokrasi,” 94. 
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For him, Islam does not stipulate a particular mode of government and hence opens a vast 
space for Muslims for devising mechanisms of rule: “Al-Qur'an Al-Karim contains no 
detailed or given political mechanism which Muslims must adhere to.” Rather, what the 
Qur'an provides is “the values of the political system—justice, dignity, equality and 
freedom—but it does not impose any particular political mechanism on human beings, 
because political systems are subject to change over time.”146 For Davutoğlu democracy 
as a mechanism rests on four principles, and none of them contradicts the core values of 
Islam: “(i) the rational legitimacy of political power; (ii) political participation as a way 
of creating political power; (iii) political and legal accountability of political leaders; and 
(iv) the possibility of changing political power through elections.” These mechanisms, 
however, “must further the core values of Islam”. These core values, Davutoğlu argues, 
are the “Maqasyd,” more commonly known as Maqasid al-Shari‘a, or, the Purposes of 
Shari‘a.147 These core values and goals of shari‘a, as Davutoğlu enumerates in the 
interview, are protection of life, intellect, generation, religion, property, and realisation of 
justice.  For him “any mechanism can be legitimate as long as it achieves these 
values.”148 He gives the example of the different ways in which the first four Righteous 
                                                
146 He gives the example of Al-Mawardi’s Ahkam al-Sultaniya, one of the most authoritative sources of 
Sunni Islamic political thought since eleventh century, which takes monarchy, a mechanism of rule adopted 
from Roman, Byzantine, and Persian empires, as a legitimate model of governance. Davutoğlu, 
Harmonising Immutable Values and Ever-changing Mechanisms. 
147 This refers to a body of Islamic jurisprudence developed in thirteenth century that inductively identifies 
overarching purposes of shari‘a as a template to guide particular interpretations.    
148 He does not use the word ‘shari‘a’ since, probably, that would cause legal trouble in Turkey, but he does 
use the term ‘maqasid’ and argues that mechanisms that observe and foster these principles of the shari‘a 
can well be deemed legitimate. 
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Caliphs came to power after the Prophet149 indicating the possibility of a “flexible and 
innovative approach to institutionalization.”150  And the task for Muslim scholars “is to 
identify those political mechanisms which are best able to realise the universal values of 
Islam.”  
Here, Davutoğlu effectively construes democracy as one possible mechanism to 
achieve the purposes of Islamic Shari‘a. Yet at the same time, he resists the 
instrumentalization of democracy—in two senses: first, its strategic use by hegemonic 
powers for pursuing material interests, and second, its reduction to a mere mechanism 
stripped of its core constitutive values—that is equality and freedom, together with the 
four others mentioned above. Davutoğlu first makes an analytical separation between 
values and mechanisms in thinking about democracy, but then blurs that distinction by 
suggesting that all mechanisms are sedimentations of particular values. After tacitly 
recognizing the difficulty of neatly separating values and mechanisms, he goes on to 
assert a “hierachy” between the two. For him, there is a “hierarchical distinction” 
between “substance” and “form,” which in his account corresponds broadly to the 
difference between value and mechanism, respectively. On the question of democracy, he 
takes the “mental texture” and “social norms” derived from Islam as the substance/value 
according to which democracy as a form/mechanism should be interpreted and adapted. 
This adaptation, for him, cannot run against the core values of democratic mechanisms—
freedom and equality. However, this is a rather vague condition that needs specification, 
                                                
149 “General election and consensus, consenting to a nominee, forming a group of selectorate among the 
wisest, taking the consent of majority.” Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Devlet,” Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam 
Ansiklopedisi (DİA) (İstanbul, 1994), 237. 
150 Ibid. 
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something Davutoğlu hardly provides. In other words, democracy is understood both as a 
mechanism (representation, accountability, elections) and as a value (freedom and 
equality) and as a mechanism it is hierarchically subordinated to the values of Islamic 
normativity, which for him are compatible with Islamic norms. Hence democracy should 
be reinterpreted in order to render it “harmonious” with Islamic norms provided that such 
an adaptation does not violate democracy’s core values of “ontological freedom and 
equality” as well as the hierarchy between Islamic norms and democratic mechanisms.  
Similarly, in his article on the different conceptions of the sources of sovereignty, 
Mustafa Şentop, a professor of constitutional law and legal history and an AK Party vice-
chairman and MP, who is also the vice-chairman of the Constitutional Committee in 
parliament, makes broad comparisons between Western Christianity’s historical 
trajectory and Islamic political and legal thought. By making a similar distinction 
between values and mechanisms, Şentop argues that Islamic law provides only the 
fundamental values for political governance and not a specific model. He notes, “Islamic 
law does not institute any model for political sovereignty. Therefore, from the very 
beginning, different political understandings have been prevalent in different states that 
Muslims formed. These understandings were shaped by the conditions of the time, the 
repertoire of rulers and the traditions they were influenced by.”151 Again, what is 
important here is “the criteria of compliance with Islamic law.”152 
                                                
151 Mustafa Şentop, “Siyasi Hakimiyetin Kaynağı Meselesi ve Osmanlı Telakkisi,” (The Question of the 
Source of Political Sovereignty and the Ottoman Understanding”) E-Akademi Hukuk, Ekonomi ve Siyasal 
Bilimler Aylık İnternet Dergisi no. 29 (July 2004): para.71, http://www.e-
akademi.org/incele.asp?konu=Siyasi%20Hakimiyetin%20Kayna%C4%9F%C4%B1%20Meselesi%20ve%
20Osmanl%C4%B1%20Telakkisi&kimlik=1088765050&url=makaleler/msentop-1.htm.  
152 Ibid., para.76. 
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In a way, Şentop’s discussion of the Ottoman legal system provides a reading that 
comes close to the Islamic democracy model.  Implicitly drawing on the theme of siyasa 
al-shariyya (shari’a politics) in classical jurisprudential literature, Şentop points out that 
“in Islamic law the head of the state’s authority to legislate is limited with the general 
framework of Islamic law and with the spheres that it did not explicitly regulate.”153 The 
customary law that were legislated by the sultan were not explicitly derived from the 
sources of shari‘a, but they were part of the shari‘a system because they were regulating 
the spheres that Islamic law intentionally left void.154 Şentop suggests that “Islamic law 
(shari’a law) (şeri hukuk) is not an order that posits consummate legal rules for every 
sphere of life.” Rather, “within the general perspective of a worldview, the fundamental 
immutable principles of the legal order are determined and a very wide space is left open 
for legislative activities on the condition that it does not go against these fundamental 
principles.”155 According to Şentop, it is precisely these limitations that Islamic law puts 
on the ruler in legislation and execution that effectively prevents the idea of an “absolute 
power.” And interestingly, Şentop argues that this is what makes the Ottoman rule a 
“limited power that rests on religious principles yet it is not a theocracy.”156 This is an 
important argument that needs closer attention.  
Şentop makes a clear distinction between religious-based and theocratic rule. He 
argues that theocracy belongs only to the European experience between the eleventh and 
                                                
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., para.77. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid., para.78.  
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fifteenth centuries.157 The main character of theocracy is that the source of political 
sovereignty is divine, and those who hold political power act in the name of God and are 
granted the right to be unaccountable (sorumsuz).158 In a religious-based rule, such as the 
one in the Ottoman Empire, political power is subordinated to a legal system that is 
formed outside the political power.159 It was not the state but the class of scholars (ulema) 
who enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy who formed the shari‘a.160 The ruler 
does not have the right to speak in the name of God and his laws and decisions are not 
considered divine.161 Muslim rulers did not claim an absolute divine right to rule and 
their political sovereignty was not absolute or unlimited but was rather under the rule of 
Islamic law—hence, their governance was religious-based but not theocratic.162 The head 
of the state derives his legitimacy from his compliance with Islamic legal system and it 
has most certainly been acknowledged that there would be no obedience to the ruler on 
matters that clearly contradict shari‘a. Nearly all scholars living in late nineteenth century 
Ottoman Empire, Şentop notes, “argue within the framework of Islamic principles that 
                                                
157 For him Shi‘ite political theory of Imamate (political ruler) comes close to theocracy because of its 
conception of the ruler as divinely ordained and innocent (masum). However, Şentop points out that even 
Shi‘ite political theory is different from Western theocracies in that the latter had an absolute authority in 
legislation, executive, and judiciary and has not bound itself with the rules it itself posited. However, in 
Islamic law, including the Shi‘ite tradition, the ruler is bound with both the revealed law and the legal rules 
he posits through ijtihad. Ibid., para.44. 
158 Ibid., 78. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid., 63. 
161 Ibid., 78. 
162 Shi‘ite political theory of ‘imamate’ significantly differs from the Sunni theory of ‘caliphate’ by moving 
toward a theocratic conception. The fact that imamate (political rulership) is seen as a doctrinal matter 
divinely ordained by God rather than a political question decided upon by the community (umma), and that 
the ruler is makes Shi‘ite political theory closer to theocracy.  
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governing a state is not a religious task, various systems can be adopted on the basis of 
public interest (maslahat), and political sovereignty resides in people.”163  
Şentop finds it noteworthy that despite the prevailing understanding in the early 
periods of Islamic history that God is the ultimate sovereign but political sovereignty is 
humane, those intellectuals (note the difference from the ulema) who argue in the modern 
era that political sovereignty belongs to God are mostly from Muslim countries who lived 
under colonial rule. Colonialism disavowed the political and social aspects of Islam 
which also started to be neglected by the Muslim populace.164 According to Şentop, 
colonial conditions led the Muslim intellectuals in Pakistan and Egypt 165 to “excessively 
evince” those political and social aspects of religion in a way that “wrapped up some 
political and conjunctural discourses in a religious form.”166 Despite that, intellectuals 
such as Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, and Abdulkader Udah do not call for theocracy. Rather 
they think that authority is derived from the umma and the ruler is to be accountable. In 
other words, while “the absolute and unlimited sovereignty” (of the kind that Şentop 
finds in Bodin’s thought) belongs to God alone, political sovereignty understood as the 
“representation of sovereign will on earth is completely deferred to human beings.”167 
Therefore, for Şentop, the question of whether sovereignty belongs to God or to people is 
a misleading one. The two can be translated into each other (telif edilebilir).168 
 
                                                
163 He cites Seyyid Bey, Ali Abdurrazik, Said Halim Pasha as intellectuals supporting this line of 
argumentation. Şentop, “Siyasi Hakimiyetin Kaynağı Meselesi ve Osmanlı Telakkisi,” para.55. 
164 Ibid., para.45. 
165 The reference here is to Mevdudi and Sayyid Qutb, as he makes it explicit in paragraph 50.  
166 Şentop, “Siyasi Hakimiyetin Kaynağı Meselesi ve Osmanlı Telakkisi,” para.45. 
167 Ibid., para.60. 
168 Ibid., para.62. 
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4. Transcending Islamism: Disowning ‘Islamic State’ for Islamic Reasons 
 
When we look beyond official party documents and statements to attend closely 
to the political imaginary and the intellectual vision behind AK Party, it becomes 
apparent that AK Party denounces the idea of an Islamic state for Islamic reasons in a 
particular context—that is, through the logic of Islamic normativity in negotiation with 
liberal secularism. That does not fit neatly with either of the rejection or transition 
narratives. To start with, in AK Party’s political imaginary it is problematic to use the 
term ‘Islamic’ with every modern institution. The adjectival form of ‘Islam’ as ‘Islamic’ 
is a signature term of classical Islamist discourse as represented by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. As a defensive modernist ideology seeking public implementation of 
Islamic norms,169 Islamism takes modern institutions, practices, ideologies, and sciences 
and seeks to ‘Islamize’ them.170 The adjective ‘Islamic’ is attached to various modern 
categories such as state, party, finance, banking, democracy, feminism, liberalism, 
socialism, science, sociology, economics, etc.’171 Among them, the term ‘Islamic state’ 
                                                
169 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Shari‘a and the State in Pakistan,” The Review of Faith & International 
Affairs 10, no. 4 (2012): 53. For an extended version, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Shari‘a and the State 
in Pakistan,” in Shariʻa Politics Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World, ed. Robert W Hefner 
(Bloomington [Ind.]: Indiana University Press, 2011). 
170 Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. 
171 Recently in a conference on “Technology, Civilization, and Values” Alparslan Açıkgenç, a Turkish 
academic who studied under FazlurRahman at the University of Chicago, provocatively claimed that “an 
Islamic bicycle” could be produced. By referring to a famous tradition attributed to Prophet Muhammad, he 
argued that in Islam all deeds are judged according to intentions. Hence, “a bicyle produced with the 
intention of seeking God’s approval (rıza) and prioritizing its usefulness for people” would count as an 
Islamic bicycle. It is worth noting that in his case, ‘Islamization’ refers more to the intentions in engaging 
with such institutions than effecting a transformation in them. But in his book, Acikgenc lays out a vision 
of ‘Islamization’ that is not restricted to intentions. But rather, he points to the fundamentally different 
“worldviews” (dünyagörüşü) of Islamic and Western civilizations that deeply impact any production of 
knowledge. Hence, the need to make them compliant with Islamic “worldview”. This is akin to the Islamist 
conception of ‘Islamization’ as changing institutions in order to render them compliant with Islamic norms 
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has been particularly salient in Islamist discourse so much so that it has become its 
trademark. This usage, however, is quite new and alien within Islamic tradition. As Noah 
Feldman notes, the term ‘Islamic state’ has been “largely absent from the classical 
vocabulary.”172 It only emerged as a response to the pressing demands and penetrating 
institutions of modernity. It emerged as a defensive strategy of modernization among 
Muslim reformists through appropriation of modern norms and institutions.  
İbrahim Kalın, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, notes that using the adjective 
‘Islamic’ with every modern concept or institution sits uneasily with Islamic tradition.173 
He draws on the example of Avicenna, a leading Muslim philosopher of the 11th century, 
to make this point: “Avicenna said this is the problem of contingency and substance (araz 
ve cevher) [in philosophy]. He didn’t say I will look at this problem also from an Islamic 
perspective. Attributing an Islamic reference to everything is a modern attitude. 
Islamizing everything. Instead we should be able to immerse (yedirmeliyiz) our 
Muslimness into everything we do.”174 This statement very neatly summarizes the 
reasoning behind AK Party’s abstention from the label of ‘Islamic’ or even ‘Muslim’ 
despite its concern for acting in accordance with Islamic norms. In other words, Kalin’s 
remarks explain why AK Party affirms, in the words of an AK Party deputy, “a pious but 
not a religious perspective.” (dini değil dindar bir bakış açısı).175 It endorses “pious 
politicians” yet disowns “the politics of religion” (din siyaseti) or “religionism” (dincilik). 
                                                                                                                                            
and law. Alparslan Açıkgenç, Bir Kavram Ve Süreç Olarak Bilginin İslamileştirilmesi (“Islamization of 
Knowledge as a Concept and Process”) (İstanbul: Nesil Yayınları, 1998). 
172 Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, 111. 
173 As the quotation from him makes it clear, as a scholar of Islamic philosophy, he launches a critique of 
the very idea of an ‘Islamic’ philosophy.  
174 Kalın, Interview by the author. 
175 This phrase was used by İsmet Uçma . Author’s interview with İsmet Uçma . December 13, 2011.  
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This, according to İsmet Uçma , is a putting into practice of the Quranic injuction (1/141) 
to be ummatan wasatan (“community of the middle path”).176  
In various occasions, AK Party leadership has revealed their distaste with the 
adjectival use of Islam particularly for state or political parties.177 Abdullah Gül, the co-
founder of the AK Party and now President of Turkey, suggested that using the term 
Islamic for a party would only harm Islam. Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly stated that AK 
Party was not an Islamic party. He made this point clearly during his first visit to Egypt 
after the fall of Hosni Mubarak.  In that visit, Erdoğan spoke at a dinner to an Egyptian 
audience that included political party leaders, journalists, academics, and civil society 
activists from both Islamist and secular wings. In the Q&A session, an old lady in the 
audience started her question by leveling a lengthy critique of Islamists in Egypt and then 
asked Erdoğan what advice would he give to the Islamic parties of Egypt as leader of an 
Islamic party in Turkey. Erdoğan started his response by rejecting the lady’s description 
of his party as Islamic: “The program of my party is based not on Islam, but on the 
constitution of the Turkish Republic.” He disowned the idea of an ‘Islamic party’ and 
even refused the label ‘Muslim democrat’ for the party:  
“Some are calling us ‘Muslim Democrat.’ We do not accept the Christian 
Democrat understanding we see in the West. There can’t be a party 
understanding like Muslim Democrat. This is wrong. As a person I’m 
Muslim. But if I call my party Islamic then I bill my own mistakes as a 
                                                
176 İsmet Uçma, Interview by the author, December 13, 2011. 
177 It is interesting to note that the AK Party did not show as much of a distaste with the term ‘Islamic 
banking’ or ‘Islamic finance’. AK Party government has created the necessary legal, institutional and 
political infrastructure to attract more of ‘Islamic finance.’ Indeed the AK Party government declared many 
times that it wanted to be a hub for Islamic finance. But it should also be noted that the term used in AK 
Party’s discourse is usually not Islamic finance but “interest-free banking.” 
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human being (kul) to Islam. This would be wrong. For example the main 
opposition in Turkey calls itself social democratic, but when you ask them 
they also say ‘we are Muslim’. Then we should call them Muslim social 
democrats? As a human being I can make mistakes in politics. But my 
religion doesn’t have any mistakes. Why should I bill my mistakes to my 
religion?”178 
 
The reason Erdoğan provides for his abstention from identifying his party as Islamic or as 
Muslim is not the secular norms of liberal democracy but concerns about its Islamic 
appropriateness. He finds claims to being an Islamic or Muslim party as antithetical to 
and harmful for Islam. Not only that claiming Islamicity for a party holds Islam 
responsible for what are indeed human mistakes (and indirectly, by making Islam an 
instrument of daily politics), but also that these labels are divisive. Putting Islam or even 
Muslim in the title or identity of the party would exclude a party like the main opposition 
party CHP (Republican People’s Party) whose cadres, despite having a staunchly 
secularist Kemalist ideology, do express their Muslimness. “If you develop a religious 
politics,” argues İsmet Uçma, one of the founders of the AK Party and a deputy of 
Istanbul who studied theology and labour economics, “then the opposition against you 
will be an opposition against religion.” 179 Such monopolization of Islam for Uçma is 
Islamically wrong. 
                                                
178 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, September 13, 2011, Four Seasons Hotel, Cairo. My own translation from my 
notes at the dinner.  
179 Uçma, Interview by the author. 
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Ahmet Davutoğlu makes the same point in his interview with the Al-Ahram 
Weekly in 2004. When asked about the major dilemmas an Islamic party faces in power, 
he starts his response with problematizing the adjectival use of Islam with the word party:  
Let me first clarify one point. The concept of an "Islamic party" is a false 
concept, because any political party is by nature a dividing rather than a 
unifying force. Islam, on the other hand, is a unifying factor, a common 
element. So the concept of an "Islamic party" should be used cautiously. 
But we can refer to the different ways different political parties refer to 
Islam, or their relation to religion in general. By the same token, one can 
extend the argument to American politics: for example, US President 
George Bush made far more reference to Christianity in his campaign than 
did Senator John Kerry. We should not reduce Islam to a political group or 
party, because then you end up with certain parties monopolising the 
representation of Islam. The leaders of the AK party did not use this 
concept of an "Islamic party", but tried instead to present themselves as 
part of the Turkish political tradition. 
Upon this response, the interviewer changes her description of AK Party from “an 
Islamic party” to “a party with an Islamic orientation” and Davutoğlu tacitly affirms the 
new label. Interestingly, this exact same argument (that Islam unites people while 
political parties divide them) was made decades ago by people such as Hasan Al-Banna, 
the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, to claim that party politics was going against 
Islam’s injunctions banning fitna (a charged term in Islamic tradition that usually means 
chaos, but also understood as division). Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, however, use this same 
Islamic reasoning but end up at a rather different destination. They affirm party politics 
while recognizing its divisiveness; this is why they want to keep Islam outside of this 
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division.180 In other words, instead of disowning party politics, AK Party disowned the 
idea of what Davutoğlu referred to as “monopolizing the representation of Islam.”181  
For the AK Party, there is nothing in Islamic teachings and history that posits the 
necessity of an Islamic state. As Emrullah İşler, a professor of Arabic language and AK 
Party deputy for Ankara who serves in the Foreign Affairs Committee and the 
Parliamentary Committee of the Organization of Islamic Conference, argues: “The 
Prophet Muhammad’s state did not have the adjective ‘Islamic.’ The phrase ‘Islamic 
state’ just didn’t exist.”182 For him, “the addressee (muhatap) of the Qur’an is not the 
state but the human.” However, “with the fall of the Caliphate, Muslims turned to 
political Islam (siyasal Islam) under a sense of oppression and humiliation.” Furthermore, 
he sees the inclusion of Islam or shari‘a in the constitutions of the Arab states as cynical 
strategic moves to contain social unrest:  
“It means nothing to have it [Shari’a] in the constitution. All dictators in 
the Arab world are using this. On paper. To satisfy their people. That’s 
unnecessary. It is not important to write it down, what is important is 
human rights, individual rights, religious freedom, and being able to live 
                                                
180 Here it must be noted that Islam has never been out of political debates in Turkey. All major political 
parties, including the AK Party, has drawn upon Islam in different ways. The Kemalist main opposition 
party, CHP, occasionally fielded candidates such as Yasar Nuri Ozturk and Ali Ihsan Ozkes who were 
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stauncyly secularist political platform, organized “civil Friday prayers” against the Friday prayers led by 
state-appointed imams. AK Party also drawn upon Islam in order to articulate an opposition of what they 
see as Kemalism’s oppressive policies toward religion and Muslims (and non-Muslims alike).  
181 It is also worth noting here that Davutoğlu feels the need to refer to the role religion plays in American 
politics in order to justify his party’s orientation to religion. When the interview was conducted in 2004, 
AK Party could not yet consolidate itself in power, it was seeking to justify itself in the eyes of the 
Kemalist establishment and liberal international order as an Islamically-oriented but not Islamist party. AK 
Party sought to garner international and domestic legitimacy through drawing comparisons with the public 
salience of religion in the U.S. This is one of the subtle indicators of the international politics of secularism 
in Turkey.  
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according to your religion. There is no community with one single 
religion. Prophet Muhammad lived with Jews and Christians. Mosque, 
synagogue, and church are side by side.”183  
 
Not only that Islam does not necessitate an Islamic state, but for the AK Party leadership 
the idea of Islamic state does not befit Islamic tradition. For example, Ahmet Davutoğlu 
points out that “the contemporary conception of the Islamic state emerged as an outcome 
of the defense mechanism of Islamic culture” against the “Westernized elites” who 
denied a space for Islam’s ethico-legal ideals.184 However, Islamic state rests on and 
reproduces “the Hegelian-inspired nation-state model” that contradicts the principles of 
the state established by Prophet Muhammad—these principles, for Davutoğlu, are 
inclusive membership to community and state’s embeddedness in and responsiveness to 
society.185 Davutoğlu argues that classical conceptions of state within Islamic tradition 
were tightly interconnected with the concepts of umma (“a universal spiritual/political 
union”) and dar al-Islam (“politico-legal world order”).186 This relationship between 
state, umma, and dar al- Islam formed a “Muslim imagination of politics based on an 
alternative Weltanschauung.” 187 Yet, the idea of Islamic state severs it. Within this 
“Muslim imagination of politics,” the ‘Hegelian-inspired’ modern nation-state’s tendency 
of disciplining and monitoring society and of individual in the name of the state is not 
acceptable.188 And Islamic state is no exception. In classical Islamic political thought the 
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state has been seen “solely an instrument to realize the moral and social ideals of the 
belief system.” The state was “an instrument that puts into practice the legal and moral 
understanding of life.”189 Hence, the idea of nation-state being “detached from society, 
abstracted, and imposing”190 does not befit Islamic tradition. With ascendance of the 
nation-state form, he argues, “state began to be visualized as a sovereign element within 
the international system instead of a political instrument for the ethico-legal ideals of the 
Islamic belief system.”191   
This is because of the centrality of human freedom in Islam.  “Human beings 
believe through their capacity to choose. Coercion violates the essence of faith.”192 
Davutoğlu suggests that “may be for the first time in Muslim political thought, now we 
must take freedom (özgürlük) as being equal to justice in significance.”193 Because 
“resisting your ego (nefs) is an act of will, and using your will is freedom. If you are 
restricting freedom there is no value in believing.”194 However, he stresses that this is not 
“liberalization (liberallik) bereft of identity.” Rather, “this is liberation without 
liberalization (liberalleşmeden özgürleşmek).” It is the recognition of the freedom God 
has given to people in choosing what to believe as a condition of just rule. 
What is noteworthy here is Davutoğlu’s recurring references to “an alternative 
Weltanschauung,” “Islamic paradigm,” or “Islamic civilization” and his sensitivity to 
differentiate them from liberalism. These are references to the existence and effectiveness 
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of another logic of appropriateness operating within Islamic discursive tradition. In other 
words, while AK Party adopts particular constitutive norms of liberal global governance, 
and becomes part of the ‘liberal global social,’ there is also another ‘social’ with its own 
standards of appropriateness, which AK Party as an actor comes from and has already 
been socialized into. What is clear in Davutoğlu’s vision is an affirmation of this other 
social in conversation with the social of liberal global governance. Hence, a process of 
translation is in order—a translation that collapses neither into a claim of equivalence nor 
of incommensurability between the two socials, but rather, a performative production of 
difference within socialization. 
Islamic state’s claim to public implementation of Islamic norms with the force of 
law is also very problematic for AK Party policymakers. For example, İbrahim Kalın 
notes that “it is debatable as to whether a state should legalize an ethics. To what extent 
should a state protect an ethics? That’s debatable. I think there is no need for a state to 
enter into such a business. If it legalizes or codifies an ethics then it stops being ethics.” 
Similarly, Mustafa Şentop argues that “Islam’s comprehensiveness (kuşatıcılığı) is not 
legal but ethical.”195  
Emrullah İşler similarly recognizes that “there will be [alcohol] drinkers in 
society, and they should have places to do that. If even Allah Teala Hazretleri grants the 
freedom to not to believe in him, then we also must recognize this right to them.”196 After 
stressing his expertise in Arabic language, İşler continues:  
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“Allah says ‘la iqraha fiddin’ (there’s no compulsion in religion) and here 
‘iqraha’ is indefinite (nekre). That means all sorts of compulsion is 
forbidden. Not only for non-Muslims but also for Muslims alike. It 
wouldn’t be a prayer or a fast if you do it because you are forced to. Even 
Sayyid Qutb writes this in Fi Zilal [his Quranic exegesis]. You can also 
see this in Elmalili[‘s Quranic exegesis.] Compulsion and imposition 
(zorlama ve dayatma) are definitely wrong. (…) For example I cannot 
force my daughter to wear headscarf. I can only try to convince her with 
soft words and clemency. I tell her why it is important, but I cannot 
impose if she doesn’t accept, it is her decision.” 
 
In that vein, Davutoğlu considers the modern idea of an Islamic state was first put into 
practice in Pakistan after partition from India197 as a kind of “defensive 
communitarianism”198 that sought to “re-balance the internal consistency of the Islamic 
Weltanschauung and its practical reflections.”199 Yet, it could not go beyond the nation-
state logic. It could not form “an alternative international legal and political system.”200 
For him, why ‘Islamic state’ emerged in post-colonial India is understandable, but the 
conditions have changed, hence the mechanisms and institutions should also change. 
Sticking to the postcolonial idea of Islamic state “harms (yipratir) Islamic values.”201  
Likewise, Mustafa Şentop, points to the impact of colonialism in the emergence 
of the idea of an Islamic state. For him, anti-colonial sentiments drifted the colonized 
Muslim societies to an anti-state position, which was then translated into a demand for a 
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new ‘Islamic state.’202 For him this constitutes a fundamental difference between Turkey 
and the formerly colonized Muslim countries. Since Turkey has never been colonized, 
Islam in Turkey has never been mobilized around the idea of destroying a colonial/anti-
Islamic state and establishing an Islamic one. On the contrary, people in general endorsed 
the state as their own—even in the single party period between 1924-1945, whose 
policies were openly hostile to religion.203 For example Necmettin Erbakan’s political 
discourse since 1970s has centered on the demand for a Heavy Industry Initiative (Ağır 
Sanayi Hamlesi) instead of an Islamic state.204 That was in part because Islam in Turkey 
has always been a significant political practice in implicit and explicit ways even when its 
political expressions were repressed by the state.205  
Related to this history of not having the experience of a colonial state, Şentop 
notes that Turkey’s difference and advantage has been that “Islam in a political sense, 
that is Islam that includes politics, emerged as a practice and not as a theory. In other 
words, “Islamism in Turkey has always walked through social realities.”206 However, in 
places such as Pakistan and Egypt the idea of an Islamic state first emerged as a rather 
“rigid theory” (sivri teori), and then it was put into practice. Şentop suggests that 
“ideologies are based on a shared delusion that provide mental comfort” and they are in 
“square shape.” However, “life is indented (girintili cikintili) and ideologies don’t fit life. 
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Islamism is an ideology too. It is a response given in particular conditions. Now we have 
different conditions.”207  
In challenging the notion of Islamic state, AK Party also challenges the 
concomitant Islamist model of ‘Islamic democracy.’ ‘Islamic democracy’ presumes and 
rests on the idea of ‘Islamic state.” Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran all display certain features 
of ‘Islamic democracy’ that combines democratic procedures with particular conceptions 
of shari‘a enforced by the state. But its critique of Islamic democracy is carried out not in 
the name of secular liberal democracy, but rather in the name of Islamic notions of 
appropriateness. This is quite evident in İsmet Uçma’s remarks. Uçma argues that the 
model of ‘Islamic democracy’ is highly problematic. The reason is not that it does not 
comply with secular liberal norms, but that it does not fulfill the Islamic injunction of 
justice:  
“Islamic democracy. I don’t approve that. Iran tried and failed miserably 
(son derece basarisizdir). This [understanding of Islamic democracy] 
results from a lack of proper understanding of the Quran. There is no 
divinely ordained mode of governance in Islam, except for the injunction 
of justice. Even rule of law and democracy don’t suffice. Our civilization 
commands a state of justice (adalet devleti). Whichever instruments you 
use, it must establish justice.”208  
 
AK Party is compelled, by both international and domestic structures, to translate its own 
vision into the language of secularism and conservatism.  Because of the legal-political 
constraints imposed by the Kemalist state and endorsed by liberal international order, AK 
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Party cannot not invoke secularism as its foundation. Yet, at the same time, regardless of 
the pressure, AK Party is opposed to the idea of an Islamic state—state’s monolithic 
enforcement of shari‘a—for principled Islamic and historical reasons. This is because of 
AK Party’s particular configuration of the relationship between shari‘a and people within 
a secular democracy. 
 
5. People as the Guardian of Shari‘a: The Politics of Translation in AK Party’s 
‘Conservative Democracy’ 
 
The classical Islamist notion of ‘Islamic democracy’ stipulates an ‘Islamic state’ 
in which shari‘a is constitutionalized, that is, written in the constitution as a or the source 
of legislation. In addition, some kind of a judicial mechanism is foreseen in order to 
review, and if necessary annul, the actions of the legislative and executive on the basis of 
their compliance with shari‘a —either in the form of a Constitutional Court, a Council of 
Scholars, or various combinations of both. In AK Party’s ‘conservative democracy,’ 
Islam and shari‘a does not have any constitutional appearance, and hence there is no 
court or council to do Shari‘a review. Rather, observing shari‘a compliance is deemed as 
a responsibility onto Muslims individually and communally, yet it does not make its way 
into state and its constitution. In other words, while shari‘a is not constitutionalized 
(written into constitution), it is, in some ways, democratized—the task of ensuring non-
repugnancy to shari’a is given to the people as civil society members and electorate.  
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One of the definitive differences between the ‘Islamic’ and ‘Muslim’ forms of 
democracy is that while the former tries to secure a notion of Islamicity—implementation 
of and compliance with Shari‘a —through constitutional mechanisms, the latter does not 
resort to such constitutional mechanisms to secure the Islamicity of state actions and 
decisions, but rather leaves it to civil society and to the electorate as a personal and 
communal religious obligation to check for Islamicity. As a result, while in the Islamic 
democracy you would have a constitutional court (Pakistan, Egypt), or Guardians of the 
Constitution (Iran) or an institution of scholars (Egypt) to review legislation to ensure 
compliance with the Shari‘a, in AK Party’s ‘conservative democracy,’ civil society 
groups and individual citizens bear the burden of judging and assessing the Islamicity of 
legislation and state action. While in the Islamic democratic model the state itself is 
responsible for securing that its actions are in accordance with Shari‘a, in AK Party’s 
conservative democracy, it is the responsibility of Muslims as individual citizens and 
collective actors, not of the state, to ensure non-repugnance to shari‘a. This becomes even 
more interesting when one considers that among the Turkish public the level of support 
for shari‘a is very low.209   
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If shari’a denotes “Islamic normativity”210 and “Islamic way of doing things,”211 
then it provides a logic to evaluate appropriateness. In Islamic tradition, this is referred to 
as ‘fiqh’—jurisprudence, or logic and method of appropriateness broadly construed. As 
the court cases I discussed earlier indicates, shari‘a has been securitized and criminalized 
in Turkey.212AK Party cannot and does not invoke shari’a, but that does not entail its 
eradication from politics. Rather, shari‘a is incorporated into AK Party’s discourse in 
more indirect ways and in the form of broad norms and values. For example in his 
address to his party group in the parliament, R. Tayyip Erdoğan said: “It is our duty to 
protect the security of property. It is our duty to protect the security of life. It is our duty 
to protect the security of intellect. It is our duty to protect the security of progeny and 
ancestry. It is our duty to dwell on these.”213 Interestingly, all these four items that he 
enumerates (protection of life, property, intellect, progeny) are known in Islamic tradition 
as the ‘purposes of Shari‘a’ (Maqasid al-Shari’a). ‘Protection of religion’ is also one of 
the five purposes of shari’a mentioned in the literature, which is, quite tellingly, the only 
missing item in Erdoğan’s list probably in order not to attract the wrath of the Kemalist 
judiciary—indeed three months after this speech the Prosecutor filed the litigation at the 
Constitutional Court to ban the party. Şentop defines Islamic civilization as a 
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“civilization of fiqh or law.” Shari‘a is not the entirety of law, but rather, it is “the 
unchanging sphere of constants.” Shari‘a provides “the fundamental legal rules that 
would bind the state.” Constitutional democracy is a democracy that recognizes such 
unchangeable principles. The question then is about the content of such principles.214 
Against those “who think that Islamism is implementation of criminal law” Davutoğlu 
argues that the real “value” and purpose of is protection of rights. (Maqasid al-Shari‘a). 
Here, he rejects the arguments about the end of Islamism, and suggests that AK Party is 
producing a new interpretation: “This is not a collapse in the way that Olivier Roy talks 
about. This is a reinterpretation of power, sovereignty, and social reality from within our 
own resources.”215  
In line with AK Party’s critique of the notion of Islamic state, İbrahim Kalın 
suggests that classical Islamism was concentrated on the nation-state but what is needed 
now is a “social movement led by non-state actors.”216 That’s because “the source of 
legitimacy has shifted from state to people.”217  Kalın maintains that “just as liberalism’s 
biggest illusion was its belief that everyone would become a liberal, Islamism’s biggest 
illusion is to believe that everyone will become a Muslim. Such flaws estranged Islamism 
to society, and rendered it stiff and reductionist.”218 In part due to the trauma of Kemalist 
top-down policies and in part due to its particular interpretation of Islamic tradition, AK 
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Party has positioned itself as a challenge to Kemalist project of state-led social 
engineering. Hence, classical Islamism’s similar state-led projects of radical 
transformation in the name of Islam face a principled objection from the AK Party. 219 
In that vein, in his analysis of the intellectual roots of authoritarian tendencies in 
Turkish politics, Ahmet Davutoğlu notes that in the republican period “the state has 
started to be seen as a mechanism of enlightening (nurlandırma) society by a privileged 
group who explore the West’s ‘wisdom’ (‘hikmetini’) and ‘light’ (‘nurunu’).”220 For him, 
Turkish intellectuals’ “enlightening mission” is similar to Rudyard Kipling’s ‘White 
Man’s Burden.’221 These “light-importing” (nur ithalatçısı) intellectuals “looked down on 
the masses” whom they considered as “deprived of any light” (nurunu kaybetmiş).222 
That is why they “insisted on the bigotry of ‘despite the people for the people’ ” (halk 
ragmen halk icin) and they “could not show the courage of saying ‘with the people for the 
God’” (halkla beraber Hak için).223 Starting with the İttihat ve Terakki Partisi (Union and 
Progress Party) the “elitist recipes” that were “mostly restrictive and prohibitive” and that  
“excluded people from distribution of power” were “imposed” on society through the 
civilian and military bureaucracy.224 The fundamental method that this state-centric top-
down modernization project has employed is not communication and exchange of ideas, 
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but rather “intimidating opponents through oppressive judgements and prohibitions.”225 
Therefore, the Kemalist method of deploying state power to transform society toward a 
political ideal has been rejected by the AK Party, and the Islamist tendency to deploy 
state’s coercive power for ‘Islamic’ ends is similarly disavowed. That is why, for 
example, one usually hears from AK Party circles the critique of both Kemalism and the 
Iranian experience, which are seen as the mirror images of each other—one imposes 
wearing headscarf while the other prohibits it. AK Party claims to be the via media. This 
is what Tayyip Erdoğan suggested in his speech at the international conference on 
‘conservative democracy’ organized by the AK Party:  
“All kinds of imposing, authoritarian, homogenizing, and social 
engineering approaches are obstacles against a healthy democratic system. 
No one should attempt to give directions or shape to societies from their 
armchairs. Our conservative democratic identity opposes any kind of 
social and political engineering.” 226 
 
Under conditions co-created by liberal international and Kemalist domestic order, AK 
Party translates its critique of Kemalist top-down modernization project into the language 
of conservatism’s critique of radical projects of Enlightenment rationalism. In that sense, 
AK Party couches its opposition to Kemalism within the framework of conservative 
reaction to “the Jacobin interventions that impose French-type Enlightenment to everyone 
without taking society into consideration.”227  What is appealing for the AK Party here is 
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the stress conservatism puts on society, tradition, religion, and family values.228  
However, Ali Bulac, a renown Islamist writer and a critic of the AK Party, argues that “if 
AK Party’s conservatism does not have deep-rooted Islamic reference” then that means it 
only fosters “a religiosity bereft of any creedal (itikadi) and jurisprudential (practical) 
dimension.”229 Then the stress on conservatism would become “the political discourse of 
marginalizing religion, restricting it to private sphere, and relativizing it.” “Global 
capitalism is not against such a religiosity,” Bulaç notes, “rather it is in dire need of it.” 
Having a claim to represent the religiously-oriented masses that have suffered 
under Kemalism’s radical and authoritarian project of transformation, AK Party positions 
itself on the side of gradual change and evolution—hence, the lure of conservative recipe 
for it. This entails two things. First, AK Party categorically rejects any radical 
transformation of society through state power, law, or police force—the instruments of 
Kemalism.230 Second, the critique of radical Enlightenment and the endorsement of the 
idea of tradition within conservative thought have opened up a space for the AK Party in 
Turkish politics and international politics.231 AK Party’s deployment of conservatism as 
part of its party identity was an attempt to garner international legitimacy through 
invoking the experience of Christian Democrats in Europe. At the same time, the 
category of conservative was something AK Party did not want to own. For that purpose 
AK Party sought to adopt the concept by transforming232 and diluting it.233 In its attempt 
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to both be included within and differ from conservatism, AK Party engages in a 
performative politics of appropriation.  Bülent Turan’s comments exemplify this mode of 
engagement with the concept:   
“If conservatism (muhafazakarlık) is about being pro-status quo we are not 
conservative. In the past when we invoked the term [conservative] we 
used to refer to some other people. Like Özal, Demirel. We aren’t like 
them. If we are still speaking with the terms of the 90s we are not 
conservative. And we are proud of not being such conservatives. But we 
are conservative in the sense of being ethical, respectful, developmentalist, 
modern, and respectful towards religion. These terms will settle down in 
time. It is the times and conditions that maturate the terms. We are using 
these terms by transforming them. Conservative Democracy. Receptive 
(yenilikçi) and respectful to religion. I was also against the term 
‘conservative’ at the beginning. But now conservative means placing one 
leg of the divider (pergel) into our civilization and then opening out to the 
environment. We are different from the right wing. We are Muslim. We 
are committed to our ancient, deep-rooted civilization.234” 
 
Ömer Özbay, an advisor to Prime Minister on economic issues, suggests that this attitude 
toward the people is one important difference between the National Outlook (Milli 
Görüş)—the Islamist political movement from which most AK Party founders come—
and the AK Party: “National Outlook was a right-wing Kemalist structure. It was viewing 
the people with the same glasses. It was conservative Kemalist. It was an inverse Ittihat-
ism (tersten İttihatçılık). Just like Kemalism, it was belittling the people. This was 
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wrong.”235 That is why, Özbay argues, Erdoğan sought to reach out to people instead of 
imposing something on them. He mentions Erdoğan’s initiation of the party’s women’s 
wing for the first time, his abstention from rigid slogans, his effort to find a proper 
language to reach out to general public, and his visits to bars to talk with people and to 
earn their support as examples of the centrality of ‘people.’ Özbay suggests that “he 
[Erdoğan] never demanded a shari’a state. His purpose was to reach out to people and 
convey his message to them. He did not want anything other than what the people 
want.”236 In that sense, “AK Party is not an Islamist party, but a party established by 
Muslims. It’s definitely not Islamist, but was founded by pious people. It doesn’t have a 
demand like Islamic state. Otherwise it would be a nostalgic party with about %3 support. 
But it also did not anchor itself in right-wing politics (sağcılığa da demirlemedi).” 
In a similar vein, Mustafa Şentop finds any claim, Islamist or Kemalist, to change 
society quite arrogant. One can at best hope for and await the prospect that the society 
will transform itself.237 Along these lines, Bülent Turan stresses that “nothing can be 
done against or despite the society.”238 “I believe you cannot prevent someone from 
drinking alcohol with the force of the state, you cannot prohibit it. You cannot just say 
‘this is God’s order, get rid of it.’”239  Turan then stresses that this perspective is derived 
not from secular norms of liberalism but from Islamic injunction of justice: “I’m not a 
                                                
235 Ömer Özbay, Interview by the author, December 20, 2011. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Şentop, Interview by the author.This also refers to the verse in the Quran (13:11): “Indeed, Allah will 
not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves. And when Allah intends for a 
people ill, there is no repelling it. And there is not for them besides Him any patron.” 
238 Turan, Interview by the author. 
239 He points out that AK Party’s politics is based not on “prohibitions” (yasaklar) but on “production of 
alternatives.” During the times of the Milli Görüş, he says, “we used to think that not watching TV is a 
virtue. Is it more virtuous and logical to say we should have moral and righteous TV channels or to say do 
not watch TV? We should see both positives and negatives.” Ibid. 
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liberal. Neither is AK Party. But this is a party that doesn’t act despite people (insanlara 
ragmen). It acts not with reference to religion but with reference to justice.” 
Furthermore, as a critique of the Islamic state’s tendency to legalize Islamic code 
of ethics, Şentop suggests that using law as an instrument of social change is a sign of 
weakness. Social change should come organically through practice and “in its own 
natural course.”240 For example it is better that the ban on headscarf in Turkey is lifted 
not through the force of law but through the bottom-up social dynamics.  What is striking 
here is that Şentop launches this critique against Islamic state not through the protocols of 
liberal political imaginary but from a rather different standpoint that prioritizes and 
highlights the prevalence of Islamic normativity—shari’a—in society so much so that 
social change through law does not become an option. Put differently, arguing against the 
Kemalist pedagogic project of transforming society along secularist lines with the force 
of law (and sometimes with the force of exceptions to law), and at the same time 
disowning the same pedagogic practices of ‘Islamic states’ that seeks to transform society 
through the force of law and the state, Şentop opts for a politics that is aimed not at the 
state as the agent of transformation but society itself. In a way, this is a political project 
that seeks to pressurize the state to respect social demands and sensitivities, rather than 
forcing people to endorse state’s project. 
 Emrullah İşler recognizes that there are certain laws that do not comply with 
shari’a and suggests that it is possible to change these laws “if society demands that, but 
only if the people demand it.”241 He gives the hypothetical example of a shari’a-related 
                                                
240 Şentop, Interview by the author. 
241 İşler, Interview by the author. 
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legislation that is put on referendum and rejected by the majority of the public. For him, 
“there is nothing one can do if the people reject it.” Conservatism, in Isler’s view, is 
“living your faith and culture,” but it would be “Jacobinism if you impose it.” Here it is 
also worth noting that İşler’s argument about the inappropriateness of state-enforced 
impositions and prohibitions on the basis of religion is closely linked with the question of 
“integration with the world.” “How can you integrate with the world with prohibitions?” 
asks Isler. “Otherwise you’ll close yourself to the outside world. You’ll become 
unsuccessful. And then your mistakes will be billed on Islam as it happened in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere.”   
In that sense, in AK Party’s political imagination, shari‘a is the Islamic normative 
order that speaks first and foremost to individual and community—not to state. 
Organizing life in accordance with shari‘a is a religious obligation on the Muslim 
community, but its relationship with the state is rather complex and risky. That is to say 
shari‘a inevitably shapes the way Muslims think and act, yet it cannot be enforced by the 
state. Put differently, AK Party stands against the idea of incorporating shari‘a into the 
constitution, but it seeks to foster a politics in which society—as individual voters and as 
organized citizens—take on the responsibility of observing shari‘a in politics and in other 
domains. In a sense, AK Party is against “constitutionalization of shari‘a” but approaches 
favorably to “democratization of shari‘a” in the sense of incorporating shari‘a into 
politics through social demands and individual preferences.242 Shari‘a comes to influence 
                                                
242 Nathan J. Brown, “Debating the Islamic Shari’a in 21st-Century Egypt,” The Review of Faith & 
International Affairs 10, no. 4 (2012): 9–17. Here, Brown defines democratization of shari’a as the 
dispersion and diversification of the authority to interpret shari’a. AK Party’s gesture toward translating 
shari’a’s moral authority in society into politics through democratic channels is partly compatible with 
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politics not through forming ‘Islamic’ constitutional courts or scholarly councils to strike 
down state laws or actions deemed repugnant to shari’a. This is the fundamental 
characteristic of “Islamic democracies” as variously practiced in Iran, Pakistan, and 
Egypt. AK Party, however, leaves the task of shari’a compliance to people.  Shari‘a 
observance is to be sought not through the force of law but through bottom-up social 
relationships and civic activism.  
According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, democracy is the belief in the idea that “the 
choice of the general public would not contradict common reason (ortak akil).”243 Here, 
the word ‘common reason’ has indirect Islamic references. In a famous tradition (hadith) 
Prophet Muhammad is reported to say  “my community will not reach a consensus on the 
wrong.” One question that arises—and has been asked time and again in the modern 
Islamic political thought—is what if the majority’s demands or their representatives’ 
legislations contradict shari’a? What if public makes its choice in a direction that goes 
against Islamic normativity? In other words, what if vox populi contradicts vox dei? The 
answer of the Islamic democracy model is that a supreme body—a constitutional court or 
a council of scholars—annuls the move. AK Party’s response differs from the ‘Islamic 
democracy’ model of Islamism, and Davutoğlu neatly summarizes it: “If it [vox populi] 
                                                                                                                                            
Brown’s definition of democratization of shari’a. But it should also be noted that AK Party does not invoke 
a mode of religious authority in which “everyone is a preacher onto himself.” On the reverse, AK Party 
kept and buttressed the state’s institutions that seek to control religious field (such as Directorate of 
Religious Affairs [DRA]). Furthermore, on questions such as the headscarf ban in Turkey, R. Tayyip 
Erdogan suggested that determining whether headscarf is a religious obligation or not is not the business of 
the court but of the Islamic scholars (ulema). Similarly, on various occasions, AK Party acted on the fatwas 
(jurisprudential opinions) issued by the DRA. The AK Party government’s withdrawal from its original 
proposal to build breast milk banks for babies upon the fatwa of DRA. Rather, what I mean by 
democratization of shari’a is its incorporation into politics through democratic mechanisms and by virtue of 
its capacity to muster a normative status in society. This is more akin to the conception of the relationship 
between shari’a and politics articulated by writers such as Khaled Abou Al-Fadl, Mohammad Fadel, Asifa 
Quraishi, Ebrahim Moosa, and Abdullahi An-Naim.  
243 Davutoğlu, Interview by the author. 
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contradicts [vox Dei], then it means we’ve lost something else.”244 This short statement 
conveys the gist of AK Party’s configuration of the relationship between Shari‘a and 
democracy. If democratic mechanisms produce results that sit uncomfortably with 
Shari‘a, then the ‘problem’ and its ‘remedy’ is to be sought in the domain of the social. In  
Davutoğlu’s words, the priority must be given to “the institutional construction of 
religious consciousness (idrak) and mentality (zihniyet)” through “vivid, diffuse, and 
horizontal civil society activism.”245  
6. Conclusion 
 
I argued in this chapter that AK Party at once accepts and resists secularism, 
hence adopts the norm non-normatively. AK Party’s adoption of secularism as a norm is 
at once normalization and a challenge to normalization. It appropriates secularism, wrests 
it from its proper ‘authorized’ meanings delimited by the Kemalist state, and reinscribes 
difference in its very repetition.  In that sense, neither the ‘transition’ (‘pedagogic 
socialization’) nor the ‘rejection’ (‘Islamist anti-sociality’) narratives capture the ways in 
which AK Party ‘translates’ these norms (‘performative socialization.’)246 Rather, one has 
to account for the dynamic and context-specific interaction of the conditions and forces 
                                                
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
246 In a sense this also troubles the binaries in the norm socialization literature in IR between accepting 
norms (at different degrees of socialization from mere conformity to deep-down internalization) or 
rejecting the norms (hence lack of socialization) There is little space in these accounts to analyze situations 
like AK Party’s endorsement of secular democracy. Categories of strategic manipulation or strategic 
acceptance speak to acceptance of norms for strategic reasons without internalizing them. Johnston, Social 
States, 2008; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.” However, its 
radical separation between ‘strategic reasons’ and ‘normative reasons’ cannot capture the instances—such 
as AK Party’s adoption of secularism—where both logics are operative and where different logics of 
appropriateness enter into a process of translation that potentially transforms both logics. 
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that exert a normalizing power on actors such as the AK Party and how they engage with 
those conditions and forces. Here, I tried to demonstrate that AK Party’s adoption of 
secularism as a norm took place under the pedagogic pressure of the conditions co-
created by the Kemalist state and liberal international order. Yet, in normalizing into the 
norm of secularism, AK Party engaged in a politics of translation that sought to insert 
cultural difference and to destabilize the normalizing logic of the norm. The party used its 
own normalization as a resource for resisting normalization. In that sense, AK Party 
neither assimilates into the norm of secularism (since it seeks to differ in it) nor negates it 
(since it adopts it). Rather, it negotiates the norm through a performative process of 
cultural translation.  
This is why its socialization into secularism can be better understood in 
performative, and not solely pedagogical, terms. AK Party’s performative politics 
challenged the terms of Kemalism’s negotiation of cultural difference within liberal 
global governance. It invokes the universality of secularism where Kemalism defends the 
necessity of a different secularism for Turkey; and it introduces cultural difference into 
secularism where Kemalism universalizes it.  AK Party’s “conservative democracy” 
invokes the universality of “democratic secularism” and seeks to be included within it in 
order to thwart the authoritarian practices of Kemalism’s “militant democracy.” This 
claim to be included within the norm of secularism is a performative gesture against the 
‘not yet’ of Kemalist Orientalism—that Turkey is not yet ready for full exercise of 
democratic rights since it has not yet achieved reformation in religion and secularization 
in life. However, through seeking to introduce difference into secularism (with the 
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adjective ‘democratic’) and into democracy (with the adjective ‘conservative’), AK Party 
engages in a politics of cultural translation in which it negotiates Islamic and liberal (and 
Kemalist) ‘socials’—standards of appropriateness, historical experiences, and claims to 
universality.  
 Yet, these complex negotiations and translations could only happen under strict 
secularist conditions that criminalize and securitize any distant reference to shari‘a. AK 
Party is conscripted, by both the Kemalist state and liberal international order, to translate 
its Islamic political orientation into the language of secularism. However, it appropriates 
secularism through a logic of appropriateness that seeks authorization from within 
Islamic discursive tradition. It draws on a repertoire of ideas that discredits the category 
of ‘Islamic state’ for Islamic and historical reasons. In that sense, AK Party’s 
‘conservative democracy’ is not so much a shari‘a-free Muslim politics—‘pedagogic 
socialization’—as it is a different modality of shari‘a politics—one that considers the 
enforcement of shari‘a as state law as being repugnant to the principles and purposes of 
shari‘a. Therefore, its negotiation of secularism and ‘conservative democracy’ is better 
understood as a cultural translation under liberal conditions—hence as performative 
socialization.
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CHAPTER 5 
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ‘ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY’: 
NEGOTIATING DEMOCRACY, SECULARISM AND SHARI‘A THROUGH 
THE CIVIL STATE  
 
“Do Arabs have the right to decide—through the democratic process—that they 
would rather not be liberal?”1 This question Shadi Hamid asks goes to the heart of the 
debate around Islamism, secularism and democracy in Egypt and elsewhere. Can popular 
participation through free and fair elections with attendant rights to assembly and 
expression generate democratic legitimacy if it does not strictly follow secular liberal 
precepts? Can there be democracy without liberal secularism? Can one say ‘Islamic 
democracy’? After the July 3, 2013 military coup in Egypt that toppled Mohammad 
Morsi, the first-ever democratically elected President of the country and a leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), these 
questions have become even more pressing. The Egyptian military and many secular 
liberal activists justified the coup and the subsequent banning of the Muslim Brotherhood 
as “a way to stop the Islamization of Egypt.”2 A self-proclaimed ‘secular liberal’ 
Egyptian friend of mine told me that he supports the coup because “secularism in Egypt 
was in danger”—a sentiment widely shared among other liberals inside and outside 
Egypt. But was there secularism in Egypt before Morsi came to power? In what sense 
                                                
1 Shadi Hamid, “The Brotherhood Will Be Back,” The New York Times, May 23, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/opinion/more-democratic-less-liberal.html. 
2 Jocelyne Cesari, “Why the Muslim Brotherhood Will Not Die,” Al Jazeera America, May 29, 2014, 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/5/muslim-
brotherhoodpoliticalislammuslimcountriesegyptlibya.html. 
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was the Brotherhood a threat and to which secularism? If the Brotherhood was not 
secular did it also mean it was not democratic? How then are we to make sense of the 
Brotherhood’s notion of ‘Islamic democracy’ and its call for a “civil state within an 
Islamic frame of reference”?  
For sure, Egypt’s liberals were not alone in supporting and rationalizing the coup. 
Many salafi scholars, sufi shaikhs, and the prestigious Islamic institutions such as Al-
Azhar University and Dar al-Ifta also joined the coup coalition, in part for their 
ideological distaste for the Brotherhood and in part for protecting themselves from the 
wrath of the military and for securing themselves a favorable spot in the post-coup 
environment that would create a vacuum with the ban of the Brotherhood and its party 
FJP. But still, despite a rather sizable acquiescence if not full support from Islamic 
sectors and institutions, it was the secular liberal politicians (e.g. Mohamed El-Baradei), 
intellectuals (e.g. Khaled Fahmy, Samir Amin, Saadeddin Ibrahim, Alaa al-Aswany) and 
movements (e.g. Tamarrod) which were in the forefront of mobilizing support for the 
coup, both domestically and internationally.  
For them the problem was the Brotherhood’s Islamist ideology and its dubious 
commitment to democracy because of its expressly anti-secular and politically illiberal 
orientation.3 It is probably true that “policy makers and academics in the West tend to be 
more concerned with the Brotherhood’s views of Hamas than with its understanding of 
                                                
3 Economic difficulties were also part of the complaints but was trumped by the politics of secularist fear. 
For a discussion of the secularist fear in Egypt, see Asad, “Fear and the Ruptured State: Reflections on 
Egypt after Mubarak.”  
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Shariah.”4 After all, it was the U.S. who helped enshrine shari‘a in the Iraqi Constitution 
after invading the country5 and it was the US that annulled the results of democratic 
elections in Palestine in 2006 that brought Hamas to power—not to mention the long 
history of its support for the coups against secular nationalist governments such as 
Mosaddegh in Iran in 1953 and in various Latin American countries during the Cold War. 
But when Morsi was toppled down by a military coup, the dominant discourse of 
justification was less about Brotherhood’s relationships with Hamas than its illiberalism 
and anti-secularism. 
The discourse used to justify the coup is anything but new. Since the rejuvenation 
(or the second birth) of the Brotherhood in Egypt in 1970s in professional unions, 
syndicates and student organizations, and particularly after its participation in the 
electoral politics of the country since early 1980s, the main ideological opposition to the 
movement has claimed that the Brotherhood “can’t be democratic” because it does not 
endorse secularism and liberalism since it seeks to enshrine shari‘a in the constitution.6  
By blending religion and politics, the argument goes, the Brotherhood is bound to 
produce an Iranian-style theocratic dictatorship. Some went further and suggested that the 
obstacle for democracy was not simply Brotherhood’s brand of Islamism, but Islam itself 
                                                
4 James Traub, “Islamic Democrats?,” The New York Times, April 29, 2007, sec. Magazine, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/magazine/29Brotherhood.t.html. 
5 The Article 2 of the Constitution of Iraq defines Islam as the “official religion of the state”  and as “a 
fundamental source of legislation.” Section A of the same article stipulates that “no law that contradict the 
established provisions of Islam may be established,” while the Section B and C of the article suggest that 
laws cannot contradict “the principles of democracy” and “the rights and basic freedoms” stipulated in the 
constitution. Article 89 of the Constitution posits that the Federal Supreme Court will be made up of judges 
and law experts as well as “experts in Islamic jurisprudence” whose selection criteria will be determined by 
a law by the Council of Representatives. “Iraqi Constitution,” n.d., 
http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf.  
6 Bassam Tibi, “Why They Can’t Be Democratic,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008): 43–48; Bassam 
Tibi, The Sharia State: Arab Spring and Democratization (Routledge, 2013). 
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as a religion;7 while others tried to show the opposite by pointing out the compatibility 
between Islam and democracy8 and the potential of Islamists to contribute to the 
democratization of their polities.9 Others saw the Brotherhood not as a theocratic threat 
but rather as a harbinger of ‘illiberal democracy.’ Accordingly, the danger is less about 
Egypt’s turning into another Iran than into another Russia with illiberal policies coupled 
with relatively free and fair elections.10 In those accounts what derails Brotherhood’s 
democratic credentials is not Islam per se, but rather its anti-secularist commitment to 
incorporate shari‘a into political life.11  
I argue that such accounts posit a secular liberal pedagogy around the norm of 
democracy—a tutelage that is instituted and sustained by the cooperation of the Egyptian 
state/military, secularist intelligentsia and liberal international order. This pedagogy not 
only posits secular liberalism as the precondition of democracy, but also claims that the 
Brotherhood must give up its ideological program, endorse secular liberal framework and 
move toward a ‘post-Islamist’ direction in order to gain the authority to properly claim 
democracy. In that sense, it is quite noteworthy that those who argued that the 
                                                
7 Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong?: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (Harper 
Perennial, 2003); Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (July 1, 
1993): 22–49; Elie Kedourie, Politics in the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 1992); Gilles Kepel, 
The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (Polity 
Press, 1994). 
8 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1996); John L. 
Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse University Press, 1998); John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth 
or Reality? (Oxford University Press, 1999). 
9 Nathan J. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option: Islamist Movements in Arab Politics (Cornell 
University Press, 2012); S. V.R Nasr, “The Rise of‘ Muslim Democracy,’” Journal of Democracy 16, no. 2 
(2005): 13–27. 
10 Fareed Zakaria, “How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East,” Time, February 3, 2011, 
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2046038,00.html. 
11 Bayat, Making Islam Democratic. 
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Brotherhood must secularize and liberalize their program in a post-Islamist direction also 
endorsed the July 3, 2013 coup as a major pedagogical instrument.12  
This secular liberal discourse in the Egyptian and Western media and scholarship 
tends to depict the Brotherhood as a movement that either repudiates democracy tout 
court or fails to create the authority to properly claim democracy for failing to live up to 
its secular liberal preconditions. These are narratives of anti-socialization in which 
Islamism as a counter-hegemonic discourse and movement rejects ‘Western’ democratic 
norms. While ‘post-Islamists’ such as the AK Party in Turkey are considered as 
‘socializing’ into democracy by coming to adopt secular liberal norms, the Brotherhood 
on the other hand, stands as the anti-social movement that repudiates democracy by 
clinging on the idea of incorporating shari‘a into its political platform.13 
In this chapter I put these pedagogic narratives under scrutiny. I argue that a 
closer and contextual analysis of the Brotherhood yields a much more complex picture 
than these representations allow. Even though the MB expressly repudiates secularism as 
“unacceptable,” it endorses the idea of the “civility of the state” (madaniyyat al-dawla). 
For many Egyptian liberals civility of the state means secularism, but in the 
Brotherhood’s lexicon it refers to a non-theocratic and non-militaristic political 
governance. The Brotherhood negotiates Islam’s relationship to politics and the state 
through its double rejection of both theocracy and secularism. It calls for an “Islamic 
state that is not religious,” and for a civil state that is Islamic. It invokes the normative 
                                                
12 Ashraf El-Sherif, What Path Will Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Choose?, September 23, 2013, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/09/23/what-path-will-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-choose/gnx6; 
Micheline Ishay, “Forum: What Killed Egyptian Democracy?,” Boston Review, 2014.  
13 Bayat, Making Islam Democratic. 
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authority of democracy but claims to build it on the Islamic notion of shura (consultation) 
and within the bounds of the principles of shari‘a, hence the idea of ‘Islamic democracy.’  
Clearly, these rather complicated and seemingly paradoxical statements indicate 
that the Brotherhood’s engagement with modern democratic norms cannot be shoehorned 
into a story of ‘rejection’ of socialization just as it cannot be seen as an unconditional 
endorsement of these norms in a way that could be called “smooth socialization.” Rather, 
what is at stake here is a sustained attempt to negotiate these democratic norms and 
institutions, to translate modern categories and classical Islamic categories into each 
other, partaking in democracy but also seeking to escape from its secular liberal 
discipline, bringing shari‘a and democracy together, and thus at once adopting and 
challenging democracy as a norm. As such, I argue that the Brotherhood’s brand of 
‘Islamic democracy’ is a catachrestic form of appropriation which wrests democracy 
from its ‘proper’ secular liberal configurations and inscribes cultural difference into it.14 
In short, Brotherhood’s relationship with democratic norms is neither one of rejection 
(‘anti-socialization’) nor of complete or unconditional endorsement (‘smooth 
socialization’). Rather, it is one of translation, appropriation and non-normative adoption 
(‘performative socialization’).  
In this chapter I analyze how the Brotherhood seeks to ‘Islamize’ democracy 
through establishing an ambivalent equivalence between democracy and shura, and how 
it at once resists and negotiates secularism through the concept of the ‘civility’ of the 
                                                
14 Established in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna in Isma‘iliyya province in Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
has been the progenitor of numerous movements and parties, some ideologically breaking with the MB 
such as the Islamic Jihad and some breaking with its organization such as the Wasat Party. This is why 
observers and members of MB make a distinction between MB “school of thought” and MB 
“organization.”  
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state. I also look at how the MB reflects these ideas into the 2012 Constitution which was 
drafted under heavy influence of the movement and Islamist factions in general. I 
occasionally provide comparative analysis of the 2012 Constitution with the preceding 
1971 Constitution and the succeeding 2013 Constitution in order to indicate continuities 
and discontinuities. 
To do so, I dwell on primary sources I collected during my ethnographic 
fieldwork research in Egypt in the summer of 2010 and the fall of 2011. These include 
my interviews with the Brotherhood leaders and members and the fieldnotes I took in 
Brotherhood meetings and events. I also analyze the movement’s official statements, 
issued programs and platforms, and published pamphlets as well as the published or 
broadcasted interviews and articles or commentaries of Brotherhood leaders. The 
secondary sources include the journalistic or scholarly reports and comments on the 
movement’s past and present.  
But before going into an analysis of Brotherhood’s conception and practice of 
‘Islamic democracy,’ I first explicate the domestic and international contexts within 
which this engagement takes place. Among these factors, the Egyptian state and its 
liberal international supporters exert a pedagogic power on the Muslim Brotherhood to 
transform it into a more secular liberal political actor. Yet, the constitutional recognition 
of Islam as the religion of the state and shari‘a as the main source of legislation together 
with the public support for the public role of Islam in politics serve as dynamics and 
windows of opportunity for the Muslim Brotherhood to engage with secularism and 
democracy performatively. In that vein, I discuss the ambiguous secularism and 
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Islamicity of the Egyptian state system, the popular support for the public role of religion, 
the secular pedagogy of the Egyptian state and military and the secularist support for this 
tutelage both in Egypt and in liberal international order.    
 
1. The Domestic and International Conditions of Muslim Brotherhood’s Appropriation 
of Democracy 
 
1.1. “Sometimes the regime is more Islamist than we are”15: The Ambiguous 
Secularism and Islamicity of the Egyptian State 
“Is Egypt a secular or a religious state?” This seemingly simple question Hussein 
Ali Agrama asks turns out to be a notoriously difficult and complex one. For Agrama, 
“this is neither an answerable nor a false question.” Rather it is expressive of the 
fundamentally contested nature of secularism as a question of where to draw the line 
between religion and politics. In its entire organizational life since its foundation in 1928, 
the Muslim Brotherhood has lived under constitutions that recognized Islam as state 
religion. But it was the 1971 Constitution, promulgated a year after Anwar Sadat replaced 
Gamal Abdul Nasser, that first enshrined shari‘a in the constitution as a source of 
legislation. The original version of the Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution suggested that 
“Islam is the religion of the state; Arabic its official language. Principles of Islamic law 
                                                
15 Interview with Essam El-Errian conducted by the Crisis Group, October 2007, Cairo; quoted in “Egypt’s 
Muslim Brothers: Confrontation or Integration? - International Crisis Group,” 20, accessed June 26, 2014, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/egypt-syria-lebanon/egypt/076-egypts-
muslim-brothers-confrontation-or-integration.aspx. 
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(shari‘a) are a principle source of legislation.”16 In May 22, 1980, a national referendum 
changed the article by elevating Islamic Sharia from being “a” source of legislation to 
being “the” main source. This formulation of the Article 2 remained untouched during the 
thirty-years rule of Hosni Mobarak, and it was also kept same in 2012 and 2013 
constitutions.   
What Mubarak did touch, however, was the Article 7 of the 1971 Constitution. 
The original formulation of that article defined the political system of Egypt as a 
“multiparty system.” In a controversial 2007 amendment, Mobarak government added 
two sentences to this article that read: “The citizens have the right to establish political 
parties according to the law. It is prohibited, however, to exercise any political activity or 
to found any political party based on religious considerations or on discrimination on 
grounds of gender or race.” This created a very curious paradox within the constitutional 
logic of the Egyptian state. The state was at once adopting an official religion and at the 
same time banning any political activity on the basis of that official religion.  
Importantly, the standard that Article 7 brought for prohibiting or banning parties 
was not discrimination on the basis of religion—a standard used in matters pertaining to 
gender and race—but rather any “religious consideration” was barred from entering the 
political field. This was also not confined to political parties since the article stipulated 
the prohibition of “any political activity” inspired by “religious considerations.” In other 
words, the article dramatically expanded the power of the state to stifle political arena for 
                                                
16 “State Information Services Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 1971,” accessed June 21, 2014, 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208#.U6WX86iLFhI. 
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Islamist politics, and in particular, it “closed off any avenue for the formation of a 
political party by the Muslim Brotherhood.”17  
Indeed this new amendment to the Constitution was already present in a similar 
form in the law that regulates political parties.18 The Article 4 of the Political Parties Law 
embodies the same tension between the Article 2 and Article 5 of the Constitution. The 
second paragraph of the Article 4 of the law stipulates that “the principles, purposes, 
programs, policies, or methods of the party in exercising its activities shall not contradict 
the Constitution or exigencies of preserving national unity, social peace, and the 
democratic system.” The fourth paragraph of the same article, however, suggests that 
“the party, in its principles, programs, the exercise of its activity, or the election of its 
leadership or members, shall not be founded on a religious, class, sectarian, categorical, 
or geographical basis, or on the exploitation of religious feelings, or discrimination 
because of race, origin, or creed.”19 Since the Constitution defines Islam as the religion of 
the state and requires legislation to be compliant with shari‘a, second paragraph’s 
requirement that political parties’ principles, programs, and activities cannot contradict 
the constitution also means they cannot run against the Islamicity of the state—per 
Article 2 of the Constitution. However any such allusion can easily be registered as an 
                                                
17 This 2007 ammendment in fact was the regime’s response at the constitutional level to Brotherhood’s 
electoral success in 2005 elections for the lower house of the parliament in addition to another round of 
arrests and investigations. See, Nathan J. Brown, Michele Durocher Dunne, and Amr Hamzawy, Egypt’s 
Controversial Constitutional Amendments (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington DC, 
2007), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/egypt_constitution_webcommentary01.pdf.  
18 Law No. 40/1977 as amended by Law No.177/2005.  
19 Article 22 and 23 of the same law stipulates that the founders and members of parties deemed illegal by 
the provisions of the law will be imprisoned “even if this party is under any religious veil.”   
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“exploitation of religious feelings” and hence be outlawed per Article 4 of the Political 
Parties Law.20 
Such constitutional and legal articulations manifest the contradictions within, and 
ambiguities about, the nature of the Egyptian state. While the Article 2 of the 
Constitution adopts a state religion and makes this religion the fundamental source of 
legislation, it also prohibits parties that claim to act according to the dictates of this 
constitutional clause. The Egyptian state adopts Islam as official religion,21 but it bans 
religiously inspired parties in order to “maintain a secular political environment.”22 
Befuddled by this apparent contradiction between Article 2 and newly amended Article 5 
of the Constitution, James Traub asked Hossam Badrawi, a reformist member of 
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, in 2007: “How can a self-professed religious state 
prohibit a political activity with a “religious background”?” Badrawi responded by 
resorting to what is sometimes referred to as ‘reductio ad Hitlerum’: “If I go to Germany 
and I want to start a Nazi Party, would I be allowed to do that?” When Traub questioned 
                                                
20 Monopolizing Power: Egypt’s Political Parties Law (Human Rights Watch, January 2007), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45a4e0a92.html. The Muslim Brotherhood did not apply for being 
registered as a political party before January 25 uprisings, but the Wasat (Centrist) Party under the 
leadership of Abu’l ‘Ila Madi, who broke with the MB in early 1990s, applied for officially registering his 
party for several times. All his attempts at legal recognition were turned down by the Political Parties 
Committee, a body instituted by the 1977 Law and that gives the government, and in practice Mobarak’s 
party, National Democratic Party, the right to allow or disallow the formation of new political parties, 
hence tightly control the party political landscape. 
21 It should be noted that the Constitution refrains from the language of ‘Islamic state’ despite adopting 
Islam as the religion of the state and the fundamental source of legislation. This stands as an interesting 
question for further investigation. The Islamists demands for ‘Islamic state’ is precisely one that wants to 
make Islam the state religion and shari‘a its foremost source of law. One reason for not using this language 
might be a sensitivity on the part of the state to distinguish itself from Islamist parlance. But more 
importantly, as Kristen Stilt indicates, the way the Egyptian state puts Article 2 of the Constitution into 
practice differs from Islamist projects. I will return to this question below. Kristen Stilt, “Islam Is the 
Solution: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” Texas International Law Journal 
46 (2011 2010): 73. 
22 Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, “An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal Research,” Hauser 
Global Law School Program, October 2006, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/egypt.htm#_Political_Parties. 
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whether this was a fair analogy, Badrawi rejoined: “Yes, because they don’t respect the 
constitution, which lays out a separate role for religion and politics.”23 Indeed there was 
no such injunction in the Constitution separating religion and politics, except for the 
amendments that were being prepared at the time of that conversation.  
 The Egyptian constitution accepts shari‘a as the fundamental source of legislation 
but still the Egyptian state claims to have “secular underpinnings.”24 The fact that the 
constitution recognizes Islam as state religion “does not have significant repercussions on 
the organization of power within the State or on the functioning of the public 
institutions,” hence proclaiming a formal religion of the state “does not lead to the 
establishment of an Islamic regime.”25 Egypt has a “mixed-secular system”26 or a “hybrid 
system”27 that embodies an ambiguity about where to draw the line between religion, 
politics, and the state.28 The inherent indeterminacies of secularism in Egypt do not 
undermine secularism but rather enable to state to further expand its reach and power.29 
As Dina Shehata puts it, “Egypt’s political system is mixed, it is a mixed state, not a 
shari‘a state. 1st Article of the Constitution set up dawla madaniyya (civil state) based on 
equal citizenship, then the 2nd Article establishes shari‘a as the source of legislation. So 
                                                
23 Traub, “Islamic Democrats?”. 
24 Tamir Moustafa, “Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt,” Law & Social Inquiry 
28 (2003): 884. 
25 Nisrine Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A 
Comparative Study (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008), 37–38. 
26 Dina Shehata, Interview by the author, Cairo, August 4, 2010. 
27 Pakinam Rachad Elsharkawy, “Religion and State in the Muslim World: Comparative Perspectives” 
(Foundation for Sciences and Arts, Istanbul, December 13, 2010), 
http://www.bisav.org.tr/merkez.aspx?module=yuvarlakmasaayrinti&turid=18&menuID=8_6_18&merkezid
=6&yuvarlakmasaid=502. 
28 H. A Agrama, “Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a Secular or a Religious State?,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 52, no. 03 (2010): 495–523; Hussein Ali Agrama, Questioning 
Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2012). 
29 Agrama, Questioning Secularism, 105. 
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the state engages in a balancing act between more secularist and Islamist wings. It is a 
semi-secular system.”30 
This mixed and ambiguous nature of the state in matters about religion and state 
also becomes glaringly apparent in the Egyptian Civil Code of 1948 which suggests that 
“where no provision is made in the present text, the Judge must have recourse to custom 
(‘urf), then to the principles (mabadi’) of the shari‘a, then to natural law (qanun tabi‘i) 
and then to equity (‘adala).”31 This suggests that the sources of legislation and 
jurisprudence are both religious and secular. In that vein, the shari‘a-based legal principle 
of ‘hisba,’ that is, the policing for preventing vice and commanding good and controlling 
markets, is a particularly curious practice that stirs heated debates inside and outside 
Egypt. Most famously, in 1996, Egypt’s highest civil and criminal appellate court, the 
Court of Cassation (Mahkamat al-Naqd), convicted Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, a professor of 
Arabic and Islamic studies, for apostasy because of his writings and forced him by decree 
to divorce from his wife.32  
For some this mixed constitutional structure is an outcome of the regime’s 
strategy of cooptation for survival. Accordingly, given that the Egyptian public is self-
expressedly religious and want to see more public role for religion, the authoritarian 
regime offers such constitutional “concessions” in order to “buy in” the masses into the 
regime or to disarm any political opposition that can come from religious circles.33 
                                                
30 Shehata, Interview by the author. 
31 Maurice Borrmans, “Cultural Dialogue and ‘Islamic Specificity,’” in Islam, Modernism and the West: 
Cultural and Political Relations at the End of the Millennium, ed. Gema Martín Muñoz (I. B. Tauris in 
association with the Eleni Nakou Foundation, 1999), 88. 
32 Agrama, Questioning Secularism. 
33 Elsharkawy, “Religion and State in the Muslim World: Comparative Perspectives.” 
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Indeed one can argue that this strategy worked quite well in Egypt with the Islamists 
outside the Brotherhood, particularly with Salafis and Sufis, who were pointing at the 
Article 2 to suggest that Egypt was already an Islamic state and hence Brotherhood’s 
political activism was entirely wrong-headed.34 In formulating its vision of Islamic 
democracy, the Brotherhood capitalizes on this ambiguous character of the Egyptian state 
as at once Islamic and secular in order to push for more space for shari‘a governance. 
 
1.2. Popular Support for Enshrining Shari‘a in the Constitution and for Public Role of 
Religion 
In one of the largest bookstores in Cairo’s Talat Harb Square in November 2011, I 
was conversing with a gentleman. “I’m liberal,” he said, “I support Baradei. I hate 
Islamist parties. I never supported them.” When I asked what he meant by the term 
liberal, he said, “I want human rights, democracy, and secularism (‘almaniyya).” Since he 
described himself as a secular liberal, I asked if he would like to see shari‘a not 
implemented and if he would want the Article 2 of the Constitution changed. He was 
almost offended by the question. “How can I not apply shari‘a?” he said with 
befuddlement. “I’m Muslim. I’m liberal but I pray and fast and everything. Of course I 
would implement shari‘a. That’s not what secularism is about. Secularism is not atheism 
(ladiniyya). We’re religious people. For thousands of years that has been so.”  
                                                
34 Many Salafis I talked to expressed these views. One of them was a ‘born-again Salafi’ who was a strong 
supporter of Nasser and a high-ranking buraucrat at his time, who went to Saudi Arabia to work and came 
back as a more devout and Salafi person. For him, “Ikhwan went too far in politics” as it went to “pressure 
the authority” to take certain measures. What was true was the way of the Al-Azhar scholars, that is to “tell 
the authority what is right and not right” and it is up to the ruler to listen or not. “Ikhwan is using Islam in 
order to reach to power,” he told me, and then he grabbed the chair he was sitting on and continued, “they 
want to sit on the chair, nothing more.” Abdulhamid Salem, Interview by the author, Cairo, July 9, 2010. 
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Such conversations turned out to be not so infrequent during my fieldwork in 
Egypt. As one Egyptian academic observed, “there is an Islamist hegemony in Egypt so 
that even secularists cannot argue against shari‘a.”35 Nathan Brown finds a “surprising 
consensus” over the “general themes” of shari’a.36 There is nearly a consensus among 
Egyptians about adopting shari‘a, particularly over personal status issues such as 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance.37  
Almost every poll conducted in Egypt continuously finds a very strong public 
support for inclusion of shari‘a in the constitution as the primary or only source of law, 
including the criminal punishments derived from it. The Arab Barometer Survey finds 
that 80 percent of Egyptians believe that laws should be made in accordance with the 
shari‘a.38 But large majority of people also do not want the “men of religion” to control 
politics. But the large majority of Egyptians also believe that democracy is preferable to 
any other kind of government. According to the Pew survey in 2011, 82 percent of 
Egyptians support stoning as a punishment for adultery, 84 percent favor the death 
penalty for Muslims who leave the religion. Also on questions such as homosexuality, 
divorce, gender equality, and adultery, the public favors an illiberal attitude.39  
                                                
35 Ashraf El-Sherif, “Shari’a and the Civil State in Egypt” (American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt, 
October 11, 2011). 
36 This aspect of Egyptian politics is what makes it quite different from Turkish politics. In Egypt many of 
the liberals I interviewed—those who staunchly supported secularism either as ‘almaniyya or as 
madaniyya—expressed their adherence to shari’a. Their criticism of Islamists, it turned out, was about how 
Salafis or Muslim Brotherhood interpreted it. In Turkey however, not only that the general public does not 
express an interest in shari’a, but even the Islamists do not use the term shari’a that often, and definitely, 
AK Party does not and cannot refer to shari’a in any way.  
37 Brown, “Egypt and Islamic Sharia.” Brown, “Debating the Islamic Shari’a in 21st-Century Egypt.” 
38 Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins, “New Findings on Arabs and Democracy,” Journal 
of Democracy 23, no. 4 (2012): 89–103, doi:10.1353/jod.2012.0066. 
39 “The Tahrir Square Legacy: Egyptians Want Democracy, a Better Economy, and a Major Role for 
Islam,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, accessed June 19, 2014, 
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Tarek Masoud and Wael Nawara’s interrogation of the question “Will Egypt’s 
Liberals Ever Win?” provides an interesting way to track the impact of this ‘Islamist 
hegemony’ and the broad consensus over shari‘a in Egyptian public. For them, liberals 
can win the political battle against Islamists, but “they must forget Shariah and focus on 
painting Egypt’s Islamist president [Morsi] as just another Mubarak.”40 The authors 
report a survey conducted by one of them in November 2011 which shows that 80 
percent of Egyptians believe that the government should set up a council of religious 
scholars to oversee legislation’s conformity with shari‘a, 75 percent believe that religious 
authorities should be able to censor media, and 67 percent believed that having a female 
president was not a good idea. Hence, surveys find that a non-secular and non-liberal 
democracy, which incorporates shari‘a into the constitution but is not run by religious 
scholars, is what majority of Egyptians demand. 
 
1.3. The Military Tutelage over Politics and Society and Secular Liberal Endorsement 
of It  
For the Egyptian state, it was an unmistakably pedagogical project to protect the 
ambiguous secularity of the state against Islamists, particularly against the Brotherhood. 
What is usually referred to as the 1952 Revolution, or the Free Officers Coup, paved the 
way to a form of socialist Arab nationalism which was both secularist and authoritarian in 
orientation. For Nasser, if political parties were permitted, they would act like the stooges 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/01/24/the-tahrir-square-legacy-egyptians-want-democracy-a-better-
economy-and-a-major-role-for-islam/. 
40 Tarek Masoud and Wael Nawara, “Will Egypt’s Liberals Ever Win?,” Slate, December 4, 2012, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2012/12/egypt_s_liberals_can_defeat_moham
mad_morsi_if_they_ignore_the_muslim_brotherhood.html. 
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of foreign intelligence agencies or the feudalists. If he had allowed party pluralism, “there 
would be a party acting as an agent for the American CIA, another in the pay of MI6, the 
British intelligence service, and a third working for the Soviety KGB.”41 For Nasser, 
Egyptian society was not yet ready for democratic self-rule. For this it had to go through 
a fundamental social change that would overcome feudal relations. This vision becomes 
crystallized in his response to a question asked by an Indian journalist in 1957 about 
whether he would think about introducing democracy:  
“Can I ask you a question: what is democracy? We were supposed to have 
a democratic system during the period 1923 to 1953. But what good was 
this democracy to our people? I will tell you. Landowners… ruled our 
people. They used this kind of democracy as an easy tool for the benefits 
of a feudal system. The feudalists [would] gather the peasants together and 
drive them to the polling booths. There the peasants would cast their votes 
according to the instructions of their masters. I [on the other hand] want to 
liberate…the peasants and workers to be able to say ‘yes’ and ‘no’ without 
any of this affecting their livelihood or their daily bread. This in my view 
is the basis of freedom and democracy.”42  
 
This vision continued in Sadat’s presidency, yet with significant changes in the 
constitutional structure of the state, particularly on matters pertaining to the relationship 
                                                
41 Adeed Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening: Revolution, Democracy, and the Islamist Challenge from 
Tunis to Damascus, 1 edition (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013), 73. 
42 Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East (Routledge, 2000), 
149. Also quoted in Dawisha, The Second Arab Awakening. It is worth noting that Hasan Al-Banna, the 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, was also holding similar views about party pluralism. For him, at a 
time when the Muslim community was struggling against colonialism for its independence, party politics 
would open the door for foreign interference and would boost those who are only concerned with selfish 
gains. He said, “We the Muslims are neither communists nor democrats nor anything similar to what they 
claim; we are, by God’s grace, Muslims, which is our road to salvation from Western colonialism.” Ahmad 
S. Moussalli, “Hasan Al-Bannā’s Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies 4, no. 2 (July 1, 1993): 172. 
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between religion, state and politics. The 1971 Constitution promulgated under Sadat 
introduced Islam as state religion and the principles of shari‘a as the source of legislation, 
By introducing these Islamizing moves Sadat sought to appease and buy off the ever 
more consolidating Islamist movement against his encounter with the left.43 This was the 
time when Egypt was reshuffling its alliances in the Cold War and enshrining shari‘a in 
the constitution was Sadat’s way of coopting the public against the pro-Soviet left. After 
Egypt’s humiliating defeat in 1967 War under the secular-nationalist-populist Nasser, 
Egypt’s international alliances has been reshuffled under Anwar Sadat. Against the 
Russian-sympathizer left, Sadat eased the repression on Muslim Brotherhood and 
allowed (and at times encouraged) them to flourish in student unions and professional 
unions.  
 The Hosni Mubarak period also started with the easing of the relationship 
between the state and the MB in a bid to contain violent jihadi groups which assassinated 
Sadat in 1981. However, with Mubarak’s support for the Gulf War and its policies in the 
US-Israeli orbit together with the Brotherhood’s growing presence in electoral politics, 
professional unions and social service provision, the relationship between Mubarak and 
Brotherhood increasingly deteriorated. Several campaigns of crackdown with arrests, 
bans, and confiscations followed. Even the modicum of democratic governance was 
constantly deferred and suspended by the Mubarak regime on the grounds that people 
were not yet ready and mature enough for exercising self-governance. Mubarak once 
                                                
43 Tamir Moustafa, “Law in the Egyptian Revolt,” Middle East Law and Governance 3, no. 1–2 (March 25, 
2011): 190. 
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said, “we are providing doses of democracy in proportion to our ability to absorb them.”44 
The Mubarak regime portrayed itself to the secular liberal audience, inside and outside 
Egypt, as defender of the secularity of the regime against ‘Islamist fundamentalists.’ For 
example, when asked on Al-Jazeera English in 2007 about whether there was a political 
future for the Muslim Brotherhood within Egypt, Maged Reda Boutros, a spokesperson 
for the regime, said: “Yes of course, if they secularize their program. If they reintroduce 
themselves, if they reorient themselves. Because simply it is not just a political debate or 
an argument, it is rather a choice between stability and chaos. No government would 
allow chaos in its arena or in its environment. So it is very natural that the Egyptian 
regime would ask the MB or urge them to convert into a secular political program.”45  
 What is really interesting is that despite such calls for “conversion” of the MB 
into secularism as a precondition for political participation, the regime was also keen on 
keeping a public image as the defender of the faith. One instance where this became 
evident was during the public uproar that erupted in 2006 after Egyptian Culture Minister 
Farouk Hosni said that headscarf was “a symbol of backwardness.” The Egyptian daily 
Al-Masri Al-Youm quoted him saying that Islamic headscarf represented a “backward 
thinking” and that he longed about the times when women “went to universities and work 
                                                
44 May Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt (Ithaca Press, 1999), 54. 
This very much echoes what Abdelraouf al-rawabda, a former Jordanian prime minister, said in support of 
deferring democracy to a time when people and conditions get mature enough: “Democracy is an evolving 
being, gets born and grows up. It is never created all at once. Whoever asks for something pre-maturely, 
one will be punished by not getting it. The baby that is born bigger than its natural size either will die; the 
mother will die or both will die.” Quoted in Moataz A. Fattah and Jim Butterfield, “Muslim Cultural 
Entrepreneurs and the Democracy Debate,” Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 1 (April 
2006): 65, doi:10.1080/10669920500515135.  
45 Inside Story (Al-Jazeera English, July 29, 2007). 
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places without headscarf.”46 After various demonstrations in universities and elsewhere 
the Egyptian Parliament held a joint session of the Culture and Religious Affairs 
committees to address the issue. In the meeting, the Brotherhood MP for the Delta 
governerate of Gharbiyya stormed Hosni for making “a contemptuous remark about a 
religious and a Quranic decree.” What was surprising, however, was the reaction of some 
NDP MPs. While some NDP MPs defended Hosni, others shouted at him, called on him 
to resign, and even one of them attempted to physically assault him. One NDP MP, 
Mohamed El-Omda, accused the Minister for spreading “an American agenda of liberal 
Western values in Egypt.” El-Omda said that he had filed a complaint with the 
prosecutor-general, inviting him to intervene “to save Egypt and Islamic world from 
which America and the Egyptian regime leads against Islamic values and identity.”47 This 
short-lived instance vindicates what Essam El-Errian, a leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and FJP, once told in an interview a few months after this controversy: 
“Sometimes the regime is more Islamist than we are.”48 In that sense, while the Mubarak 
regime acted as a pedagogue for forcing to “convert” the Brotherhood into a secular 
movement, at times, it also has given reactions that surpassed the Brotherhood in its 
Islamist coloration.  
The tutelary role of the military in Egypt still continues under Al-Sisi. Nasser’s 
crackdown on the Brotherhood radically stalled the growth of the movement till 1970s, 
and Sadat and Mubarak’s policies were a blend of repression and opening. But since the 
                                                
46 Adam Morrow, “Headscarves Dispute Travels to Egypt,” Inter Press Service, December 1, 2006, 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2006/12/religion-headscarves-dispute-travels-to-egypt/. 
47 Essam El-Din, “Hosni Makes No Apology,” Al-Ahram Weekly, December 7, 2006, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/823/eg4.htm. 
48 “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers,” 20. 
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July 3, 2013 coup and his subsequent rise to the presidency, Al-Sisi has clearly 
communicated his will and determination to exterminate the Brotherhood altogether from 
Egyptian society and politics. Along with Al-Sisi’s policies of bloody repression, we 
have an interesting source to discern the broader vision that informs Al-Sisi’s stance 
toward democracy and secularism. This is the thesis Al-Sisi wrote as a student at US 
Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania in 2006. In this 17-page thesis, Sisi makes 
two points. First, democracy should not be pushed or promoted “hastily” because the 
Middle Eastern society is not yet ready for it and the results would embarrass American 
policies in the region, particularly on the question of Israel. So rather than talking about 
democracy, American and Egyptian policymakers should talk about economic 
development and education that may (or may not) lead to democracy in the future. It 
should be kept in mind that this thesis was written at a time when the Bush administration 
was using the pretext of promoting democracy as an ideological justification for US 
aggression toward Iraq. Perhaps more importantly, it was produced at a time when the 
Bush administration was toying with the idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East 
and was pressuring Mubarak to further liberalize the system. Indeed, under US pressure, 
the Mubarak regime did make a change in 2005 by allowing more Brotherhood MPs into 
parliament (88 out of 454), which, for many, was Mubarak’s way of warning the US what 
would happen if he would allow for truly democratic elections. Ultimately the US 
pressure was watered down as Bush administration discarded its so-called ‘Freedom 
Agenda’ after Hamas’s electoral victory. Second, Al-Sisi suggests that democracy in 
Egypt cannot be implemented a la secular liberal model. Rather, he argues, democracy 
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must be built on Islamic principles and secular liberal values should not be imposed on 
Muslim societies.  
 What is also worth noting is the support that the Mubarak and Al-Sisi regimes get 
from secular liberal intelligentsia in its pedagogic effort to socialize the MB into secular 
liberal coordinates. The most recent example of this was the July 3, 2013 coup, which 
was hailed by most secular liberal figures.49 The pedagogic pressure of these self-
identified liberal and/or secularist intellectuals, allying themselves with the discourse of 
the Egyptian state, urged the Brotherhood that the only way it could be given a chance to 
join in public political life was through a radical transformation of its Islamist ideology 
toward a more liberal ‘post-Islamism’ that is in peace with secularism as a precondition 
of democracy.50  
This precondition argument that posits secularism as a necessary if not sufficient 
condition for democracy has two dimensions. First, it is a theoretical and historical 
explanation about which institutions, mechanisms, or norms have led to the rise, survival, 
and consolidation of democracy. The second is a more overtly political claim that used 
the explanatory argument about the emerging conditions of democracy to deny 
democracy to societies which have not gone through these steps, such as secularization.  
The distinction between the two is not hard and fast and there are significant overlaps. 
Yet still these are two different modes of thinking about preconditions of democracy. The 
liberal discourse in contemporary global politics often depicts Brotherhood’s critical 
                                                
49 Amr Mahmoud El-Shobaki, “The End of Muslim Brotherhood Rule in Egypt,” Carnegie Middle East 
Center, August 1, 2013, http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/08/01/end-of-muslim-brotherhood-rule-in-
egypt/gk93. 
50 Ishay, “Forum: What Killed Egyptian Democracy?”; El-Sherif, What Path Will Egypt’s Muslim 
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stance to secularism as the proof of its unfitness to democratic rule. Such arguments that 
view secularism as a precondition and liberalism as the only framework for democracy 
led self-identified liberal democrats to justify and buttress the pedagogic role of the 
military over Egyptian society, as one can see in Fareed Zakari’a comments: 
My hope is that Egypt avoids this path [of illiberal democracy]. I cannot 
tell you in all honesty that it will. But much evidence suggests that 
democracy in Egypt could work. First, the army, which remains resolutely 
secular, will thwart any efforts to create a religious political order. The 
Egyptian army may well fight the efforts of democrats to dismantle some 
elements of the military dictatorship — since the elites of the armed forces 
have benefited mightily from that system — but it is powerful and popular 
enough to be able to draw certain lines. In Egypt, as in Turkey, the army 
has the opportunity to play a vital role in modernizing the society and 
checking the excesses of religious politics.51 
 
Similar arguments that buttressed the army’s tutelage over civilian politics, especially on 
Islamist factions, have found support from inside and outside Egypt. These political 
supports rested on various arguments that depicted Egyptian people and/or conditions of 
the country as being ‘not yet’ mature enough to exercise democratic self-governance. 
“I’m not sure the time is right for the Arab region to go through the democratic process,” 
said the Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu during the protests in Tahrir Square 
in January 2011, and continued:  “You can’t make it with elections, especially in the 
current situation where radical elements, especially Islamist groups, may exploit the 
                                                
51 Zakaria, “How Democracy Can Work in the Middle East.” 
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situation. It might take a generation or so.”52 A similar sentiment was also echoed by the 
Egyptian Minister of Culture Mohamad Saber who was appointed by the military after 
the July 3, 2013 military coup: “There is no time for democracy during the circumstances 
and times that the country is going through.”53 Moreover, in his quarrel with Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the World Social Forum in 2009, Shimon Perez 
rejected Hamas’s democratic legitimacy by repeating the same distrust in elections in a 
striking way. “Democracy is not about elections,” Perez argued, “it is a civilization.” 
Hence, not belonging to the civilization of democracy, HAMAS and the Muslim 
Brotherhood from which it emerged get discursively deprived of making a credible and 
authoritative claim on democracy as a norm.  
 
1.4. “Absolutely Necessary Rescue of a Nation”: Liberal International Support for 
Egypt’s Military Tutelage 
As the largest Arab country and the cultural and geographical gravity center of the 
Arab world, Egypt is arguably the most important Arab ally of the United States in the 
Middle East. After fighting wars with Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, Egypt then became 
the first Arab country to recognize and make peace with it. Since then, Egypt has been 
the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel.54 Brotherhood has long been one of the 
                                                
52He then called on the U.S. and European countries to “curb their criticism of President Hosni Mubarak to 
preserve stability in the region” since it was “in the West’s interest to maintain the stability of the Egyptian 
regime.” Barak Ravid, “Israel Urges World to Curb Criticism of Egypt’s Mubarak,” Haaretz.com, January 
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mubarak-1.340238.  
53 Ahmed Naje, “Culture in the Age of Sisi: The Continued Propaganda of Illusions,” The Tahrir Institute 
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most vocal critics of the terms of Camp David Treaty with Israel and is the progenitor 
and one of the closest supporters of Hamas in Palestine. Even though the Brotherhood 
had declared that it would abide by Egypt’s international agreements, it also suggested 
that it would demand a renegotiation of the terms of Camp David (a widely popular 
demand in Egypt shared across ideological and religious aisles) 55 The Brotherhood’s 
party program consistently refers to Israel as the “Zionist entity” without mentioning its 
name, affirms “the right of the Palestinian people to liberate their land” and highlights 
“the duty of governments and peoples of Arab and Muslim countries, especially Egypt, to 
aid and support the Palestinian people and the Palestinian resistance against the Zionist 
usurpers of their homeland.”56  
When the international community did not recognize the results of the Palestinian 
elections, the Brotherhood issued an official statement in 2007, criticizing the West for 
being hypocritical and insincere about democratic reform in the Middle East. 
“Democracy, freedom and human rights and all other values propagated by the West and 
the United States are a tool for achieving Western and US interests without any real 
impartiality or fairness,” it argued. The Brotherhood observed that “if democracy brings 
                                                                                                                                            
(Congressional Research Service, January 2010). Up until the 2005 amendments, the Political Parties Law 
was prohibiting any leader or member of a political party from being “affiliated with, related to, or in 
cooperation with any party, organization, group, or political power that has called for the abrogation of 
Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.” Interestingly, this clause was lifted in the very same amendment that 
lifted the requirement for a political party’s “founding pillars, principles, goals, programs, policies, or 
methods” to be compliant with Islamic jurisprudence as well as “the principles of both the July 23, 1952 
and the May 15, 1971 revolutions.” Refworld | Monopolizing Power. 
55 As the Crisis Group report on the MB points out, “[r]ejection of the Camp David treaty as illegitimate is 
a view shared by a sizeable poirtion of the opposition, whether secular or Islamist, either on the grounds 
that Israel has not lived up to its commitment to pursue peace with Palestinians or that the manner in which 
President Anwar al-Sadat pursued the agreement was illegitimate.” However, the same report also quotes 
an interview with Essam El-Errian, a senior MB leader, saying that the movement’s political party would 
“respect previous agreements” even if the movement itself would not. See, “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers,” 20. 
56 “Freedom and Justice Party 2011 Parliamentary Elections Program,” n.d., 36. 
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in US and Western agents, it will be welcomed and praised, and if it brought freemen 
who oppose Western and US plans, it would be considered illegitimate, to reveal the 
ideological hypocrisy of the Western civilization.” For the Brotherhood, “the United 
States has realized that the free choice of Islamic peoples contradicts with its interests, 
leading to US procrastination in asking for holding free elections and making political 
reforms.” Since “the US policy doesn’t achieve region’s interests,” the Brotherhood 
stresses that those who are “willing to be politically liberated from tyrannical regimes 
related to US interests” should take the issue in their hands and create an “international 
awakening against the US project that want to dominate the futures of the people.”57  It 
calls for “the awakening of Islamists…to face the Western project that aims to attack the 
Nation” by drawing on a “comprehensive cultural view of Islam and its moderate 
method.” Therefore, the Brotherhood clearly articulates an opposition to American 
regional order in the Middle East. 
Egyptian military, on the other hand, thrives on the $1.3 billion annual American 
foreign aid that is conditioned on keeping the treaty with Israel. As the military that 
fought with Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973, its military has very much become dependent 
on the US, financially and politically. The Egyptian military is not as strictly secularist as 
the Kemalist ideology of the Turkish military. It never expressed any distaste with 
ordinary people’s religiosity. For example, it is quite ordinary to see Egyptian military 
officers in their uniforms praying in mosques, something that is beyond the pale for the 
Turkish military officers. However, similar to the Turkish military, the Egyptian military 
                                                
57 “Reading into The Muslim Brotherhood’s Documents,” Ikhwanweb, June 13, 2007, 
http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=818. 
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has took on the task of fighting ‘Islamist fundamentalism,’ a category that is 
overstretched to include non-violent Islamists such as the Brotherhood. Therefore, the 
Egyptian military acts as the defender of the American regional order in the Middle East 
in fighting political Islam. The fact that the Egyptian military bombed the underground 
tunnels from Rafah to Gaza in the second day of the coup was a strong signal to the West 
as to the strategic value of the coup. This also transforms secularism from being solely a 
domestic matter of the institutional relationship between religion and state into an 
international geopolitical question. 58   
In this light, democracy seems unfit for the region for strategic reasons,59 and the 
claim that secularism is a precondition for democracy attains a high geopolitical value in 
sustaining and supporting the pro-American autocracies in the region. Right after the fall 
of Bin Ali in Tunisia, and three days before the start of the uprising in Egypt, Robert 
Kaplan suggested that “in terms of American interests and regional peace, there is plenty 
of peril in democracy.” He then went on to explicate the fundamental paradox between 
democracy and imperial power in Egypt: 
It was not democrats, but Arab autocrats, Anwar Sadat of Egypt and King 
Hussein of Jordan, who made peace with Israel. An autocrat firmly in 
charge can make concessions more easily than can a weak, elected 
leader—just witness the fragility of Mahmoud Abbas’s West Bank 
government. And it was democracy that brought the extremists of Hamas 
to power in Gaza. In fact, do we really want a relatively enlightened leader 
                                                
58 Agrama, Questioning Secularism. 
59 Charles Krauthammer, “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” The National Interest, n.d.; Francis 
Fukuyama, “After Neoconservatism,” The New York Times, February 19, 2006, sec. Magazine, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html; Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev, “Democratic 
Impulses versus Imperial Interests: America’s New Mid-East Conundrum,” Orbis, no. Summer 2003 (n.d.): 
415–31. 
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like King Abdullah in Jordan undermined by widespread street 
demonstrations? We should be careful what we wish for in the Middle 
East.60 
 
This advice the US government and other Western states did listen, and they have been 
careful of what they wished for.61 Later, the international community offered a rather 
warm welcome to the July 3, 2013 coup. The United States, European Union, Arab 
League and other international organizations (e.g. UN, WB, IMF, OSCE, G-8) did not air 
any serious criticism of the coup and endorsed the language of the military (i.e. “Egypt’s 
right to defend itself against terrorism”). The US government did not recognize the event 
as a coup to continue its military aid to the new military-backed government. The Gulf 
monarchies not only provided political support but also poured billions of dollars to make 
the coup economically successful. The key actors of liberal global governance and their 
regional clients have almost unanimously given a free pass to Egypt’s new military-
backed regime.62  
Despite his killing of more than 2500 nonviolent protestors and injuring more 
than 4000 of them in one single day of August 14, 2013 in Cairo’s Raba‘a Square; Abdel 
Fattah El-Sisi did not face any international condemnation let alone prosecution, but was 
                                                
60 Robert D. Kaplan, “One Small Revolution,” The New York Times, January 22, 2011, sec. Opinion, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/opinion/23kaplan.html. 
61 Obama first called for an “orderly transition” in Egypt—a transition that would give enough concessions 
to the protestors yet would not allow the regime to lose the hold on power. And the liberal international 
community offered a warm welcome to the July 3, 2013 military coup that ousted Morsi from power, and 
did not raise any serious voice against the military regime when it committed mass atrocities, when it 
turned power to the hands of the military that would protect the West from “perils of democracy.” 
62 Marc Lynch, “Peak Middle East?,” Foreign Policy, November 21, 2013, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/obama_administration_egypt. 
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rather endorsed as the leader to head the country toward democracy.63 Upon his election 
as the President with 96 percent of the votes, Canadian Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement congratulating Sisi for the results of the election, endorsing the language the 
Egyptian regime uses in repressing the Brotherhood (“We continue to stand with Egypt in 
its efforts to confront terrorism”), describing Sisi’s election as a sign of “making a 
peaceful and meaningful transition to democracy, based on respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”64 Similarly, the US Secretary of State John 
Kerry also paid a visit to Cairo to congratulate Sisi, which has been understood by the 
Egyptian political establishment as a clear support to the regime.65  
As another typical example of Western support for the military coup in Egypt, and 
by extension for the Mubarak regime before it, Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom, agreed to work as El-Sisi's business advisor through a United Arab 
Emirates-funded consultancy project. Blair congratulated Sisi on "winning the support of 
people" with 96 percent of the votes in what the British daily Guardian calls "a 
dictatorial-style election" in which the biggest political force in the country was banned 
and the media totally controlled. Blair suggested that Sisi "deserved the support of the 
whole international community." As The Guardian notes, in April 2014, Blair singled out 
the Brotherhood and other Islamists as "the enemy that the west and east should unite 
                                                
63 It should be noted that Saddam Hussein was convicted of crimes against humanity and was therefore 
executed for his killing of 148 civilians in the city of Dujail in 1982 after a failed assassination attempt 
against him. “Saddam Hussein Executed in Iraq,” BBC, December 30, 2006, sec. Middle East, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6218485.stm.  
64 Foreign Affairs Government of Canada, “Canada News Centre - Statement on Egyptian Election 
Results,” News Releases, (June 4, 2014), http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=853509.  
65 “Party Leaders: Kerry’s Visit to Egypt Official Recognition of 30 June | Egypt Independent,” Al-Masry 
Al-Youm, July 24, 2014, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/party-leaders-kerry-s-visit-egypt-official-
recognition-30-june. 
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against," and hailed Morsi's overthrow as "the absolutely necessary rescue of a nation." 
And he joined with the autocracies of Arab Gulf region such as UAE and Saudi Arabia 
who see themselves as the "spearhead of a life-and-death regional struggle against 
political Islam."66 What bothered Blair in his support of Sisi was not the killing of 2500 
protestors, injuring of more than 17000, and jailing of more than 16.000 (80 of which 
died in custody) and detaining and inditing 40.000 in one single year, nor its systematic 
torture campaigns and its complete ban of all political and media presence of 
opposition.67 But rather it was only the jailing of three Al-Jazeera journalists that Blair 
felt was worthy of mentioning.  
 
2. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Notion of ‘Islamic Democracy’ 
 
Operating under these domestic and international conditions, how did the 
Brotherhood engage with democracy as a norm? Over the last decade, Egyptian and 
international observers of the Brotherhood have rightly pointed out that there were 
                                                
66 Seumas Milne, “Tony Blair to Advise Egypt President Sisi on Economic Reform,” The Guardian, July 2, 
2014, sec. Politics, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jul/02/tony-blair-advise-egypt-president-sisi-
economic-reform. A potential success of the MB government posed an existential threat to the oil-rich and 
Western-backed monarchies of the Gulf, boosting the voices demanding the end to the autocratic rules of 
these tribal monarchies. After all, the MB’s program explicitly states its willingness to “play an active role 
in supporting the Arab revolutions,” which poses an existential threat to the tribal monarchies of the Arab 
Gulf states. Securing those monarchies would also secure the Western-backed regional order. These are 
only some of the reasons that led the key actors liberal international order and its regional backers in the 
Middle East and North Africa to support a military coup against MB’s democratically elected President in 
the country’s first free and fair elections in her thousands years of history. 
67 For numbers, see Michele Dunne and Scott Williamson, “Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability by the 
Numbers,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 24, 2014, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/24/egypt-s-unprecedented-instability-by-
numbers/h5j3?reloadFlag=1; “Egypt: Rampant Torture, Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions Signal 
Catastrophic Decline in Human Rights One Year after Ousting of Morsi | Amnesty International,” July 3, 
2014, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-anniversary-morsi-ousting-2014-07-02. 
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significant ambiguities and gray areas in the movement’s constitutional vision on the 
question of democracy and shari‘a.68 It was not only outside observers, but also members 
of the MB who were criticizing the movement for its lack of clarity in program and 
discourse.69 Khaled Hamza, the head of Brotherhood’s official English website 
Ikwanonline, acknowledges that there are “gray areas” in the Brotherhood’s program, but 
he then adds: “But sometimes there should be gray areas. Because muslims live under 
tyranny (zulm). How can we make the balance (mawazin) between resistance and 
democracy, and between international alliance and liberation from colonization?”70  
Under Mubarak’s repression, this was in a way understandable given the fact that 
there were no real prospect for the Brotherhood to rule the country and hence there were 
no pressing demands or incentives to come up with a detailed program whose details may 
alienate potential supporters.71 Similarly, Samer Shehata points out that the Brotherhood 
is sometimes put to an unfair test by expecting too much of clarity and specificity when 
we do not expect the same from other political factions. After all, before January 25, 
                                                
68 Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process 
in the Arab World: Exploring Gray Zones, Middle East Series (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, March 2006), http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/03/08/islamist-movements-and-democratic-
process-in-arab-world-exploring-gray-zones/2cvu; Stilt, “Islam Is the Solution.” 
69 One former member of the movement who worked very closely with Esam El-Errian once told me that 
he was a member of the committee that works on developing policies for MB but he even does not know 
what the MB wants in domestic and foreign policy Abdulla, Interview by the author, Cairo, July 7, 2010. 
The criticism was echoed by another former MB member, who is also son of a member of MB’s highest 
ruling body (Maktab al-Irshad), after long conversations I had with him: “Ikhwan doesn’t have a strategy. 
It doesn’t know where it wants to go, with what means, and so on. You’ll do months of research on 
Ikhwan. And before you leave Egypt, if you have any idea what Ikwan wants, then you tell me.” 
Abdurrahman, Interview by the author, Cairo, October 8, 2011. 
70 Khaled Hamza, Interview by the author, Cairo, August 12, 2010. 
71 Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway, Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World. 
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2011 (and now after July 3, 2013) they were participating in an electoral game in which, 
as Nathan Brown aptly puts it, “victory is not an option.”72 
Up until 1970s, the Brotherhood viewed democracy as a foreign idea. Some saw it 
as a repudiation of God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya). Others, including Hasan Al-Banna, 
founder of the Brotherhood, saw party politics (hizbiyya) as undermining the unity of the 
Muslim community (umma) and making it weaker in the face of Western colonialism and 
imperialism.73 But beginning in 1970s and accelerating in ‘80s and ‘90s, Brotherhood 
went through a transformation that increasingly adopted democracy as a legitimate form 
of governance and the only game in town.74 Starting with its electoral coalition with the 
Wafd Party in 1984, the Brotherhood has been an active participant in the country’s 
radically narrowed-down space of electoral politics. As a result, the movement has started 
to issue public official statements about its endorsement and interpretation of democracy 
in early 1990s, and in mid-2000s it published several platforms, programs, and reform 
agendas before the parliamentary and municipal elections. In the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, the Mobarak regime allowed the Brotherhood to win 88 of the 454 seats in the 
lower house of the parliament (majlis al-sha‘b).75 Since the prospects of further inclusion 
and greater participation was increasing, the Brotherhood issued a Draft Political Party 
Platform in 2007 to lay out its basic constitutional vision and policy framework. This 
                                                
72 Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option. 
73 This point was particularly more pronounced in Hasan Al-Banna’s speeches and writings. See, On this 
question, see Ibid., 79. 
74 Mona El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers,” International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 37, no. 03 (2005): 373–95. For the rejuvenation of the Brotherhood in 1970s, see 
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam (Columbia University Press, 2002). 
75 Because of the massive electoral fraud by the regime, the MB could win only as many seats the regime 
allowed. The MB had slated only 161 candidates to signal to the regime that they are not seeking the 
majority in the parliament. Many observers believe that Mobarak allowed the MB to win that much of seats 
to signal to the international community what would happen if he allowed free and fair elections.  
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rather lengthy document attracted signfiicant attention from domestic and international 
observers, and caused concerns, even within the young and moderate sections of the 
movement, about the Brotherhood ’s stance on the relationship between shari’a and 
democratic state. This document has never been finalized; it remained as a draft.  
But in the aftermath of the January 25, 2011 uprisings, the Muslim Brotherhood 
became a legal organization and formed its own political party with its own finalized, 
official party program. In addition, it has spearheaded the drafting of a new constitution 
that went into effect in December 2012. Hence, we now have more tangible evidence of 
Brotherhood’s constitutional vision of the relationship between shari‘a and democratic 
state. In this section I will analyze these documents alongside other official statements 
and publications of the Brotherhood and my interviews with Brotherhood leaders and 
members in order to explore how the Brotherhood appropriates both the Egyptian state’s 
notion of Islamicity of the state (per Article 2 of the Constitution) and democratic norms 
and institutions.  
 
2.1. Muslim Brotherhood’s Catachrestic Appropriation of Democracy 
At the height of the protests in Egypt in the faithful January of 2011, Essam El-
Errian—then the spokesperson of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, later the vice 
chairman of the group’s Freedom and Justice Party, and now sixth-time political prisoner 
after the July 2013 military coup—wrote an op-ed article for the New York Times two 
days before Hosni Mubarak stepped down. In that piece El-Errian took on the task of 
communicating Brotherhood’s vision for the future of Egypt to a skeptical international 
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audience and affirming the movements commitment to democratic mechanisms and to 
the rights of all Egyptians. Also key to his task was to pronounce the difference 
Brotherhood’s Islamist outlook would interject into the concept and practice of 
democracy. In carrying out this daunting task, El-Errian first highlights the movement’s 
long-held principles of gradual reform and denunciation of violence, and points at its 
history of peaceful participation in the electoral process in Egypt despite being legally 
banned since 1954. He then explains Brotherhood’s vision:  
As our nation heads toward liberty, however, we disagree with the claims 
that the only options in Egypt are a purely secular, liberal democracy or an 
authoritarian theocracy. Secular liberal democracy of the American and 
European variety, with its firm rejection of religion in public life, is not 
the exclusive model for a legitimate democracy. In Egypt, religion 
continues to be an important part of our culture and heritage. Moving 
forward, we envision the establishment of a democratic, civil state that 
draws on universal measures of freedom and justice, which are central 
Islamic values. We embrace democracy not as a foreign concept that must 
be reconciled with tradition, but as a set of principles and objectives that 
are inherently compatible with and reinforce Islamic tenets.76  
 
These few sentences succinctly encapsulate the core of Brotherhood’s view of the 
relationship between Islam, secularism and democracy in the Egyptian context. Here El-
Errian “embraces” democracy but repudiates “secular liberalism” as its sole modus 
operandi and he thus invokes alternative models of “legitimate democracy.” In El-
Errian’s language, “a purely-secular liberal democracy of the American and European 
                                                
76 Essam El-Errian, “What the Muslim Brothers Want,” The New York Times, February 9, 2011, sec. 
Opinion, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/opinion/10erian.html. 
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variety” indexes a pedagogic mode of socializing into democratic norms. On the other 
hand, “authoritarian theocracy” signifies a rejection of socialization. El-Errian clearly 
states that this binary does not exhaust the menu of meaningful possibilities for the 
Brotherhood and for Egypt. What he seeks, instead, is a performative mode of socializing 
into democratic norms by differently adopting them. For El-Errian this difference stems 
from religion which “continues to be an important part” of Egyptian social life.  
The word ‘continues’ here stands as a covert reference to the secularization of 
Western societies. He implies that religion no longer matters in “purely secular” Western 
societies and that they allow no space for religion in the public sphere, whereas religion 
still matters in Egypt and hence will inevitably inform the way democracy is conceived 
and practiced. In many respects his claim that both American and European secularisms 
“firmly reject” religion’s role in public life is an overstatement, since especially for 
American-British form of secularism where public sphere is more open to religious 
expressions, signs, and arguments.77 In addition, whether religion has left the public 
square is also debatable.78 However conceived, this indicates the Brotherhood’s reading 
of Western liberal democracies as providing only too tight a space for religion by 
relegating it to the private realm, which in his reading would not befit Islamic tradition 
and the Egyptian society.  
                                                
77 Most recently, the US Supreme Court decided that corporations are not obliged to offer health insurance 
coverage for birth control methods which they regard as abortion. In another recent decision, the Supreme 
Court found it constitutional to open board meetings with religious prayer. Richard Wolf, “From Politics to 
Prayer, a Supreme Court Game of Inches,” USA Today, July 2, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/07/02/supreme-court-term-conservative-
incremental/11915611/. More generally, the divisive political issues such as abortion, stem cells, death 
penalty, financing of contraceptives all highlight and exemplify the role of religion for the public debates. 
In that sense, El-Errian’s claim about a “firm rejection of religion in public life” does not quite hold.  
78 José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
   271 
What is also noteworthy in El-Errian’s op-ed is his negotiation of the dynamics of 
authority and universality established around democracy. In arguing that the Brotherhood 
does not see democracy as a foreign concept to be reconciled with Islamic tradition but as 
a “set of principles and objectives that are inherently compatible with and reinforce 
Islamic tenets,” El-Errian makes two gestures. First, he blurs the historical origins of 
modern democracy by declaring that it is not a Western or “foreign” concept. In so doing 
he strongly affirms the universality of democracy as a normative ideal, so much so that he 
even evades the role of cultural translation by suggesting that there is no need to make it 
congruent with Islamic norms since it already is. However, and this is the second point, 
for El-Errian the universality and normativity of democracy stems from its “inherent 
compatibility” with Islamic tradition. That is to say, what grants democracy its universal 
normative force and appeal is its authorization by Islamic principles. In addition, El-
Errian’s statement embodies another paradox. If democracy is not a foreign concept and 
if it is inherently compatible with, and reinforcing of, Islamic tenets, then why call it 
Islamic democracy?79   
A similar tension appears in El-Errian’s claim that secular liberal democracy does 
not exhaust the possible forms of legitimate democracy. By invoking the notion of 
legitimate democracy, he recognizes that there are models or practices of democracy that 
are not legitimate. He does not elaborate on what constitutes this legitimacy and what 
practices are beyond the pale from the perspective of that legitimacy. He only mentions 
and denounces theocracy as being beyond the pale of “legitimate democracy.” But El-
                                                
79 El-Errian does not mention it here but as I will indicate later, in MB’s vision the “Islamic principles and 
objectives” that democracy is “inherently compatible with and reinforce” is the principle of Shura 
(consultation). I discuss this in more detail in section 2.3. 
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Errian makes it clear that secularism is not one of the constitutive principles or necessary 
preconditions of democracy. It is not part of the definition or prerequisite of a “legitimate 
democracy.” This is why for him the non-secular and non-liberal form of democracy that 
the Brotherhood espouses is still within the limits of “legitimate democracy.” By so 
doing, he destabilizes the liberal secular authority established around democracy. 
In doing so, El-Errian works through a performative contradiction. He invokes the 
universality of the norm of democracy and claims to be part of it, but the dominant 
articulation of the norm excludes him from the proper invocation of that norm. But he 
rejects the limits imposed by the pedagogy of the norm and lays claim to the norm 
nevertheless. Thus he catachrestically appropriates the norm by wresting it from its 
‘proper’ secular liberal meanings and practices. He disentangles the normative power of 
democracy as a good for society from its normalizing power—that is, from its hegemonic 
articulation as “secular liberal democracy of the American and European variety.” In that 
sense, it unsettles the secular liberal pedagogy attached to democracy. Secular liberal 
conventions do not authorize him to properly participate in the norm, but he 
performatively institutes the authority of Brotherhood’s brand of Islamic democracy.  
However, such a production of authority (or self-authorization) occurs at two 
levels: illocutionary and perlocutionary. In trying to buttress the legitimacy of an Islamic 
democracy through democratic conventions (i.e. that there can be different legitimate 
forms of democracy in response to popular demands), El-Errian produces the authority of 
his claims at the illocutionary level. But at the perlocutionary level, the force of his 
utterance depends on the reaction of his audience—both domestic and international. It is 
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hard to measure the attitudes and response of domestic and international audiences in 
relation to authorizing Brotherhood’s vision of democracy. But it is also not difficult to 
discern that in a liberal international order constituted by secularist sensibilities, 
Brotherhood’s claims to democratic governance is at best viewed with a high dose of 
skepticism or at worst dismissed squarely as “wolf in sheep clothing” whose coming to 
power through democratic mechanisms would mean nothing but “one man, one vote, 
once.”80  
With this op-ed El-Errian addresses the international audience in order to 
engender their support for the protests in Tahrir Square and to urge the US to withdraw 
its support from Mubarak. But while he seeks to communicate and possibly persuade, he 
does not seek authorization since he makes it clear that the Muslim Brotherhood’s vision 
of democratic Egypt would not follow the footsteps of secular liberalism. In that sense, to 
put it in Edward Said’s terms, if secular liberal democracy represents a “voyage out,” that 
is the worldwide expansion of Western-originated norms and institutions, then 
Brotherhood’s Islamic democracy is a form of “voyage in”—a “conscious effort to enter 
into the discourse of the West, to mix with it, transform it.” It is an appropriation of 
democracy that inscribes difference into it by contesting its secular liberal discipline 
within liberal global governance.  
Then how does the Brotherhood bring together shari‘a and democracy in its 
constitutional vision? This is the question I address next. 
 
                                                
80 Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy,” The Atlantic, February 1993, 
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2.2. Shari‘a and Democracy: The Question of Religious Authority 
The FJP’s 2011 program for parliamentary elections envisions a “national 
constitutional Islamic modern democracy, based on sharia (Islamic law) as a frame of 
reference.”81 Hence it expressly invokes an “Islamic democracy” which operates as a 
modern constitutional democracy but under the guidance and within the limits of 
shari‘a.82 Within the Brotherhood and among its observers as well, the debate has centred 
around “what specifically should be understood by a democracy bounded by shari‘a,”83 
or more specifically by Brotherhood’s catch-phrase “democratic civil state within an 
Islamic frame of reference”? Many questions follow. First, what is Islamic democracy, 
and what is Islamic about it? How does Brotherhood understand shari‘a and its 
relationship with state and politics? Who decides what shari‘a prescribes in a particular 
situation or whether a particular law is in compliance with shari‘a? Second, how does the 
Brotherhood understand democracy? Is it merely a procedural mechanism of peaceful 
transfer of power through free and fair elections, or are there other institutions that are 
prerequisite for a democracy? If there are, what are they? Is secularism one of them? 
Third, what is a “civil state”? In what ways it is similar to or different from a secular 
                                                
81 “Freedom and Justice Party 2011 Parliamentary Elections Program,” 10. 
82 Mohammad Morsi’s appearance on CNN denying the idea of ‘Islamic democracy’ shows that not only 
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state? I will address these questions in order to explicate Brotherhood’s conception of 
Islamic democracy.  
As an ideal-type, Islamic democracy refers to a constitutional configuration in 
which democratic norms and procedures are put into practice within the bounds of the 
principles of Islamic shari‘a. For Kathleen Collins and Erica Owens an Islamic 
democracy is “a regime based on some fundamental democratic institutions (e.g., 
elections and accountability) but allowing illiberal religious influence on the constitution 
and laws at the expense of state religious neutrality and some core liberal principles and 
individual rights.”84 Here I work with a rather narrower definition. I suggest that the 
distinct character of ‘Islamic’ democracy is its stipulation of some form of a 
constitutional body that would check the activities of the legislature and the executive in 
terms of their compliance with shari‘a. I distinguish this from the ideal type of a ‘Muslim 
democracy’ (or ‘conservative democracy’ in the case of the Turkish AK Party) which 
does not take shari‘a as a (or ‘the’) source of legislation and hence does not institute a 
constitutional body for ensuring that legislation is compliant with shari‘a.  
Brotherhood and FJP envisions an Islamic democracy, but they are not the only 
ones. Countries such as Iran85 and Pakistan86 enshrine shari‘a in the constitution and 
                                                
84 Kathleen Collins and Erica Owen, “Islamic Religiosity and Regime Preferences Explaining Support for 
Democracy and Political Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus,” Political Research Quarterly 65, no. 3 
(September 1, 2012): 501. In ‘Islamic democracy,’ it is not only the parliamentary legislation or 
presidential actions that are put within the bounds of shari‘a, but in general, rights, freedoms, and duties are 
also configured—expanded and curtailed—on that basis. For example, Article 11 of the 2012 Constitution 
repeats the 1971 Constitution enshrines equality between men and women but “without prejudice to the 
provisions of Islamic law”—a formulation that repeats the 1971 Constitution. As part of the secularizing 
and liberalizing moves of the 2013 Constitution drafted after the military coup, this shari‘a conditionality 
was also removed from the article.   
85 Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran stipulates that “all civil, penal, 
financial, economic, administrative, military and political law and other laws and regulations, shall be 
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recognize Islam as the religion of the state, but they also allow for party pluralism and 
electoral politics. Elected representatives and leaders make and execute laws with one 
significant condition: their decisions and actions must be within the boundaries set by the 
principles of shari‘a. Both states establish constitutional bodies for monitoring laws and 
regulations and are given the power to strike them if they are deemed unIslamic and 
hence unconstitutional.  
Likewise, the Brotherhood envisions a democratic state operating within the 
bounds of Islamic law.87 It foresees institutional guarantees for making sure that laws and 
regulations comply with the provisions of shari‘a. The Islamic modernist tradition of 
which Brotherhood is a part, modern notions such as democracy are endorsed but on the 
                                                                                                                                            
based on the Islamic standards.” The second paragraph of the same article creates a constitutional hierarchy 
among norms by suggesting that all laws have to be in compliance with Islamic principles and that this 
principle applies “absolutely and generally to all articles of the Constitution as well as to all other laws and 
regulations.” In accordance with that, Article 91 of the Iranian Constitution tasks the Guardian Council 
with reviewing whether the decisions of the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) are repugnant to shari‘a: “The 
Guardian Council shall be established with a view to safeguarding the rules of Islam and the Constitution 
and to see that the decisions of the Majlis are not inconsistent with them.” Similarly, Article 72 of the 
Constitution reiterates the same point for the Consultative Assembly: “The Islamic Consultative Assembly 
cannot make laws that are contradictory to the principles, official religion of the country or the constitution. 
Discretion on whether such contradictions exist, as stated in article 96, is assigned to the Guardian 
Council.”  
86 Islam was defined as state religion in Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution—the 1956 Constitution did not 
recognize Islam as official religion. Article 227 of the 1973 Constitution clearly institutes an Islamic 
judicial review by stipulating that “all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of 
Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnahh… and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to 
such injunctions.” Article 230 of the Constitution establishes an Islamic Council whose mission is to advise 
leglislators as to whether a proposed law complies with injunctions of shari‘a. In addition to this advisory 
body, the Eighth Constitutional Amendment instituted a new Federal Shariat Court that would decide 
whether a law or regulation is repugnant to shari‘a. If the court deems a law or regulation running against 
Islamic principles, then it may ask the concerned governmental unit to present its point of view. If the court 
finally decides that the law is repugnant to shari‘a then it requires the President or the governor to change 
the law to make it compliant with shari‘a. See Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and International Human 
Rights Treaty Obligations.  
87 This is a core idea of the MB since its inception. Hasan Al-Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood, 
considers the state as “an appendix to Shari‘a” such that its goals must be “within the postulates of 
Shari‘a.” See, Moussalli, “Hasan Al-Bannā’s Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State,” 
168.  
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condition that they do not transgress the limits drawn by God’s shari‘a.88 It accepts new 
mechanisms and values “as far as they do not contradict authentic and well-established 
sharia.”89 The Muslim Brotherhood Initiative for Reform in Egypt, a reform program 
declared in 2004, calls for “changing the laws and purifying them to be in conformity 
with the principles of Islamic Shariah as it is the major source of legislation, under the 
second article of the constitution.”90 The Brotherhood’s program for the parliamentary 
elections of 2005 similarly underlines the movement’s commitment to “making use of the 
experiences of modern civilization which do not clash with the fixed principles of the 
Shari‘ah, such as: separation of the authorities, plurality of parties, and peaceful 
circulation of power through elections.”91  
However, what is worth mentioning here is that Egypt already recognizes this 
idea of an Islamic judicial review under the authority of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court (SCC). This was clearly stated by the SCC in one of its decisions: 
The principles of the Islamic Sharia are the major source of legislation. 
This imposes a limitation curtailing both the legislative and executive 
power, through which they are obliged that whatever laws or decrees they 
enact, no provision contained in them may contradict the provisions of 
Islamic law which are definite in terms of their immutability and their 
                                                
88 Mohammad Fadel, “Modernist Islamic Political Thought and the Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions of 
2011,” Middle East Law and Governance 3, no. 1–2 (March 25, 2011): 94–104; Moussalli, “Hasan Al-
Bannā’s Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State”; Roxanne L. Euben, “Premodern, 
Antimodern or Postmodern? Islamic and Western Critiques of Modernity,” The Review of Politics 59, no. 
03 (1997): 429–60; Rachel M. Scott, “Managing Religion and Renegotiating the Secular: The Muslim 
Brotherhood and Defining the Religious Sphere,” Politics and Religion 7, no. 01 (2014): 51–78.Mousalli, 
Euben, Brown, Fadel,  
89 Fattah and Butterfield, “Muslim Cultural Entrepreneurs and the Democracy Debate,” 61. 
90 “Muslim Brotherhood Initiative on the General Principles of Reform in Egypt,” March 3, 2004. 
91 “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Program for the Parliamentary Elections of 2005,” Ikhwanweb, June 13, 
2007, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=811. 
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meaning. (…) Whatever legislative enactment contravenes them must be 
declared null and void.92  
 
In that sense, the Egyptian state has already been operating within the broader 
constitutional framework of ‘Islamic democracy.’ Then what does the Brotherhood 
demand? The Brotherhood fundamentally articulates a demand for a more expanded and 
consistent application of this principle. Many MB leaders whom I interviewed stressed 
that Egyptian legal system was already requiring laws to be compliant with shari‘a but 
that the corrupt political regime and its elites were not following it through.93  
If shari‘a will serve as a framework for laws and regulations, then there is a 
fundamental question to be answered: who will decide whether a law was in conformity 
with shari‘a? Whose interpretation of shari‘a would be taken as more authoritative, or 
who would get to decide what a proper interpretation of shari‘a entails in a particular 
situation? These questions pertaining to interpretive authority are central to the debates 
over shari’a.94   
 The first time the Brotherhood offered an explicit answer to this question was in 
its 2007 Draft Political Party Program. This draft program, which was distributed to 
                                                
92 Appeal no 5257/43 on December 28, 1997. Quoted in Abiad, Sharia, Muslim States and International 
Human Rights Treaty Obligations, 48. 
93 For example, Ahmed Diab, Interview by the author, Cairo, October 11, 2011; Saad Al-Hoseiny, 
Interview by the author, Cairo, October 15, 2011. 
94 The question of religious authority is also a deeply political question in Egypt. With Nasser’s abolition of 
the waqfs (charitable foundations) which provided the financial support for Al-Azhar to be independent of 
the state, religious institutions such as Al-Azhar and Dar al-Ifta’ (the State Mufti’s Office) have become 
incorporated into the state and religious scholars have been rendered salaried state employees dependent 
completely on the state. This creates a paradox and a tension for the MB vis-à-vis religious institutions. On 
the one hand they call for a more prominent position for religious institutions in society and politics as well 
as more state support for these institutions. But on the other hand, they are highly critical of these 
institutions because of their cooptation into the regime. Brown, When Victory Is Not an Option, 76.  
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journalists and intellectuals for getting their feedback, was stipulating the establishment 
of a Council of Religious Scholars (majlis ‘ulama) to be consulted before passing laws to 
check if they were compliant with shari‘a. The decisions of the council would not be 
binding but senior Islamic scholars of Al-Azhar University, not the public, would elect 
the council. This created heated debates in Egypt about whether the country was moving 
toward an Iran-like clerical regime. Upon widespread criticisms, the then Deputy General 
Guide of the MB, Mohammad Habib, suggested that this council of scholars would not be 
like the Council of Guardians in Iran which has the right to strike down legislation, but 
rather, it would be a consultative body: “It is a consultative committee that could be part 
of al-Azhar and that parliament could use as consultants. But of course parliament would 
have the final decision, and the Supreme Constitutional Court could also be appealed to 
should parliament pass legislation thought incompatible with the freedoms guaranteed by 
the constitution.”95 
This provision also caused an internal debate within the Brotherhood. Some 
members openly expressed their disagreement and calling it a “total fiasco”96 and others 
conceded that it was a “mistake” and a “poorly worded” idea. The moderate and more 
politically open faction within the Brotherhood was excluded from the body drafting the 
                                                
95 Interview with Mohammad Habib conducted by the Crisis Group, quoted in “Egypt’s Muslim Brothers,” 
17. 
96 In a Crisis Group interview, one senior reformist MB leader (who wanted to remain anonymous) referred 
to the draft as a “total fiasco” and continued: “It’s a ridiculous program that does not take into account all 
the things that have happened in the last 30 years. The program was drafted in a very hasty way and 
without enough consultation. It’s a rushed job and the Society should apologise for it, because we’re stuck 
with the image of a very negative program. There have been other programs that have been more coherent 
than this in the last 50 years, but there was no introspection, no look at past attempts. It fails to tackle the 
issue of how to exist as a group in Egypt. If we are to be a major presence, then we must make some major 
decisions.” See, Ibid., 18. 
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program at the time of its writing.97 Consequently, the Brotherhood dropped this proposal 
from the platform. The Brotherhood confirmed that the only body with the right to strike 
down legislation would be the Supreme Constitutional Court—as was already posited in 
the Constitution. The parliamentarians themselves would judge whether a law is in 
accordance with shari‘a and act upon their own interpretations. Following these lines, the 
2011 Party Program of the FJP did not mention anything like a council of Islamic 
scholars, and instead it invoked the SCC as the solely authorized body to do an Islamic 
judicial review.98  
However, the Article 4 of the 2012 Constitution, drafted by a council dominated 
by Islamists after the fall of Mubarak,99 stipulated that “Al-Azhar senior scholars are to 
be consulted in matters pertaining to Islamic law.” This was meant to be a consultative 
body only, but many liberal commentators and human rights organizations expressed 
their concern that unelected and unaccountable religious scholars would block legislation 
proposed by elected representatives. Here it is important to note that this demand for 
adding a provision to the 2012 Constitution featuring the Al-Azhar as the referential 
                                                
97 Essam El-Errian and his cadre was not included in the penning of the draft and he later declared his 
unease with the outcome. He suggested that the draft should not be seen as the final position of the 
movement. See, “The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political 
Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7, accessed June 
24, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/01/14/draft-party-platform-of-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-
foray-into-political-integration-or-retreat-into-old-positions/5g4; Stilt, “Islam Is the Solution,” 85; “Egypt’s 
Muslim Brothers,” 17. 
98 For more on Islamic judicial review, see Feldman, The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. 
99 The 2012 Constitution was drafted by a committee that initially had 100 members, majority of whom 
were Islamists from MB or Salafi groups since they were selected by the elected parliament in which 
Islamists were in majority. However, the non-Islamist members of the assembly almost immediately 
walked out of the body by claiming that it was dominated by the Islamists. Then the assembly was 
dissolved by the court on the grounds that it was unconstitutional for including members of the parliament 
and unrepresentative for including few women, minority representatives and young people. When the 
second assembly was formed the secularists again boycotted the assembly. The Constitution was put to 
referendum on December 15, 2012 and was accepted. It remained in effect till the July 3, 2013 coup d’etat.  
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authority for interpreting the shari‘a and monitoring compliance with it came not from 
the Muslim Brotherhood but from the shaykh of Al-Azhar during the Constituent 
Assembly meetings. The Brotherhood agreed with that but when it faced criticisms from 
secular opposition it declared that “it would not insist” on the provision and “would agree 
to the idea that the reference of authority could remain with the Supreme Constitutional 
Court.”100  
Furthermore, the practical implications of Article 4 were not readily apparent. 
While it was positing an advisory body made up of senior Al-Azhar scholars (elected 
among the scholars of Al-Azhar), the Article 175 of the same Constitution was 
exclusively authorizing the SCC to “undertake the judicial control of the constitutionality 
of the laws and regulations,” including questions pertaining to Islamic law. Hence it was 
still the Supreme Constitutional Court that held the power to strike down legislation, 
which has been the constitutional norm under 1971 Constitution, which was kept same in 
the 2013 Constitution promulgated after the coup. Hence in terms of the Supreme 
Constitutional Courts’ exclusive right to oversee legislation and assess compliance with 
Article 2, there was “considerable continuity—albeit arguably added ambiguity—with 
the pre-revolutionary semi-secular order.”101  
One important difference Muslim Brotherhood’s vision of democratic civil state 
within the bounds of shari‘a would make is that it would transform the practice of Article 
2 of the Constitution from being a negative regulation into an active one. The SCC is not 
                                                
100 Scott, “Managing Religion and Renegotiating the Secular,” 64.  
101 Ibid., 65. Furthermore, the Article 219 of the Constitution was clarifying what it means by “the 
principles of Islamic shari‘a” in Article 2. Accordingly, shari‘a includes “full evidences, rules conforming 
to prevailing jurisprudential principles, and sources valued by the Sunni schools of law and the 
community.” 
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by itself authorized to inquire into a court case or a legislation, but it only considers the 
cases where a party claims the unconstitutionality of a piece of legislation at a local court, 
and the court then refers it to the SCC if deemed necessary. In other words, the SCC is 
not consulted ahead of legislation to inquire its compliance with shari‘a, and it is not 
authorized by itself to strike legislation without a local court carrying the case to it. 2012 
Constitution kept this process in place, but adding that a council of Al-Azhar scholars are 
to be consulted ahead of legislation. Perhaps the most publicized and internationally 
highlighted change the 2013 Constitution made was to remove this paragraph of Article 4 
that formed an advisory body of Islamic scholars from Al-Azhar. For many secular 
liberal commentators this was the most important change in the new constitution for 
securing the ‘secularity’ of the Egyptian state.  
Then, how does the MB understand shari‘a? In Brotherhood’s vision, shari ‘a 
stands for the system of ethical principles and binding rules that regulate individual and 
collective life. It refers to “Islamic normativity”102 and to the “Islamic way of doing 
things.”103  Shari‘a is not the exact equivalent of law since it includes issues that go 
beyond the sphere of law (bodily purification, prayer rituals, etc) as well as normative 
categories of behavior that exceed the language of the law, such as the jurisprudential 
categories of legally mandatory, approved, legally indifferent, disapproved, and legally 
                                                
102 Salvatore, “After the State: Islamic Reform and the ‘Implosion’ of Shari’a.” 
103 Brown, “Egypt and Islamic Sharia.” 
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prohibited.104 Shari‘a comprises both Islamic law and ethics and as such it is “the 
hallmark of the Islamic order” that gives it its “moral and political purpose.”105  
For the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the fundamental characteristic of shari‘a is 
its comprehensiveness.  Hasan Al-Banna suggested that Islam was “both religion and 
society, a mosque and a state, of this life and of the hereafter. It has dealt with practical 
life more than the issues of worship… Religion then is a part of the Islamic system, and 
Islam regulates it exactly as it does with life. We, as Muslims, are asked to base religion 
and the world on Islamic rules.”106As Richard P. Mitchell observed in 1960s, the idea that 
Islam is “a total system, complete unto itself, and the final arbiter of life in all its 
categories” has been established as one of the core principles of the Brotherhood in a 
decade of its foundation.107 This notion still constitutes the core of Brotherhood’s claim 
that ‘Islam is the Solution.’ (Al-Islam huwa Al-Hall) FJP’s 2011 Program explains the 
party’s understanding of shari‘a:  
By its nature, Sharia nurtures aspects of faith, worship and morality, and 
also regulates various aspects of life for Muslims and their non-Muslim 
partners in the homeland. However, in some (few) cases, Sharia regulates 
these aspects through definitive texts with direct relevance and 
significance. It can also regulate through general rules and principles, 
leaving details for interpretation and legislation as suits different times and 
environments, in the service of justice, righteousness and the interests of 
                                                
104 Talal Asad, “Boundaries and Rights in Islamic Law: Introduction,” Social Research: An International 
Quarterly 70, no. 3 (2003): 684.  
105 Gudrun Kramer, “Techniques and Values: Contemporary Muslim Debates on Islam and Democracy,” in 
Islam, Modernism and the West: Cultural and Political Relations at the End of the Millennium, ed. Gema 
Martín Muñoz (I. B. Tauris in association with the Eleni Nakou Foundation, 1999), 179.  
106 Majmu‘at Rasa’il al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna (Bayrut: Dar al-Qalam, n.d.), 304, quoted in 
Moussalli, “Hasan Al-Bannā’s Islamist Discourse on Constitutional Rule and Islamic State,” 170.  
107 Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford University Press, USA, 1993), 14.
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the homeland and citizens. This is to be entrusted to legislative councils, 
while the Supreme Constitutional Court is charged with monitoring the 
constitutionality of resulting legislation.108  
 
Here Brotherhood not only highlights the idea of the comprehensiveness (shumuliyya) of 
shari‘a but also provides its own approach to how this comprehensiveness unfolds itself. 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s 2004 Initiative on the General Principles of Reform in Egypt 
defines the goal of the movement as a comprehensive reform “through constitutional and 
legal channels in a bid to apply Allah’s Shariah (Islamic Legal Code) which is best for 
this world and the Hereafter.” (p.4) Here the Brotherhood defines shari‘a as “legal ways 
and laws of the Islamic Monotheism.” (5)  
Following the Islamic modernist thinkers of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, Brotherhood argues that even though shari‘a covers the entirety of 
one’s individual and collective life, much of the content of shari‘a is left, by God’s grace, 
to the interpretation of Muslims in different historical and spatial contexts.109 For the 
Brotherhood, “God deliberately left Muslims with some legislative vacuums that may be 
filled by the human mind performing ijtihad (independent reasoning) within the 
boundaries of Islamic sharia.”110 What is left out of this independent reasoning is the 
verses in the Quran and in the hadith (Prophetic tradition) whose legal and/or normative 
injunctions are clear-cut and definitive. For the Brotherhood, these constitute only a small 
section of shari‘a, which leaves much of shari‘a open to independent reasoning and 
                                                
108 “Freedom and Justice Party 2011 Parliamentary Elections Program,” 11. 
109 On this see, Khaled Abou El Fadl, Joshua Cohen, and Deborah Chasman, Islam and the Challenge of 
Democracy: A Boston Review Book (Princeton University Press, 2004). This is a classical argument within 
Islamic political thought developed most forcefully by Ibn Taymiyya in his treatise Al-Siyasa Al-Shar‘iyya.  
110 Fattah and Butterfield, “Muslim Cultural Entrepreneurs and the Democracy Debate,” 61. 
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adaptation. For example, Abdul Mun‘im Abou Al-Fotouh, a leader of the Brotherhood 
who left the movement shortly after Mubarak’s fall, suggests that only 5 percent of 
shari‘a is fixed and unchanging, and the remaining 95 percent consists of principles and 
values that can manifest themselves in different forms in different contexts.111 In fact, 
almost all members and leaders of the Brotherhood I interviewed stressed this point 
rather strongly, which suggests that it is a fundamental message conveyed in the 
movement’s discourse and internal education programs (tarbiya). Such a construal of 
shari‘a expands the domain of human interpretation and agency for which the 
Brotherhood gets heavy criticism from more Salafi groups. 112   
In Brotherhood’s political reading, shari‘a becomes the constitution of Muslims. 
As ‘Abd Al-Qadir ‘Awda, a prominent judge and a member of the Brotherhood, put it: 
“The Islamic shari‘a is the basic constitution for Muslims, and all that agrees with this 
constitution is true and all that violates it is invalid, whatever the changes of time and the 
developments of opinion in legislation, because the shari‘a came from God by way of his 
                                                
111 Abdul Monem Abul Futouh, “The Muslim Brotherhood Comments on Gray Zones’’ Carnegie Paper,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 13, 2006, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2006/07/13/muslim-brotherhood-comments-on-gray-zones-carnegie-
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112 Brotherhood’s stance differs rather significantly from that of Salafis, for whom only “what has been 
accepted anciently by sharia and consensually condoned by the al-salaf al-saleh (the pious predecessors)” 
can be Islamically acceptable. Therefore, much of new interpretations (ijtihad) to respond to new 
challenges are considered bed‘a (man-made innovation in religion). For Salafis such innovations not only 
corrupt the legacy of the tradition but also violates the consensus (ijma) of earlier scholars. See, Fattah and 
Butterfield, “Muslim Cultural Entrepreneurs and the Democracy Debate,” 61. This is also reflected in the 
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leading source of legislation. The Salafis pushed hard to include the term “ahkam al-shar‘iyya” (rulings of 
shari‘a) in the Article but Brotherhood disagreed and instead succeeded in keeping it as “mabadi’ al-
shari‘iyya” (principles of shari‘a). Thus the Brotherhood put more daylight between the norms of shari ‘a 
and actual social and political practice, highlighting the importance of reasoning and reinterpretation of 
classical rulings in implementing shari ‘a. 
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prophet, peace be upon him, to work by it in each place and time.”113 Within Islamist 
imaginary “only shari ‘a can safeguard justice, harmony and stability.”114 This is why 
Noah Feldman concludes that the demand for shari‘a among vast numbers of Muslims is 
indeed a demand for rule of law—a law that restricts the ruled and the ruler alike. 
However it is essential to note that claiming the comprehensiveness of shari‘a also 
represents a demand for independence from the legacies of colonialism and imperialism 
and a search for (or a recovery of) cultural authenticity. This is because of the intertwined 
history of imperialism and legal change in Egypt. One of the most significant results of 
European colonialism has been its implementation of Western civil and criminal law in 
Egypt and its relegation of shari‘a to the sphere of personal status law that dealth with 
matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and custody. Indeed the very concept 
of ‘personal status law’ (qanun al-ahwal al- shakhsiyya) “does not exist in its present 
form in the pre-modern period”115 and is a modern construction under the impact of 
European colonialism.116 As Muhammad Ma’mun El-Hudaiby, the sixth guide-general of 
the Brotherhood puts it, it is part of the struggle of “the countries and peoples occupied 
by the armies, creed, and social, economic, and ethical systems of the west … to attain 
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their independence and be liberated from the sway of the west.”117 For him, the most 
fundamental outcome of Western colonialism and imperialism (“the foreign Christian 
invasion of the Islamic countries,” as he sometimes refers to it) has been its dislocation of 
shari ‘a from Egypt’s legal, political, social, and educational life:  
In the period of colonial Christian invasion, the Islamic shari'a was 
excluded from serving as the constitution and law of the state. Egypt was 
occupied by the British in September 1882; less than a year later, in July 
1883, Islamic religious courts were replaced by "national courts." Most of 
the new judges were non-Egyptians, and the law they applied were 
translated French laws, which became the dominant laws in civil 
commercial and criminal cases. The jurisdiction of Islamic religious courts 
was restricted to areas of personal status, marriage, divorce, and the 
related issues of establishing lineage, dowries, and alimonies. The Islamic 
economic system was replaced by a system of banks, despite the 
prohibition of the interest rate under Islamic shari'a. In the educational 
realm, new schools offered few opportunities for the young to learn the 
creed and tenets of their religion. The social system permitted alcohol 
prostitution, gambling, and other activities forbidden in Islam.118 
 
But the Brotherhood’s demand for an ‘Islamic democracy’ is justified through a rather 
paradoxical logic. Brotherhood leaders love to emphasize that Egyptians are very 
religious people and that they want to see shari‘a to be adopted as the frame of reference. 
But the question is, if Egyptian people are already very religious and convey their 
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religious preferences to the political field, why is there a need to institute a constitutional 
body to check whether laws are in conformity with shari‘a?  
This highlights the difference between Brotherhood’s Islamic democracy and AK 
Party’s ‘conservative’ democracy. While the former believes in an Islamic state adopting 
democratic rights and procedures within the confines of shari‘a and a constitutional body 
monitoring the Islamicity of legislation and executive action; the latter believes in a 
democratic state equidistant to religions. In the latter, shari‘a is not enshrined in the 
constitution and hence there is no constitutional body to check legislation for its 
conformity with shari‘a. That means, if the laws passed by the legislators contradict with 
Islamic precepts, there is no institutional body that would thwart them. Rather, it is up to 
the people to debate and create awareness for the Islamic appropriateness of pieces of 
legislation, and it is through electing the legislators that the public takes on the task of 
monitoring the conformity of legislations and regulations with Islamic precepts.  
This logic is clearly articulated in Khaled Abou El Fadl’s attempt to wed 
democracy and shari‘a in a liberal framework: “And in the worst case—if the majority is 
not persuaded by the ‘ulama, if the majority insists on turning away from God but still 
respects the fundamental rights of individuals, including the right to ponder creation and 
call to the way of God—those individuals who constituted the majority will still have to 
answer, in the Hereafter, to God.”119 In other words, the if the representatives of the 
majority passes a law that contradicts Islamic law, it is not prevented by a higher body of 
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scholars but it is addressed as a question of individual moral and religious responsibility 
to choose the right representatives.  
Indeed some Brotherhood leaders already point toward that direction. For 
example Ahmed Al-Raysouni, the former head of the Moroccan chapter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Justice and Development Party), suggests that the fears that democracy 
would pave the way for revoking shari‘a is “only mental and theoretical” rather than real. 
Indeed historically “the abolition of some shar‘i rules in the laws of some Muslim 
countries was done in a dictatorial, not democratic, way. Some of these abolitions were 
imposed by foreign occupation and some by Muslim rulers under foreign pressure or out 
of their totalitarian will. Democracy is not to be blamed for this.” Furthermore, even 
when these fears materialize and a democratically elected legislature acts against shari‘a, 
the problem here is not democracy but “the existing reality”: “Democracy in such a case 
would have only exposed these problems, not been the reason behind them. In fact, this 
should make us approve of and hold onto democracy, not reject, criticize, and level 
accusations against it.”120 
 
2.3. Islamizing Democracy: The Ambivalent Equivalence of Shura and Democracy in 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Discourse 
 “Assuming that they [Islamists] are acting in good faith and that they have 
adopted democracy as their ‘strategic option,’” writes Gudrun Kramer, “is there an 
                                                
120 Abdel Lawy Lakhlafah, “Democracy: One of the Objectives of Shari`ah?,” November 7, 2012, 
http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/contemporary-issues/human-conditions-and-social-context/450278-
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Islamic path to a pluralist democratic society?”121 This important question is widely 
asked in cross-disciplinary discussions over Islamism and democracy. However, Islamists 
such as the MB who seek to wed shari‘a and democracy, ask the same question that 
Kramer asks, but in reverse order. For them the question is: Is there a pluralist democratic 
path to an Islamic society? In this lies the difference between liberal and Islamist 
approaches to democracy in the Egyptian context.  
This has become very clear in a guest-lecture I delivered at the American 
University in Cairo one day before the first parliamentary elections in post-Mubarak 
Egypt. While discussing Islamism in Egypt, a self-identified liberal student said that she 
was not opposed to implementing shari‘a since it was “the most significant social norm 
for both Muslims and Christians, and therefore it was not wrong to include them in law.” 
When I asked her in what ways then this was different from Brotherhood’s proposal of a 
“civil state within an Islamic frame of reference,” she replied: “the Muslim Brotherhood 
isn’t very flexible, but liberals want to modernize Islam.” Upon these remarks a self-
identified Islamist student, who sympathizes with but is not a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, entered into the conversation and said: “Liberals want to modernize Islam 
but Islamists want to Islamize modernity.”  
This crucial point captures an important dynamic about Brotherhood’s 
relationship with modern norms and institutions, but in fact it cuts both ways. While the 
Brotherhood seeks to Islamize modernity, it also modernizes Islam in the process by 
refashioning classical concepts to fit modern conditions. In translating modern concepts 
into the categories of Islamic tradition (and vice versa), the Brotherhood ends up 
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transforming both. This selective and transformative adoption of Western originated 
norms and discourses marks Brotherhood’s mode of engagement with modernity from its 
very inception. The founder of the Brotherhood, Hasan Al-Banna, argued that “instead of 
slavishly aping Western ideas, a return to the precocious wisdom of Islam was the 
solution.”122  But this ‘return’ to the original wisdom of Islam did not entail a rejection of 
“Western ideas,” rather it entailed a differential adoption of, and participation in, them.123 
According to Mohammad ‘Abduh, whose work deeply influenced Al-Banna,124 “adapting 
to modernity need not require Westernization,” but rather, through the use of reason 
(‘akl) it was possible to create “an indigenous path to modernity that will free Muslims 
from blind imitation both of Western models of secular society and tradition-bound views 
of Islam.”125  
The mainstream Islamist movements, especially the Brotherhood, develop a 
critique of modernity particularly for its secularist tendencies to exile religion from public 
life or even from individual conscience. This critique brings about not a total repudiation 
of modernity, but rather a negotiation and appropriation of it. As Abdessalam Yassine, a 
Morroccon Islamist writer and activist, puts it, “we should appropriate to ourselves 
whatever positive aspects of modernity are useful to us, without letting ourselves be 
fooled by the glitter of post-modernity, without letting ourselves be overshadowed by 
                                                
122 Quoted in El-Ghobashy, “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” Studying the history 
of the movement, El-Ghobashy concludes that the MB “was poised to be a highly adaptive political 
creature, weathering the permutations of ordinary parties and experiencing their usual crises.”  
123 Al-Banna’s own stance toward party pluralism can be taken as one example. On the one hand he was 
highly critical of the dividing nature of party politics—a common theme in his time as was echoed also in 
Nasser’s comments above—but he “enthusiastically embraced elections and ran and lost in parliamentary 
contests in 1942 and 1945.” Ibid., 377. 
124 Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, “Facing Modernity,” Harvard International Review 19, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 12. 
125 Euben, “Premodern, Antimodern or Postmodern?,” 439.   
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modern advertising that tries to fob off what is false at an exorbitant price.126 What he 
calls for is a performative mode of socialization, which seeks to appropriate modernity 
and translate its concepts and institutions into a different context with different historical 
traditions. Yassine makes these points crystal clear: 
Thus we will embrace modernity, but on our terms. We will need to 
conduct ourselves as canny purchasers of modernity. A shrewd buyer 
examines the merchandize in order to uncover damages and spot the cheat. 
It is along these lines that we ask such questions of modernity and insist 
that the past be taken into account. And it is with the intention of requiring 
justice and equity from modernity that our plan of making modernity 
Islamic must begin, by posing such questions and exploring meeting 
points.127  
 
This mode of engagement with modernity is in line with the Brotherhood’s general 
strategy for social and political reform. As Quintan Wiktorowicz points out, “the 
Brotherhood’s method of change is not the erection of a new system of politics; it is a 
reformist strategy of working through the current system to imbue it with more Islamic 
tones.”128 The Brotherhood not only subscribes to the project of individual and social 
reform (islah) in line with Islamic norms, but it also seeks to ‘Islamize’ modern norms 
and institutions by rendering them compliant with shari‘a; and as a “model and mother 
movement” of Islamism, Brotherhood seeks to ‘Islamize’ democracy by placing it within 
an Islamic frame of reference. 
                                                
126 Quoted in Aksikas Jaafar, Arab Modernities (Peter Lang, 2009), 106.  
127 Ibid.  
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In Brotherhood’s imaginary, democracy is more a mechanism of peaceful transfer 
of power than a philosophical and social ideal. It is a ‘technique’ for addressing the needs 
and aspirations of the Muslim community129 and a mechanism to realize the goals and 
principles such justice, mutual consultation, equality, freedom, mercy, and compassion 
stipulated by the Quran and the Sunna (Prophetic tradition). Brotherhood endorses free 
and fair elections but also accepts the key political rights that make participation and 
contestation possible and meaningful. In a sense, the Brotherhood adopts a minimalist 
liberal vision of democracy based on the rule of majority through elections and the rights 
of the minority through rule of law.130 But it insists that the substance of democratic 
politics would be informed not by liberal norms but by Islamic shari‘a.131 Through 
disjointing democracy’s mechanisms and background philosophy, it seeks to ‘Islamize’ 
democracy, that is to put it within the bounds of shari ‘a. By so doing, it envisions a form 
of democracy that is expressly not liberal and not secular. 
The Brotherhood’s party platforms place a sustained emphasis on rights. But they 
place communal rights and the shari’a-derived norms above individual rights, including 
freedom of expression, particularly in the field of artistic production. It envisions 
Egyptian society not as a composition of autonomous and religiously unaffiliated 
individuals but as members of religious communities.132 Therefore, when it highlights 
religious freedoms and liberties, it is often based on the membership of these individuals 
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130 This acceptance of the procedural formulation of democracy represents a change in the movement’s 
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131 Shehata, Interview by the author.  
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into a ‘divine’ religion—that is Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. In that vein, Article 3 of 
the 2012 Constitution stipulated that “the principles of Christian and Jewish laws are the 
main source of legislation for followers of Christianity and Judaism in matters pertaining 
to personal status, religious affairs, and the nomination of religious leaders.” These rights 
are defined through membership to particular religions (three Abrahamic religions).  
However, religions outside this tradition (‘non-divine religions’) are not granted 
these rights. For example, Bahais, not being recognized as followers of a divine religion, 
cannot build temples, cannot have their own personal status laws or cannot officially 
register their religion on their national identity cards.133 In terms of religious freedoms, 
Muslim Brotherhood recognizes the communal rights of non-Muslims, particularly the 
Coptic Christians but does not recognize religious conversion. In addition, the non-liberal 
nature of Brotherhood’s platform is also apparent in its treatment of women’s rights 
issues. As Brown notes, its vision of personal status law depends on “a set of reciprocal 
but not identical obligations between husband and wife.”134 It recognizes the equality of 
men and women but it stresses women’s roles “as wives, mothers and makers of men, 
and aims to better them for this role” by extending services to women such as social 
security benefits, family guidance programs, and home-based ‘friendly’ loans. 
One discursive strategy through which Brotherhood advances an ‘Islamic’ notion 
of democracy is through establishing an ambivalent equivalence between the modern 
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concept of democracy and the Islamic concept of shura (consultation), a Quranic 
commandment for Muslims. (Quran 3:159, 42:38) It is through the politics of translating 
these notions into each other that Muslim Brotherhood seeks to institute an ‘Islamic’ 
form of democracy. In Brotherhood’s discourse, shura is often used either alongside with 
democracy or solely by itself in order to communicate the idea that the kind of 
democracy the movement espouses is one that is rooted in Islamic discursive tradition 
and guided by Islamic teachings. For example, the preamble of the FJP’s 2011 program 
calls Egyptians to “strive arduously” for “building a strong democratic political system 
that safeguards the citizens’ rights and freedoms, applies the principle of Shura 
(consultation), and builds an institutional state where the rule of the law is the title of 
civilized modern human life.”135 In this formulation, the Brotherhood envisions a 
democratic form of governance that implements the principle of shura. Later, it refers to 
shura and then explains it in the brackets: “(democratic/Islamic consultation)”136 In that 
passage, the Brotherhood describes democratic demands of the people in the Arab Spring 
as a demand for shura, defined as an Islamic form of democratic consultation and 
participation. 
In that vein, the 2012 Constitution stipulates that “the political system is based on 
principles of democracy and on Shura,” coupling the two concepts.137 This constant 
coupling of shura and democracy through establishing an ambivalent equivalance 
between them is also reflected in 2012 Constitution of Egypt. The 1971 Constitution did 
not refer to shura as a principle for political governance. Rather, it only appears in the 
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Constitution as the name of the upper chamber of the parliament, which is Shura Council 
(Majlis Al-Shura). The Shura Council was, and is, technically a body of consultation with 
a wide range of purview: drafting social and economic development plans, laws that are 
referred to the Council by the President, and public and foreign policy matters. However, 
it does not make an explicit reference to shura as a principle. But what is shura and what 
difference does it bring in to democracy? The 2011 Program explains: 
The State is Democratic, based on the Shura (consultation) principles, 
which the FJP believes are essential for the foundation of the state with all 
its institutions. Shura is not merely a political principle governing only the 
forms of political relations. Indeed, it is a pattern of behavioral and a 
general approach to managing the various aspects of life in the State, in 
addition to being a frame of work for faith and a moral guide for the 
behavior of individuals and their social relations, instilled in the hearts and 
minds of indivuduals, families, societies and the rulers, in order for it to 
become part and parcel of the patriotic character and an important 
ingredient thereof, and to engage all citizens. 
 
As this rather long, complicated and at times confusing paragraph suggests, in basing 
democracy on the principle of shura, the Brotherhood in fact wants to suggest that their 
conception of democracy is one that draws on the resources of Islamic tradition and that 
is within the bounds of shari‘a. In Brotherhood’s vision, “shura is what makes authority 
legitimate, and the continuation of legitimacy hinges on the application of the Shari‘a.”138 
But it recognizes liberal democratic institutions as the best available mechanisms for 
implementing shura in modern times. Modern democracy constitutes “a means whereby 
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to achieve justice and equality; prevent tyranny and oppression; and guide the 
management of common public affairs.”139  
Hence, the Brotherhood reinterprets democracy as “one of the objectives of 
Shari‘ah.”140 As Ahmed Al-Raysouni, a prominent Moroccan Islamic scholar and the 
former head of the Muslim Brotherhood chapter in that country (Justice and Development 
Party), points out, democracy is “an aspect of Shura in its moral and spiritual sense” and 
“a tool for liberation from political autocracy in most Muslim countries.”141 He discusses 
verses from the Quran and examples from the life of the Prophet that encourage learning 
from, and following the example of others “whenever they act rightly and perfectly” for 
which the criterion is “whether what they do is in accordance with Islam, benefits 
Muslims, and serves their interests.” That also means democracy is not to be accepted 
“exactly as it is, without tackling its flaws.” Rather, as a modern category democracy 
needs to be “rectified and adapted to our Islamic environment so that it can reach the 
desired objectives.” Clearly, Al-Raysouni seeks to disentangle the normative power of 
democracy (which he finds completely compatible with Islamic principles) from the 
normalizing power of democracy (when it contradicts Islamic principles.)  
This for Al-Raysouni is an attempt to “treat the drawbacks of democracy.” He 
writes, “[a]s it is our destiny, we Muslims, to live in this age of democracy and its 
globalization, being invited or forced to adopt it entirely or partially, we may also be 
destined to be the nation that rectifies democracy, elevates it, and treats its ills.”142 In this 
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passage, Al-Raysouni recognizes the defining discursive regime of global governance 
(“this age of democracy”) and points at its pedagogies of violence and education (“being 
invited or forced to adopt”). In the face of these pedagogic forces, Al-Raysouni neither 
rejects democracy nor adopts it as it is. Rather, he seeks to adopt it non-normatively 
(“rectifying it”). He calls for performatively socializing into the norm of democracy by 
grafting it on shura and by establishing a form of equivalence between shura and 
democracy.  
In a similar vein, Yassine argues that “democratic forms and methods, applied 
with precaution and discernment, cannot harm shura.” Rather, democratic mechanisms 
complement the notion of shura. While Yassine hails democracy as a significant progress 
for human society, he also suggests that “the other face of democracy—the religion of 
secularism—is unacceptable.”143 So he presents shura as “the name of our kind of 
democracy”—an Islamic democracy.144 He explains: 
 
“Shura and democracy belong to radically different reference points. The 
historical itinerary of democracy, a Greek word and practice, is utterly 
other than that of shura. The first begins at pagan Athens and ends in 
“advanced” modern societies as a secularist practice, atheist and immoral, 
while the second has its beginning at pious Medina and remained a dead 
letter for nearly fourteen centuries. Today it is both a vital need for 
Muslims and a divine system that forms a party of our Islamic plan. It 
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remains to be put back into practice by means of a process yet to be found 
or borrowed from the wisdom of the people.145  
 
However, the problem here is that despite certain similarities such as the emphasis on 
deliberation and consent, the classical idea of shura is radically different from modern 
democratic practice. This disjunction between the two creates numerous questions about 
a conception of democracy based on shura, questions such as: will consultation be 
binding on the ruler, who will be party to consultation, which matters will be subject to 
consultation, will the consultants be elected or selected and how, and how will the 
consulted body decide? Most Brotherhood-affiliated Islamists consider shura to be “both 
required and binding on the ruler (wajiba and mulzima), to include religious as well as 
other experts and community leaders, and to accept majority decisions as normal and 
legitimate.”146 Brotherhood’s refashioning of the notion of shura as “a formal process 
and an institution” and its attempt to build a general yet ambivalent equivalence between 
democracy and shura transforms both ends, since democracy gets wrested from its 
dominant liberal secular valence and shura takes on a new meaning and form that is 
unprecedented in classical Islamic history.147 
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Besides the point about commonalities between shura and democracy, it is hard to 
indicate any specific institutional mechanism or principle in Brotherhood’s platform that 
come directly and exclusively from the historical practice of shura. This shows that 
Brotherhood’s constant stress on shura is not a real attempt to provide a synthesis of two 
sets of practices under the rubrics of shura and democracy, but rather it is an attempt to 
secure a space for cultural difference within the dominant liberal democratic practices. 
The Broterhood refers to shura as “the basic principle in Islamic State system,”148 but 
since there is no particular mechanism that derives directly from shura, it only serves as a 
proxy for locating democracy within the limits and frame of reference of shari‘a.  
In that sense, the Brotherhood’s attempt to translate shura as democracy and vice 
versa and its attempt to build an ambivalent relationship between the two that is at once 
equivalent (“shura/democracy”) and not equivalent (“shura and democracy”) is an 
expression of claiming the norm of democracy and differing from it. By articulating 
shura into a modern Islamic democracy the Brotherhood participates in the normative 
desirability of democracy and but seeks to escape from its normalizing secular liberalism.  
As a modernist Islamist movement, Brotherhood often engages in cultural 
translation by trying to establish relationships of equivalence between a desirable modern 
concept and a related concept from Islamic tradition. However, as much as these 
translations introduce difference into modern Western concepts, it also refashions and 
reconstructs Islamic tradition along the lines of modern demands, sensibilities and 
necessities. For example, the FJP’s 2011 program describes itself as being “founded on 
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four fundamental principles, which represent the great purposes of Sharia (Islamic law), 
namely: Freedom… Justice… Development… Leadership.”149 The purposes of shari‘a 
(maqasid al-shari‘a) refers to a well-established literature in Islamic jurisprudence 
developed mainly in 12th century jurist Al-Shaybani which suggest that Islamic rulings 
and norms should be interpreted in line with the ‘purposes of shari‘a’ which are the 
protection of life, reason, property, religion, and progeny.150 Recently there has been 
intense scholarly attention to the idea of purposes of shari‘a since it gives more flexibility 
and latitude in negotiating modern conditions.151 But what is striking is that no Islamic 
scholar, classical or modern, has taken ‘development’ or ‘leadership’ (and to a certain 
extent ‘freedom’) as part of the ‘great purposes of shari‘a.’ Even though one can argue 
that development or leadership can be extrapolated as an objective of Islamic law with a 
finer interpretation, the point still remains: in engaging with modern norms and 
institutions and in its effort to come up with a modern program derived from Islamic 
tradition, the Brotherhood transforms the Islamic tradition too.  
Furthermore, such modernist interpretations of shari‘a create other kinds of 
problems. For example, in an unprecedented gesture, the FJP defines ‘leadership’ as an 
objective of shari‘a but then when the entire program is studied, one realizes that 
leadership comes into the picture only in the section about party’s foreign policy which 
talks about Egypts “regional and political leadership” and vies for “restoring the historic 
leading role of Egypt in the Arab and Islamic regions and the whole world.”152 That is to 
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say, the Brotherhood not only transforms Islamic tradition through its politics of cultural 
translation, but it does so in ways that put Islamic concepts to the service of a form of 
modern nationalism.   
 
2.4. “Islamic But Not Religious”? Muslim Brotherhood’s Negotiation of Secularism 
through the Concept of the Civil State  
FJP declares in its 2011 program that it seeks to establish an Islamic state (dawla 
Islamiyya) but not a religious state (dawla diniyya). This claim seems rather paradoxical. 
After all, the same program refers to Islam as a religion,153 then how can an Islamic state 
not be a religious state? Or put differently, if the state is not to be religious, how is it then 
not secular? I argue that the Brotherhood navigates this paradoxical terrain through the 
concept of the ‘civil state.’ On the one hand, the Brotherhood clearly refutes secularism 
as unacceptable. But on the other hand, the Brotherhood in practice reworks secularism 
by affirming the civility of the state.  
In differentiating what is religious, secular and civil, the Brotherhood articulates a 
particular negotiation of secularism, one that is expressly, if paradoxically, anti-secular. 
Or better put, in formulating an Islamic civil state the Brotherhood negotiates a particular 
form of secularism (understood as rule of lay people) in repudiation of another form of 
secularism (understood as radical separation of religion and politics and relegation of 
religion to the private sphere). It does so by pointing out the cultural and historical 
differences between Egyptian-Islamic and European-Christian contexts. The Brotherhood 
finds a conception of secularism as endorsement of civil state and rule of lay people to be 
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compatible with Islamic tradition, but considers the latter account of secularism as 
separation of spheres to be repugnant to Islamic teachings. For the Brotherhood an 
Islamic state—a state which implements shari‘a—is not a religious state since a religious 
state is by nature theocratic (dawla theokratiyya) and Islam does not approve theocracy.  
A theocratic state would be a state in which clergy rules, but there is no such 
distinct clerical class in Islamic tradition. Muslim Brotherhood denounces the idea of a 
religious state “governed by the clergy or by Divine Right”154 for there can be “no 
infallible people who can monopolize the interpretation of the Holy Koran and have 
exclusive right to legislation for the nation and are characterized by Holiness.” Rulers are 
not divinely ordained clergymen holding exclusive rights because there is no such clerical 
class in Islam and “the rulers in the Islamic state are citizens elected according to the will 
of the people; and the nation is the source of authority.”155  
Secularism has been translated into Arabic language as ‘almaniyya or ‘ilmaniyya. 
Both neologisms were produced in late 19th century as equivalents of the term 
‘secularism.’ As Bernard Lewis notes,  
The words for “secular” and “secularism” in modern Islamic languages are 
either loanwords or neologisms. There are still no equivalents for the 
words “layman” and “laity.” Jurists and other Muslim writers on politics 
have long recognized a distinction between state and religion, between the 
affairs of this world and those of the next. But this in no way corresponds 
to the dichotomy expressed in such Western pairs of terms as “spiritual” 
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and “temporal,” or “lay” and “ecclesiastical.” Conceptually, this 
dichotomy simply did not arise.156  
 
While ‘almaniyya is derived from the word ‘alem (world) and comes to denote a sense of 
profanization, the letter is derived from the word ‘ilm (knowledge, science) and has 
connotations of positivist scientism. In other words, both terms refer to a settlement of the 
relationship between religion and politics in which religion is either denied any public 
role and/or thought to be sent to the dustbin of history.157 Both terms have generally been 
perceived as carrying hostile overtones toward religion and its public role.158 In the 
Egyptian context secularism (‘almaniyya) refers to a kind of settlement that defies this 
incorporation of shari‘a. This was also later acknowledged by Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, about the controversy around the Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s advice to the Muslim Brotherhood for endorsing secularism in 
the constitution before and during his visit to Egypt and Tunisia in September 2011. 
According to Davutoğlu, 
What Erdogan meant by secularism (laiklik) was indeed siyasa madaniyya 
(civil politics). But it was mistranslated into Arabic as ‘almaniyya. So it 
didn’t match up well. Because ‘almaniyya corresponds to our laicist state 
(laikçi devlet). Islam is already enshrined in Arab constitutions. So 
‘almaniyya comes to mean a demand for a structure that has no reference 
to Islam whatsoever, that is a demand for laicism (laikçilik).”159 
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However, the concept of the civil state in Muslim Brotherhood’s discourse operates as the 
equivalent of the rule of laity that Lewis talks about. While the Brotherhood squarely 
rejects an idea of secularism understood as ‘almaniyya or ‘ilmaniyya, but it endorses the 
‘civility’ of the state. The fact that Islamists offer a “vocal denunciation of secularism” 
does not imply that they “make no distinction between the spheres of religion proper and 
of worldly affairs, between the sacred and the profane, the eternal and the temporal.”160 
Rather, the Brotherhood insistently makes distinctions between theocracy (“rule by men 
of religion or a ruler of divine grace”) and dawla madaniyya, that is “a civil or, to be 
more precise, lay state.” As Kramer points out, this important distinction often gets 
neglected by observers.161  
For the Brotherhood, civility of the state refers to its non-theocratic character. 
That is, rulers are just fallible human beings with no religiously-derived authority. “While 
the government in Islam is required to abide by the principles of the Islamic Shari‘ah,” 
writes Ma’mun El-Hodaiby, the guide-general of the group, “it is still a civil government 
that is subject to accountability.”162 He suggests that “Islam knows no infallible religious 
government that speaks in the Name of Allah that claims that its decisions are part of 
religion.” But this does not mean that Islam is separated out of the sphere of politics. On 
the contrary, for El-Hudaiby, “the teachings of the Islamic Shari‘ah have introduced and 
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regulated the principles of justice, equality, and human rights.” The shari‘a is “an integral 
part of politics” and its “injunctions should be adhered to and acted upon.”163  
For the Brotherhood, a civil state is one that is not a police state and also not a 
religious state or theocracy. Rather it is a state run by civilians. Civilian here refers to 
people who are not actively serving in the military, but also to people who are lay, or not 
clergy. The idea is that since there is no clerical class in Islam and religious authority is 
rather dispersed, decentralized, and communally negotiated. Hence, shari‘a-guided 
political rule will be Islamic but not theocratic. As many statements, platforms, and 
position papers of the Brotherhood, including the 2011 Program of the FJP, emphasize, 
“people” or “the nation” are “the source of authority.”164 The Brotherhood rejects a 
secularist compartmentalization of religious and other social and/or political spheres, but 
instead argues that Islam is both religion and state (din wa dawla) or religion and world 
(din wa dunya). But through the idea of ‘civility’ the Brotherhood advances a particular 
rendition of secularism as rule of laity—a non-secular secularism.165  
However, this civil state in Brotherhood’s imagination is a “civil Islamic 
State.”166 For the Brotherhood “the State is civil and civilian, for the Islamic State is 
civilian in nature.”167 Interestingly, the Program uses the two terms, ‘civil’ and ‘civilian,’ 
as the characteristic of the state. While the former stands as a repudiation of theocracy 
and religious state, the latter expresses a refutation of “a military state ruled by armed 
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forces who get in power by military coups, and (…) rule like a dictatorship, [or] a police 
state controlled by the security forces.”168  
This also points to the very interesting struggle taking place over the term ‘civil 
state’ especially after the fall of Mubarak. Many self-proclaimed secularists suggested 
that civil state meant secular state and some saw the military tutelage over Egyptian 
politics as the guarantor of the civil state. Some secularists make an indirect 
preconditions argument by suggesting that the civil state means equal citizenship rather 
than secularism; however equal citizenship can only be established and sustained through 
secularism. Hence, secularism is posited as a precondition for civil state.  
The Brotherhood’s program for 2005 parliamentary elections reiterates the 
movement’s conception of civility as a non-theocratic and non-secular settlement of the 
relationship between religion and politics. It points out that “there is no one in Islam who 
has religious authority—whoever he is—except the authority of good preaching, calling 
for good and warning of evil,” and this kind of authority, the program claims, is “granted 
by Allah (Exalted and Glorified be He) to every Muslim regardless of his/her social 
status.”  “Due to the fact that Islam denies the religious authority,” it suggests, “the state 
in Islam is a civil one where the nation sets up its systems and institutions, as the nation is 
considered to be the source of authorities.” But again, it is a civil state “based on applying 
the Shari‘ah and the restrictive ordinances of the Almighty.” This Islamic civil state 
“combines both religion and state” and “this world and Hereafter.” But since the state is 
civil and the rulers are “civil governors,” their authority rest on a “social contract” and 
the people has the right to “choose the ruler, control him, and depose him” if they 
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wish.169 The President has no religious authority, but as the leader of the community, he 
is charged with the task of executing shari‘a and overseeing its execution. In other words, 
“while the state rests on a religious foundation, its leadership carries no religious 
sanction.” 170 
When interviewed by AlJazeera English about Brotherhood’s (and FJP’s) notion 
of ‘Islamic democracy,’ Saad Al-Katatny, the chairman of FJP and the first speaker of the 
People’s Assembly after the 2011 uprisings, said: 
If you want to know what principles guide our party let me tell you—the 
principles of the Islamic Sharia law and they are included in the Egyptian 
Constitution. Our party is not a religious party but it’s a civil party…that 
seeks a modern and democratic state but with an ‘Islamic reference.’ We 
see the principles of Islamic Sharia as the framework that governs us when 
we enact laws. We are not against any different reference as long as it 
does not conflict with our constitution. The important point is not to have 
parties based on religion and not to have parties with military wings to 
achieve any goals.171  
 
Similarly, in a roundtable discussion among leaders of Egyptian political parties and 
groups organized by the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies in 2007, Hussein Abdel 
Razeq, the Secretary General of the leftist Tagammu‘ Party, suggests that the Article 2 of 
the Constitution stipulating Islam as the religion of the state and shari‘a as the principle 
source of legislation “strengthens the idea of religious state” hence calls upon changing 
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that article by including “all sacred religions” in the Constitution rather than only one of 
them. In response, Dr. Ahmed Abou Baraka, a member of the Brotherhood parliamentary 
bloc, argued that “a proper implementation” of Article 2 of the Constitution “would 
eventually lead to the establishment of a civil state, since Islam did not impose the 
‘deification’ of the ruler.”172 In other words, if shari‘a is implemented properly, then this 
would strengthen the civil state.  
The Muslim Brotherhood on the other hand defines the civil state as the state run 
by civil (lay) people and civilians (non-military and non-police). Interestingly, its 
reworking of secularism through the civil state was simultaneously positioning civility 
against the military’s encroachment over civilian life. When explaining their vision of the 
civil state, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders always couple the rule of the lay people with 
the rule of the civilians, hence constantly seeking to curtail the power of the military 
tutelage through its negotiation of secularism.  
This contrast in liberal and Muslim Brotherhood interpretations of the civil state 
stem in part from their different readings of what poses the real danger to realizing aims 
of the 2011 Uprising (what was called January 25, 2011 Revolution). For the secularists 
religious difference (between Coptic minority and Muslim majority, and between 
Islamists and secular liberals) is the real source of instability and injustice. For the 
Muslim Brotherhood it is the military, the bureaucracy and their international allies that 
threaten the revolution. These different diagnoses bred different significations of the civil 
state among secular liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood. This why while Islamists such 
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as Fahmy Huwaydi insist that “the political obsession with secularism as a constitutional 
guarantee of freedom, toleration, and equality will only make justice and democracy 
harder to achieve,”173 many secularists called on the military to intervene in order to 
protect the ‘civil state’ from Islamists.  
In Brotherhood’s discourse, both religious and secular states are two sides of the 
same coin and are both perils to be avoided. Hence, the ‘civil’ state stands as 
Brotherhood’s non-religious and non-secular third way. For the Brotherhood, the 
sensibilities that are commonly placed under the category of secularism (i.e. rule of lay 
people, freedom of religion) in liberal democracies are protected under a ‘civil’ state that 
is ‘Islamic.’ Therefore, practically, if not literally, the MB translates the Western category 
of secularism into the Egyptian context as civil state (dawla madaniyya). MB never 
invokes secularism. It is not part of its vocabulary.    
This also points to the limits of the language of the religious versus secular binary 
in understanding political life in Egypt.174 The binaries of Islamist versus secularist or 
religious versus secular hides as much as uncovers the way Islamist and secularist groups 
understand and foresee the role of religion in public life and the relationship between 
religion, politics, law and the state. Ascribing too much stability and cross-cultural 
resonance to the concepts such as the religious and the secular and pitching them as the 
polar opposite of each other makes it more difficult to understand the complex 
articulations and intertwinement of them, such as the Brotherhood’s call for an Islamic 
state that is not religious, and a civil state that is not secular. Not attending to such 
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seemingly paradoxical complexities in historically rooted and culturally produced 
differences ends up in the arguments that the Brotherhood is hiding its true intentions and 
agenda and waiting for the right time to terminate democracy and establish its theocratic 
dictatorship. Hence, it either rejects socialization into democratic norms, or its 
socialization is strategic and instrumental with no internationalization of the norm—a 
‘Potemkin socialization.’ Some easily discard these distinctions the Brotherhood makes 
as oxymoronic.175  
What these accounts often do not pay attention to the fact that Brotherhood 
negotiates these categories of religion, secularism, civility and democracy in the Egyptian 
context. They also miss the essentially contested nature of these categories.176 The 
Brotherhood did not impose an Islamic state over a presumably secular Egyptian state. 
What it did was to offer a different negotiation of the ‘secularity’ of the Egyptian state 
(through the notion of the civility of the state) and different mechanisms to incorporate 
religion into state and politics (through the advisory body of Al-Azhar scholars).177  
Again, when one digs deeper into the discourses articulated in the ideological 
battles over constitution in post-Mubarak Egypt, one realizes that the positions of the 
parties do not conform to the coordinates of the binaries such as religious and secular. 
The facts that the Brotherhood rejects a ‘religious state’ and that many ‘secularists’ want 
to enshrine shari‘a in the constitution suggest that the narratives of Islamists as rejecting 
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secularism versus the secularists adopting it fail to attend to the complexities of 




As Kathleen Collins and Erica Owens note, “Islamic democracy is an increasingly 
salient concept and its appeal needs to be studied.”178 In that vein, this chapter inquires 
into the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s articulation of Islamic democracy as an example 
of performative socialization into democracy as a norm. Over the last few decades, the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has come to accept key institutions of liberal democracy, 
such as free and fair elections, party pluralism, government accountability, political and 
civil rights for assembly and expression (within the bounds of shari‘a), and the rule of 
law. However, as Gudrun Kramer points out, the movement “has not adopted liberalism, 
if that includes religious indifference.”179 The Brotherhood advances a vision of ‘Islamic 
democracy’ that repudiates secular state. However, it also repudiates a religious state, 
calling it a theocracy that is unjustified in Sunni Islamic tradition. Rather, it calls for a 
civil democratic state within an Islamic frame of reference. 
I argue that the Muslim Brotherhood’s double negation of both secularism and 
religious state and its affirmation of a civil state within an Islamic frame of reference 
constitutes a reworking of secularism within the Egyptian context. The MB’s 
endorsement of civil state (dawla madaniyya) against secularism (‘almaniyya or 
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‘ilmaniyya) in some ways parallels AK Party’s endorsement of ‘democratic secularism’ 
against Kemalist secularism. Even though AK Party does not call for enshrining Islam or 
shari ‘a in the constitution, still both political actors seek to open up more space for 
religion in public life without putting the state under the command of religious authority. 
In performatively socializing into democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood translates 
democracy into shura (and vice versa) and establishes an ambivalent equivalence 
between the two. In doing so it transforms both concepts and traditions. In addition, it 
appropriates democracy catachrestically by disjointing it from its ‘proper’ secular liberal 
norms. As such the Brotherhood claims democracy as a norm but seeks to escape from its 
secular liberal pedagogy by introducing a non-secular non-liberal difference into it. By so 
doing, the Brotherhood destabilizes the liberal conventions that posit secularism as a 
precondition for democracy. It claims democracy and self-rule ‘here and now’ against the 
‘not yet’ of the Egyptian state and liberal international order. The Egyptian regime has 
long been, and still is, postponing democracy till the time people reach the sufficient level 
of maturity. The Brotherhood performatively institutes the authority and maturity of the 
people by claiming their right to self-governance.  
I started this chapter by asking if Arabs have a democratic the right to be non-
secular and non-liberal. One observer of Muslim politics has a bleak answer to this 
question: “Secularism or liberal democracy is no longer regarded as ‘a’ way (one of many 
possible paradigms albeit for some the best way) but ‘the’ way, the only true path for 
political development. In the name of enlightenment (reason, empiricism, pluralism) a 
new absolute, a new norm is posited. Alternative paradigms, especially religious ones, are 
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necessarily judged as abnormal, irrational, retrogressive.” 180 Liberal global governance 
operates with a “Mecca or mechanization” binary that stipulates secularism as the only 
way for Muslims to make their way into modernity and democracy.181 However, as 
Robert Hefner notes,  
“There is no one-size-fits-all democracy but a variety of forms linked by 
family resemblances. Democracy’s values of freedom, equality, and 
tolerance-in-pluralism do not come with unbending instructions for all 
places and times. The general values take their practical cues from the 
particularities of the place in which they would work. Even in modern 
Western Europe, we know, the balance struck among democratic values 
has varied across countries and epochs.”182 
 
This chapter tries to show that through taking its “practial cues” from the Egyptian-
Islamic context, the Muslim Brotherhood advances an Islamic notion of democracy that 
negotiates the relationships between rights and duties, public and private, individual 
autonomy and communal obligations. Hence, as Hefner reminds, “we should not be 
surprised to see that democratization in the Muslim world will strike its own balance 
among values.”183 But this democratic experiment and experience of striking its own was 
cut abruptly by the Egyptian military. Then what future awaits the Muslim Brotherhood? 
Will the Brotherhood survive the most bloody and comprehensive crackdown of its 
eighty-six years of history? Writing on the MB in late 1960s, Richard Mitchell suggested 
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that the movement “has had its way in history” so much so that “for very few of its 
leaders will historians reserve a place larger than a footnote.”184 Similarly, at the height of 
Nasser’s crackdown, many observers had declared the end of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
There is a cottage industry of declaring the end of Islamism. Not only in 1960s was 
Islamism declared dead, but also in 1990s, during the Arab Spring, and now with the July 
3, 2013 coup. Clearly, this round of obituaries for the Brotherhood and for Islamism in 
general has some good reasons. The arrests, killings, tortures, confiscations, and 
harassments perpetrated by the Egytian military since the coup is unprecedented, far 
surpassing the Nasser era. It is of course hard to tell what future awaits the movement. 
But if the history of the movement tells us anything, it is that repression succeeds only in 
controlling the expansion of the movement, but leaves its core more determined to 
survive and flourish in the future.
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“The vast majority of contemporary international theorists,” Siba Grovogui 
observes, “have failed to recognize the validity of non-Western languages of politics and 
their intended moral orders as legitimate contexts for imagining the alternatives to the 
present moral order.”1 The commitment, particularly within liberal and constructivist 
approaches, to take secular liberalism as “the ultimate one path to modernity”2 
contributes to this failure to take alternative social imaginaries and vocabularies as 
legitimate sources for political thinking and organization. This non-recognition, however, 
creates a fundamental problem that plagues the liberal politics of our time. This is the 
problem of the failure of liberal global governance to relate democratically to difference. 
It operates with a politics of modernity that seeks to neutralize and tame difference 
through pedagogy of education and/or to eliminate and liquidate it altogether by 
pedagogy of violence.3 It does not envision a global life that embraces “difference in 
equality.”4 
My dissertation attempts to address this problem first by identifying the dynamics, 
contours and problems of the pedagogical construction of norm socialization processes, 
and then by developing a performative reading of socialization that accounts for cultural 
and historical difference in normative negotiations. It problematizes the ways in which 
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pedagogic narratives of socialization builds implicit and explicit hierarchies between 
‘liberal socializers’ and ‘illiberal socializees.’ In those narratives the West—a shorthand 
for the constellation of powerful states, international organizations, transnational 
networks—assumes the position of the pedagogue with the prerogatives to “disseminate, 
teach and enforce” secular liberal norms.5 As such, they discursively produce a 
Eurocentric liberal secular tutelage on a global level. 
The performative reading I develop in my dissertation aims to attend to the ways 
in which those who are on the margins of liberal global governance—the non-West, the 
postcolonial societies and actors, the Global South—engage with the constitutive norms 
and institutions of liberal modernity. I particularly look at how different Islamist 
formations in Turkey (AK Party) and Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood) negotiate secularism, 
democracy and their interrelationship with shari‘a (Islamic norms and law). This 
performative account makes three theoretical interventions: First, it argues that 
socialization should be taken as a process of cultural translation (and not simply as a 
process of straightforward transition). Second, it explores the ways in which actors 
appropriate norms non-normatively through various strategies such as performative 
contradiction and inscription of difference. And third, it argues that through cultural 
translation and appropriation, actors resist the norms they adopt. Therefore, my 
performative reading analyzes how norms are transformed and negotiated through 
translation and appropriation. It thus shifts the question from whether a norm is adopted 
to how it is adopted and what effects get produced and made possible in and through it.  
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Socialization takes place within contexts co-created by local and global pedagogic 
forces that seek to transition actors into modern norms as they are articulated by liberal 
norm entrepreneurs. Yet at the same time, actors seek to unsettle these pedagogic 
dynamics through various strategies. In this project, I focus on cultural translation and 
non-normative appropriation as strategies of adoption and resistance. As such, the 
analytics of performativity helps us think together the universalizing patterns of liberal 
modernity and the cultural differences that supplement and potentially punctuate them. It 
points toward the possibility of a non-imperial diffusion of norms and a more democratic 
mode of engaging with cultural difference in liberal global governance.  
One of the fundamental requirements for a democratic engagement with 
difference is to resist attempts to foreclose the meaning of the constitutive norms of 
liberal modernity. As Klotz and Lynch suggest, “[l]iberalism, or any other form of 
discursive dominance, shuts down alternative ways of thinking and acting.”6 Pedagogic 
frameworks of socialization participate in the closure of the meaning of norms either by 
construing them as constative categories (correct versus wrong interpretations) or by 
endorsing disciplinary measures to adopt a particular liberal interpretation as the most 
appropriate one. By stressing translation and appropriation, performative approach to 
socialization seeks to keep norms open to differential claims on them. This expands the 
sphere of democratic politics globally. In fact, much of the political struggles in world 
politics take place by way of contesting the meaning of constitutive norms of political 
modernity rather than challenging these norms themselves. Liberal global governance 
operates with the premise that “ the road to emancipation can only traverse the mountains 
                                                
6 Klotz and Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, 51. 
   319 
and valleys of Western Reason.”7 As Mustapha Kamal Pasha notes, “the possibility of 
other pathways leading to different places outside the spatio-temporal horizon of Western 
modernity is scarcely entertained,” a constriction whose major consequence is limitation 
of “the field of emancipation” and construction of hierarchies.8  
In this dissertation, I detect the limitations and hierarchies created by the global 
politics of secular liberalism in the particular issue area of Islamism. My entry point for 
this debate is the globally prevalent discourses of post-Islamism and ‘Muslim democracy’ 
that depict Islamists as rejecting socialization into secularism and democracy and the 
post-Islamists as socializing into them. I analyze these discourses as examples of the 
pedagogic vision of socialization that seek to discipline Islamists. In doing so, I concur 
with Hurd’s observation that liberal global governance seeks to “lure [Islamists] toward a 
European model of secularism and punish them economically and politically should they 
stray from this trajectory.” 9 My empirical discussions in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
develop a reading of the AK Party’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s negotiations of the 
categories of secularism and democracy in terms of their relationship to shari‘a. 
Moreover, I highlight the secularist hierarchies and exclusions established and 
naturalized within these discourses.  
These chapters conclude that pedagogic narratives of post-Islamism and Muslim 
democracy capture significant aspects of the transformation Islamist politics has been 
going through, yet they fall short of attending to the complexity of normative negotiations 
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operative in this transformation. I suggest that these two actors performatively socialize 
into secularism and democracy in ways that does not fit into the binary of Islamism 
versus post-Islamism. Both actors translate and appropriate secularism and democracy in 
ways that transform and contest their normalizing power. They both attempt to rethink 
Enlightenment universals from and for the margins. Thus they fit neither into a narrative 
of post-Islamist absorption into secular liberal hegemony nor into a narrative Islamist 
rejection of secularism and democracy. They seek neither liberalism nor illiberalism. It is 
neither subsumption into secular liberal norms nor their outright rejection. Rather, they 
both attempt to configure a non-liberal form of politics that has significant overlaps with 
liberal democracy.10  
However, both AK Party and the Muslim Brotherhood translate, negotiate and 
appropriate secularism and democracy under the pedagogic conditions co-created by the 
states of their respective countries and the liberal international order that lends these 
states full support in sustaining their tutelage over politics. This is why performativity, 
even when it takes the form of a strategy, is in no way a voluntaristic celebration of 
agency. Rather it is one effort to account for the deeply conditioned nature of agency in 
normative negotiations in world politics.  
As a project of creating an Islamic modernity, Islamism seeks to adapt and mold 
modern norms, discourses, institutions, and practices. It entails is a mode of engagement 
with modern norms that is neither rejectionist nor celebratory. Thus, Islamism is a form 
of modernism that contests the fundamental categories of modernity—such as its 
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conceptions of humanism, individualism, and secularism. Hence the binaristic reading of 
Islamism as repudiating modernity and of post-Islamism as openly endorsing it misses 
the ways in which both actors are critically adopting modern norms and institutions. It 
also underemphasizes the constitutive force of modern norms and institutions. Much of 
Islamist interpretations of modern norms and institutions take place on the “glacial 
terrain” created by modern power. Rather than forging a total critique of modernity, 
Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Justice and Development Party invokes an 
alternative mode of inhabiting modernity.  
Noah Feldman suggests that Islamist demands for shari‘a is an index for a 
demand for justice and rule of law.11 However, what Islamism does not fully recognize is 
the potential of the modern state to be a source of tremendous injustice when the state’s 
totalizing power is merged with shari‘a-based claims. Modern state’s practice of Islamic 
shari‘a brought about many problems and created many injustices—the case of Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd being only one prominent example.12 There are deep problems that 
peril attempts to put an Islamic face on the modern state. Islamists fall short of 
recognizing the dangers of the totalizing and corrupting force of the modern state. Thus 
simply trimming its operations to keep it or shari‘a-compliant would not necessarily bring 
about the deep constitutive values of Islamic shari‘a. Put differently, unquestioned 
wedding of the modern state with shari‘a may betray shari‘a more than it betrays liberal 
sensibilities and conventions.  
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In a bid to counter the secularist claims that Islam has nothing to offer to the 
modern world, Islamists targeted the state as a major instrument for achieving their own 
project of Islamization. Yet the marriage of the state power and shari‘a has created many 
injustices that contradict the purposes and principles of shari‘a.13 As Scott points out, “the 
project of the Islamic state has a number of similarities with that of the modern nation 
state, in the sense that it is the state that manages, disciplines, and defines religion.”14 In 
other words, just adding the adjective ‘Islamic’ to the state does not make it Islamic. Or, 
for that matter, simply incorporating shari‘a into a state also does not make it Islamic. As 
Heba Raouf, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood and an influential academic 
and activist, once noted,  
Islamists said if the state is so powerful, why don’t you just Islamize it? 
Why don’t you convert it? But some say, “no dear, its nature is secular.” If 
you apply shari‘a in a modern state, it turns into hell. You re using the law 
without mercy, without attention to social dynamics, morality and ethics, 
as we saw in Sudan. You neglect ethical, moral, social compass. If you 
separate from context you have a huge problem.15   
 
Echoing the same sensibility, one member of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom 
and Justice Party, and son of one top-ranking Brotherhood leader, said, with the idea of 
Islamic state, “you’re just putting a label on a stupid machine.”16 Thus, by Islamizing the 
state Muslim Brotherhood does not solve the problem but makes it Islamic.  
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Islamists have long argued that secularism was a European cure for a European 
problem.17 Drawing attention to the different historical trajectories of Christian European 
societies and Muslim societies especially in terms of the nature of the relationship 
between religious and political authorities, Islamists suggested that secularism was an 
alien import that was imposed by the westernizing elites of their own countries. As 
Rashid al-Ghannushi, the intellectual and political leader of An-Nahda, the Tunisian 
chapter of the MB, once said: “Secularism came to us on the back of a tank, and it has 
remained under its protection ever since.”18 However, Bernard Lewis once argued that  
Separation of church and state was derided in the past by Muslims when 
they said this is a Christian remedy for a Christian disease. It doesn’t apply 
to us or to our world. Lately, I think some of them are beginning to 
reconsider that, and to concede that perhaps they may have caught a 
Christian disease and would therefore be well advised to try a Christian 
remedy.19  
 
Realizing that the ‘Christian disease’ is no longer reserved only for the Christian world, 
Islamist intellectuals and actors have negotiated the terms of secularism for their own 
contexts. The Turkish AK Party expressly adopts a ‘democratic’ version of secularism—
one that is akin to American secularism. The Muslim Brotherhood expressly rejects 
                                                
17 Indeed, Islamists were not alone in making this claim. Ashis Nandy argues that secularists in India were 
mistaken in taking secularism as a universal political norm. For him secularism as a model was efficacious 
in Christian Europe but not for India. The extensive debates over the meaning and practice of secularism in 
India point at its deeply contested character. Roover, Claerhout, and Balagangadhara, “Liberal Political 
Theory and the Cultural Migration of Ideas.”  
18 Rashid al-Ghannushi, Muqarabat fi’l ‘ilmaniyyah wa’l mujtama‘ al-madani (London: al-Markaz al-
Magharibi li’l Buhuth wa’l Tarjamah, 1999), 175; quoted in Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, Contemporary Arab 
Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History (London  ; Sterling, Va: Pluto Press, 2003), 203.  
19 Joseph Liu, “Islam and the West: A Conversation with Bernard Lewis,” Pew Research 
Center’s Religion & Public Life Project, April 27, 2006, 
http://www.pewforum.org/2006/04/27/islam-and-the-west-a-conversation-with-bernard-
lewis/. 
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secularism but its endorsement of the idea of the civil state amounts to no less than a 
negotiation of secularism as non-theocracy. 
In their normative negotiations, two perils haunt postcolonial actors, including 
Islamists: these are the Scylla of bon pour l’Orient democracy (Orientalist relativism) and 
the Carybdis of democracy without difference (Eurocentric assimilation). The task is to 
chart a path that does not fall into either of these traps—renunciation of cultural 
difference in the name of secular liberalism, or a tout court rejection of democracy and 
secularism in the name of cultural difference. This cannot be achieved, however, through 
a renewed faith in secular liberal redemption, as pedagogic discourses seem to suggest. 
Rather, the first step toward achieving this task is to engage democratically with 
difference and to open modern categories and norms to differential inhabitations. 
Performative understanding of socialization, I hope, contributes to this daunting yet 
urgent task.
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